CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 20 octobre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 33977/96                        by Petar ILIJKOV                        against Bulgaria        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 20 October 1997, the following members being present:              Mr     S. TRECHSEL, President            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            MM     R. NICOLINI                  A. ARABADJIEV                Mr     M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;      Having regard to the application introduced on 25 October 1996 by Petar ILIJKOV against Bulgaria and registered on 26 November 1996 under file No. 33977/96;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 14      February 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 8 May 1997;          Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Bulgarian national born in 1955 and residing in Plovdiv.   He is currently in prison.   Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Mihail Ekimdjiev, a lawyer practising in Plovdiv.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.     A.    Particular circumstances of the case        The criminal proceedings        On 4 October 1993 the applicant was arrested on charges under Section 212 paras. 1,2 and 4 of the Penal Code (Nakazatelen kodeks) concerning forgery of documents and fraud effected between 9 April and 10 September 1993.   The applicant, with the assistance of a customs officer and two other accomplices, had made false customs declarations certifying fictitious exports of loads of cigarettes, which in reality had been sold in the country.   On the basis of the false declarations the applicant had obtained the reimbursement of 7,811,400 leva in excise tax and had attempted to obtain the reimbursement of another 7,419,000 leva, the total amount at stake having been 15,230,400 leva (about 3,000,000 FF at the time).        The preliminary investigation was concluded on 1 April 1994 when the indictment drawn up by the prosecutor was submitted to the Plovdiv Regional Court (Okrazhen sad).        The Plovdiv Regional Court held several hearings.   There is a dispute between the parties as to the reasons for certain adjournments.        It appears undisputed, however, that some of them were related to the examination of the appeals, submitted to the Supreme Court (Varhoven sad) by the applicant and by his accomplices, against the refusals of the Plovdiv Regional Court to order their release on bail (see below, The applicant's detention on remand).   In practice, whenever such an appeal was submitted, the Plovdiv Regional Court transmitted the file of the criminal case together with the appeal to Sofia, to the Supreme Court.   It was thus impossible for the Plovdiv Regional Court to deal with the case until the return of the file from the Supreme Court.        It appears that the case-file was thus transmitted: on or about 20 May 1994 and returned shortly after 30 June 1994; on or about 7 December 1994 and returned shortly after 21 February 1995; on or about 28 September 1995 and returned shortly after 6 November 1995; on or about 16 April 1996 and returned shortly after 28 May 1996;   on 19 November 1996 and returned shortly after 4 December 1996.   When transmitting the case-file on 19 November 1996 the Regional Court accompanied it with a note asking for a speedy examination in view of the fact that a hearing had been scheduled for 19 December 1996.        As from 19 February 1996 the Plovdiv Regional Court had to recommence the examination of the case because one juror (sadeben zasedatel) had fallen ill and had to be replaced.   The new chamber of the court held a hearing on 26 and 27 March 1996.        Another hearing was scheduled for 7 and 8 May 1996, but at that time the case-file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court.   As a result the hearing was adjourned for 16 and 17 September 1996, the earliest dates available, in view of the courts' holidays.   However, since a juror had broken his leg and was unable to attend, the hearing was adjourned again for 29 and 30 October 1996.        On 29 October 1996 the parties to the criminal case, including the applicant who at that time was on a hunger strike (see below, The applicant's hunger strike), appeared before the Plovdiv Regional Court. The Court heard the medical experts who had been appointed on the previous day and had examined the applicant briefly.   The experts stated that the applicant needed to undergo a full examination in a hospital.   On 30 October 1996 the Court ordered the applicant's temporary placement in a hospital and adjourned the hearing, the reasons therefor being disputed between the parties.   The applicant submits that the reason for the adjournment was the absence of several witnesses and the Court's order for medical checks in a hospital, whereas the Government maintain that the only reason was the applicant's state of health, the medical experts having considered that he was not in a condition to participate in the hearing.        The hearing ultimately took place on 29, 30 and 31 January 1997. The Plovdiv Regional Court heard witnesses and the submissions of the parties to the criminal case and examined other evidence.   The Court could not hear four of the witnesses as they did not appear.   The applicant apparently unsuccessfully requested the adjournment of the hearing in order to question these witnesses, whose attendance had previously been requested by both parties.        On 31 January 1997 the Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment.   His accomplices were also convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment between eleven and twelve years.   The Court reserved the reasoning of its judgment. As of 1 May 1997 the reasoning was not yet prepared.        It appears that when adjourning the hearings the Plovdiv Regional Court often did not fix a date for the next hearing, but announced the date later, through summons sent to the parties.   On several occasions the summons was received by the applicant between ten days and two weeks prior to the date of the hearing.        Throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer and, at some stages, by two or three lawyers simultaneously.        On an unspecified date in 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation (Varhoven kasatzionen sad) against his conviction and sentence.   The case is currently pending before the Supreme Court of Cassation.          The applicant's detention on remand        On 4 October 1993, the day of his arrest, the applicant was brought before an investigator who questioned him, in the presence of his lawyer, and decided to detain him on remand.   This decision was approved by a prosecutor on an unspecified date.        On 14 October 1993, when the case was at the preliminary investigation stage, the applicant appealed to the Plovdiv Regional Court against his detention on remand.   The Court examined the case in camera, on the basis of the investigator's file and the applicant's petition.   By a decision of 3 December 1993 the Court dismissed the applicant's appeal.        One of the applicant's accomplices, a Mr H., was released on bail on 6 November 1993, but was again arrested on 15 February 1994.   When at large Mr H. attempted to induce Mr. G., a witness, to give false evidence, a crime under Section 293 of the Penal Code, of which Mr H. was later convicted.        Following the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in the applicant's case, and after its submission on 1 April 1994 to the Plovdiv Regional Court for trial, the applicant lodged seven requests for release on bail.   All requests were submitted to, and examined by, the Plovdiv Regional Court before which the case was pending.        The requests for release were submitted and dismissed as follows: the first request, of 3 October 1994, was dismissed by the Regional Court on 6 October 1994; another request was dismissed by the Regional Court on 30 November 1994 and, on appeal, the Regional Court's refusal to release the applicant was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 21 February 1995; a request of 11 July 1995 was dismissed by the Regional Court on 21 September 1995 and, on appeal, the Regional Court's refusal to release the applicant was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 6 November 1995; a request whereby the applicant asked the Regional Court to annul or alter its refusal of 30 November 1994 was rejected on 4 December 1995; a request for release on bail of 15 January 1996 was refused by the Regional Court on 20 February 1996; a request made at the oral hearing on 27 March 1996 was refused by the Regional Court on the same day, the refusal was confirmed by the same court by a decision of 9 April 1996 and, on appeal, by the Supreme Court on 28 May 1996; a request of 15 October 1996 was refused by the Regional Court on 29 October 1996 and, on appeal, the refusal to release the applicant on bail was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 4 December 1996.        In its decision of 21 February 1995 confirming the refusal of the Regional Court to release the applicant on bail, the Supreme Court stated that under Section 152 paras. 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure every person accused of a crime punishable by ten or more years imprisonment had to be detained on remand, the only exception being a case where it is clear, beyond doubt, that there is no danger of absconding or re-offending.   In the Supreme Court's view such would only be cases where, for example, the accused person is seriously ill, or of an old age or in other condition which excludes the danger of absconding or re-offending.   Since the applicant was charged with a crime punishable by more than ten years imprisonment, and as no special circumstances excluding the danger of absconding or repetition had been established, there existed no grounds to order the applicant's release on bail.   The Court referred to its case-law on the matter (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice).        The Supreme Court further refused to deal with the applicant's contention that the evidence against him was weak.   The Court found that it was not competent to do so in the framework of proceedings concerning detention on remand.   Its only task was to examine whether the conditions for detention on remand under Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been met.        In its decision of 4 December 1995 refusing to annul or alter its decision of 30 November 1994 as regards the applicant's detention on remand, the Plovdiv Regional Court stated, in response to the applicant's assertion that the evidence in the case was weak, that discussing the evidence in the case and making conclusions related to the applicant's guilt would be a serious breach of procedure.   The Court reiterated that the only factors to be taken into account when deciding on the detention on remand were the gravity of the charges and the requirements of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        In its decision of 4 December 1996 confirming the refusal of the Plovdiv Regional Court of 29 October 1996 to release the applicant on bail, the Supreme Court stated inter alia that the danger of absconding, of re-offending and of obstructing the proceedings was presumed on the basis of the gravity of the crime with which the applicant had been charged.   The Court further stated that this conclusion was not affected in any way by the applicant's health problems, which could be dealt with at the penitentiary, or by the length of the detention, despite its inevitable negative consequences. The Court further found that the complaints of the applicant under the Convention were unfounded.   In particular, the applicant wrongly considered that certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were contrary to the Convention.          The applicant's hunger strike        On 23 September 1996 the applicant commenced a hunger strike to protest against his continuing detention on remand.   On 24 September 1996, upon the order of the prison administration, the applicant was examined by a doctor.   The doctor recommended regular medical examinations every second day.   On 4 October 1996, on the eleventh day of the hunger strike, the applicant was examined by a commission of three doctors.   They found that the hunger strike had had some effect on the applicant's state of health, but that it was not significant. Therefore, artificial feeding was not yet necessary.   The doctors also explained to the applicant that irreversible changes may occur after the fifteenth day.        On 7 October 1996 in the morning the applicant refused to drink water or accept any other liquid.   At about 2.30 p.m. the medical doctor at the prison administered an intravenous infusion with the applicant's consent.        On 8 October 1996 the applicant refused to accept another intravenous infusion and did not drink or eat.   On the same day the director of the prison consulted a prosecutor over the telephone and authorised the medical commission of three doctors to administer artificial feeding if necessary.   The order was based on Section 86 of the Law on the Execution of Punishments (Zakon za izpalnenie na nakazaniata).        On 10 October 1996 the medical commission examined the applicant for the eighth time since the beginning of his strike.   The commission found that there had been dystrophic changes in the applicant's liver and that his cardiac rhythm was accelerated.   The commission also found that the applicant was capable of understanding the consequences of his acts and that he firmly wanted to continue the strike.   With a view to preserving the applicant's health the medical commission administered forced feeding with sweetened yogurt and amino-acids, by using a medical stomach-tube. The commission also ordered further forced feeding with concentrated fluid substance prepared at the Medical Academy in Plovdiv.        The medical commission drew up a report on 28 October 1996 describing the applicant's state of health on the twenty-seventh day of his strike.   Dystrophic changes had occurred in several internal organs.   The continuation of the hunger strike, despite the forced feeding, was found to be dangerous for the applicant's life.        It appears that the applicant was brought to a hospital on 2 November 1996 and was returned to the prison a day or two later.        On 6 November 1996 the applicant was brought to a hospital for comprehensive examinations, pursuant to the order of the Plovdiv Regional Court of 30 October 1996.   The conclusion after the examination was that the applicant's life was not in danger, partly owing to the forced feeding.   Further to the previously diagnosed problems, the applicant had developed a gastritis, which could have been caused by the inadequate alimentary regime.   A treatment with medicaments was prescribed in this respect.   While in hospital the applicant's forced feeding   through a medical stomach-tube continued.        On 8 November 1996 the applicant returned to the prison, where he continued his hunger strike and was regularly examined and fed forcefully by the doctor at the prison.   On 18 November 1996 the applicant made a handwritten declaration stating that he was aware of the fatal consequences of his acts, but insisted not to be fed forcefully.   The forced feeding continued, however, because the prison doctor considered that its suspension would endanger the applicant's life.        On 19 November 1996 a commission of three medical doctors drew up another report on the applicant's condition, after having examined him at the Medical Academy in Plovdiv.   The report stated inter alia that the applicant was fit to participate in the hearing of his case and that more active treatment should be applied against the gastritis, there having been a danger of acute ulcer.        On 26 November 1996, upon the applicant's request, he was issued with a medical certificate drawn up by the doctor at the prison.   The certificate stated inter alia that the applicant had lost twenty kilograms.        On 26 November 1996 the applicant decided to start accepting liquids temporarily, until 19 December 1996, in order to preserve his health.   He made a handwritten declaration in this respect.        On 28 November 1996 the applicant decided to suspend his hunger strike.        According to a medical certificate of 20 January 1997, the applicant's health is satisfactory.     B.    Relevant domestic law and practice        Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force at the relevant time and until 4 June 1995, provided as follows: <Translation>        "(1)   Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the      charges concern] crimes punishable by ten or more years'      imprisonment or capital punishment.        (2)    In the cases under the preceding paragraph [detention on remand] shall not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading justice or committing another crime."   <Bulgarian>   "(1)   Miarka za neotklonenie zadarzhane pod strazha se vzema za prestaplenie, za koeto e predvideno nakazanie lishavane ot svoboda deset ili poveche godini ili smurt.   (2) V sluchaite po predhodnata alinea miarkata za neotklonenie ne se vzema ako niama opasnost obviniaemiat da se ukrie ili da izvarshi drugo prestasplenie."        These provisions, as in force after 4 June 1995 and until August 1997, provided as follows:   <Translation>   "(1)   Detention on remand shall be imposed [in case where the charges concern] a serious wilful crime.   (2)    In the cases under paragraph 1 [detention on remand] may not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading justice, obstructing the investigation, or committing another crime."   <Bulgarian>   "(1) Miarka za neotklonenie "zadarzhane pod strazha" se vzema za tezhko umishleno prestaplenie.   (2)   V sluchaite po al. 1 miarkata za neotklonenie mozhe da ne se vzeme, ako niama opasnost obviniaemiat da se ukrie, da osueti razkrivaneto na obektivnata istina ili da izvarshi drugo prestaplenie."        According to Section 93 para. 7 of the Penal Code "serious" is a crime punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.        The Supreme Court has stated that it is not open to the courts, when examining an appeal against detention on remand, to inquire whether there exists sufficient evidence supporting the charges against the detainee.   The courts have to examine only the lawfulness of the detention order, i.e. to establish whether there exists a "real danger" of absconding or of repetition (Decision of 23 May 1995) (opred. No. 24 ** n.d. 268/95, I n.o., Sb. 1995, str. 149).        Paragraph 4 of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force at the relevant time and until 4 June 1995, provided as follows: <Translation>   "(4)   The detained person shall be provided immediately with a possibility to file an appeal before the court against the [imposition of detention].   Within a time-limit of three days from the filing of the appeal the court shall pronounce a decision which is final."   <Bulgarian>   "(4) Na zadarzhania se osiguriava nezabavno vazmozhnost da obzhalva pred sada miarkata za neotklonenie. Sadat se proiznasia v tridneven srok ot podavaneto na zhalbata s opredelenie, koeto e okonchatelno."        At the trial stage of the criminal proceedings, according to Section 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court examines the detainee's requests for release.   According to Section 344 the decision of the trial court is subject to appeal to the higher court. The law does not require the trial court or the higher court to decide within a particular time-limit.        According to Section 347 and Section 348 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when an appeal has been lodged against a court order (such as an appeal against detention on remand) the case-file is transmitted by the lower court to the higher court "when necessary", or can be requested by the latter.        Section 86 of the Law on the Execution of Punishments reads as follows:   <Translation>   "In case a detained person refuses to take food and this endangers his life or his health, the necessary medical measures shall be taken in accordance with the doctor's prescription."   <Bulgarian>   "Kogato lisheniat ot svoboda otkazva da priema hrana i tova sazdava opasnost za zhivota ili zdraveto mu, po predpisanie na lekaria se vzemat neobhodimite meditzinski merki."     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that he was subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He claims that the forced feeding during his hunger strike was administered by unqualified personnel through a dirty rubber hose, in a manner which caused violent pain and a sense of helplessness and represented a serious risk for his life. In particular, according to independent medical advice, obtained from the London Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, forced feeding administered without qualified medical supervision on persons on hunger strike may result in cardiac arrest and death.        The applicant also claims that his exceptionally long detention on remand amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment as it was causing mental demoralisation, breaking of his volitional and physical stability and a sense of humiliation and helplessness.   2.    The applicant complains that his detention on remand was unlawful and contrary to Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention.   He submits that even if the arrest may have been lawful, the continuation of his detention after a certain lapse of time was not justified, there having been no danger of absconding or committing a crime.        The applicant also complains under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention that his detention on remand was unreasonably long and that following his arrest in October 1993 he was not brought before a judge or other officer exercising judicial power, the investigator not being sufficiently independent and impartial under Bulgarian law.   As regards the length of the detention the applicant submits that the case was not legally complex and that a reasonable bail would have served the purpose of guaranteeing his appearance in court.   Also, after the collection of most of the evidence in the case, there could not possibly exist a danger of him concealing evidence or otherwise hindering the administration of justice.        The applicant also raises a complaint under Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention in respect of the examination of the appeals against his detention on remand.   He maintains that his appeals were not examined "speedily" as required by Article 5 para. 4, that the courts decided in camera and did not provide the guarantees of adversarial proceedings. Also, his appeals were rejected arbitrarily, without examining any evidence.   Instead, the Supreme Court in its decision of 4 December 1996 refusing release on bail stated that the   danger of absconding, of re-offending or of obstruction of justice was presumed as the applicant had been charged with a serious crime.   Referring to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court according to which the courts are competent to examine only the "formal lawfulness" of the detention, the applicant also argues that the judicial control on the lawfulness of his detention was deprived of its essence, the power of the courts having been very limited.   3.    The applicant also complains under Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention that the judges examining his case were partial, that the proceedings were unfair and unreasonably lengthy.   The applicant states in particular that the proceedings were unduly delayed; that by having to decide on seven applications for release on bail, the chamber of the Plovdiv Regional Court which examined his case inevitably became partial; that the reasons given for some of the refusals of bail disclosed prejudged opinion and violated the presumption of innocence; that the summons for some of the hearings were received by the applicant in prison ten days prior to the date of the hearing which, in view of the time necessary to organise a meeting with his lawyer, left   the applicant without an adequate possibility to prepare for the hearing; and that he has been on several occasions denied access to his lawyers. In respect of the latter complaint the applicant has also invoked Article 25 para. 1 of the Convention, claiming that there has been a hindrance of the right to individual petition.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 25 October 1996 and registered on 26 November 1996.        On 26 November 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.   The Commission also decided, pursuant to Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure, to indicate to the Government of Bulgaria that it was desirable in the interests of the Parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Commission that all necessary steps be taken by the Government to preserve the applicant's health.   The Commission also decided, pursuant to Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure, to invite the applicant to stop his hunger strike.        On 29 November 1996 the applicant informed the Commission that he had decided to stop his hunger strike.   On 19 December 1996, in response to the Commission's request of 6 December 1996, the Government submitted information about the measures undertaken to preserve the applicant's health.   On 24 January 1997, noting that the imminent danger for the applicant's health did not exist any longer, the Commission decided not to maintain the interim measures under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure.        The applicant elaborated his complaints in the application form which was submitted on 11 December 1996 and transmitted to the Government on 13 December 1996.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 14 February 1997.   The applicant replied on 8 May 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that the length of his detention on remand and the manner in which he was treated during his hunger strike amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.        Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention provides as follows.        "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading      treatment or punishment."        The Government submit that the applicant's suffering was the result solely of his own decision to commence a hunger strike.   He was repeatedly informed of the grave consequences which might follow if he persistently refused to accept food and liquids.   Also, the applicant never claimed that the conditions in the prison were unbearable and inhuman.   In fact, he has not claimed before the Commission that he had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by the prison administration.   He has stated that the strike was in protest to the refusal of the courts to release him on bail.        The Government, referring to the Tyrer case (Eur. Court HR, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26), also submit that the applicant's suffering has not attained such a level or intensity as would be indicative of an inhuman or degrading treatment.        The Government further reject the applicant's allegation that his medical treatment and forced feeding during the hunger strike was inhuman and degrading.   It is not true that the applicant was treated by unqualified personnel.   While due to the economic crisis in the country all medical institutions experience difficulties, there exists strict professional control, the medical staff is well qualified and maintains the quality of medical care.    The applicant's health was closely monitored by medical doctors, and he was twice taken to a hospital for full examinations. He was forcefully fed only when this became necessary, by medical personnel, with the use of appropriate medical equipment and substances.   Finally, the forced feeding was administered according to a procedure prescribed by law.        The applicant replies that the torture and inhuman and degrading treatment complained of was the violent and unprofessional way in which he was forcefully fed.   In particular, liquid food was poured into his stomach by unqualified personnel through a dirty rubber hose, a "medieval" treatment endangering his life.        The Commission recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall under Article 3 (Art. 3).   The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some case, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (Eur. Court HR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65 para. 162).        According to the Court's case-law a measure which is a therapeutic necessity from the point of view of   established principles of medicine, cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading. The Convention organs must nevertheless satisfy themselves that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist (Eur. Court HR, Herczegfalvy v. Austria judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 244, p. 26 para. 83).        Moreover, the Commission notes that the applicant does not claim that he should have been left without any food or medicaments regardless of the possible lethal consequences.   Consequently, the applicant does not claim that the forced feeding per se, as an act of disrespect for his will to continue the hunger strike, amounted to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.        The Commission, therefore, is called upon to examine whether the manner in which the applicant was fed forcefully, and treated in general during the hunger strike, amounted to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.        The Commission notes that the applicant's statement that he was fed by unqualified personnel through a dirty rubber hose is not supported by the medical reports.   The applicant has not claimed that these reports were false.   Nor has he challenged the medical doctors' finding that forced feeding was necessary.   Indeed it aimed at preserving his life, and was apparently decisive for the fact that the applicant's health did not deteriorate.        Also, it appears established that the applicant was under constant medical supervision, that he was examined practically every two or three days by one or more medical doctors, that he was twice brought to hospital for extensive examinations and that the forced feeding and the treatment were ordered and administered by medical doctors.   Moreover, it does not appear that the feeding and medical treatment resulted in any aggravation of the applicant's health.        In these circumstances the Commission does not consider that the applicant was subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment during the period of his hunger strike.        As regards the applicant's complaint that the length of his detention caused suffering which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, the Commission notes that the applicant has not raised any complaint in respect of the conditions of detention.   While his prolonged stay in detention pending trial undoubtedly caused distress, the Commission does not consider that in the particular case it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.   Also, the issues related to the length of the detention on remand as such fall to be examined under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        It follows that the applicant's complaints under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and have to be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant complains that his detention on remand was unlawful and contrary to Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention.   He also complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that his detention on remand was unreasonably lengthy and that following his arrest in October 1993 he was not brought before a judge or other officer exercising judicial power; and under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the manner in which the courts examined his appeals against detention.        Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows.        "1.    Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.      No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following      cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:              a.     the lawful detention of a person after conviction by      a competent court;        ...              c.     the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected      for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal      authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence      or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his      committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;        ...        3.     Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the      provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought      promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to      exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a      reasonable time or to release pending trial.   Release may be      conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.        4.     Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or      detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the      lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court      and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.        ..."   a)    In respect of the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant's detention the Government have stated that he was arrested and accused on serious charges, his detention on remand having been ordered and confirmed in accordance with the law.        The applicant replies that the warrant for his arrest did not contain any reasoning as to the existence of a reasonable suspicion against him, nor as regards the alleged danger of absconding, obstruction of justice, or repetition.   Moreover, these issues were not examined adequately even in the decisions of the courts confirming the applicant's detention on remand, the only argument having been that the detention was necessary in view of the grave accusations.   Also, following his arrest he was not brought before a judge or other officer exercising judicial power, which made the detention unlawful.        The Commission does not find any indication that the applicant's detention was unlawful under domestic law.   Furthermore, as regards the alleged lack of a reasonable suspicion, it appears undisputed that the accusations were based on documents such as false customs declarations signed by the applicant.   Insofar as the applicant challenges the reasons given by the courts to justify the continuation of his detention, and insofar as he submits that he was brought before an officer who was not independent and impartial, these are issues which fall to be examined under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        The Commission finds, therefore, that the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention is manifestly ill- founded and has to be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   b)    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that following his arrest in October 1993 he was not brought before a judge or other officer exercising judicial power.        The Government have not commented on this point.   In his observations in reply the applicant maintains that he was brought only before an investigator, who, due to his status under the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality and cannot be considered an officer exercising judicial power within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, as interpreted in the Convention organs' case-law.        The Commission notes that the above complaint is directed against certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (cf. No. 24760/94, Assenov, Ivanova, Ivanov v. Bulgaria, Comm. Report 10.7.97, paras. 130 - 143), as they have been applied at the time of the applicant's arrest on 4 October 1993.   Apparently, there existed no remedy against the alleged breach of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.   In these circumstances the six months' time-limit under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention ran from the date of the alleged breach, which allegedly occurred on 4 October 1993 and in the following several days (cf. No. 12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 108). However, the application to the Commission was introduced on 25 October 1996, more than six months thereafter.        It follows that the above complaint has been introduced out of the six months' time-limit under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention and that, therefore, it has to be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3).   c)    The applicant complains that there has been a breach of his right under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention to a trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.        The Government submit that the charges against the applicant concerned serious crimes, punishable by more than five years imprisonment.   In such cases Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the accused be detained on remand.   Release on bail is possible, according to the jurisprudence, only in exceptional circumstances, when there does not exist even a theoretical possibility of absconding, repetition or hindering the administration of justice. No such exceptional circumstances existed in the applicant's case. Moreover, the conviction of Mr. H., one of the accomplices, for having induced a witness to give false evidence, is indicative of the existing danger of obstructing the investigation.        The Government further indicate that the preliminary investigation was concluded in April 1994, well within the relevant time-limits.   Since then the Plovdiv Regional Court regularly scheduled hearings in the case and took all necessary procedural steps to ensure examination of the case within a reasonable time.   All delays were due to reasons for which the Court was not responsible.        On two occasions delays were caused by the fact that a juror had fallen ill. Apart from these two occasions, in the Government's submission, the applicant and the other three co-accused were responsible for all remaining adjournments.   In particular, a delay of two months was caused by the applicant's hunger strike when he was not fit to attend the hearing.   Furthermore, every request for release and appeal to the Supreme Court against the Regional Court's refusal caused an inevitable delay of a month or two as the case-file had to be transmitted to the Supreme Court in Sofia.   Moreover, the applicant and the other co-accused, being aware that every appeal causes a delay, kept sending appeals, despite the fact that there were no new circumstances.   Therefore, in the Government's view, the applicant was clearly not interested in the speedy examination of his case and was abusing his right to appeal against his detention on remand.        The Government conclude, referring to the criteria laid down in Wemhoff v. Germany (Eur. Court HR, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7) that, taking into account the responsibility of the applicant for most of the delays, the "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) and of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention has not been exceeded.   The case was allegedly complex as it concerned forgery of documents and required the appointment of experts and the hearing of many witnesses.   Also, the Plovdiv Regional Court had to strike a balance between the speedy examination of the case and the necessity to examine carefully all evidence and deliver a just judgment.        The applicant replies that his continuing detention was unnecessary as there was no danger of absconding, of repetition, or of obstruction.   Furthermore, the courts when refusing bail did not give any reasons why they considered that such danger existed but simply referred to the gravity of the charges.        The applicant disputes the Government's assertion that he is responsible for most of the delays in the examination of the case.   He submits, referring to the Court's case-law, that it is for the State to organise its legal system so as to enable the courts to comply with the Convention.   In the applicant's view it is disturbing to see the Government stating that the exercise of a defence right, namely the right to appeal against detention, can serve as an argument to justify a restriction on another right, the right to a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.   The applicant states that this is a dangerous remnant from the communist penal theory and practice, according to which it was in the best interest of the accused to cooperate, rather than to exercise his rights.        In respect of the delays caused by jurors havin