CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 22 octobre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 31469/96                       by Leendert VAN DER TAS                       against the Netherlands          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 22 October 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    G.H. THUNE, President            MM     J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 16 October 1995 by Leendert VAN DER TAS against the Netherlands and registered on 13 May 1996 under file No. 31469/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1949, and resides in Breda, the Netherlands. He exploits a cattle farm. In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Mr L.J.L. Heukels, a lawyer practising in Haarlem.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.   a.    Particular circumstances of the present case   I.        On 22 June 1989, with the applicant's consent, three officials of the General Inspection Department (Algemene Inspectiedienst, hereinafter referred to as "AID") of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij) searched the applicant's car. They found thirteen lots of veterinarian drugs. They took samples of these drugs and seized them. The samples were found to contain substances referred to in Article 1 of the Regulation veterinarian drugs and drug containing food (Kanalisatieregeling diergeneesmiddelen en gemedicineerde voeders).        On 23 June 1989, three AID officials took urine samples and counter samples of 11 cows on the farm of Mr P.V., who had allowed the taking of these samples. The samples were sealed and sent for laboratory tests. Three of these samples were tested and found positive for 17 x-Ethenylestradiol, a growth inducing hormonal substance.        On 11 October 1989, the cows on the farm of Mr L.V.M. were controlled by AID officials. They found that the conditions of 15 cows about 15-20 months old and of 12 cows about 10 months old were not in conformity   with the regulations in force. L.V.M. stated that these animals had been previously owned by the applicant. L.V.M. had not yet received the papers of these animals.        Criminal proceedings for economic offences were instituted against the applicant, who was ordered to appear before the Magistrate for economic matters (economische politierechter, hereinafter referred to as "Magistrate") of the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Breda.        On 4 July 1990, the Magistrate found the applicant in default of appearance, suspended the trial for an indefinite period and referred the case to the investigating judge (Rechter-Commissaris) for further investigation.        On 11 April 1991, the proceedings before the Magistrate were resumed. The Magistrate heard the applicant, who stated inter alia that seven of the cows found in P.V.'s stable were jointly owned by P.V. and himself and that he knew that on 23 June 1989 there were three cows in P.V.'s stable to whom 17 x-Ethenylestradiol had been administered. He further stated that he was the initial owner of the cattle found on the farm of L.V.M. and that he had never sent the papers in respect of these animals. The Magistrate further considered the evidence and heard pleadings by the prosecution and the defence.        On 23 April 1991, the Magistrate rendered an interim judgment (tussenvonnis). On 25 April 1991, the Magistrate requested the Court of Justice of the European Communities to make a preliminary ruling.        On 10 June 1992, the Magistrate resumed the investigation of the case. The defence requested an adjournment as the requested preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice had not yet been issued. The Magistrate suspended the proceedings for an indefinite period.        On 8 October 1992, the Court of Justice of the European Communities issued the preliminary ruling in the applicant's case. The Court of Justice held that the Council Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 86/469/EEC did not preclude an EC Member State from prohibiting the possession of animals to whom substances with oestrogenic, androgenic, gestagenic or thyreostatic effects had been administered insofar as such a prohibition would respect the exceptions contained in these Directives.        On 2 December 1992, a further hearing took place before the Magistrate. Upon the request of the prosecution, the Magistrate decided to refer the case to the three judge economic section of the Regional Court (meervoudige economische kamer van de Arrondissementsrechtbank) in order to allow a simultaneous treatment of this case with a similar case against the applicant.   II.        On 19 August 1991, the Regional Court of Breda issued a search warrant (huiszoeking ter inbeslagneming) to the investigating judge in respect of the farm exploited by the applicant.        On 6 September 1991, the premises of this farm were searched by the investigating judge who was accompanied by two police officers, an AID official and two officers of the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Department (Fiscale Inlichtingen en Opsporingsdienst, hereinafter referred to as "FIOD"). According to the investigating judge's formal report of 9 September 1991 on the search, the farm hand who was present on the premises and who was shown the Regional Court's warrant had no objections against the search.        At the request of the investigating judge and under the supervision of the AID official a veterinarian took urine samples and counter samples of three cows found on the farm premises. These samples were sealed and entrusted to the investigating judge. An interim measure (voorlopige maatregel) within the meaning of Article 28 of the Act on Economic Offences (Wet op de Economische Delicten) was issued in respect of these three animals. The investigating judge further took food samples and seized several items, including syringes and several bottles containing various substances.        On the same day, another investigating judge searched the applicant's private home. The applicant was absent and the person present objected against the search. After this person had been shown the search warrant issued by the Regional Court of Breda of 22 August 1991, the search was conducted. Substantial parts of the applicant's personal administrative records were seized. Also the contents of a post office box used by the applicant were seized.        Two of the three urine samples taken on 6 September 1991 were tested and found positive for clenbuterol, a substance with sympathico mimetic effects.        On 15 October 1991, the applicant admitted to the police that he had administered clenbuterol to his cattle, knowing this was prohibited.        Criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, who was summoned to appear before the Magistrate. On 6 October 1992, a hearing took place before the Magistrate. The applicant was declared in default of appearance and the proceedings were suspended for an indefinite period. The Magistrate referred the case to the three judge economic section of the Regional Court (meervoudige economische kamer van de Arrondissementsrechtbank).                                    III.        On 18 January 1993, a hearing took place before the sixth economic section of the Regional Court. With the consent of the defence, the two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant were dealt with simultaneously. Invoking his right to remain silent, the applicant refused to make any statement. The Regional Court considered the evidence and heard pleadings by the prosecution and the defence.        By judgment of 1 February 1993, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of various offences under the Decree on substances with sympathico mimetic effects (Verordening stoffen met sympathico mimetische werking), the Decree on substances with hormonal effects (Verordening stoffen met hormonale werking), the Decree on control of cattle disease (Verordening bestrijding runderziekten), the Act on veterinarian drugs (Diergeneesmiddelenwet) and the Decree on administration of substances with oestrogenic effects (Verordening toediening van stoffen met oestrogene werking), respectively.        In its determination of the sentence, the Regional Court had regard to the applicant's multiple previous convictions of offences under the Act on Economic Offences. It imposed two fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each, three fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each, fifteen fines of 100 Dutch guilders each, twelve fines of 100 Dutch guilders each, one fine of 5,000 Dutch guilders and three fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each.        Both the applicant and the prosecution filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch.        The Court of Appeal considered the applicant's case on 22 April 1994, 6 May 1994 and 3 June 1994. The applicant was represented by a lawyer. In the course of the appeal proceedings the court ordered a reopening of the investigation and heard evidence from the applicant and a number of witnesses, in particular on the way samples were taken and handled.        By judgment of 17 June 1994, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 1 February 1993, convicted the applicant of five counts of having violated regulations referred to in Article 93 of the Industrial Organisation Act (Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie) and an offence under the Act on veterinarian drugs. It imposed two fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each, three fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each, fifteen fines of 100 Dutch guilders each, twelve fines of 100 Dutch guilders each, a fine of 5,000 Dutch guilders and three fines of 2,500 Dutch guilders each. It further ordered the confiscation of the two cows, whose urine was tested and found positive for clenbuterol and a number of items seized in the course of the investigation against the applicant.        Insofar as the defence argued that the investigation, the taking of samples and the investigation of these samples fell short of the relevant legal requirements and should thus be considered as unlawfully obtained evidence and that the absence of guarantees against abuse and lack of judicial control over the taking of samples violate Article 8 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal held:   <Translation>      "In general it must be noted that the civil servants who have      taken the samples have stated their findings in written reports      and in addition have been heard as witnesses at the trial, so      that the judge and defence have been able to control the taking      of the sample and the subsequent events in this connection. There      is no legal rule requiring that the suspect must be present when      samples are taken. There was therefore no question of unlawfully      obtained evidence.        As to the reliability of the taking, identification, packing and      sending of the samples to the laboratory, it appears sufficiently      from the evidence that these actions were in conformity with the      conditions which can reasonably be set in this field.      The court derives the following requirements from the Decision      of the <EC> Commission of 14 July 1987 (87/410/EEC; Pb L 223):      1. The samples must enable an adequate analysis, a repeated      analysis and verification tests for confirmation;      2. The samples must be marked in such a manner that      identification is possible at each stage;      3. The packing, storing and transport must not affect the sample      in any way and must not influence the results of the analysis.        All these conditions have been fulfilled.        From the Implementing Order on the Regulation prohibition of      administration of specific substances with hormonal effects (PVV)      1987 (taking of samples) the court derives the condition that the      controlling authority is to take a counter sample for the benefit      of the person concerned. The taking and storage must take place      in conformity with <the norms set out in> Annex A to that Order.      .... From the investigation at the trial it has not appeared that      these norms - insofar as relevant for the present case - have      been violated. When asked at the trial, the suspect has stated      that for personal reasons he does not wish to avail himself of      the possibility offered to analyze the counter samples taken."        The Court of Appeal further did not find it established that the samples taken in the present case had been tampered with, although the defence had demonstrated before the court that it was possible to gain access to the samples without breaking the AID seals. The Court of Appeal noted on this point that it was not possible to open each sealed bag containing samples without breaking the seals, but only those bags which had not been closed tightly enough. It further noted that the samples at issue had not left the investigation circuit and that they had arrived sealed at the laboratory where they had been analyzed shortly after.        Insofar as the applicant had relied on Article 8 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal held:   <Translation>      "The taking of samples and the subsequent actions in respect of      these samples did not harm the applicant in any interest      protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Insofar as the      reference to <the judgment of> the European Court of Human Rights      <of> 25 February 1993 ... <Funke v. France, Series A no. 256-A>      also implies a reliance on Article 6 of the Convention, this      objection is also dismissed; the suspect has in particular not      been compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence. There is      further no legal rule to the effect that a counter sample must      immediately be handed over on the spot to the suspect. According      to the formal minutes, in all cases counter samples have been      taken, have been packed and sealed in the same manner and have      been sent to the laboratory. Also in this respect the suspect has      thus not been harmed in his defence."        The Court of Appeal also rejected the argument that the administration of the substances at issue fell within the scope of permissible exceptions. It noted that these exceptions concerned therapeutical treatments subject to conditions, such as administration by a veterinarian, a condition which was not met in the applicant's case. It further rejected the applicant's argument that the clenbuterol had been administered with permission of a veterinarian for medical treatment of coughing animals, holding that it concerned store cattle older than 14 weeks and that it clearly appeared from the evidence that the applicant was aware that this constituted an offence.        The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The Supreme Court rejected the appeal in cassation on 6 June 1995.        The Supreme Court accepted the findings of the Court of Appeal as regards the way in which the evidence was taken, in particular the taking of samples and their subsequent handling. The Supreme Court further accepted the Court of Appeal's findings under Article 8 of the Convention. As the taking of the samples at issue and their subsequent handling did not, as such, concern any interest protected by Article 8, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal did not have to examine the argument that the rules governing the taking of samples fell short of the requirements of this provision of the Convention.        Referring to Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie), the Supreme Court further rejected the remainder of the applicant's appeal in cassation as not prompting a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development.   b.    Relevant domestic law        The possession of cattle to which certain chemicals have been administered is an offence according to the Decree on chemicals with sympathico mimetic effects, a regulation referred to in Article 93 of the Industrial Organisation Act (Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie) thus falling within the scope of the Act on Economic Offences.        Unless expressly ruled out in the Act on Economic Offences or the statutory or secondary legislation referred to in Article 1 and Article 1a of that Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to the criminal investigation of economic offences (Article 25 of the Code on Economic Offences).        Article 17 para. 1 of the Act on Economic Offences reads:   <Translation>      "With the investigation of economic offences are entrusted:      1.     the civil servants referred to in Article 141 of the Code      of Criminal Procedure;      2.     the civil servants appointed by decision, published in the      Netherlands Official Gazette, of the Minister of Justice in      agreement with Our other Minister concerned;      3.     the customs duty and excise tax civil servants."        Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its wording at the relevant time, reads:   <Translation>      "With the investigation of criminal offences are entrusted:      1.     the Public Prosecutors;      2.     the District Court judges in cases, which do not fall      within their cognizance;      3.     the mayors in municipalities, where there is no      municipal police commissioner;      4.     the civil servants of the National Police Corps and      the municipal police, with the exception of:            a.     the paid civil servants in a lower rank than the            one determined by Our Minister of Justice;            b.     the civil servants, appointed to perform            exclusively technical or administrative tasks;      5.     the commissioners of the national police and the      special civil servants of the national police;      6.     for the cases to be determined by Our Ministers of      Justice and of War: the commissioned and non-commissioned      officers of the Royal Military Constabulary and the other      military of that arm as designated by Our afore-mentioned      Ministers;      7.     the civil servants of the National Police Corps and      the municipal police, designated by Our Minister of      Justice,   who have been appointed within the regular      framework and classification of ranks to perform      exclusively technical or administrative tasks."        Article 12 of the Constitution provides:   <Translation>      "1.    Entering a home against the will of the occupant is only      allowed in cases prescribed by law, by those persons authorised      thereto by law.        2.     Apart from exceptions prescribed by law, prior      identification and information as to the purpose of entering are      required before entering in accordance with the previous      paragraph. The occupant shall be provided with a written report      on the entry."        Article 12 para. 1 of the Constitution implies that an occupant must clearly state that he or she objects against an entry by investigation officials for investigation purposes (Hoge Raad, 10 april 1979, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1979, nr. 483; and Hoge Raad, 19 februari 1985, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, nr. 691).        Where an occupant has no objections against an entry of his or her home by investigating officials for investigation purposes no written warrant is required.        Pursuant to Article 20 of the Act on Economic Offences, investigating officials have access to any place, insofar as this is reasonably required for the fulfilment of their duties. According to paragraph 2 of this provision, investigating officers shall only enter homes against the will of the occupant in cases of investigation of an economic offence and accompanied by a police commissioner or the local Mayor, or on the basis of a written order issued by the prosecution department.        According to Article 20 para. 3 of the Act on Economic Offences, formal minutes (proces-verbaal) of an entry and investigation of premises against the will of the occupant shall be made within 48 hours, which shall be communicated to the public prosecutor.        Under Article 21 of the Act on Economic Offences, investigating officials are competent to take samples of goods present on places, to which they have access under the terms of the Act on Economic Offences. If thereto requested, the holder of such goods is obliged to provide them with the necessary co-operation.        Article 28 para. 1 of the Act on Economic Offences provides for interim measures to be taken by the public prosecutor in cases where serious objections (ernstige bezwaren) against the accused have been raised and where the interests protected by the allegedly violated provision require immediate action.        An interim measure may consist of an order to refrain from certain acts (Article 28 para. 1.a) and of an order to ensure that certain specified goods, which are liable for seizure, are stored and kept at a specified place (Article 28 para. 1.b).        According to Article 99 of the Judicial Organisation Act an appeal in cassation is limited to points of law and procedural conformity.        Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act reads:   <Translation>      "If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint submitted cannot      lead to cassation and does not prompt a determination of legal      issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development, it      can limit itself to this finding when giving the reasons of its      decision on that point."     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the investigation methods used in his case including the officials' entry and search activities and/or the rules on which these methods are based are contrary to Article 8 of the Convention. He submits that he could not express his consent or objection as he was absent when these activities took place.   2.    The applicant further complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the way in which the samples obtained by the AID were subsequently handled was unlawful, in that this handling fell short of the requirements of Article 8 para. 2, in particular in that it was not in conformity with the EEC Council Directives 67/371 and 85/591, Article 4 of the EEC Council Directive 86/469 and the EEC Commission's decision 87/410, and in that no counter samples were left in the hands of the applicant.   3.    The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the Supreme Court rejected part of his appeal in cassation, including an argument under Article 8 of the Convention, under Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act without giving further reasons.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that the investigation methods used in his case and the rules on which these methods are based are contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        The Commission notes that this particular complaint, which concerns the lawfulness of the respective entries and searches as such, was not raised when the applicant introduced his application with the Commission by letter dated 16 October 1995, but was raised for the first time in the applicant's second letter to the Commission of 12 February 1996.        The complaints under Article 8 of (Art. 8) the Convention the applicant initially submitted to the Commission in his letter of 16 October 1995 all concerned the alleged lack of adequate safeguards in respect of obtaining samples, the alleged lack of adequate safeguards against tampering with sealed samples taken for investigation purposes and the allegedly unjust rejection by the Dutch courts of arguments put forward by the defence as regards the applicability or interpretation of certain rules emanating from European Union institutions.        The question therefore arises whether the complaint regarding the compatibility with Article 8 (Art. 8) of the entries and searches in the present case, as such, has been brought within the six months' time-limit referred to in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.        The Commission recalls that the question whether allegations submitted after the introduction of an application comply with the six months rule depends upon whether those allegations should be regarded as legal submissions in support of the original complaints or as fresh complaints (cf. No. 18660/91, Dec. 7.12.94, D.R. 79, p. 11).        The Commission further notes that in the domestic proceedings the applicant has not complained about the lawfulness of the entries and searches, as such. Insofar as the applicant raised complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention in the domestic proceedings, they were all related to the working methods applied in obtaining samples and their subsequent handling. The question therefore also arises whether in this respect the applicant has duly exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (cf. No. 15669/89, Dec. 28.6.93, D.R. 75, p. 39).        However, the Commission does not find it necessary to determine these issues as this complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.        The Commission accepts that the respective entries and searches of the applicant's premises by the investigating authorities constitute an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Funke v. France judgment of 25 February 1993, Series A no. 256-A, p. 22, para. 48; and No. 15882/89, Dec. 29.3.93, D.R. 74, p. 48). The question thus arises whether this interference can be regarded as justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        The Commission recalls that the words "in accordance with the law" in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) refers essentially to domestic law, which is primarily for the national authorities to apply and interpret, but also subject to a limited jurisdiction of the Convention institutions as to the manner in which this is done. The relevant domestic rules must further be sufficiently accessible and precise (cf. Eur. Court HR, Kruslin and Huvig v. France judgments of 24 April 1990, Series A nos. 176-A and B, pp. 20, 23, paras. 27, 33 and pp. 52, 55, paras. 26, 32 respectively; No. 17441/90, Dec. 4.9.92, D.R. 73, p. 201; No. 21482/93, Dec. 27.6.94, D.R. 78, p. 119 and No. 21207/93, Dec. 30.11.94, D.R. 79, p. 31).        The Commission notes that, in the Netherlands, the entry of private premises, against the will of the occupant, by investigating officials for the investigation of economic or other offences is subject to a number of clear conditions prescribed by statutory rules setting out the scope and procedures for the exercise of these powers.        The Commission does not find it established that these conditions were not respected in the present case. The Commission, therefore, accepts that the interference at issue was "in accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        The Commission further notes that the entries and searches at issue occurred on the basis of suspicions of economic offences and, therefore, can be reasonably be regarded as necessary in a democratic society for the legitimate aim of prevention of crime or protection of health mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2).        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further complains that the way in which the samples were taken and subsequently handled violates his rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        The Commission notes that this complaint does not, as such, concern the lawfulness of the respective entries and searches carried out in the present case. It is a complaint that the methods applied for obtaining the samples and the manner in which they were subsequently handled were not in accordance with a procedure containing sufficient statutory guarantees against tampering as can be inferred from certain international regulations.        The Commission considers that questions relating to the admissibility, reliability and credibility of evidence in criminal proceedings are matters to be considered under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as relating to the fairness of criminal proceedings (cf. Eur. Court HR, Delta v. France judgment of 19 December 1990, Series A no. 191). These are no matters which fall within the scope of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, unless the way in which evidence has been obtained affects private and family life, home or correspondence within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This complaint was, however, found to be manifestly ill-founded (see under 1.).        The Commission does not find that the way in which the samples taken in the present case or the way in which they were subsequently handled constituted an interference with the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        The question whether or not the Dutch courts' findings in the present case as regards the applicability of certain national or international rules and the conformity of the facts at issue with these rules are correct is not a matter which the Commission can review under the terms of Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention.        It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that the Supreme Court rejected part of his appeal in cassation under Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act without giving further reasons.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "1.    In the determination of ... any criminal charge against      him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a ...      tribunal...."        The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (cf. Eur. Court HR, Ruiz Torija v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, p. 12, para. 29; and Hiro Balani v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-B, p. 29, para. 27).        The Commission further recalls that when a State provides for an appeal to a Supreme Court, it may prescribe the conditions and procedure (cf. No. 12972/87, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54, p. 207) and that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not require that a decision whereby an appeal tribunal, basing itself on a specific legal provision, rejects an appeal as having no chance of success be accompanied by detailed reasons (cf. No. 8769/79, Dec. 16.7.81, D.R. 25, p. 240).        The Commission notes that the Supreme Court, referring to Article 101a of the Judicial Organisation Act authorising this procedure, rejected part of the applicant's complaints in cassation, which is limited to points of law, as not prompting a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development. The Commission has previously found that this procedure cannot be regarded as contrary to the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 30059/96, Dec. 26.2.97, unpublished). The Commission finds no reason to reach a different finding in the present case.        Insofar as the applicant can be understood as complaining under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention about the way in which the evidence in his case was taken, the Commission recalls that it may examine how evidence has been adduced, but not how it has been assessed by the court, unless there has been gross unfairness or arbitrariness (cf. No. 22909/93, Dec. 6.9.95, D.R. 82, p. 25).        The Commission notes that in the present case, the Court of Appeal explicitly considered the submissions by the defence as regards the possibilities to tamper with the sealed samples and the question whether or not these samples should be considered as unlawfully obtained evidence. The Court of Appeal did not accept the arguments put forward by the defence on these points and found that it had not been established that the samples taken in the present case had in fact been tampered with.        The Commission cannot find that the conclusions of the Court of Appeal on this particular point can be regarded as grossly unfair or arbitrary.        Consequently, also noting that the applicant has been convicted following adversarial proceedings in which he has been given ample opportunity to state his case and to submit whatever he found relevant, the Commission cannot find that the proceedings at issue fell short of the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as to the fairness of criminal proceedings.        It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.          For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.          M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               G.H. THUNE       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber