CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 26493/95                       by Willem ZEGWAARD and ZEGWAARD B.V.                       against the Netherlands        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    G.H. THUNE, President            MM     J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 22 November 1994 by Willem ZEGWAARD and ZEGWAARD B.V. against the Netherlands and registered on 13 February 1995 under file No. 26493/95;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      29 January 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicants on 9 April 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant, W. Zegwaard, is a Dutch citizen, born in 1944, and residing at Rijswijk. The applicant company, Zegwaard B.V., is a company with limited liability, established under Dutch law, which has its registered seat in Delft. The first applicant is the managing director of the applicant company and holder of all its shares. Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. C.J. van Bavel, a lawyer practising in Utrecht.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.    The particular circumstances of the case        In April 1989 preliminary judicial investigations were initiated into allegations of, inter alia, forgery and illegal dumping of chemical waste perpetrated by the applicant company. On 11 April 1989 the house of the first applicant and the premises of the applicant company were searched, and on 18 September 1990 the first applicant was detained on remand. On 17 October 1990 he was released.        On 14 October 1991 the applicants were summoned to appear before the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague on 25 November 1991. The first applicant was charged with the following criminal offences:   1.    participation in an organisation managed by him which intended      to commit the criminal offences of (i) forgery, (ii) fraud,      (iii) the deliberate dumping of chemical waste and (iv) the      deliberate dumping of polluted waste matter;   2.    attempt to obtain a permit to dump waste matter under false      pretences committed by an organisation on his orders and/or      whilst he was in actual charge of this act;   3.    obtaining of an unlawful advantage committed by an organisation      on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;   4.    deliberate use of false or forged documents committed by an      organisation on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge      of this act;   5.    forging of documents stating weights committed by an organisation      on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;   6.    forging of invoices committed by an organisation on his orders      and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act;   7.    dumping of chemical waste committed by an organisation on his      orders and/or whilst he was in actual charge of this act; and   8.    violation of the regulations laid down in the Surface Water      Pollution Act (Wet Verontreiniging Oppervlaktewateren) committed      by an organisation on his orders and/or whilst he was in actual      charge of this act.        The applicant company was charged with the following offences:   A.    participation in an organisation which had the intention to      commit the criminal offences of (i) forgery of so-called border      documents and other documents, (ii) fraud, (iii) the deliberate      dumping of chemical waste and (iv) the deliberate dumping of      polluted waste matter;   B.    attempt to obtain a permit to dump waste matter under false      pretences;   C.    obtaining of an unlawful advantage;   D.    deliberate use of false or forged documents;   E.    forging of documents stating weights;   F.    forging of invoices;   G.    dumping of chemical waste; and   H.    violation of the regulations laid down in the Surface Water      Pollution Act.        Public hearings took place on 26 November and 3 December 1991.        As regards the first applicant, the Regional Court on 17 December 1991 declared the indictment in respect of the charges under 1 (i) and (iii) null and void, acquitted him of the other charges under 1 and the charges under 3, 4, 6 and 7, and convicted him of the charges under 2, 5 and 8. It sentenced the first applicant to a partially suspended term of 24 months' imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial detention. The Regional Court furthermore imposed a fine of 100,000 Dutch guilders on the first applicant.        As regards the second applicant, the Regional Court on the same day declared the indictment in respect of the charges under A (i) as regards forgery of other documents and (iii) null and void, acquitted it of the other charges under A and the charges under C and G, and convicted the applicant company of the charges under B, D, E, F and H. The Regional Court imposed a fine of 600,000 Dutch guilders on the applicant company and obliged it to pay the State 50,000 Dutch guilders to deprive it of the estimated financial advantages it had obtained.        Both applicants and the Prosecutions Department filed an appeal against the Regional Court's decisions with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.        Public hearings before the Court of Appeal were held on 15 and 16 February, 9 March and 19 April 1993.        On 3 May 1993 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's judgments. In regard to the first applicant, the Court of Appeal considered that only the offence of attempted fraud (2) had been proved. Nevertheless, it sentenced the first applicant to 12 months' imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial detention. In this respect the Court of Appeal held, inter alia:   <Original>        "Het hof heeft de op te leggen straf bepaald op grond van de      ernst van het feit en de omstandigheden waaronder dit is begaan      en op grond van de persoon en de persoonlijke omstandigheden van      de verdachte zoals daarvan is gebleken uit het onderzoek ter      terechtzitting.        Daarbij is in het bijzonder het volgende in aanmerking genomen.        De verdachte was binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven niet alleen formeel      maar ook, mede gezien de zogenaamde platte organisatiestructuur      van de Zegwaard-bedrijven, materieel degene bij wie de      uiteindelijke beslissingsmacht en verantwoordelijkheid berustten.      Hij is voorts getypeerd als iemand die "zeer goed op de hoogte"      was van hetgeen zich binnen de bedrijven afspeelde. Het moge zijn      dat van de telastegelegde feiten maar één enkel feit bewezen is      verklaard, maar feit blijft niettemin dat uit het onderzoek ter      terechtzitting in hoger beroep naar voren is gekomen dat in de      telastegelegde perioden binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven tal van      strafbare feiten - zoals oplichting van de dienst Gemeente      Reiniging Den Haag en die van Voorburg (LVZ), het opzettelijk      gebruikmaken van valse BNL-50 formulieren, het vervalsen dan wel      valselijk opmaken van weegbonnen en facturen en het zich in      strijd met de regels ontdoen van chemisch afval - heeft      plaatsgevonden. Dat dit kon gebeuren, valt de verdachte      - ongeacht het bepaalde in artikel 51 van het Wetboek van      Strafrecht - ten zeerste aan te rekenen en moet, gezien het feit      dat hij zich erop voorstond dat bij de Zegwaard-bedrijven alles      volgens de regels gebeurde, des te verwerpelijker worden      geoordeeld.        De verdachte had er kennelijk geen bezwaar tegen dat, zulks      uitsluitend ten bate van de Zegwaard-bedrijven en met voorbijgaan      van milieubelangen, door middel van misleiding van overheden      vergunningen c.q. ontheffingen werden verkregen. Een en ander      acht het hof dermate strafwaardig dat het zwakke en weinig alerte      beleid van die overheden alsook dat de milieuwetgeving zich als      chaotisch en gebrekkig doet kennen daarvoor nauwelijks als een      verzachtende omstandigheid kunnen gelden.        Het hof is van oordeel dat, gelet op de aard en ernst van het      bewezen feit en gelet op het vorenoverwogene, het opleggen van      een onvoorwaardelijke gevangenisstraf ... de enige passende      reactie vormt. Bij het bepalen van de strafmaat heeft het hof      mede rekening gehouden met mogelijk negatieve effecten van alle      publiciteit die de media sedert de huiszoekingen hebben gewijd      aan deze strafzaak."   <Translation>        "The Court has determined the sentence on the basis of the      severity of the criminal offence and the circumstances under      which it was committed, and on the basis of the personality and      the personal circumstances of the accused as these have emerged      from the hearings before the Court.        The Court has had particular regard to the following.        Within the Zegwaard group of companies the accused was the person      in charge, taking final decisions and bearing responsibility, not      only formally, but also in substance given the flat      organisational structure of the group. He has furthermore been      typified as a person who was "very well informed" of all matters      within the companies. It may be true that of the offences he was      charged with only one has been proved, but it has nevertheless      emerged from the hearings on appeal that in the period during      which the alleged offences took place a number of criminal      offences were committed within the Zegwaard group, such as      fraudulent acts in dealings with the municipal sanitation      departments of The Hague and Voorburg (LVZ), the deliberate use      of false border documents, the forging or false drawing up of      documents stating weights and of invoices, and the disposal of      chemical waste contrary to the regulations. The fact that these      offences were allowed to occur may, despite Section 51 of the      Criminal Code, to a large extent be attributed to the accused and      should, given that he prided himself on the fact that everything      at the Zegwaard group was done according to the rules, be deemed      all the more reprehensible.        The accused manifestly did not object to the fact that through      deception of the authorities permits and exemptions were      obtained, such only for the benefit of the Zegwaard group whereas      the interests of the environment were ignored. The Court      considers these facts worthy of punishment to such an extent that      neither the feeble and not very alert policy of those authorities      nor the chaotic and deficient appearance of the environmental      legislation, could serve as a mitigating circumstance.        The Court is of the opinion that, in view of the nature and      seriousness of the proved offence and of the considerations      above, the imposition of a non-suspended prison sentence ... is      the only fitting reaction. In the determination of this sentence      the Court has also had regard to the possible negative effects      of all the publicity which the media have devoted to this case      ..."        In regard to the applicant company, the Court of Appeal declared the indictment in respect of the charges under A (i) insofar as this concerned the forgery of other documents, (iii) and (iv) and H null and void and acquitted it of the remaining charges under A and the charges under C and G. It convicted the applicant company of the charges under B, D, E and F and imposed on it a fine of 600,000 Dutch guilders. In this respect, it held, inter alia:   <Original>        "Het hof heeft de op te leggen straf bepaald op grond van de      ernst van de feiten en de omstandigheden waaronder zij zijn      begaan en op grond van de omstandigheden van de verdachte zoals      daarvan is gebleken uit het onderzoek ter terechtzitting.        Daarbij is in het bijzonder het volgende in aanmerking genomen.        De verdachte heeft zich meermalen schuldig gemaakt aan valsheid      in geschrift en het gebruikmaken van valselijk opgemaakte      geschriften; zij heeft zich voorts schuldig gemaakt aan een      poging tot oplichting. Het moge zo zijn dat de overige      telastegelegde feiten het niet tot een bewezenverklaring hebben      kunnen brengen, feit blijft dat uit het onderzoek ter      terechtzitting naar voren is gekomen dat zich bij Zegwaard B.V.      in de telastegelegde perioden tal van feiten hebben voorgedaan      die stuk voor stuk als strafbare feiten zijn aan te merken.        Zo heeft Zegwaard B.V. de Dienst Gemeente Reiniging van      's Gravenhage en die van Voorburg (LVZ) ertoe weten te bewegen      een ontheffing voor het storten van 100.000 ton huisvuil in      Mellery (België) te verkrijgen, welke ontheffing zij vervolgens      ten onrechte uitsluitend ten eigen bate heeft aangewend. Voorts      heeft Zegwaard B.V. zich in strijd met de regels veelvuldig      ontdaan van allerlei soorten chemisch afval, zulks terwijl zij      over geen enkele vergunning, ontheffing of deskundigheid terzake      beschikte. Kennelijk diende een en ander om de bestaande praktijk      te laten voortbestaan en stond men in werkelijkheid - anders dan      naar buiten toe werd voorgewend - onverschillig tegenover het      milieu, de milieuwetgeving en de daarvoor verantwoordelijke      overheden. Dat die wetgeving zich als chaotisch en gebrekkig doet      kennen en het door die overheden terzake gevoerde beleid zwak en      weinig alert kan worden genoemd, doet aan de ernstige      strafwaardigheid van voorgaande gedragingen niet af.        Het hof is, gelet op de ernst van de bewezen feiten en gelet op      het vooroverwogene, van oordeel dat, niettegenstaande de      omstandigheid dat het tot minder bewezenverklaarde feiten komt      dan waartoe de rechtbank is gekomen, toch een geldboete van      gelijke omvang dient te worden opgelegd.        Bij de vaststelling van de geldboete heeft het hof rekening      gehouden zowel met de draagkracht van de verdachte zoals deze uit      het onderzoek ter terechtzitting is gebleken, als met mogelijke      negatieve effecten van alle publiciteit die de media sedert de      huiszoekingen hebben gewijd aan deze strafzaak."   <Translation>        "The Court has determined the sentence on the basis of the      severity of the criminal offences and the circumstances under      which they were committed, and on the basis of the accused's      circumstances as these have emerged from the hearings before the      Court.        The Court has had particular regard to the following.        The accused has several times committed forgery and has      deliberately made use of documents falsely drawn up; it has also      attempted to commit fraud. It may be true that the other offences      [with which the accused was charged] have not been proved, but      it has nevertheless emerged from the hearings on appeal that in      the period during which the alleged offences took place a number      of facts have occurred at Zegwaard B.V., each of which may be      characterised as criminal offences.        Thus Zegwaard B.V. has managed to persuade the municipal      sanitation departments of The Hague and Voorburg (LVZ) to grant      an exemption enabling it to dump 100,000 tons of household refuse      in Mellery (Belgium), which exemption was subsequently wrongfully      used with the sole purpose of benefiting [Zegwaard B.V.] only.      Zegwaard B.V. has furthermore many times disposed of different      kinds of chemical waste contrary to the regulations and without      being in possession of any permit, exemption or professional      knowledge. All these actions were manifestly undertaken in order      to continue an existing practice, whereas in reality, contrary      to what was pretended towards the outside world, [Zegwaard B.V.]      was indifferent towards the environment, the environmental      legislation and the responsible authorities. The Court considers      these facts worthy of punishment to such an extent that neither      the feeble and not very alert policy of those authorities nor the      chaotic and deficient appearance of the environmental      legislation, could serve as a mitigating circumstance.        The Court is of the opinion, in view of the seriousness of the      proved offences and of the considerations above, and      notwithstanding the fact that it has found the accused guilty of      fewer offences than the Regional Court, that a fine of the same      amount should nevertheless be imposed.        In the determination of this fine the Court has had regard to the      accused's financial resources as these have appeared from the      hearings, as well as to the possible negative effects of all the      publicity which the media have devoted to this case ..."        The applicants and the Prosecutions Department both filed appeals in cassation against the judgments of 3 May 1993 with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The applicants raised, inter alia, the following complaint concerning the reasoning applied by the Court of Appeal in respect of the determination of the sentences:   <Translation>      "...        2.     The Court of Appeal was wrong to take account of criminal      offences which came to light during the hearings, since it has      not been determined that the applicants committed these offences      ...        3.     The offences to which the Court refers in this respect      concern offences in respect of which the indictment has been      declared null and void, whereas in respect of one offence - the      illegal dumping of chemical waste - the applicants have been      acquitted ..."        On 31 May 1994 the Supreme Court declared the appeals in cassation of the Prosecutions Department inadmissible on the ground that they had been lodged out of time, and rejected the applicants' appeals in cassation. As regards the applicants' complaint of the determination of the sentences, the Supreme Court considered that, in general, a judge, when determining the sentence to be imposed, may take account of facts and circumstances which have emerged at the hearing. In respect of the first applicant, the Supreme Court held furthermore:   <Original>        "7.2. ... Weliswaar blijkt uit de processen-verbaal van de      terechtzittingen in hoger beroep niet dat de verdachte de      strafbare feiten heeft begaan die hem zijn telastegelegd doch ten      aanzien waarvan het Hof de inleidende dagvaarding nietig heeft      verklaard en die waarvan hij is vrijgesproken, doch het is niet      onbegrijpelijk dat het Hof uit het verhandelde ter      terechtzittingen, zoals blijkt uit de daarvan opgemaakte      processen-verbaal, heeft afgeleid dat binnen de      Zegwaard-bedrijven tal van strafbare feiten zijn begaan, zoals      die welke het Hof ... heeft vermeld. Voorts kon het Hof uit het      verhandelde ter terechtzittingen ... afleiden dat de      beslissingsmacht in en de verantwoordelijkheid over de      Zegwaard-bedrijven op de verdachte rustten.        7.3. Het Hof mocht een en ander in onderling verband beschouwen.      Door aldus te overwegen dat het de verdachte ten zeerste valt aan      te rekenen dat binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven die strafbare feiten      werden gepleegd, heeft het Hof kennelijk en niet onbegrijpelijk      tot uitdrukking gebracht dat de verdachte, als degene die de      beslissingsmacht had binnen de Zegwaard-bedrijven, een      verantwoordelijke positie bekleedde en dat hij die      verantwoordelijke positie niet of onvoldoende heeft aangewend om      te voorkomen dat de door het Hof bedoelde strafbare feiten binnen      die bedrijven werden gepleegd. Het stond het Hof vrij deze op de      persoon van de verdachte betrekking hebbende omstandigheid in      aanmerking te nemen bij het bepalen van de op te leggen      straf. ..."   <Translation>        "7.2 ... It is true that it does not appear from the minutes of      the hearings on appeal that the accused committed the criminal      offences with which he had been charged but in respect of which      the Court of Appeal had declared the indictment null and void or      of which he had been acquitted. However, the fact that the Court      of Appeal deduced from what was debated at the hearings ... that      within the Zegwaard group a number of criminal offences have been      committed, such as those mentioned by the Court of Appeal ...,      is not inexplicable. The Court of Appeal was further able to      deduce from what was debated at the hearings ... that within the      Zegwaard group the power of decision and the responsibility for      the group lay with the accused.        7.3.   The Court of Appeal was entitled to consider the above in      correlation. By holding that the commission of criminal offences      within the Zegwaard group was to a large extent attributable to      the accused, the Court of Appeal obviously and not inexplicably      stated that the accused, as the person entrusted with the power      to decide within the Zegwaard group, held a position of      responsibility and that he did not or not sufficiently exercise      this position of responsibility in order to prevent the criminal      offences indicated by the Court of Appeal from being committed      within these companies. The Court of Appeal was free to take      account of these circumstances which concern the person of the      accused when it determined the sentence to be imposed. ..."        The Supreme Court's judgment concerning the applicant company contained phrases of a similar nature.   B.    Relevant domestic law and practice        Article 51 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) provides as follows:   <Original>        1.     Strafbare feiten kunnen worden begaan door natuurlijke      personen en rechtspersonen.        2.     Indien een strafbaar feit wordt begaan door een      rechtspersoon, kan de strafvervolging worden ingesteld en kunnen      de in de wet voorziene straffen en maatregelen, indien zij      daarvoor in aanmerking komen, worden uitgesproken:      1*. tegen die rechtspersoon, dan wel      2*. tegen hen die tot het feit opdracht hebben gegeven, alsmede      tegen hen die feitelijke leiding hebben gegeven aan de verboden      gedraging, dan wel      3*. tegen de onder 1* en 2* genoemden te zamen.        3.     (...)   <Translation>        1.     Offences may be committed by natural persons and legal      persons.        2.     If an offence is committed by a legal person criminal      proceedings may be instituted and the punishments and other      measures provided for by law may be implemented where      appropriate:      1*.    against the legal person, or alternatively,      2*.    against the persons who ordered the commission of the            offence as well as the persons who were in actual charge of            the prohibited act, or alternatively,      3*.    against the persons referred to under 1* and 2* together.        3.     (...)        In its well-established case-law the Supreme Court further holds that the court dealing with the facts may not impose a sentence which exceeds the maximum sentence provided for in the relevant legal provisions. However, when determining the sentence, there is no legal impediment preventing the court from taking into account, to the detriment of the accused, any aggravating circumstances which have emerged from the trial.        According to Section 99 para. 1 (2) of the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie) the Supreme Court may quash judgments of lower courts if it finds that they are contrary to the law. The Convention is part of Dutch law.     COMPLAINTS        The applicants complain that when it determined the sentences to be imposed on them, the Court of Appeal took into account offences with which the applicants had not been charged, of which they had been acquitted, or in respect of which the indictment had been declared null and void. In addition, the first applicant also complains that in the sentence imposed on him he was held responsible for offences committed by a legal entity, whereas he had been acquitted of the charges accusing him of ordering and guiding the legal entity to commit these offences.        The applicants furthermore complain that it was only at the stage of sentencing that they were confronted with the fact that the Court of Appeal took account of offences with which they had not been charged, of which they had been acquitted or in respect of which the indictment had been declared null and void. They had thus been unable to react to this and, if necessary, provide evidence to the contrary. The applicants claim not to have been able to challenge this state of affairs before the Supreme Court, because the decision of the Court of Appeal to take into account certain offences when determining the sentences is closely related to the facts, whereas the Supreme Court does not establish facts.        They invoke Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 22 November 1994 and registered on 13 February 1995.        On 16 October 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 29 January 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicants replied on 9 April 1997, also after an extension of the time-limit.     THE LAW        The applicants claim to have been victims of a breach of Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention in that the principle of presumption of innocence was violated and in that they were unable adequately to challenge before the Supreme Court the taking into account of offences of which they had not been found guilty in the determination of the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal.        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law ..."        Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention reads:        "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed      innocent until proved guilty according to law."   1.    The Government contend in the first place that the applicants have failed to comply with the requirement laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention in that they did not bring the alleged violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 6-1, 6-2) before the Supreme Court.        The applicants argue that they did complain before the Supreme Court that they had in effect been convicted of offences which had not been proved. They further maintain that since the Supreme Court cannot rule on the facts of a case, they were unable to exercise their defence rights in respect of the offences which the Court of Appeal took into account when determining the sentence to be imposed.        The Commission recalls that pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law. The mere fact that an applicant has submitted his case to the competent courts does not in itself constitute compliance with this rule. It is also required that any complaint made before the Commission should have been raised at least in substance, and thus without necessarily requiring a particular reference to the Convention, during the proceedings concerned (cf. No. 11921/86, Dec. 12.10.88, D.R. 57, p. 81; No. 16278/90, Dec. 3.5.93, D.R. 74, p. 93).        The Commission notes that the applicants did not raise their complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, either formally or in substance, during the proceedings before the Supreme Court. However, it appears from Section 99 para. 1 (2) of the Judicial Organisation Act and the fact that the Convention is part of Dutch law that alleged violations of the Convention may be invoked in cassation proceedings. The Commission considers that in these circumstances the applicants, in order to exhaust domestic remedies, should and could have complained to the Supreme Court that they had not been able to exercise their defence rights in respect of the offences taken into account by the Court of Appeal in the determination of their sentence.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Articles 26 and 27 para. 3 (Art. 26, 27-3) of the Convention.        As regards the complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the Commission notes that in the proceedings before the Supreme Court the applicants complained that the Court of Appeal, when determining their sentence, had taken into account criminal offences which had come to light during the hearings. The Commission accepts that the applicants thus basically complained that they were punished for offences of which they had not been found guilty according to law. In the Commission's view, this amounts to a complaint of a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence as laid down in Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.        It is true that in their cassation memorial the applicants then stated that the Court of Appeal had referred to offences in respect of which the indictment had been declared null and void and to one offence of which the applicants had been acquitted. They thus did not raise expressis verbis the complaint that account had been taken of offences with which they had not been charged.   Nevertheless, the Commission considers that for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention in the present case it must be deemed sufficient for the applicants to have complained in the domestic proceedings, as they did, that in the determination of their sentence regard was had to offences the commission of which had emerged from the hearings. Insofar as their complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) is concerned, therefore, the applicants must be considered to have satisfied the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies.   2.    As to the merits of the complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2), the Government submit that the applicants were only convicted of offences with which they had been charged. However, when determining a penalty, a court is not obliged to confine itself to the offences with which an accused has been charged, but it may also bear in mind circumstances as long as these have been raised at the hearing or are generally known. The Government point out that in the present case the Court of Appeal thus also took into account, for example, the possible negative effects on the applicants of the media attention which the case had attracted. Moreover, in passing sentence, the Court of Appeal had regard to aggravating and extenuating circumstances which related to the case and the person and company concerned.        With regard to the first applicant, the Government argue that it was established during the proceedings that numerous offences had been committed within the Zegwaard companies. Although the Court of Appeal explicitly did not conclude that these offences had been committed by the first applicant, it was nevertheless able to deduce from what emerged from the hearings that the power of decision and the responsibilities for the Zegwaard companies had been his. By holding, therefore, that the commission of these offences was to a large extent attributable to the first applicant, the Court of Appeal was able to conclude that although the first applicant was not criminally liable these circumstances should nevertheless be taken into account in the determination of the sentence to be passed.        Similarly, with regard to the applicant company, the Government submit that the Court of Appeal concluded from what emerged at the hearings that numerous activities had taken place within the Zegwaard companies which could be considered to constitute criminal offences. Again, the Court of Appeal did not find that the applicant company had committed these offences itself, but it merely took into account all kinds of facts relating to the circumstances.        According to the Government, the most important aspect of the principle of presumption of innocence relates to the basis for conviction. They argue in this respect that in the present case the applicants were convicted on the basis of legally recognised evidence submitted during the trial by the prosecuting authorities which the applicants were given every opportunity to refute.        The applicants agree with the Government that a court may take into account all conceivable facts and circumstances in passing sentence provided that in doing so it does not violate the principle of presumption of innocence. In their opinion, a court goes beyond what can be accepted in this respect if, as in the present case, when stating its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, it describes as offences matters of which it has previously acquitted the accused, in respect of which it had held the indictment to be null and void or with which the accused had not been charged.        They further submit that the first applicant was acquitted of the great majority of the offences with which he was charged precisely because he could not be held responsible in legal terms as the person actually in charge under Section 51 para. 2 of the Criminal Code. Yet in the determination of the sentence the Court of Appeal nevertheless held the first applicant responsible for these offences.        Having regard to the parties' submissions and the case-law of the Convention organs, the Commission considers that this part of the application raises complex questions of fact and law which require an examination of the merits. The Commission concludes, therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring this part inadmissible have been established.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the      applicants' complaint that the principle of presumption of      innocence was violated when the Court of Appeal in the      determination of the sentence took into account offences with      which they had not been charged, in respect of which the      indictment had been declared null and void or of which they had      been acquitted;        DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.        M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               G.H. THUNE       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber