CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 21 mai 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 29515/95                       by Xenis LARKOS                       against Cyprus        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs. J. LIDDY, President            MM.   E. BUSUTTIL                 A. WEITZEL                 C.L. ROZAKIS                 L. LOUCAIDES                 B. MARXER                 B. CONFORTI                 N. BRATZA                 I. BÉKÉS                 G. RESS                 A. PERENIC                 C. BÎRSAN                 M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs. M. HION            Mr.   R. NICOLINI              Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 21 November 1995 by Xenis LARKOS against Cyprus and registered on 12 December 1995 under file No. 29515/95;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      12 November 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 7 February 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Cypriot citizen and a civil servant, born in 1936 and residing in Nicosia, Cyprus. In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Mr. A. Demetriades, a lawyer practising in Nicosia.        The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties, can be summarized as follows.        On 1 May 1967 the applicant rented from the Government of Cyprus a house in which he has been living ever since with his family.        On 3 December 1986 the Ministry of Finance informed the applicant that the permission by virtue of which the applicant occupied the premises was revoked. It requested the applicant to surrender the property by 30 April 1987. On 3 June 1987 the Attorney General warned the applicant that, if he did not evacuate the premises before 31 July 1987, he would take legal action against him.        On 3 July 1987 the applicant replied that he had been living together with his large family in the house in question for twenty years. He had been obliged to spend significant sums of money for the maintenance and improvement of the premises, because the competent public authorities had shown no interest. Since he was a "statutory tenant", he intended to continue to occupy the premises as long as he was protected by law.        On 9 March 1989, replying to a second letter by the Attorney General dated 5 January 1989, the applicant reiterated his earlier position.        On 3 February 1990 the Government of Cyprus instituted proceedings against the applicant before the District Court of Nicosia. The Government submitted, inter alia, that the applicant did not occupy the flat by virtue of a tenancy agreement, but that the flat had been allocated to him by administrative order because of his position in the civil service.        On 5 February 1992 the District Court of Nicosia gave judgment against the applicant. The court did not pronounce on the issue of the title by virtue of which the applicant occupied the flat. The court interpreted the Rent Control Law (Law 23/1983) and concluded that it only bound private owners of property and not the Government of Cyprus. As a result, a person who rented premises owned by the Government was not a "statutory tenant" protected by that law. The applicant was ordered to vacate the premises before 30 June 1992.        The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court relying on Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. At the hearing before the Supreme Court the applicant relied, in principle, on the following argument: his rights as a tenant were "property rights" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and he was being subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights, because Law 23/83, as interpreted by the District Court of Nicosia, gave no protection to the Government's tenants, while the same law protected the Government as a "statutory tenant" when the Government rented premises owned by a private individual. However, the applicant also submitted that he enjoyed less protection than tenants of private persons.        On 22 May 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, considering that the applicant could not claim any property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a tenant. The Court also found that, in any event, the notion of equality did not require that a person who enjoyed the protection of Law 23/83 as a tenant should be automatically required to grant the same protection to his or her tenants if that person happened to own property. Finally, the Court considered, in an obiter dictum, that even if the case concerned the different treatment reserved by the law to property rented out by private owners and to property rented out by the Government, there would be no violation of the Constitution or the Convention because "it would be reasonable to consider that it is not necessary to grant protection (to tenants) vis-à-vis the Government which is not in the same position as the private owners and it is not expected to administer the property of State with criteria similar to those guiding the private owners". Further to this decision, the applicant was expelled from the flat.   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for the reasons invoked before the Supreme Court.   2.    The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, in that he will be expelled from his home following a decision of the Supreme Court which interpreted Law 23/83 in a discriminatory manner.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 21 November 1995 and registered on 12 December 1995.        On 10 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 12 November 1996. The applicant replied on 7 February 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.   THE LAW        The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article 14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention that, because he is a tenant of the Government, he does not enjoy the protection which Law 23/83 gives to persons placed in analogous situations, i.e. the Government or other individuals when renting property from private owners.        The Commission recalls that the provisions invoked by the applicant provide as follows:        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national      minority, property, birth or other status."        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."        The Government argue that the applicant failed to raise before the Supreme Court a ground of discrimination that could substantiate his case under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. Although the applicant raised in substance the complaint that he was subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of his right to respect for his home, he did not complain that, as a Government tenant, he enjoyed less protection than tenants of private persons. At the hearing before the Supreme Court, the applicant confined his arguments to the following position: his rights as a tenant were "property" rights within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and he was being subjected to discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights, because Law 23/83, as interpreted by the District Court of Nicosia, gave no protection to the Government's tenants, while the same law protected the Government as a "statutory tenant" when the Government rented premises owned by a private individual. In any event, the Government argue that, even assuming that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies, his complaints are manifestly ill-founded. A tenancy agreement does not give rise to rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). Moreover, all the tenants of the Government are treated equally and as the Supreme Court pointed out, it is not necessary to extend to the tenants of the Government the protection enjoyed by the tenants of private owners, because the Government is not expected to administer the property of the State with criteria similar to those guiding private owners.        The applicant submits that at the hearing before the Supreme Court he complained that he did not enjoy the rights he would have enjoyed had his landlord been somebody else. As a result, he has raised his complaints in substance. The Supreme Court did not advance any reasons why he should enjoy less protection than tenants of private owners. In any event, he is the only Government tenant facing eviction.        The Commission recalls that, according to its case-law, to exhaust domestic remedies the person concerned must have raised before the national authorities, at least in substance, the complaint he puts before the Commission (No. 16810/90, Dec. 9.9.82, D.R. 73, p. 136).        The Commission notes that before the Supreme Court the applicant complained of discrimination in the protection he enjoyed as a person renting property which he used as his home. To substantiate his complaint, he compared his situation, not only to that of the Government when renting property from private owners but also to that of other individuals renting property from private owners which they used as their homes. As a result, the Commission considers that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.        Moreover, the Commission, in the light of the parties' other observations, considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. The application cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE,      without prejudging the merits of the case.     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY      Secretary                                    President to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber