CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 23 octobre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 28772/95                       by Keith HALL                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 23 October 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    J. LIDDY, President            MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 6 May 1995 by Keith HALL against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 September 1995 under file No. 28772/95;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the information submitted by the respondent Government on      30 January 1997 and the reply received from the applicant on      26 March 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a British citizen born in 1955.   He lives in Leeds.   The facts of the application, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case        On 10 March 1994 the applicant was acquitted by the Leeds Crown Court of the murder of his wife.   The trial judge had refused to let the only evidence in the case - tape recorded conversations the applicant had had with an undercover woman police officer - be put to the jury, and had directed an acquittal.   On the same day, the judge permitted the tapes to be used outside the court.        On 16 March 1994 the coroner for West Yorkshire wrote to the Home Secretary asking for advice concerning the holding of an inquest into the death of Mrs Hall.   The coroner's letter began:        "I am able to state that I am definitely of the opinion that      [Mrs Hall] was murdered by her husband at a location within my      jurisdiction, and that her body has been deliberately destroyed      by burning and therefore cannot be recovered."        The letter continued to explain that the coroner considered an inquest to be necessary because the death could then be formally established, and the immediate family would be able to accept the death as a fact.   The coroner considered that the tapes of the conversations the applicant had had could be used in the inquest proceedings.        The Home Office replied to the coroner on 22 July 1994.   The request for an inquest was declined on the ground that it would be intolerable if the findings of an inquest were to be inconsistent with the acquittal of the applicant.        The coroner wrote a further letter to the Home Office in which he stated that a verdict at an inquest of "killed unlawfully" or an "open" verdict would not conflict with the Crown Court verdict in the applicant's case.   In October 1994, after Mrs Hall's sister's solicitor had written to the Home Office to support the coroner's request, the Home Office asked the coroner to indicate what evidence existed that a death had occurred other than the taped confession.   The coroner replied, enclosing a detailed report from a senior police officer into the apparent death.        On 2 February 1995 the Home Office informed the coroner that the Secretary of State had had regard to the practical difficulties facing Mrs Hall's family, but had come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to direct an inquest in the case.   He continued:        "The consequence of not holding an inquest (namely the practical      difficulty referred to above) does not in the opinion of the      Secretary of State outweigh what he considers to be the general      undesirability, and potential for unfairness, of an acquitted      defendant being subjected to a second judicial process in      circumstances where all the issues have already been ventilated      in a trial lasting nine days".        On the same day, in reply to a parliamentary question, the Undersecretary of State for the Home Department made a statement in Parliament to the same effect as the letter. It was pointed out in this reply that although a verdict of an inquest of unlawful killing would not be inconsistent with an acquittal in criminal trial in every case, such a verdict in the instant case could contemplate no one but the applicant. The practical difficulties facing Mrs Hall's family in there being no official pronouncement of her death were outweighed by the general undesirability of directing an inquest in the circumstances of the present case.        Mrs Hall's sister applied for judicial review of the letter of 2 February 1995.        In his judgment of 14 December 1995, Mr Justice May set out the facts of the case, and then gave an outline of the relevant provisions on coroners and inquests (see below, Relevant Domestic Law).   He was of the opinion that the Secretary of State had not declined the inquest because there was no certainty that Mrs Hall was dead, but because, as a matter of discretion, it was preferable not to direct an inquest. He considered that the substance of the Secretary of State's decision        "was that it was ... undesirable that there should be a second      judicial process when Mr Hall had been acquitted at the first      criminal trial in which the facts had been ventilated.   An      inquest was likely to be seen, in any narrow legalistic terms,      as directed towards a verdict whose substance was that Mr Hall      was the killer.   A verdict of unlawful killing would not be      inconsistent with Mr Hall's acquittal, but that is how everyone      would regard it. ... It is not for the court to substitute its      discretion simply because I might have come to a different      conclusion had the discretion been vested in the court, which it      is not.   For these reasons the application fails."        An article in the Yorkshire Evening Post on 14 December 1995 read, so far as relevant, as follows.        "Coroner names husband cleared of murder as the killer.        A Leeds man cleared by a jury of murdering his wife has been      named as the killer in the High Court. ...      The allegation was presented during a hearing to try to reverse      a decision made by the Home Secretary ... to refuse an inquest      into the death of [Mrs Hall] ...      Despite the Crown Court verdict Mr I.B., representing the Home      Secretary told the High Court that the West Yorkshire Coroner has      since told the Home Office of his 'definite opinion that      [Mrs Hall] was murdered by her husband in a location in his      jurisdiction and her body had been destroyed by burning and      cannot be recovered'.      [Arguing against an inquest, Mr I.B. continued] 'To put it      crudely, nobody would be in any doubt at all what in fact      unlawful killing meant.   It would mean that a man who had been      acquitted in the Crown Court was to be stigmatised as guilty by      a coroner or jury if he sat with one'."   B.    Relevant domestic law        A coroner is required to hold an inquest where inter alia there is a body in his jurisdiction and reasonable cause to suspect that the deceased died a violent or unnatural death (Section 8 of the Coroners Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act")).   However, where there is no body but the coroner has reason to believe that a death has occurred and that the body has been destroyed, the coroner may only report the facts to the Secretary of State (Section 15 (1) of the 1988 Act).   In such a case, the Secretary of State may, if he considers it desirable to do so, direct a coroner to hold an inquest (Section 15 (2)).   COMPLAINTS   1.    By letter of 12 June 1995, the applicant complains about the article in the Yorkshire Evening Post of 14 December 1995, citing it as an example of the way he has been treated since his acquittal.   2.    The applicant also complains of the order of the judge at the end of the applicant's trial by which the tapes of the applicant's alleged "confession" were made public, and the subsequent media coverage.   3.    Finally, the applicant makes various other complaints, including an alleged conspiracy by the West Yorkshire Police Force and a reference to him in a newspaper in connection with a different incident.        The applicant alleges variously violations of Articles 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15 of the Convention and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention in connection with the decision of the trial judge in his case to release the tapes of the evidence which had not been put to the jury.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 6 May 1995 and registered on 27 September 1995.        On 27 November 1996 the Commission decided to request further information of the Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (a) of its Rules of Procedure.   The information was submitted on 30 January 1997, and the applicant submitted his comments on it on 26 March 1997.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains about the article in the Yorkshire Evening Post of 14 December 1995, citing it as an example of the way he has been treated since his acquittal.        The Commission has considered this complaint in the context of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, which provides as follows:        "2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed      innocent until proved guilty according to law."        The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention applies not only to statements by judicial authorities, but also to statements by other public authorities (Eur. Court HR, Allenet de Ribemont v. France judgment of 10 February 1995, Series A no. 308, p. 16, para. 36).   It applies whilst criminal proceedings are pending, but may also be relevant after a person has been finally acquitted, if there is a sufficient link between the criminal proceedings and the statement in question (Eur. Court HR, Sekanina v. Austria judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-A, p. 13, para. 22).   The Commission also recalls that where a statement is made which is capable of being interpreted as a finding that a person is guilty of a criminal offence, that statement must be considered in the light of subsequent developments, even if the subsequent developments do not follow directly from an appeal by the party concerned (cf. Eur. Court HR, Adolf v. Austria judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 49, pp. 18-19, para. 40; in that case, the Court took into consideration the reasoning of the Supreme Court on a plea of nullity to safeguard the law that a decision of the District Court had not involved anything in the nature of a verdict of guilty.        The statement of the coroner in his letter of 16 March 1994 was a statement by a public authority that he considered that the applicant had murdered his wife.   It therefore prima facie gives rise to issues under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, provided that a sufficient link can be established between the acquittal in the criminal proceedings and the statement itself.        However, the letter was not a public statement, and the applicant only became aware of it because it was referred to in the course of judicial review proceedings by Mrs Hall's sister, and was subsequently reported in the press.   The Commission must therefore consider not merely the letter by the coroner, or the report of it in the press, but the manner in which the letter was considered by the other authorities in the case, namely the Home Office and the judge in the judicial review proceedings.        The impugned statement in the coroner's letter was made in the context of a request to the Secretary of State for an inquest to be held.   The Secretary of State, however, declined to order an inquest precisely because of the potential for unfairness of subjecting an acquitted defendant to a second judicial process in circumstances where all the issues had already been ventilated in the criminal trial.        Further, the Undersecretary for State made a statement in Parliament on the importance of not directing an inquest in the present case which might reach a verdict inconsistent with the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal proceedings.        Finally, in his judgment on Mrs Hall's sister's application for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision not to order an inquest, Mr Justice May, whilst underlining that his role was to review the Secretary of State's decision, not to take it, did not accept the criticism of the decision not to order an inquest.        The Commission considers that, taking the letter of the coroner in its proper context, that is, in the context of the decisions and public statement of the Secretary of State and of the judgment of 14 December 1995, the circumstances of the case do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.        The Commission would add that the fact that the applicant's complaint as made refers to the item in the Yorkshire Evening Post does not affect this conclusion: the newspaper article contained reference to the coroner's letter and to the Secretary of State's view and, although the headline refers to the coroner's letter rather than to the proceedings as a whole, the article ultimately does no more than reflect what had happened in court and was therefore in the public domain.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant also complains of the order of the judge at the end of the applicant's trial by which the tapes of the applicant's alleged "confession" were made public, and the subsequent media coverage.        The Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts submitted by the applicant in this part of the application disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with a complaint submitted within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. The "final decision" in the present case is represented by the order made on 10 March 1994 and/or the newspaper articles published in the days which followed, which dates are more than six months before the date on which the application was submitted.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   3.    Finally, the applicant makes various other complaints, including an alleged conspiracy by the West Yorkshire Police Force and a reference to him in a newspaper in relation to a different incident.        However, insofar as these matters have been substantiated and are within its competence, the Commission finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber