CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 23 octobre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 30381/96                       by Vassil MIRONOV                       against Bulgaria           The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 23 October 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    J. LIDDY, President            MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  L. LOUCAIDES                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 5 October 1994 by Vassil Mironov against Bulgaria and registered on 6 March 1996 under file No. 30381/96;         Having regard to:   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       16 December 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 18 March and 9 May 1997;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Bulgarian national born in 1930 and residing in Rousse.   Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Dobri Dobrev, a lawyer practising in Lovech.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.     Particular circumstances of the case   a.     The applicant's convictions and prison terms         The applicant has had several convictions on various charges. His convictions date from 1949, 1960, 1964, 1982, 1986 and 1988.   Prior to the events relevant to the present case he had served several prison terms.   Thus, he was in prison between March 1983 and May 1985.         In 1986 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment by the Burgas Regional Court (Okrazhen sad). On 4 January 1988 he was convicted by the Kardjali Regional Court for forgery and fraud and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.   On 14 June 1988 the Supreme Court (Varhoven sad) confirmed this judgment.   Subsequently the Kardjali Regional Court fixed a general term of twelve years' imprisonment for these two convictions.         The applicant began serving his prison term on 18 December 1988.         On 29 November 1990 the Supreme Court, which was seized by the applicant's second petition for review (molba za pregled po reda na nadzora) of the convictions and the sentence, decided to suspend temporarily the serving of his prison term, pending the outcome of the review proceedings.   The applicant was released on the following day.         On 27 September 1991 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition for review.   This decision had the effect of automatically terminating the temporary suspension of the applicant's prison term. However, due to an administrative omission the competent prosecutors whose duty was to supervise the enforcement of sentences were not informed of the Supreme Court's decision until some time in 1993.         On 13 May 1993 the serving of the applicant's twelve years' sentence was renewed by an order of the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Rousse.   At that time the applicant was in prison as on 18 November 1992 he had been detained on remand in case No. 1856/92 on charges of misappropriation of funds, allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992 (see below).         On 29 April 1996 the Lovech Regional Court examined the state of enforcement of the applicant's 1988 sentence.   The Court ordered his conditional release on parole (predsrochno uslovno osvobozhdavane), thus granting a remission of the remaining part of his twelve years' sentence.   However, the applicant was not released in view of the prosecutor's orders for his detention on remand in case No. 1856/92 (see below).         On 30 September 1996 the applicant was convicted by the Rousse Regional Court in other criminal proceedings, opened in 1995, for having threatened to kill a person.   The applicant had sent letters to a prosecutor stating that he would see to it that she and her family be "liquidated".   He was convicted under Section 114 para. 3 of the Penal Code and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.         On 16 January 1997 the conviction and sentence were confirmed on appeal by the Rousse Regional Court.   The applicant began serving the two years' prison term on 20 February 1997.         On 20 May 1997, upon the applicant's petition for review, the Supreme Court quashed the 1996 conviction and acquitted the applicant.   b. The 1992 criminal proceedings and the applicant's detention on remand         On an unspecified date in 1992 the investigation service (sledstvena sluzhba) in Rousse opened preliminary investigation No. 1856/92 against the applicant on charges of misappropriation of funds by means of forgery of documents under Section 212 para. 4 of the Penal Code (Nakazatelen kodeks).   The charges concerned the activities of A., the limited liability company which the applicant had registered with other persons in 1991.   It was alleged, inter alia, that the applicant and his accomplices had offered non-existing deliveries of clothes by using forged documents to convince potential buyers to sign a contract and to pay an advance.   In one transaction the buyer issued a letter of credit the payment of which was obtained by the applicant allegedly thorough the presentation of false invoices.         On 18 November 1992 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand.   On 1 December 1992 his lawyer unsuccessfully appealed to the Rousse Regional Court against his client's detention on remand.         On 18 January 1993 the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office (Glavna prokuratura) dismissed another petition for release as there existed a danger of absconding and of repetition.   On 13 April 1993 and again on 25 April 1995 the investigator (sledovatel) charged the applicant with some additional crimes in the framework of case 1856/92 and confirmed that the 1992 order for his detention on remand was in force.         At the time there were other criminal proceedings pending against the applicant.   They had been opened by the Gorna Oriahovitsa District Prosecutor's Office (Raionna prokuratura) in 1990, on charges of misappropriation of funds, but were eventually discontinued by a prosecutor's decision of 24 January 1995.   It appears that there has been no separate decision for the applicant's detention on remand in the framework of these criminal proceedings.         In the course of the proceedings in case 1856/92 the investigator in Rousse collected documentary material and examined witnesses. Some of the witnesses were examined by delegation in other cities.         On an unspecified date in 1994 the preliminary investigation in case No. 1856/92 was concluded and an indictment was submitted to the Rousse Regional Court.   On 29 December 1994 the Court found that the investigating authorities had incorrectly refused to allow the examination of certain witnesses.   As a result the case had to be returned to the prosecution authorities for further investigation.         On an unspecified date in 1995 the additional investigation was concluded and a new indictment was submitted to the Regional Court. On 9 October 1995 a judge at the Court ordered the return of the case again to the prosecution authorities.   The order stated inter alia that the prosecution authorities had not examined the applicant's request for the replacement of the investigator in his case.   Also, additional evidence had to be collected.         On 16 October 1995 the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Rousse refused the applicant's request for the replacement of the investigator and sent the case for additional investigation.    This was concluded soon thereafter and an indictment was prepared on an unspecified date in 1996.         The criminal proceedings against the applicant, which originated in investigation case No. 1856/92 are still pending.         In a letter of 18 December 1995, one of his numerous letters to the Chief Public Prosecutor, the applicant asked inter alia that measures be taken against the Rousse Regional Prosecutor's Office (Okrazhna prokuratura) for having delayed allegedly deliberately the examination of the criminal case.         On 13 May 1996 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the Chief Public Prosecutor to release him as he had no sentence to serve any more, the courts having relieved him from serving the remainder of his twelve years' sentence (see above, The applicant's convictions and prison terms).   The applicant further contended that the charges against him in case No. 1856/92 were absurd.         On 3 June 1996 the Rousse Regional Court examined another request for release and ordered the applicant's release on bail (pod garantzia).   The amount of the bail was fixed at 800,000 leva (about 30,000 FF at the time).   The decision stated inter alia that the Court had taken into account "the information about [the applicant's] state of health".         The applicant appealed against this decision, stating that he could never find 800,000 leva.   On 30 September 1996 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.   The Court found that in view of the crimes with which the applicant was charged, and because he was a recidivist, it was obligatory under Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Nakazatelno-protzesualen kodeks) that he should be detained on remand. In the Supreme Court's view release on bail was not possible. Therefore, the Regional Court's decision of 3 June 1996 was contrary to the law.   However, the Supreme Court could not quash it and could not order the applicant's detention on remand as the decision was challenged only by the applicant, not by the prosecutor.         The applicant failed to post bail and was not released.   On 20 February 1997 he began serving his 1996 sentence (see above). Following the Supreme Court's judgment of 20 May 1997 which quashed the 1996 conviction and sentence and acquitted the applicant, he remained in the Lovech prison, apparently on the strength of the orders for his detention on remand in the framework of the criminal proceedings which had commenced in 1992 and are still pending.         On 11 August 1997 the applicant posted bail of 800,000 leva and was released.   c.     The alleged taking of the applicant's and his company's property         In 1991 the applicant engaged in trade and registered limited liability company A., together with several other persons, one of whom was apparently a former prosecutor.   On an unspecified date the Bulgarian People's Party, a political party which has never been represented in Parliament, also became a shareholder.   The applicant was a shareholder and the president of A.         Disputes developed among the shareholders and on 8 May 1992 the commercial register at the local court registered the ousting of the applicant and the election of a Mr. B. as president.   On 13 July 1992 Mr. B. and the police broke into the applicant's apartment pursuant to a prosecutor's order.   The order instructed the police to assist the new president of A. to take possession of the company's property.         On 15 September 1992 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 8 May 1992.   It appears that since 20 October 1992 the applicant has again been legally recognised as president of A.         On 30 April 1992, in the framework of criminal case 1856/92, the investigating authorities conducted a search in the applicant's apartment and confiscated documents and a teargas gun.         On 30 November 1992, following the applicant's arrest, the investigator in case 1856/92 decided to seize four automobiles as a security in respect of the moneys allegedly misappropriated by the applicant.   The attachment order stated that the automobiles belonged to the applicant.   However, in a document issued later, on 13 April 1993, the investigator referred to the cars as the property of A., the applicant's company.   In his submissions before the Commission the applicant also states that the cars belong to his company A.         Two of the attached automobiles were found and were taken for keeping by the police.   The other two were in the possession of two shareholders of A.         The applicant submitted numerous complaints to various institutions alleging that the prosecutor and the investigator who were conducting his case had personal interest in it as they were connected with private companies which sought to destroy his business.   He stated inter alia that the prosecutor had stolen the property of his company, that in 1993 a sum of 1,400,000 leva disappeared from his company's account with a private bank, that the investigator had asked him for 1 million leva in exchange for his release, and generally that his arrest and detention were the result of a plot against him.   On 29 November 1995 the applicant was heard personally by the Chief Public Prosecutor of Bulgaria.   The parties have not substantiated whether the applicant's complaints have resulted in the institution of any proceedings against the implicated persons.         In 1994 and again in 1996 the applicant, acting without a lawyer, brought civil actions for damages against two prosecutors personally and against the Regional Prosecutor's Office.   After inviting the applicant to clarify his claims on an unspecified date in the end of 1995 the Regional Court rejected the first claim as it clearly constituted a criminal complaint, and sent it to the prosecution authorities.   The second civil claim concerned the alleged damages suffered by the applicant from the fact that his 1988 conviction and sentence of twelve years' imprisonment were allegedly unlawful.   The Kardjali Regional Court dismissed this claim on 9 December 1996.         The applicant apparently has not instituted civil proceedings to recover a particular possession.   d.     The applicant's correspondence with the Commission         On 13 February 1996 the applicant prepared his application form to the Commission and sent it through the prison administration, as required by the relevant law and prison regulations.   At least until 14 March 1996 the applicant was under the impression that his application to the Commission had been withheld by the prison administration.   On that date he wrote a letter to the Commission complaining about the alleged hindrance of his right to bring an application and enclosing a second copy of his application form.   In fact the application form signed by the applicant on 13 February 1996 was received by the Commission on 4 March 1996.   His second application form of 14 March 1996, identical in content, arrived on 25 March 1996.   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice   a.     As regards the criminal proceedings and the detention on remand         A crime under Section 212 para. 4 of the Penal Code is a misappropriation of large amounts effected through the use of forged documents, when the case is grave.   The penalty is ten to twenty years' imprisonment.         The relevant part of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force until 4 June 1995, provided as follows:   <Translation>         "(1) Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the       charges concern] crimes punishable by ten or more years'       imprisonment or capital punishment.         (2)   In the cases under the preceding paragraph [detention on       remand] shall not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused       evading justice or of committing another crime ..."         The relevant part of Section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force after 4 June 1995 and until August 1997, provided as follows:   <Translation>   "(1) Detention on remand shall be imposed [in case where the charges concern] a serious wilful crime.   (2)   In the cases under paragraph 1 [detention on remand] may not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading justice, obstructing the investigation, or committing another crime.   (3)   Paragraph 2 shall not apply where other criminal proceedings for [a publicly prosecuted] crime are pending against the accused person; or where [the accused is a recidivist] ..."   b.     As regards the alleged taking of property         Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an investigator, a prosecutor, or the court should "take measures", by way of attachment or seizure, to secure the payment of sums, which could become due in respect of a civil claim brought by the victims of the alleged crime or in respect of fines or confiscations which could be imposed if the accused person is convicted.   Paragraph 4 of Section 156 reads as follows:        "The measure [to secure the payment] ... shall be effected according to the Civil Procedure Code (Grazhdansko-protzesualen kodeks)".         This provision is apparently construed in the sense that only the rules concerning the types of seizures or attachments and the legal consequences thereof are to be found in the Civil Procedure Code.   It has not been construed, in the courts' jurisprudence, as meaning that prosecutors or investigators have to follow the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code and, accordingly, apply to a court for an attachment or seizure order.         In practice attachments and seizures are ordered by an investigator or by a prosecutor, when the case is at the preliminary investigation stage.   This decision apparently can be appealed against only to the higher levels of the prosecution authorities, as long as the case has not been sent for trial.         According to Section 255 when the criminal case comes into the hands of the court, the judge rapporteur, before the commencement of the trial, is competent to decide on requests concerning the imposed attachment or seizure.   During the trial such requests are to be examined by the trial court.   According to Section 344 the orders delivered by the judge rapporteur or by the court are subject to appeal to the higher court (cf. opredelenie No. 398 ot 11.11.1993 po n.d. No. 901/92, Sbornik nak. kolegii 1992/93, str. 176).   c.     As regards the applicant's correspondence with the Commission         Under Section 37 para. 2 of the Law on the Execution of Punishments (Zakon za izpalnenie na nakazaniata) the prisoners' letters to the President's Office, the Council of Ministers, the Committee for State Control, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the prosecution authorities are not subject to control if they have been submitted in a sealed envelope.   The letters to the Commission are not covered by this provision. According to Section 43 of the Regulations implementing the Law on the Execution of Punishments all petitions and appeals by prisoners are sent to the addressees after their registration in a register maintained by the prison administration.   The entries to be made in the register include the subject matter of the petition or appeal, except where it has been submitted in a sealed envelope.         Section 33 of the Law on the Execution of Punishments provides inter alia that a detained person has the right to receive and send letters subject to control by the prison administration.   Under para. 2 of Section 37 of the Regulations, a letter sent by, or to, a prisoner may be withheld where its content is such that on grounds of "security, [the prison] regime, or on the basis of educational considerations", this is necessary.   In these cases the prisoner shall be informed.     COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains under Article 5 of the Convention that his detention is unlawful and unreasonably lengthy.   Thus, in 1990 he was lawfully released from prison but afterwards, in November 1992, he was detained on remand on new charges.   However, as the new charges allegedly proved very weak, in 1993 he was ordered to serve the remaining part of his 1987 sentence.   The applicant contends that the purpose of his detention was to keep him out of business and to facilitate the stealing of his property.         The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention of the length of the criminal proceedings which are pending against him since 1992 and also that the prosecutors and the investigators in his case are corrupt and biased.         The applicant complains, invoking Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that his and his company's property was stolen by shareholders of A. and by the prosecutors and that nothing has been done to punish the perpetrators.         The applicant also alleges that the prison administration checked the content of his application to the Commission.   He states that when he passed to the prison administration his letter containing the application form, he was told that an official translation into Bulgarian was necessary since the application form had been written in a foreign language, in English.   The applicant offered his own translation, but this was allegedly rejected.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 5 October 1994 and registered on 6 March 1996.         On 22 October 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 16 December 1996.   The applicant replied on 18 March and 9 May 1997.         On 21 January 1997 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.     THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains under Articles 5 and 6 (Art. 5, 6) of the Convention in respect of the criminal proceedings against him, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention of the alleged taking of his and his company's property, and also of the alleged control by the prison administration of his application form sent to the Commission.         The Government make a preliminary objection that the application is an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention because it is premature, the applicant not having brought all his complaints before the national authorities, and also because it contains defamatory statements which tarnish Bulgaria's international reputation.         The applicant disputes the Government's position.         The Commission considers that the arguments relied upon by the Government, insofar as they have been substantiated, cannot lead to a finding that the application is an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention (cf.   No. 22497/93, Dec. 20.2.95, D.R. 80, p. 138; No. 24760/94, Dec. 27.6.96, D.R. 86, pp. 54, 68).   2.     The applicant complains under Article 5 (Art. 5) that his detention is unlawful and unreasonably lengthy.         Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows.         "1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.       No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following       cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:              a.     the lawful detention of a person after conviction by       a competent court;         ...              c.     the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected       for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal       authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence       or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his       committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;         ...         3.    Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the       provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall ... be       entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending       trial.   Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for       trial.         ..."   a)     As regards the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention that his detention was unlawful the Government submit that he has not exhausted all domestic remedies because the criminal proceedings against him are still pending.   The Government further maintain that the applicant's detention has been lawful at all times.   Thus, there have been two grounds for his detention - his conviction and his detention on remand and they were lawfully imposed, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.         The applicant replies inter alia, that his 1988 conviction was based on false evidence and that therefore he should have been entitled to its revision and annulment.   Furthermore, the charges brought against him in 1992 were invented and were a part of a plot which involved corrupt prosecutors.         The Commission finds that this complaint is manifestly ill- founded, the applicant's detention having been partly a detention "after conviction by a competent court" under subpara. 1(a) of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention and, in its remaining part, detention on remand in pending criminal proceedings, under subpara. 1(c) of this provision.   Furthermore, in the light of all the material in its possession the Commission does not find any indication that the detention was unlawful or ordered otherwise than "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law", within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1).         Insofar as the applicant may be understood as complaining that there was no "reasonable suspicion" of his having committed a crime when he was detained on remand in the framework of case 1856/92, the Commission notes that the charges against him were based on documents, testimonies and other evidence which indicated that he may have forged documents and acted fraudulently in order to obtain money from third persons.   Finally, there was no dispute that the acts of which he was accused were considered a crime under Bulgarian law (cf. Eur. Court HR, Loukanov v. Bulgaria judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, No. 34,   para. 41).         It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   b)     As regards the complaint under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention concerning the length of the applicant's detention on remand, the Government submit that the applicant has not complied with Article 26 (Art. 26) as the criminal proceedings against him are still pending, because he has not submitted requests for a speedy examination of his case and also because he has not raised before the domestic authorities, at least in substance, the complaint now made before the Commission.         Furthermore, the applicant was a recidivist and was accused of committing a crime which carried a penalty of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment.   In these circumstances Section 152 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings did not allow any discretion, but required that the accused be detained on remand.   The Government recall that nevertheless on 3 June 1996 the Regional Court ordered the applicant's release on bail because he invoked his health problems.   However, the applicant did not post the bail, in which situation he could not be released.         The Government finally maintain that the length of the applicant's detention was not contrary to Bulgarian law, which does not provide for a time-limit for detention on remand.   Also, it was "reasonable", within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, regard being had to the complexity of the investigation.         The applicant replies inter alia that he has submitted numerous requests for release and has complained to all levels of the prosecution authorities.   He contends that the release on bail was fictitious as he could not pay 800,000 leva.   Furthermore, the detention was unreasonably long.         The Commission recalls that the only remedies that Article 26 (Art. 26) requires to be exhausted are those which are available and sufficient and relate to the particular breaches alleged (Eur. Court HR, Brozicek v. Italy judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 167, p. 16, para. 32).   When a State seeks to rely on the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, it falls to the State to indicate the relevant remedies that have not been utilised by those concerned (Eur. Court HR, De Jong, Baljet and van den Brink v. the Netherlands judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A no. 77, p. 18, para. 36).         The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that there has been a violation of his   right to "a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial".   It does not appear that the fact that the criminal proceedings against him are still pending has any relation to the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of this complaint.         It is not disputed that the applicant appealed against his detention on remand to the Rousse Regional Court on 1 December 1992, shortly after his arrest, and that within the relevant period of time he submitted many other requests for release to the prosecution authorities and again to the court.   Furthermore, he eventually obtained an order for release on bail and then appealed against it, seeking the lowering of the amount of bail.   In all these petitions the applicant disputed the existence of reasons justifying his detention on remand and insisted to be released, thereby clearly invoking in substance his right under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.   Finally, the Government have not indicated any legal provision in Bulgarian law which provides for a remedy other than those used by the applicant.         The Commission, therefore, is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         Having examined the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, the Commission finds that it raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   3.     The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings in case 1856/92 have continued for an unreasonably long period.   He also complains that the investigators and the prosecutors were biased and corrupt.         Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:              "1.    In the determination of ... any criminal charge       against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing       within a reasonable time by an ... impartial tribunal established       by law.         ..."         The Government submit that the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) have not been complied with as the applicant has not submitted requests for a speedy examination of his case.   Furthermore, the complaint is inadmissible as the criminal proceedings are still pending.         The applicant replies inter alia that he has employed all available remedies and that his complaints are well-founded.   a)     As regards the applicant's complaint of the alleged bias of the prosecutors and the investigators, the Commission recalls that the primary purpose of Article 6 (Art. 6), as far as criminal matters are concerned, is to ensure as a whole a "fair trial" by a "tribunal" competent to determine "any criminal charge".   The requirements of this provision could be relevant in pre-trial proceedings insofar as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with them (Eur. Court HR, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13, para. 36; cf. also Can v. Austria, Comm. Report 12.7.84, paras. 49, 50, Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 96, pp. 15, 16).         However, the applicant's complaints of alleged bias concern the preliminary investigation, and not a "trial" before a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.   The Commission cannot speculate whether the applicant will be put on trial, whether the evidence taken will be used at this trial, whether the trial will be fair as a whole, or whether the applicant will be convicted.   The Commission finds that the applicant cannot, at this stage, claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of his right to a "fair trial" by an "impartial tribunal" under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 31195/96, Dec. 27.2.97, D.R. 88, p. 169).         It follows that this part of the application is premature and thus manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   b)     As regards the complaint concerning the length of the criminal proceedings in case 1856/92 against the applicant, the Commission notes that the Government have not indicated any provision of Bulgarian law which affords a remedy in respect of such a complaint.   Moreover, the Commission recalls that as regards complaints of excessive length of criminal proceedings an application by the accused to accelerate the proceedings cannot be regarded as an effective remedy.   The accused person cannot be obliged to step into the role of the prosecution and advance the proceedings against himself (No. 8435/78, Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 26, pp. 18, 20).   Finally, in his letter to the Chief Public Prosecutor of 18 December 1995 the applicant indeed raised the question of the alleged improper delays in the proceedings.         This complaint, therefore, cannot be rejected under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         Having examined the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention concerning the length of the criminal proceedings against him, the Commission finds that it raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits.   This part of the application cannot, therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   4.     The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) that he has been deprived unlawfully of certain possessions and that nothing has been done to punish the perpetrators.         The Government submit that part of the complaints concern acts of private persons, that the applicant has not exhausted all domestic remedies in respect of the acts of the authorities complained of, and that in any event their acts, such as the attachment of the applicant's cars,   were lawful and justified measures.         The applicant replies inter alia that he has exhausted all possible remedies as he complained to all levels of the prosecution authorities.   Furthermore, in January 1994 he submitted a request to the President of the Rousse Regional Court seeking the repeal of the seizure order of 30 November 1992.   As he did not receive an answer he submitted another request to the President of the Supreme Court on 23 August 1994.   The applicant admits that these requests were not in the proper legal form, but states that the courts were required to examine them.         The applicant also argues that the seizure had to be ordered by an enforcement judge, in accordance with Section 319 of the Civil Procedure Code, to which Section 156 para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers, and that this was not done in his case.         The applicant further states that his property was stolen with the active participation of corrupt prosecutors and investigators and that the respondent Government are hiding the facts, thus protecting the criminals who ruined him.   a)     Insofar as the applicant's complaints concern the seizure of documents from his office on 30 April 1992 and other events prior to 7 September 1992, the date of the Convention's entry into force in respect of Bulgaria, the Commission finds that it is not competent ratione temporis to examine them.         The Commission further notes that most of the applicant's complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, such as the allegation that a sum of money has "disappeared" from his company's bank account with a private bank and that some shareholders of A. have allegedly unlawfully taken the property of the company, concern acts of private persons and are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).         Insofar as the applicant complains of the refusal of the authorities to prosecute those responsible for the alleged stealing of his property, the Commission finds that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, the Convention not guaranteeing a right to institute criminal proceedings against a third person (No. 7116/75, Dec. 4.10.76, D.R. 7, p. 91).         It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   b)     As regards the seizure of four automobiles on 30 November 1992, the Commission observes that they apparently belonged to A., a limited liability company with its own legal personality, which is free to bring an application to the Commission (cf. Eur. Court HR, Agrotexim v. Greece judgment of   24 October 1995, Series A no. 330).         Nevertheless, the Commission need not decide whether the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention is raised in his individual capacity or on behalf of A., or whether the applicant currently represents A., as this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for failure to exhaust all domestic remedies under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls the Convention organs' case-law according to which normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and capable of remedying the breaches alleged (Eur. Court HR, Beis v. Greece judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, No. 34, para. 32).   There is no exhaustion of domestic remedies where a domestic appeal is not admitted because of a procedural mistake (No. 6878/75, Dec. 6.10.76, D.R. 6, p. 79).         The applicant claims, without submitting a copy of any document in this respect, that he has made a request to the President of the Rousse Regional Court in January 1994, asking for the return of his cars.   However, it is unclear whether the criminal case against him was already pending before the Rousse Regional Court at that time.   If the case was still at the preliminary investigation stage, the Court was apparently not competent to examine the request.         In any event, the applicant did not appeal against the refusal of the Rousse Regional Court to examine his request, but submitted, on 23 August 1994, a fresh petition, addressed to the President of the Supreme Court.   In this petition the applicant asked the President of the Supreme Court to repeal the order of the investigator of 30 November 1992 and to order the return of his stolen property. However, neither the Supreme Court, nor its President, are competent to repeal orders of investigators.         Moreover, the applicant has not made before the national authorities the submission which he is now putting before the Commission: that the cars were seized in violation of Section 156 para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.   In his numerous letters to various institutions he stated that the seizure was unlawful, but only because he had been a victim of a plot for the stealing of his possessions. In these circumstances it does not appear surprising that the authorities apparently treated the applicants' petitions as repeated criminal complaints for the institution of criminal proceedings against the allegedly implicated prosecutors.         Finally, insofar as the applicant claims that the cars are in the possession of third persons without any legal ground, it is open to him to seek their recovery by way of civil action for restitution.         The Commission considers, therefore, that the applicant has not made proper use of the opportunities to challenge the seizure of the cars before the national authorities and that, consequently, he has not exhausted all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention in this respect.         It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   5.     The applicant complains that the prison administration checked the content and requested the translation of his application to the Commission.         The Government provide excerpts of Section 33 of the Law on Execution of Punishments and Section 37 of the Regulations for the implementation of this law, which concern the prisoners' general correspondence (see above Relevant domestic law and practice).   The Government state that the content of the prisoners' letters to the Commission in general, and in the applicant's case,   cannot be withheld under Section 37 of the Regulations, as this would not be considered necessary on grounds of "security, [the prison] regime or on the basis of educational considerations".         The applicant maintains his complaint.   He states in addition that prisoners cannot send registered letters or make telephone calls.         The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint about the control of his letter of 13 February 1996 to the Commission falls to be examined in the light of the alleged hindrance of the right of individual petition under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, and also under Article 8 (Art.   8) of the Convention (cf. Campbell v. the United Kingdom, Comm. Report 12.7.90, para. 74, Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 233, p. 41).   Furthermore, in his observations in reply to the Government's observations the applicant raises a general complaint as regards his right to correspondence.   a)     Having examined the applicant's complaint about the control of his letter of 13 February 1996 in the light of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission finds that it raises serious questions of fact and law which are of such com