CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 22 octobre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 28978/95                       by Mogens TANGE                       against Denmark           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 22 October 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    G.H. THUNE, President            MM     J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 13 September 1995 Mogens Tange against Denmark and registered on 26 October 1995 under file No. 28978/95;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1925. He is a lawyer by profession and resides in Aars, Denmark.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.         In 1990 the applicant acted as court appointed defence counsel in a jury trial concerning sexual abuse of minors. Judgment was pronounced in that case on 16 November 1990.         Subsequently certain attempts were made to reopen the above case and the applicant was appointed counsel for one of the persons involved on 30 September 1992. In connection with his work in the above matters the applicant received two statements, dated 16 February 1991 and 21 November 1992, respectively, made by a doctor who was also involved in the above cases. The applicant gave copies of the statements to a journalist who subsequently published parts thereof in a daily newspaper.         By indictment of 22 July 1993 the applicant was charged with having violated, inter alia, section 152 of the Penal Code which reads as follows:   (Translation)         "Section 152: Any person who is exercising or has exercised       a public office or function, and who unauthorised passes on       or exploits confidential information which he has obtained       in connection with his office or function, shall be liable       to a fine or to simple detention or to imprisonment for any       term not exceeding 6 months.         If the offence has been committed in order to obtain an       unlawful profit for the offender or for others, or in       aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to       imprisonment for any term not exceeding 2 years.         Information is confidential when so described in an Act or       other provisions, or when it is otherwise necessary to keep       it secret in order to protect important public and private       interests."         The offence, which the applicant denied having committed, related to the fact that the applicant had passed on to the journalist the two statements which allegedly contained information considered to be of a confidential nature.         By judgment of 15 September 1993 the Nibe City Court (Retten i Nibe) found the applicant guilty of the charge brought against him and sentenced him to a fine of 2,000 DKK.         With leave the applicant appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) which upheld the conviction and sentence by judgment of 31 August 1994. In its judgment the High Court stated, inter alia, as follows: (Translation)         "When compared to the original medical report which was       presented during the (1990) jury trial, the two statements,       which are referred to in the indictment, contain       particularly detailed information about the sexual       relations of a female witness who was heard during the jury       trial, including detailed descriptions of her sexual       organs. It must be considered obvious that such information       to the greatest possible extent shall remain secret.         If persons, who consider themselves the subject of sexual       crimes, had to expect that statements concerning medical       examinations, which investigations of such offences       require, could be passed on freely by the police or counsel       for the defence to journalists or others, the problems of       prosecuting such crimes would increase enormously since the       reluctance of reporting such crimes would increase       dramatically.         Thus, the High Court considers that the information (in       question) pursuant to section 152, subsection 3 must be       considered confidential since both important public and       important private interests make it necessary to keep the       information   secret.         It is undisputed that (the applicant) passed on the two       statements and since neither the fact that parts of the       first statement had been mentioned previously in a daily       newspaper, nor the fact that the female witness in the jury       trial had mentioned that case to the press could lead to       any other result, it follows that (the applicant) has       violated section 152 of the Penal Code by passing on the       two statements..."         Leave to appeal against this judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) was refused on 13 July 1995.     COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains that his conviction and sentence amounts to an unjustified interference with his right to impart information to the press. He invokes Article 10 of the Convention.     THE LAW         The applicant complains of un unjustified interference with his right to impart information as secured to him under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which reads as follows:         "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This       right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive       and impart information and ideas without interference by       public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article       shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of       broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.         2.    The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with       it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such       formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are       prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic       society, in the interests of national security, territorial       integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder       or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the       protection of the reputation or rights of others, for       preventing the disclosure of information received in       confidence, or for maintaining the authority and       impartiality of the judiciary."         The Commission notes that the applicant did not, in the domestic proceedings, rely expressly on the above provision. However, the Commission does not find it necessary to consider whether this would raise an issue under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies because it finds that the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.         The Commission finds that there was in the present case an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression within the meaning of the above provision. This interference resulted from the applicant's conviction by the Nibe City Court on 15 September 1993, which was upheld by the High Court on 31 August 1994. Such interference contravenes the Convention if it does not satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 10 (Art. 10). The Commission must accordingly examine whether the interference was "prescribed by law", had an aim that was legitimate and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim (cf. for example Eur. Court HR, Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 24, para. 35).         As regards the two first elements the Commission finds that the applicant's conviction was prescribed by law in that it was based on section 152 of the Penal Code. The restriction moreover pursued a legitimate aim covered by Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention, namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others and the prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence. What remains to be examined is accordingly the question whether the restriction complained of was "necessary in a democratic society" for achieving this aim.         In this respect the Commission recalls that according to its case-law and that of the European Court of Human Rights the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent an interference is necessary, but this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision covering both the legislation and the decisions applying it. The Commission therefore has jurisdiction to ascertain whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, a "restriction" or "penalty" is compatible with freedom of expression (cf. Eur. Court HR, Barfod v. Denmark judgment of 22 February 1989, series A no. 149, p. 12, para. 28).         In exercising its supervisory function the Commission must look at the case as a whole and determine whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by the Danish courts were relevant and sufficient.       The Commission recalls in this respect the judgment of the High Court of 31 August 1994 and the reasons given therein for the interference complained of. In particular the Commission recalls that the statements in question contained detailed information of a very intimate and private character, the confidentiality of which in circumstances as in the present case moreover served an important public purpose. Having regard thereto the Commission is satisfied that the reasons adduced by the High Court were both relevant and sufficient. Furthermore, the Commission considers that the sanction imposed was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Consequently, the Commission finds that the interference complained of may be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 10 para.   2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention for the protection of the reputation and the rights of others.         It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.      M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               G.H. THUNE       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber