CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 septembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 24889/94                       by Philip McCULLOUGH                       against the United Kingdom          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 12 September 1997, the following members being present:              Mr.    S. TRECHSEL, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  H. DANELIUS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  A. PERENIC                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  R. NICOLINI                  A. ARABADJIEV              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 28 March 1994 by Philip McCULLOUGH against the United Kingdom and registered on 11 August 1994 under file No. 24889/94;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the Commission's decision of 11 January 1995 to communicate the      application;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      25 May 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 27 November 1995 and further information submitted      by the applicant on 17 and 23 January 1996;   -     the further observations submitted by the Government on      29 August 1996 and further observations submitted by the      applicant on 10 December 1996;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is an Irish and British citizen born in 1947 and resident in Belfast. He is represented before the Commission by Ms Patricia Coyle, a solicitor working for Madden & Finucane Solicitors in Belfast.        The applicant has introduced the application on his own behalf and also on behalf of his mother, born in 1927 and resident in Leeds, and on behalf of his brother, born in 1955 and also resident in Leeds.        The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case        The applicant has lived in Northern Ireland all his life.        In 1966, the applicant was convicted of causing an explosion and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. From 1971-1975 he underwent a period of internment without trial, which he states was probably the result of his involvement in the civil rights movement in the 1960's. The Government have asserted that he was detained on grounds that he was a senior member of the Provisional IRA and that the length of the period of internment imposed reflected the authorities' assessment of the applicant's importance within the organisation.        On 22 August 1976, the applicant visited his sick father who lived in Yorkshire (England). On 29 August 1976, the applicant was detained under the Prevention of Terrorism (Supplemental Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 on suspicion of involvement in terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.        On 2 September 1976, the Secretary of State made an order under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 ("the 1976 Act") excluding the applicant from being in or entering Great Britain on the grounds that he was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. The applicant did not avail himself of the opportunity to make written representations against the order and to have those representations considered by an Adviser nominated under section 7 of the 1976 Act. He consented to being removed from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.        On 22 July 1986, following a review of the applicant's case, the Secretary of State revoked the exclusion order under the 1976 Act and made a fresh exclusion order under section 4 (1) and (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act"). The applicant made written representations against the order but declined an interview with an Adviser. The Secretary of State reconsidered the applicant's case in light of the representations and the Adviser's report. On 17 November 1986, the applicant was informed that the Secretary of State had decided not to revoke the order.        In November 1986, following the interception of a parcel containing fire-arms and cartridges, the applicant's brother was arrested and, according to the Government, he admitted having sent this and other consignments to the applicant. The applicant's brother was released on bail but absconded, a warrant for his arrest still being outstanding.        On 7 July 1989, a further exclusion order was made against the applicant under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act"). The applicant only made written representations against the order on 13 December 1991, shortly before its expiry. These representations were taken into account by the Secretary of state in deciding whether to make a fresh order.        On 2 July 1992, the Secretary of State made a further exclusion order against the applicant. The applicant made written representations against the order on 23 May 1993. Although the applicant was out of time, the Secretary of State nominated an Adviser to interview him. At the interview on 11 August 1993, the applicant was accompanied by his solicitor.        The applicant was informed by letter of 24 September 1993 that the Secretary of State had decided not to revoke the order.        The applicant is married and has two children. However, his mother and his four brothers and three sisters live in England. Effectively the exclusion order means he is excluded from every part of the United Kingdom except Northern Ireland. The applicant's mother is elderly and suffers from senile dementia and one of his younger brothers suffers from Downs Syndrome. Consequently both find it very difficult to travel and it has been several years since the applicant has seen either of them. In fact, as a result of the exclusion order against him he was prevented from attending the funeral of his father who died in England in 1985.        The applicant is a member of Sinn Fein. He denies that he has ever been involved with any terrorist organisation.   B.    Relevant domestic law and practice        The statutory provisions        Section 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 provides as relevant:        "(1)   The Secretary of State may exercise the powers      conferred on him by this Part of the Act in such a way as      appears to him expedient to prevent acts of terrorism...        (2)    The acts of terrorism to which this Part of the Act      applies are acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of      Northern Ireland."        Section 5 of the Act provides as relevant:        "(1) If the Secretary of State is satisfied that any      person-              (a) is or has been concerned in the            commission,preparation or instigation of acts of            terrorism to which this Part of the Act applies; or              (b) is attempting or may attempt to enter Great            Britain with a view to being concerned in the            commission, preparation or instigation of such acts of            terrorism,        the Secretary of State may make an exclusion order against      him.        (2) An exclusion order under this section is an order      prohibiting a person from being in, or entering, Great      Britain."        Sections 6 and 7 of the Act give the Secretary of State similar powers to exclude persons from Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom as a whole.        Exclusion orders: practice and procedure        The process of making exclusion orders is an executive and administrative one. The order is made by the Secretary of State in secret.        Pursuant to Schedule 2 paragraph 3 to the 1989 Act, a person served with notice of the making of an exclusion order may make written representations to the Secretary of State setting out his objections and may request a personal interview with one of the Advisers nominated by the Secretary of State at which he may attend with his legal representative. The Advisers are independent appointees but their identities are not disclosed to the interviewees. The Government has stated that of the three Advisers at the current time, two are Queen's Counsel and the third the ex-chairman of a public company who has served as a magistrate. Advisers may recommend that an exclusion order be revoked and have done so five times in 1989, four times in 1990 and 1991, once in 1992 and twice in 1993. In all these cases, the recommendations were accepted by the Secretary of State.        Where representations are made by an applicant against an order, the Secretary of State treats the reconsideration as a fresh decision to be made de novo on all the material then before him.        Once the order has been made there is no possibility of appeal to an independent tribunal.        The number of exclusion orders made by the Secretary of State has declined over recent years. At the end of 1984,there were 238 exclusion orders in force; 71 at the end of 1993 and 58 at the end of 1994. In 1995, further reviews were carried out which resulted in the revocation of 16 exclusion orders, leaving 38 currently in force (five of which relate to exclusion of persons from the United Kingdom as a whole).        The continuance of the existence of powers to make exclusion orders is reviewed regularly by Parliament when the prevention of terrorism provisions come up for annual renewal since 1976.        In the recent Parliamentary debate of 8 March 1995 on the renewal of the 1989 Act, the Secretary of State explained why he had declined to revoke all the remaining exclusion orders:        "I have considered whether it would be possible to go      further and lift all the remaining orders. I have not done      so for two reasons. First, it is clear that, if the      ceasefires were to break down, we might receive little, if      any warning, and without doubt many of the key targets      would, as before, be on this side of the water. Secondly,      the police remain satisfied that among those still excluded      are some who would be likely to play some part in mainland      terrorism were it to resume...if all the exclusion orders      were to be lifted now, there would be nothing to stop those      people coming here well before any possible breakdown of      the ceasefire, to make preparations for renewed attacks.      This is not a debating point. It is a point that goes to      the heart of the exercise of these powers in the cause of      protecting the safety of our people. ...I will continue to      keep the need for each of the orders under review, but I am      not prepared to take unnecessary risks at this stage, in      the face of the clear view of the police and our security      advisers."        Judicial review        Exclusion orders have been the subject of judicial review proceedings on a number of occasions.        In R. v. Secretary of Home Affairs ex parte Sean Sitt (Divisional Court 28 January 1987), where the applicant argued that natural justice required that he be given the reasons for the exclusion order made under the 1984 Act, the Divisional Court accepted that it was not possible for the individual in that case to be informed, in greater detail than was set out in the exclusion order, of the reasons why the order was made or the information which led to it being made or why the order could not be revoked, since that might lead to the discovery of the sources of information available and/or possibly compromise police operations and/or put at risk the lives of informants or their families.        In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte John Gallagher (Court of Appeal judgment of 10 February 1994) concerning the exclusion of the applicant, an Irish national, from the United Kingdom as a whole, the Court of Appeal accepted the Secretary of State's argument that he could not be more specific with regard to the national security grounds upon which he acted in making the exclusion order. The Court of Appeal also accepted that there were overwhelming reasons for not revealing the names of the panel of Advisers, namely, the risk to the Advisers concerned. It referred also to the report by Lord Colville Q.C. (1992 report on the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Provisions Act 1989) where Lord Colville stated that he knew the identity of the Advisers and could confirm <the first instance> judge's finding of the independence of the Adviser who acted in Gallagher. The case was however referred to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 177 of the EC Treaty as regarded the compatibility of the measure with Directive 64/221 EEC dealing with freedom of movement.        In its judgment of 30 November 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled, inter alia, that the directive did not preclude the competent authority which reviews a measure being appointed by the same administrative authority which took the measure ordering the expulsion, provided that the competent authority can perform its duties in absolute independence and is not subject to any control by the authority empowered to take the measures. The Court recalled that the purpose of the intervention of the competent authority was to enable an exhaustive determination of all the facts and circumstances, including the expediency of the proposed measure, to be carried out before the decision is taken. The directive concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals had to be interpreted as meaning that save in cases of urgency the administrative authority is prohibited from taking a decision ordering expulsion before a competent authority has given its opinion.        When the Court of Appeal recommenced its examination of the Gallagher case in light of the ECJ ruling, it noted that the ECJ had not found it necessary for the Home Secretary to name the Advisers appointed. It continued:        "Following the expression of some unease by this court at      the generality of the information concerning the nominated      person who interviewed Mr. Gallagher and reported to the      Home Secretary, Mr. Pannick <Government counsel> supplied      (and undertook to confirm on affidavit) the following:              'The person appointed has had no contractual or other            relationship with the Civil Service, or with Northern            Ireland. His career has been as a chairman of a public            company and chairman of an independent public            authority (neither in central nor local government)            with no connection with Northern Ireland, the Home            Office or religion. He has been a magistrate. The            criteria upon which persons are appointed are            precisely to avoid selection of persons with previous            connections with Northern Ireland and the Home Office.            Advisers are paid £194 per day plus expenses.'              There is nothing to throw any doubt on any part of            this statement...It does in our view enable the court            to satisfy itself that the nominated person could            perform his duties in absolute independence and            without any control by the Home Secretary.' "        Though the Court of Appeal found a breach of Community law in that the interview of the Adviser took place subsequent to the decision of the Home Secretary, it found that this did not furnish any ground upon which he could recover damages.        In the case of R. v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Gerard Adams, in which an exclusion order from mainland United Kingdom was challenged by way of judicial review, the Court of Appeal on 29 July 1994 made an Article 177 reference, which included the questions whether Article 8 a(1) of the EC Treaty conferred rights of free movement additional to those which existed prior to the Treaty on European Union, whether Article 8 a(1) gave rise to directly effective rights and was applicable to situations which were wholly internal to a single Member State and what were the precise requirements of the principle of proportionality in such a case which, in relation to limitations on rights of free movement, involved freedom of speech and national security. The reference was however withdrawn when the exclusion order in issue was lifted.     COMPLAINTS        The applicant asserts that under Article 6 of the Convention he has the civil right to pursue his family life, to seek employment, and to free movement within the United Kingdom. He further contends that he has been denied an independent and impartial tribunal established by law to challenge the basis on which he has been denied these rights by operation of the exclusion order.        The applicant submits that the exclusion order interferes with his right to respect for his family life since it effectively prevents him from maintaining his family relationships with his elderly mother and disabled brother.        The applicant submits that exclusion orders violate Article 14 either alone or in conjunction with Article 6 and/or 8 of the Convention. The applicant believes that the only United Kingdom citizens who are subject to exclusion orders are those from Northern Ireland. This, he alleges, amounts to discrimination on the grounds of national origin or association with a national minority in contravention of Article 14.        Finally, the applicant invokes Article 13 of the Convention in that there is no effective domestic remedy against the exclusion order.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 28 March 1993 and registered on 11 August 1994.        On 11 January 1995, the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.        The Government's written observations were received on 25 May 1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The applicant's submissions in reply were received on 27 November 1995, also after an extension of the time-limit. The applicant submitted further information on 17 and 23 January and 12 February 1996.        On 16 April 1996, the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.        On 27 June 1996, the Commission decided to invite the Government to make further submissions on a particular point.        The Government submitted its further observations on 29 August 1996 and the applicant submitted his further observations in reply on 9 December 1996 after three extensions in the time-limit.        On 26 May 1997, the Commission decided to invite the parties to present submissions at an oral hearing.        At the hearing, which took place on 12 September 1997, the Government were represented by Mr. D. Bentley, Agent, Mr. J. Eadie, counsel, Mr. H. Carter and Ms. Byrne, Home Office Advisers, and the applicant was represented by Mr. S. Treacy, counsel, Ms. K. Quinlivan, counsel, and Mr. P. Madden, solicitor.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant has stated that he has introduced the application on his own behalf and on behalf of his mother and his younger brother. The Commission notes that he has not provided a letter of authority from his mother and brother, despite a request made by the Secretariat on 13 April 1994. Nor has any authorisation been received from a legally-appointed representative of his mother and brother. It further notes that the submissions of the applicant have been presented entirely on the basis of his complaints. The Commission finds it appropriate in these circumstances to treat the applicant as the sole applicant in this case.   2.    The applicant alleges that, by excluding him from entering Great Britain, his rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) have been violated.        Article 6 (Art. 6) provides in its first sentence:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled      to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an      independent and impartial tribunal established by law."        The applicant asserts that his right to freedom of movement, right to seek employment and right to pursue his family life are denied by the exclusion order which he is unable to challenge by taking proceedings in any court.        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies only to disputes ("contestations") over rights and obligations which can be said, at least on arguable grounds to be recognised under domestic law. It does not in itself guarantee any particular content for "rights and obligations" in the substantive law of Contracting States (cf. Eur. Court HR, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 70, para. 172). It is also established case- law that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) guarantees to everyone who claims that an interference with his "civil rights" is unlawful the right to submit that claim to a tribunal satisfying the requirements of that provision (Eur. Court HR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 20, para. 44).        The Commission notes that the general rights relied upon by the applicant are not recognised as such by domestic law in the United Kingdom. To the extent that any right to freedom of movement within the territory of European Union States may be derived from the law of the European Community, and assuming that any such right is directly applicable rather than merely declaratory, the Commission is of the opinion that such right is of a public law nature, having regard to the origin and nature of the provisions and the lack of personal, economic or individual aspects which are characteristic of the private law sphere (Nos. 28979/95 and 30343/96 dec. 13.1.97 D.R. 88-A p. 137 citing Eur. Court HR Schouten and Meldrum judgment of 9 December 1994 no. 304 pp. 21-24, paras. 52-60).   Consequently, the complaints fall outside the scope of the concept of "civil rights and obligations".        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant complains that the exclusion order has interfered unjustifiably with his relationship with his mother and younger brother. In this respect he complains that the exclusion order constitutes a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority      with the exercise of this right except such as is in      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic      society in the interests of national security, public      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and      freedoms of others."        The Government dispute that there is sufficient link between the applicant and his adult relatives in England to attract the protection of Article 8 (Art. 8); in particular there has been no cohabitation for many years, and no elements of financial, emotional or other dependence.        Even if there is "family life" the Government submit that the difficulties imposed on the travel or contact are not sufficient to amount to an "interference". Even if there is an "interference", such would in any event be justified, referring to the wide margin of appreciation in national security matters and the special considerations attaching to the prevention of terrorist crime. They have provided a list of factors alleged to be capable of satisfying the Commission that the applicant is a threat to national security, including his previous conviction and internment and the arrest of his brother in connection with arms offences, but emphasise that this does not represent the full security case against the applicant. They refer to "reliable secret information that the applicant remains involved in the Provisional IRA".        Further, the Government submit that a proper balance has to be struck between the   defence of democracy in the common interest and the protection of individual rights. They argue that any alleged interference in this case is not of a serious nature whereas the exclusion order is an effective means of protecting the community from terrorism. Having regard to the sensitive intelligence material involved and the real risk of death or injury to the sources concerned, it cannot be required that information be provided as to the basis of suspicion. Further, there are safeguards to ensure that the exclusion order power is exercised fairly, including review by an independently appointed Adviser following a personal interview.        The applicant submits that in this case there is a degree of dependency involving more than normal, emotional ties and emphasises that the applicant has not seen his mother for over three years and his younger brother for over two years as a result of the exclusion order. They argue that a wider, more modern approach to family life should be adopted and refer to Republican prisoners transfer cases which emphasised the importance of maintaining family links (see eg. 19085/91 Kavanagh v. the United Kingdom, dec. 9.12.92). They refer also to the comments of the UN Human Rights Committee of 27 July 1995 which stated that:        "It is the view of the Committee that the powers under the      provisions permitting infringements of civil liberties,      such as ...imposition of exclusion orders within the United      Kingdom... are excessive." CCPR/C/79Add.55 para. 11        The applicant submits that the exclusion order clearly interferes with his family relationships, since due to his mother's age and infirmity and his brother's handicap, they have been unable to visit him for some years. He further argues that the exclusion order is an excessive and disproportionate use of power, which is not subject to sufficient procedural safeguards against abuse. No information was given to him as regards the basis of the alleged suspicions against him, nor any reasons given for the order, rendering him unable to make any effective challenge to the decision to exclude him. Further, Advisers do not offer sufficient guarantees of independence, since, inter alia, they are anonymous appointments by the Secretary of State and there is an absence of guarantees against outside pressures and influences. There is no possibility of effective judicial supervision of the exercise of the power.        The Commission, as a preliminary remark, notes that the applicant's complaints centre on the effects of a restriction imposed on his ability to move freely, and to take up residence elsewhere, within the territory of the United Kingdom. Freedom of movement is a specific right subject to protection in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2), which the United Kingdom has not ratified. While it is not excluded that restriction measures may, in appropriate cases disclose violations of other substantive rights under the Convention (eg. East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 4403/70 etc Comm. Rep. 14.12.73 D.R. 78-A p. 5 paras. 184-187),the Commission considers that Article 8 (Art. 8) cannot be interpreted as conferring a general right to reside in, or move to any particular part of a Convention territory. This element must be taken into account in the assessment of the applicant's claims of a violation of this provision.        As to whether the applicant's claims indeed fall within the scope of protection of Article 8 (Art. 8), the Commission recalls that while the "family life" generally covers the ties between near relatives, it is a question of fact in each case whether "family life" exists.        The Commission recalls that it has held that relationships between adults would not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 (Art. 8) without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, emotional ties (see e.g. Applications No. 10375/83, Dec. 10.12.84, D.R. 40, p. 196 and No. 8924/80, Dec. 10.3.81, D.R. 24, p. 183). However it notes that the Court in the Boughanemi case (Eur. Court HR, Boughanemi v. France judgment of 24 April 1996 Reports 1996-II no. 8, para. 35) stated that the tie between a parent and child can only be broken in exceptional circumstances and adverted to the expulsion of the adult applicant in that case breaking his ties with his parents and his brothers and sisters as an element in its finding of an interference with "family life" under the first paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8). Since in the present case the applicant has maintained ties throughout his adulthood with his mother and brother who live in the United Kingdom, the Commission finds that this relationship falls within the scope of Article 8 (Art. 8).        The Commission considers that it is doubtful whether the facts of the case disclose any interference with the applicant's right to respect for family life since it is not established that his mother and brother cannot visit, or move to, Northern Ireland. However, whether or not the exclusion order is considered in the context of interference with the applicant's family life under the second paragraph or respect for   his family life under the first paragraph, the Commission notes that the applicable principles are similar. In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts, the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (eg. Eur. Court HR Gül v. Switzerland judgment of 19 February 1996 Reports 1996-I no. 3 para. 38).        As regards the interests of the community, the Commission recalls that the Government emphasise the importance of the exclusion power to its ongoing fight against terrorism arising out of the situation in Northern Ireland. As held by the Court in various cases, due account must be taken of the special nature of the terrorist crime, the threat it poses to democratic society and the exigencies of dealing with it (eg. Eur. Court HR Murray family v. the UK judgment of 28 October 1994 No. 300-A para. 47). The Commission observes that the Government imposed the exclusion order on the applicant on the basis that the Secretary of State was satisfied that the applicant was or had been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. It has supplied some information relating to the grounds of this belief, including the involvement of the applicant's brother in arms offences in circumstances alleged to implicate the involvement of the applicant. The Commission has no reason to doubt, on the basis of the submissions and information provided by the parties that this measure is bona fide.        As regards the interests of the individual, the Commission must assess whether in the present case the effects of the measure on the applicant, including the provision of adequate procedural safeguards to safeguard his interests, are such as to outweigh the factors outlined above.        Firstly, the Commission notes that the exclusion order does not directly impinge on the applicant's family life. He remains free to contact them as he wishes and to meet them, subject to the prohibition that he may not enter Great Britain.        Secondly, the Commission has given attention to the complaints raised by the applicant as to the lack of effective guarantees against arbitrariness in the exclusion order process (eg. mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Klass v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1979, Series A no. 28, p. 28 para. 50 concerning secret surveillance measures).        The applicant in the present application has emphasised that the decision-making process surrounding the imposition of the order against him is wholly secret and he has never been told the information upon which the Secretary of State acted when making the order. The Commission finds however that the Government may legitimately fear that the efficacy of their investigation of terrorist crime might be jeopardised, and persons be endangered, by the provision of sensitive information to complainants (mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR Leander v.Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987 p. 27, para. 66).        The applicant complains also that there is no appeal from the order, no possibility of judicial review of the merits and that the Advisers who received his representations cannot be regarded as independent since their anonymity makes it impossible for this to be verified objectively. The Commission recalls that the Government has specified that of the three present Advisers, two are Queen's Counsel and the third, an ex-chairman of a public company and independent public authority who has served as a magistrate. It does not find that the fact that the Adviser who heard the applicant's representations was appointed by the Secretary of State can detract per se from his independence and notes that the Adviser was subject to the guarantees that he was unconnected with the civil service, the Home Secretary or affairs in Northern Ireland.        The Commission further notes that pursuant to the finding by the European Court of Justice in the Gallagher case (see Relevant domestic law and practice) the Court of Appeal reviewed the role of the Adviser (also the Adviser in the applicant's case) and found that it was able to satisfy itself that the Adviser could perform his duties in absolute independence and without any control by the Home Secretary. Notwithstanding the applicant's argument that there can be no appearance of independence if the Adviser remains anonymous, the Commission does not consider that the review by the Court of Appeal, which was based on its assessment of the information before it concerning the functioning of the system disclosed any lack of proper scrutiny. Moreover, although the Adviser who heard the applicant's representations did not have the professional training in objectivity and in law of legally-qualified Queen's Counsel, his independence was also confirmed by Lord Colville Q.C.        The Commission would observe that procedural requirements under Article 8 (Art. 8) cannot be interpreted as necessarily requiring judicial control of measures. The degree of supervision, and the level of guarantees of independence for example, will vary according to the circumstances of the case. Where risk to life and limb under Article 3 (Art. 3) is concerned for example, effective review may require an independent body with decision-making power (eg. Eur. Court HR Chahal family v. UK judgment of 15 November 1996 paras. 153-154). In the present case, where the effect on family life is indirect and consequential to measures restricting freedom of movement in order to counter terrorist crime, the Commission does not consider that the lack of further guarantees of independence discloses a risk of arbitrariness incompatible with the essential object of Article 8 (Art. 8).        The Commission has also had regard to the fact that the applicant was able to make representations in person, with the assistance of his lawyer, to an Adviser. This procedure, in its view, allows an applicant to put forward such matters as he considers relevant and provides an opportunity, albeit considerably limited by considerations of security, for the grounds of the order to be challenged.        The Commission concludes that in the circumstances of the present case the Government have not failed to achieve a proper balance between the competing interests and that consequently there has been no lack of respect for the applicant's family life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The applicant complains that he has been discriminated against contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention which provides:        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other      organisation, national or social origin, association with a      national minority, property, birth or other status."        The Government deny that exclusion orders are only made against persons living in Northern Ireland: persons may also be excluded from Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom as a whole. There are five of the latter type of order in force at present. Even if the majority have concerned citizens of Northern Ireland, this is not a difference in treatment based on a personal characteristic but related to the geographical area to which acts of terrorism are connected. Even assuming there is a relevant difference of treatment however, such would be objectively and reasonably justified in the interests of preventing terrorism.        The applicant submits that he has been discriminated against on religious and political grounds. He states that the only United Kingdom citizens who have been excluded from other parts of the United Kingdom by exclusion order are those from Northern Ireland.        While it might indeed be the case, as alleged by the applicant, that only United Kingdom citizens from Northern Ireland have been subject to exclusion orders from Great Britain, the Commission notes from the material submitted by the parties that persons from Ireland, the United States of America, Germany and Sweden have also had orders made against them and that the Secretary of State also has power to exclude persons from entering Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom as a whole. Five persons are currently subject such orders excluding them from the United Kingdom as a whole.        The Commission observes that the exclusion power is not aimed exclusively, in its terms or in practice, at persons living in Northern Ireland. Further, it is not of the opinion that the justification for the order issued in this case, namely, that the applicant is suspected of involvement in terrorism, discloses any difference of treatment attributable to the fact that he may be a Catholic of Republican/Sinn Fein convictions.        The Commission accordingly finds that the facts of this application fail to disclose that the applicant has been subject to a difference in treatment based on religious affiliation or association with a national minority or political group. The applicant has not substantiated his claim of discrimination in this respect.        It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.    The applicant invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which provides that:        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy      before a national authority notwithstanding that the      violation has been committed by persons acting in an      official capacity."        The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).        The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light of its findings above, to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his Convention rights.        It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,          DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.        H.C. KRÜGER                              S. TRECHSEL       Secretary                                President    to the Commission                       of the Commission