CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 26320/95                       by Erkki LAAKSO                       against Finland             The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    J. LIDDY, President            MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 3 June 1994 by Erkki Laakso against Finland and registered on 26 January 1995 under file No. 26320/95;         Having regard to:   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       11 January 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 8 May 1996, the additional observations submitted       by the Government on 28 June 1996 and the applicant's additional       observations of 3 and 5 June and 19 September 1996;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1965 and resident at Lahti.   A.     The particular circumstances of the case         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.                                    I.         In 1984 the applicant was convicted of various offences and sentenced to imprisonment. On 15 February 1994 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) dismissed his request for a reopening of those proceedings.                                    II.         In 1989 the applicant requested that the presumption that his mother's previous husband was his father should be quashed. The District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätten) of Porvoo dismissed the applicant's action. He appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Helsinki but later withdrew the appeal, following which it was struck off (in 1989).                                    III.         In 1992 the City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Hämeenlinna convicted the applicant, inter alia, of rape of a minor and sentenced him to imprisonment. The Court of Appeal of Turku dismissed his appeal. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on 28 April 1994.                                     IV.         The applicant wished to institute private prosecution proceedings against S, Chief Security Guard of the Parliament Building, for the purpose of charging him with, inter alia, defamation, discrimination as well as with an offence in office, all committed on 13 December 1991. When visiting the Parliament Building on that day, the applicant had noticed photographs of himself which had been posted on the inside of the security guards' counter at the front entrance. S had informed him that due to his dangerous nature special security measures had been taken in the building, including the posting of the photographs of the applicant.         The applicant's request of 31 January 1992 that the City Court of Helsinki summon S to appear before the Court was refused on 3 March 1992, Judge M. considering that the request did not meet the legal requirements. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to specify his claims. On 11 and 25 March as well as 29 April 1992 L again refused to issue a summons as the applicant had not supplemented his request properly.         Following a petition by the applicant, the Deputy Chancellor of Justice (apulaisoikeuskansleri, justitiekanslersadjointen), on 21 October 1993, considered that a summons should have been issued in spite of the somewhat vague wording of the applicant's request.   On 16 November 1993 the City Court issued the summons. It was served on S on 14 December 1993. Hearings were held on 14 January and 8 April 1994 before Division 6/2 of the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt; formerly the City Court), presided by Judge R and further comprising another professional judge and two lay judges. The applicant was granted a cost-free trial but the representative suggested by him could not be appointed as his consent had not been obtained. The applicant contends that in the course of the first hearing he also requested that a summons be issued against the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) but that this was allegedly refused without reasons. The District Court also took witness testimony.         In February 1994 the applicant lodged private prosecution proceedings before the Court of Appeal of Helsinki against Judge R, charging her with an offence in office (see also VII below). Allegedly, the minutes which she had kept from the District Court's hearing on 14 January 1994 in the case against S did not correspond to reality. In her observations to the Court of Appeal Judge R apparently stated, in March 1994, that the audio tapes from the District Court's hearings had been destroyed.         Judge R having stepped down in the applicant's case against S, a third and a fourth hearing were held on 8 and 22 June 1994 before Division 6/4 of the District Court. All judges were new in the case.         During the oral proceedings before the District Court the charges against S were extended to include also a purported offence against the Act on Personal Files. In its judgment of 22 June 1994 the District Court declined to examine the last-mentioned charge as it had not been properly served on S. It dismissed the defamation charge, noting that the proceedings had been brought on 14 December 1993, whereas the charge had become time-barred on 13 December 1993. The charges for the purported discrimination and offence in office were dismissed in the absence of sufficient evidence. The applicant was ordered to compensate S for his costs.         The public prosecutor had not supported the applicant's charges but three different prosecutors attended the District Court's respective hearings. In the course of the proceedings the public prosecutor and the Central Criminal Police refused to investigate the origin of the photographs posted in the Parliament Building. It furthermore appears that the applicant's request for an inspection to be held was refused by the District Court and that the Data Protection Ombudsman was not afforded an opportunity to be heard.         The applicant appealed and requested that the Court of Appeal listen to the audio tapes with the testimony given by the witnesses examined before the District Court.         In its judgment of 21 September 1995 the Court of Appeal, without having held an oral hearing and without having listened to the tapes, partly quashed the District Court's judgment, considering that the charge for the alleged offence in office had not been sufficiently precise and should therefore not have been examined on its merits. The Court of Appeal upheld the remainder of the judgment, adding however, that the discrimination charge should also have been dismissed already as being time-barred.         On 24 January 1996 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.V.         In February 1993 the applicant brought private prosecution proceedings before the Court of Appeal of Helsinki against Judge M, charging her with an offence in office committed as she had refused to issue the summons requested by the applicant in order to bring proceedings against S (see IV above). The applicant requested that Judge M be summoned to appear in person before the Court of Appeal. The applicant also requested that M be ordered to compensate him for his pain, including his mental suffering, and to compensate his costs.         On 22 March 1994 the Court of Appeal considered that in refusing to issue the requested summons M had acted wrongly out of carelessness. However, as her behaviour had not amounted to negligence she was acquitted. No oral hearing was held.         The applicant requested leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that an oral hearing should have been held before the Court of Appeal or that, at any rate, the Supreme Court ought to hold such a hearing.         On 13 December 1994 the Supreme Court dismissed both the applicant's request for an oral hearing and his appeal. It noted that the Code of Judicial Procedure (Oikeudenkäymiskaari, Rättegångs Balk) did not clearly stipulate when a court of appeal, having been seized with a matter as the first instance court, could decide the case merely on the basis of written submissions. In practice, proceedings concerning alleged offences in office were normally conducted in writing. A court of appeal could decide to hold an oral hearing when this was found necessary, for instance, for the purpose of clarifying the matter or safeguarding the rights of the parties. The Supreme Court concluded that an oral hearing before the Helsinki Court of Appeal had not been necessary in the applicant's case against Judge M.                                    VI.         On 29 March 1994 the First Instance Court (käräjäoikeus, tings- rätten) of Lahti dismissed the applicant's request that a summons be issued in further paternity proceedings which he wished to institute. The Court considered that the request did not meet the legal requirements. The applicant did not appeal against this decision.                                    VII.         On 8 June 1995 the Court of Appeal, without having held an oral hearing, acquitted R of the charges brought by the applicant (see IV above). On 4 December 1995 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal's judgment and remitted the case back for a new examination, as the applicant had not been properly heard in the written proceedings before the Court of Appeal.                                    VIII.         In August 1994 the applicant started serving a prison sentence. In September 1994 he was transferred to the Riihimäki Central Prison, where he was eventually placed on Ward I-2 for prisoners under special supervision. This is a so-called closed ward with ten prisoners who have expressed a wish to be separated from a larger number of prisoners during, for instance, outdoor activities.    On 19 October 1994 the applicant handed over a letter "for information" to the Director of the Department for Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice, who was then inspecting the prison. In this letter the applicant questioned, inter alia, the allegedly systematic reading of his correspondence by prison staff which, so the applicant argued, was in breach of domestic law. He requested to be informed of the measures which the Department intended to take so as to ensure that his correspondence would not be   unnecessarily and repeatedly read by prison staff. On 29 September 1994 the Deputy Chief Guard had allegedly expressed to him his concern about certain passages in a letter which the applicant had been obliged to hand over to prison staff unsealed for further dispatching. In that letter, addressed to the news editor of one of the national TV channels, the applicant had argued that he was being held in solitary confinement in violation of the law.         In his letter to the Director of the Department for Prison Administration the applicant furthermore referred to his request to be present when his outgoing mail would be inspected. At a meeting with the Prison Governor on 3 October 1994 the applicant had been informed that the prison staff was not violating domestic law by reading outgoing mail. On 4 October 1994 the Deputy Chief Guard had informed the applicant of the dismissal of his request to be present during the inspection of his mail.         In a further letter to the Director of the Prison Administration dated 22 November 1994 the applicant reiterated his request of 19 October for measures to be taken. He furthermore alleged that the unlawful interference with his correspondence had continued and that even letters from tribunals had been opened and read in his absence. He finally referred to his application before the Commission which he had supplemented on this point.         On 21 November 1994 the applicant and his fellow prisoners on the ward complained to the Board (johtokunta, direktionen) of the prison about the allegedly systematic inspection of their outgoing correspondence. Reference was again made to the prisoners' obligation to place their outgoing correspondence unsealed in an internal mail box for final dispatching by prison staff. In addition, the prisoners were not allowed to attend the inspection of either outgoing or incoming correspondence.         In its reply of 24 November 1994 the Prison Board considered that the practice of inspecting correspondence was in compliance with the relevant legal provisions and rules. The Board referred to chapter 2, section 9 (1) and (2) of the 1889 Decree on the Enforcement of Punishments (asetus 39/1889 rangaistusten täytäntöönpanosta, förordning 39/1889 om verkställighet af straff, as amended in 1974). The Prison Governor had ordered that the prisoners' outgoing correspondence should be inspected. The Chief Library Guard was in charge of emptying the mailboxes on the wards and of inspecting the letters. If the prisoners were to leave their correspondence sealed in a mailbox on their ward it would be impossible to inspect it. The correspondence was not read, unless this was necessary for the prevention of crime or there was another reason to suspect abuse of the prisoners' right to conduct correspondence.         On 2 December 1994 the applicant introduced an application before the Commission on behalf of his fellow prisoners on Ward I-2 (Application No. 26739/95, Dec. 9.4.97, unpublished).   In an article published in a leading Finnish daily on 5 December 1994 the applicant again requested the Director of the Prison Administration to take measures so as to ensure that a prisoner's right to respect for his correspondence would no longer be violated without justification and that all prisons adopt the same practice. On the latter point he again referred to the Riihimäki Central Prison, where all outgoing correspondence had to be left unsealed to prison staff even if there existed no suspicion that their right to conduct correspondence might be abused. The applicant contrasted this practice with the rule in force in the Helsinki Central Prison, where prisoners' outgoing correspondence was not being opened or inspected except on the Prison Governor's order and on the basis of   a sufficiently strong suspicion that the prisoner was preparing an escape or organising a delivery of illegal substances.         According to the applicant, he received, on 7 February 1995, a letter from the Commission dated 31 January 1995. According to the Government, the letter arrived to the prison on 31 January 1995 and was given to the applicant on 6 February 1995. The parties agree that the letter had been opened by prison staff in the applicant's absence.         On 8, 9 and 10 February 1995 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the Social Officer of the prison to grant him permission to make photocopies of certain documents which he intended to enclose to his request for pardon addressed to the President of the Republic.         On 10 February 1995 the applicant was transferred to a cell on "the special ward" allegedly intended for solitary confinement purposes. No reasons were allegedly given until 15 February 1995, when the Deputy Prison Governor informed him that the transfer had been due to "rearrangements".         According to the applicant, four other prisoners were also transferred to "the special ward" on 10 February 1995 due to "rearrangements". These prisoners were moved back to Ward I-2 on the following day. During the applicant's placement in solitary confinement it was allegedly made clear to him that he would be kept in such conditions until his release, unless he requested a transfer to another prison.         According to the Government, the prison records do not indicate that the applicant was subjected to any disciplinary punishment in the Riihimäki Central Prison. According to the Chief Guard, whom the Government have heard, it is possible that the applicant had felt threatened on Ward I-2 and had therefore requested to be placed on "the special ward" while awaiting his transfer to the Helsinki Central Prison. However, in their additional observations of 28 June 1996 the Government stated that the transfer of the applicant and certain other prisoners to "the special ward" was due to a forthcoming inspection of Ward I-2.         According to the applicant, the conditions on "the special ward" in the Riihimäki Central Prison are punitive in character. The cells are some 150 centimetres underground and the windows are not transparent. No water is available except during meals and there is no electricity, TV or radio.         According to the Government, "the special ward" is intended for prisoners who are not participating in the collective prison activities. Eleven cells are reserved for prisoners awaiting the processing of a disciplinary punishment order. There are also normally equipped cells with a table, a bed, a toilet and a washbasin. These cells are reserved for prisoners awaiting a transfer or release or going on or returning from leave.         On 20 February 1995 the applicant was transferred to the Helsinki Central Prison, where he was, at his own request, placed on a closed ward for safety reasons.         It appears that in a letter of April or May 1995 the Director of the Prison Department found no reason to take any action in response to the applicant's letters of October and November 1994.         In September 1995 the applicant was released on parole.   B.     Relevant domestic law         1.    Inspection of prison correspondence         On 1 May 1995 the 1889 Decree on the Enforcement of Punishments was afforded the status of an Act (no. 128/1995). According to chapter 2, section 9 (1) and (2) (in force as from 1974), the Prison Governor or a prison official appointed by him may inspect correspondence or packages to and from a prisoner. Letters shall not be read, unless this is necessary for the purpose of preventing crime or there is a reason for suspecting that the prisoner's right to send and receive correspondence is being abused. If, for one of these reasons, the letter or package is not delivered, it shall be returned to the sender or handed over to the prisoner at the time of his or her release, unless the nature of the correspondence renders this impossible.         In 1993 the inspection of prison correspondence also became governed by a general instruction issued by the Department for Prison Administration (32/4/1992). This instruction prohibited the inspection of a prisoner's letter to, among other bodies, the Commission.         Prior to the 1995 amendments to the 1889 Decree letters from prisoners to an authority supervising the prison or to his or her counsel were to be immediately forwarded without inspection. As from 1 May 1995 it is also prohibited to inspect incoming mail from counsel and authorities supervising the prisons. The same is true for any correspondence between prisoners and international human rights bodies to which they are entitled to complain.         2.    Remedies         A prisoner may complain of his treatment to the Prison Governor or the Prison Board and further to the Department for Prison Administration. He can also petition the Parliamentary Ombudsman, who is particularly responsible for supervising the prisons. The Ombudsman is empowered to order that charges be brought against, for instance, prison staff and is assisted by deputies. A local public prosecutor may also bring criminal charges of his own motion. Finally, the complainant is entitled to institute private prosecution proceedings independently of the Ombudsman's or the public prosecutor's view.         According to the Constitution Act (Suomen hallitusmuoto, Regeringsform för Finland 94/1919), anyone who has suffered an infringement of his rights, or damage, through an illegal act or negligence on the part of a civil servant, is entitled to demand that the civil servant be convicted and held liable for damages, or to report him for the purpose of having charges brought against him (section 93, subsection 2). Under the Tort Liability Act (vahingon- korvauslaki, skadeståndslag 412/1974) proceedings for damages may also be instituted against the State for actions taken by civil servants (chapters 3 and 4).     COMPLAINTS   1.     In his submissions of 28 December 1994 the applicant complained that he was denied an oral hearing before the Supreme Court in the private prosecution proceedings which he brought against Judge M (see V above). The denial of an oral hearing discriminated against him on the basis of his origin and political background. He invoked Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention.   2.     In his original submissions the applicant complained that the various court proceedings described above were not in conformity with the Convention and Protocol No. 7. On 19 September 1996 he withdrew this complaint in so far as it concerned the proceedings described in VII above. In so far as can be ascertained from his submissions of 3 June 1996 he then made the following more specific complaints relating to the private prosecution proceedings against S (see IV above):         (a)   There was an excessive delay in issuing the summons requested by the applicant;         (b)   the public prosecutor and the Central Criminal Police refused to investigate the origin of the photographs picturing the applicant and the prosecution also committed other offences in office;         (c)   the applicant was denied assistance by a public legal aid counsel of his own choosing;         (d)   the applicant's request to have a summons issued also against the Parliamentary Ombudsman was refused;         (e)   the applicant's request for an inspection to be held by the District Court was refused;         (f)   the District Court did not offer an opportunity for the Data Protection Ombudsman to be heard in the case;         (g)   the District Court's composition and the public prosecutor changed in the course of the proceedings;         (h)   the Court of Appeal was unable to listen to the audio tapes from the District Court's first hearings as they had been destroyed by Judge R;         (i)   the Court of Appeal should have held an oral hearing or remitted the case back to the District Court;         (j)   the outcome of the case was wrong, including the applicant's obligation to compensate S for his costs; and         (k)   the Supreme Court gave no reasons for refusing the applicant leave to appeal.3.     (a) In his submissions of 18 November 1994 the applicant furthermore complained under Article 8 of the Convention about the inspection of both his incoming and outgoing correspondence. On 26 February 1995 he made particular reference to the opening of a letter from the Commission dated 31 January 1995.         (b)   In his submissions of 18 November 1994 and 26 February 1995 the applicant also complained, more generally, about the regime both in the Riihimäki and Helsinki Central Prisons under which prisoners were obliged to send off their letters in unsealed envelopes even after their contents had been inspected. This complaint was withdrawn on 8 May 1996.         (c) In his submissions of 24 August 1995 the applicant also alleged that telephone calls which prisoners made from the Helsinki Central Prison were being tapped. This complaint was withdrawn on 8 May 1996.   4.     In his submissions of 26 February 1995 the applicant furthermore complained about his solitary confinement in the Riihimäki Central Prison from 10 to 20 February 1995. The confinement allegedly violated domestic law and was an act of revenge by the prison authorities in response to the applicant's complaints to the Commission and domestic bodies. He did not wish to invoke any particular Convention provision. In his observations of 8 May 1996 he invoked solely Article 25 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 3 June 1994 and registered on 26 January 1995.         On 18 October 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to communicate the applicant's third and fourth complaints to the respondent Government.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 11 January 1996. The applicant replied on 8 May after extensions of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The Government submitted additional observations on 28 June 1996. The applicant submitted additional observations on 3 and 5 June and 19 September 1996.         On 23 January 1996 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.     THE LAW         In view of the applicant's withdrawal of certain grievances on 8 May and 19 September 1996 the following complaints remain to be dealt with by the Commission:   1.     The applicant has complained that he was refused an oral hearing before the Supreme Court in the private prosecution proceedings which he brought against Judge M. The denial of an oral hearing also discriminated against him on the basis of his origin and political background. He invokes Articles 6, 13 and 14 (Art. 6, 13, 14) of the Convention.         The Commission has first examined the lack of an oral hearing before the Supreme Court. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) reads, as far as relevant, as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations       ... against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public       hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal       established by law. ..."         The Commission need not determine whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable in the present case, as the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.         The Commission recalls Finland's reservation to Article 6 (Art. 6) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:         "In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention, the       Government of Finland makes the following reservation in       respect of the right to a public hearing guaranteed by       Article 6, paragraph 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an       oral hearing in so far as the current Finnish laws do not       provide such a right. This applies to:         1.    proceedings before..., the Supreme Court, ... in       accordance with ... chapter 30, section 20 of the Code of       Judicial Procedure, ...         The provisions of the Finnish laws referred to above are       attached to this reservation as a separate annex."         According to the annex, chapter 30, section 20 of the Code of Judicial Procedure reads as follows:         "The Supreme Court shall, where appropriate, conduct an       oral hearing, where parties, witnesses and experts may be       heard and other accounts received. The oral hearing may be       restricted to part of a case subject to appeal.         The Supreme Court may also rule that the hearing of a       party, witness or expert shall take place in some other       court."         It has not been argued that the applicant had any unconditional right under domestic law to obtain an oral hearing before the Supreme Court. The absence of an oral hearing before the Supreme Court is therefore covered by Finland's reservation. Accordingly, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in respect of the lack of an oral hearing before that tribunal. Nor can the Commission find any indication of a violation of Article 13 or Article 14 (Art. 13, 14).         It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     Excluding the proceedings described in VII above, the applicant has also complained, more generally, that the various court proceedings were not in conformity with the Convention and Protocol No. 7. On 3 June 1996 he lodged various more specific complaints regarding the proceedings described in IV.         The Commission recalls that, in accordance with the generally recognised rules of international law, the Convention only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention with regard to that Party (see, e.g., No. 9453/81, Dec. 13.12.82, D.R. 31, pp. 204, 208). The Convention entered into force with regard to Finland on 10 May 1990. Moreover, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.         As regards the allegedly excessive delay in the issuing of the summons requested by the applicant in the proceedings described in IV above, the Commission notes that this complaint focuses on a period which ended with the actual issuing of the summons on 16 November 1993. However, as the complaint to the Commission was introduced only on 3 June 1996, i.e. more than six months later, it must be rejected as being belated pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         The Commission furthermore considers that the absence of reasons for the Supreme Court's refusal to grant the applicant leave to appeal in the proceedings described in IV does not raise any issue under the Convention or any of its Protocols. This complaint must therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         As regards the outcome of the proceedings described in IV, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, para. 45). On the point in question the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. This complaint must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         The Commission notes that none of the applicant's further grievances concerning the proceedings described in IV were put to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. It follows that domestic remedies have not been exhausted in this respect and these complaints must also be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         Finally, recalling its conclusion in para. 1 above and in so far as the Commission is competent to examine the other proceedings complained of, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, in so far as no other grounds for inadmissibility are at hand, the applicant's remaining grievances must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         It follows that the whole of this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 (Art. 27) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant has furthermore complained under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention about the inspection of his correspondence, including a letter from the Commission of 31 January 1995.         Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for ... his       correspondence.         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority       with the exercise of this right except such as is in       accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic       society in the interests of national security, public       safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the       prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of       health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and       freedoms of others."         The Government submit that domestic remedies have not been exhausted. The applicant did not petition the Parliamentary Ombudsman and never lodged a complaint with the police. He also failed to institute proceedings against the public officials responsible for the inspection or, in the alternative, proceedings against the State in order to obtain damages. He could also have complained to the Prison Governor, the Prison Board and the Department for Prison Administration.         In the alternative, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They argue, on the one hand, that the investigation which they conducted during the proceedings before the Commission produced no evidence in support of the applicant's allegation. On the other hand, the Government concede that a letter from the Commission of January 1995 was opened before being given to the applicant. This incident was a mistake by prison staff who were not sufficiently informed of the international human rights supervisory bodies. The Government submit, however, that the letter was not read before being handed over to the applicant. There existed no practice of opening the Commission's letters to him. On the contrary, domestic law prohibited such a practice. The minor error which occurred in respect of one letter from the Commission did not reach the threshold required for finding a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8). The Government have subsequently seen to it that staff in the Riihimäki Central Prison have been made aware of the legal requirements pertaining to the inspection of prisoners' correspondence.         Finally, the Government consider that the applicant has not specified the nature of the other alleged interference with his correspondence. They recall that in any event some measure of control over prison correspondence is called for and is not of itself incompatible with the Convention.         The applicant contends that he exhausted the domestic remedies by petitioning the Director of the Prison Administration in October and November 1994, by complaining to the Prison Board in November 1994. He also refers to his newspaper article published in December 1994 in which he again urged the Director of the Prison Administration to take measures so as to ensure respect for prison correspondence. The applicant finally argues that he could not be required to petition also the Parliamentary Ombudsman, given that the then Ombudsman and himself were enemies and the Ombudsman would therefore have been biased.         As regards the merits of his complaint, the applicant argues that the inspection of his correspondence was neither foreseeable nor proportionate to the aim pursued. As the letters were opened in his absence he could not know whether and to what extent they were read by prison staff. The Prison Governor and the Prison Board retained an almost unlimited margin of appreciation. Not even the 1995 amendments to the relevant law have rendered sufficiently foreseeable the provisions governing the inspection of prison correspondence. Finally, effective respect for his correspondence should have entailed affording him a right to have photocopies taken of certain documents relating to his request for pardon in February 1995.         The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with a complaint after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law. Article 26 (Art. 26) must be applied in a manner corresponding to the reality of the applicant's situation in order to guarantee him effective protection of his rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Where there is a choice of remedies, Article 26 (Art. 26) must be applied to reflect the practical realities of the applicant's position. The applicant must make "normal" use of those remedies which are apparently effective and sufficient. It may thus be sufficient for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) if the applicant has made full use of the possibility to seek the institution of criminal proceedings against the prison staff, thus putting his complaints in the hands of an authority which was competent to pursue the matter. In such a situation he might not be required to embark on further attempts to obtain redress (see No. 24760/94, Dec. 27.6.96, D.R. 86-A, pp. 54, 71 and the further references therein). The burden of proving the existence of available and sufficient remedies lies upon the State (Eur. Court HR, Deweer judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26).         The Commission notes that, as regards the applicant's general grievance concerning the allegedly systematic inspection of his mail in the Riihimäki Central Prison, he complained, in 1994, both to the Prison Board and the Director of the Prison Administration. The Commission considers, however, that these bodies cannot be considered to have provided a remedy within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26). As furthermore regards the opening of the Commission's letter of January 1995, the Commission finds no indication that the applicant has complained about this incident to any domestic authority even after it was acknowledged by the Government.         It is true that in spite of having acknowledged the opening of the Commission's letter the Government, for their part, do not seem to have taken any action either so as to have proceedings brought against the responsible prison staff. However, Article 26 (Art. 26) must be interpreted as placing the obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies solely on the applicant. In the circumstances of the case the applicant could have petitioned the Parliamentary Ombudsman, lodged a complaint with the police or instituted private prosecution proceedings against the prison staff. Given the existence of deputies to the Ombudsman, the Commission is not convinced by the reason invoked by the applicant as to why he did not petition the Ombudsman's office. The applicant thus had various remedies at his disposal. At least part of these must be considered effective and adequate for the purposes of Article 26 in (Art. 26) respect of this aspect of the complaint (cf. Eur. Court HR, A. v. France judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277-B, p. 48, para. 32; No. 25052/94, Dec. 5.7.95, D.R. 82-A, p. 102 at pp. 114-115). Accordingly, domestic remedies have not been exhausted as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         It follows that this complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   4.     The applicant has furthermore complained about his solitary confinement in the Riihimäki Central Prison in February 1995. The confinement allegedly violated domestic law and was an act of revenge by the prison authorities in response to his complaints to the Commission and domestic bodies.         The Government considers that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They initially argued that the applicant's placement in solitary confinement was based on his own wish and that it was lawful and appropriate. Later the Government submitted that the applicant had been removed from his normal ward due to a forthcoming inspection which was to be held on that ward. In any event, he was able to avail himself of his right under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention to lodge and pursue his application before the Commission.         The applicant refutes the Government's initial assertion that his placement on "the special ward" was based on his own wish. He had no reason to ask for a transfer as he was getting along well with his fellow prisoners on the closed ward No. I-2. By transferring him away from Ward I-2 the Prison Governor attempted to prevent him from pursuing both his own application   before the Commission as well as No. 26739/95 which he had lodged on behalf of his fellow prisoners. He therefore contends that his transfer and the treatment to which he was subjected on "the special ward" violated his right to individual petition under Article 25 (Art. 25).         The Commission takes note of the discrepancies between the submissions of the Government as to the reasons for the applicant's placement on "the special ward". The Commission finds no evidence, however, that his placement on that ward made him suffer any prejudice in regard to the presentation of his application before the Commission or that he was in any way frustrated in the exercise of his right of individual petition contrary to Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1)   in fine.         For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,         DECIDES TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION in respect of the alleged       interference with the effective exercise of the right of       individual petition; and         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary               &#x