CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 26909/95                       by Peter Andreas and                       Monika Kristina TENNENBAUM                       against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    G.H. THUNE, President            MM     J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 28 December 1994 by Peter Andreas and Monika Kristina Tennenbaum against Sweden and registered on 29 March   1995 under file No. 26909/95;         Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 22 October 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants on 27 January 1997;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants, Swedish citizens born in 1948 and 1945 respectively, reside in Malmö.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   a.     The particular circumstances of the case         On 27 August 1991 the applicants applied to the Central Social Council (Socialnämnden, Centrumbyrån; hereinafter "the Council") of Malmö for social welfare assistance.   They requested that the Council provide them with a place to live and grant them an allowance for their living expenses.         The same day the Council rejected the applicants' request for an allowance.   Temporary accommodation was, however, arranged for them at the Salvation Army's hostel in Malmö during the period 27 August - 16 September 1991.   The Council stated that, due to the applicants' behaviour at the places where they had previously been accommodated, the hostel was the only available alternative.   The assistance was given under Section 6 of the Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen, 1980:620).         On 20 September 1991 the applicants appealed against the decision in so far as it concerned the housing to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Malmöhus.   They claimed that they should be given an allowance to cover the cost of staying at Hotel Alexandra in Malmö from 27 August until either the Council had provided them with permanent housing or the court had examined the case.         By judgment of 20 November 1991, the County Administrative Court, noting that its examination was limited to the period referred to in the Council's decision, rejected the appeal.   It found that the applicants, on 27 August, had been in urgent need of a place to live after they had left their previous housing and that, in these circumstances, the arrangements made by the Council were satisfactory, although the hostel was not suitable for permanent housing purposes.         On 3 January 1992 the applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Gothenburg.   By judgment of 20 January 1992, the appellate court upheld the County Administrative Court's judgment.         On 4 February 1992 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).   They wished to have confirmed that they had been entitled to hotel accommodation during the period in question.   They did not claim any compensation, however.         On 25 August 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court directed the Council to submit an opinion in the case.   On 6 October the Council submitted its opinion to the court, which forwarded it two days later to the applicants.   The applicants then submitted comments on 20 and 28 October.   On the latter date they also informed the court of their post office box address in Malmö.         On 15 December 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicants leave to appeal.   At the same time it directed the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen; hereinafter "the Board") to submit an opinion in the case no later than 15 February 1993, a time-limit later extended until 15 March 1993.         Between December 1992 and December 1993 the applicants were living in a flat in Malmö provided by the Council.   The applicants allege that they were unable to receive mail at home, as their flat was situated in a neighbourhood populated by Moslem refugees from the Middle East and the applicants, therefore, could not put their Jewish surname on the door.   Furthermore, they could no longer afford to pay for their post office box.   The applicants allege that they informed the Supreme Administrative Court, by letter and by telephone, of their problems and asked the court to correspond with them via the Council. The respondent Government state, however, that there is no notation in the court's case-file of a request for correspondence via the Council.         On 15 March 1993 the Board submitted its opinion to the court.         By notices of 24 March, 6 May, 29 June, 10 August and 19 September 1993, the Board's opinion was sent to the applicants with an invitation to comment within four weeks.   The notices were sent together with a receipt form by mail, the first three times to the applicants' post office box and later to an address in Malmö.         On 13 October 1993 the applicants returned the signed receipt form.   Thus, the Board's opinion had been served on the applicants.         On 22 December 1993 the applicants replied that they wished to make no further comments.         On 5 December 1993 the applicants moved to Halmstad, in February 1994 they moved to Gothenburg and in April 1994 they moved to Trelleborg.   They informed the Supreme Administrative Court of their changes of address.         By letters to the court of 18 January, 30 June and 17 October 1994, the applicants requested information on the handling of the case.   On 1 March 1994 they submitted further observations on the merits.         By decision of 18 October 1994, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the applicants' accommodation at the Salvation Army's hostel could reasonably be accepted during a transitional period not exceeding a week.   For the remainder of the period in question, i.e. the last two weeks of the period 27 August - 16 September 1991, housing of a higher standard should have been provided for the applicants by the Council. However, as the applicants' claim concerned past time and did not involve any sum of money, the court decided to take no further action in the matter.   It thus struck the case out of its list of cases.   b.     Relevant domestic law         Section 6 of the Social Services Act provides the following:   (Translation)         "The individual is entitled to assistance from the Social       Council for his subsistence and other living expenses, if       his needs cannot be provided for in any other way.          The assistance shall assure the individual of a       reasonable standard of living.   The assistance shall be       such as to strengthen his ability to lead an independent       life."         According to Section 73 of the Act, the Social Council's decision in regard to social welfare assistance under Section 6 may be appealed against to the administrative courts.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain of the length of the proceedings in the case.   They invoke Article 6 of the Convention.   2.     Further under Article 6 of the Convention, they claim that the Supreme Administrative Court failed to determine their case, as it was struck out of the court's list of cases.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 28 December 1994 and registered on 29 March 1995.         On 27 June 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as it concerned the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 22 October 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicants replied on 27 January 1997.     THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain of the length of the proceedings in the case.   They invoke Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which, in relevant part, reads as follows:         "1.   In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone       is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time       ..."         The respondent Government contest that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable to the present case.   They claim that the proceedings did not involve a determination of a civil right.         As to the merits of the present complaint, the Government first submit that the period to be considered started on 20 September 1991 when the County Administrative Court received the applicants' appeal against the Council's decision and ended on 18 October 1994 when the Supreme Administrative Court took its decision.   Although the case itself was not complex, the Government maintain that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded.   They argue that the delays in the proceedings were mainly due to the Supreme Administrative Court's difficulties in corresponding with the applicants.   Thus, the case was delayed for approximately seven months when the court tried to serve the opinion of the National Board of Health and Welfare on the applicants. Moreover, the Government claim that the matter at stake in the proceedings was of no importance to the applicants, as the period at issue had come to an end already before they appealed to the courts.       The applicants submit that the case concerned their civil rights. They have no complaints with regard to the examination of the case at first and second instance.   However, the time spent by the Supreme Administrative Court was excessive.   The applicants state that almost one year elapsed before that court decided to grant leave to appeal and that, save for directing the National Board of Health and Welfare to submit an opinion in the case, the court made no further investigations in the case.   The applicants claim that they informed the court where they could be reached.   First they asked the court to correspond with them via the Council, with which they were in constant contact, and later, when they moved from Malmö, they informed the court of their changes of address.         Noting that the Government contest the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission considers that it is not necessary to determine this question as, even assuming that that Article applies, the present complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons.         As regards the period to be considered, the Commission notes that the applicants' request for assistance had to be determined by the Social Council before they had recourse to the courts.   The Commission therefore considers that the relevant period started when their application was filed with the Council, i.e. on 27 August 1991.   The period ended on 18 October 1994 when the Supreme Administrative Court issued its decision.   Thus, the total length of the proceedings to be assessed under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) was almost three years and two months.         From a general point of view the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed with reference to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and that of the authorities before which the case was brought (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Boddaert v. Belgium judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A no. 235-D, p. 82, para. 36).         Recalling that the examination by the Social Council and the courts at first and second instance took less than five months in total, the Commission finds, in agreement with the parties, that there is no reason to criticise the handling of the case during these stages of the proceedings.         The question remains whether the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court was excessive.   The Commission recalls that the case was pending before that court for a period of about two years and eight and a half months.   During that period the court obtained the opinions of the Social Council and the National Board of Health and Welfare.   Furthermore, it decided separately and consecutively on both the question of leave to appeal and the merits of the case (in the latter respect, cf. under 2 below).         As regards the conduct of the applicants, the Commission considers that they caused a considerable delay in the case on account of the difficulties in corresponding with them.   They have failed to show that the Supreme Administrative Court received any request for correspondence via the Social Council.   The delay of approximately seven months resulting from the court's unsuccessful attempts at serving the opinion of the National Board of Health and Welfare on the applicants is therefore imputable to them.   In this connection, the Commission further notes that it took the applicants more than two months to reply that they wished to make no comments on that opinion.       It is true that, after the Supreme Administrative Court had been seized with the case, more than six months elapsed before the court requested the Social Council's opinion and, following the receipt of that opinion and the applicants comments thereon, proceeded to decide on the question of leave to appeal.   Moreover, following the applicants' reply to the opinion of the National Board of Health and Welfare, the court took almost ten months to decide the case.         However, acknowledging that cases concerning basic social welfare benefits normally call for special diligence, the Commission considers that there was no particular need of a speedy determination of the applicants' case.   The applicants only sought a confirmation of their right to a certain kind of accommodation for a period which had already ended when they lodged their appeal with the County Administrative Court.   Furthermore, during the court proceedings they appear to have had sufficient housing.   Thus, between December 1992 and December 1993 they lived in a flat provided by the Social Council.         Having regard to the above and taking into account the overall length of the proceedings in the case, the Commission considers that they did not go beyond what may be considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case.   Thus, the present complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     Further under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the applicants claim that the Supreme Administrative Court failed to determine their case, as it was struck out of the court's list of cases.         However, the Commission recalls that, on 15 December 1992, the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicants leave to appeal. By decision of 18 October 1994, it found partly in favour of the applicants in concluding that - save for the first week of the period at issue - they should have been given housing of a higher standard by the Council.   Consequently, the applicants claim was examined on the merits.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.              M.-T. SCHOEPFER                        G.H. THUNE             Secretary                            President       to the Second Chamber                of the Second Chamber