CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 30548/96                       by Helen MacGREGOR                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    J. LIDDY, President            MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 15 January 1996 by Helen MacGREGOR against the United Kingdom and registered on 22 March 1996 under file No. 30548/96;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the respondent Government's letter of 1 August 1997 and the      applicant's reply of 13 August 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, a British citizen, born in 1970, lives at Dorset. She is a veterinary nurse.   Before the Commission, she is represented by Mr. Luke Clements of Thorpes Solicitors, Hereford.        The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.        The applicant, after her marriage in December 1994, reduced her working hours in order to be able to devote more attention to her son, who was then four years old, and her husband, a wheelchair user severely disabled after an accident.        The applicant did so in the anticipation that her loss of income would be compensated by reduced taxation in the form of an increased income tax allowance, the additional personal allowance, awarded to tax paying workers with young children, whose spouses are totally incapacitated.        The applicant expected to be able to claim this additional personal allowance by virtue of Section 259 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.   By notification dated 13 March 1995 the applicant was advised that her tax coding included the additional personal allowance at the current rate of £1,720.00 per annum. However, this allowance was then rescinded by a notice of the Inland Revenue dated 23 March 1995.        The applicant appealed against this decision.   By letter of 27 September 1995 the Inland Revenue stated that:        "... the Government's ruling is still that the additional      personal allowance is not to be extended to women with      incapacitated husbands. ...        The arrangement whereby a married man with children whose      wife is totally incapacitated is able to claim the      additional personal allowance whereas a wife in similar      circumstances cannot has its roots in a time when Social      Security provision for the disabled was much less      comprehensive than it is now.   Up to 1960 married men with      incapacitated wives qualified for the housekeeper allowance      available to widows and widowers.   That allowance was      introduced nearly 70 years ago to meet the situation where      a female relative or other person - usually a female -      living in the home of a widow or widower was employed      either to take care of young children or as a resident      housekeeper.        When the additional personal allowance was introduced in      1960 for those with single handed responsibility for      children it was extended - in place of the housekeeper      allowance - to married men with dependent children whose      wives were totally incapacitated.   It was considered at the      time that a wife who was wholly incapacitated was not able      to play an active part in looking after the home and      children. ...        It is recognised that the thinking behind the provision may      well be regarded anachronistic, particularly in view of the      introduction of independent taxation of husbands and wives.      Indeed the housekeeper allowance and some other minor      allowances were abolished in 1988 largely because they were      out of tune with modern society.   At the time the      Government considered whether this aspect of the additional      personal allowance should be abolished since its main      purpose has in any case been largely superseded by the      development of the Social Security system which is regarded      as a better vehicle than reliefs for delivering cash      assistance to those with special needs."   COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains that as a result of the application of Section 259 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, she has been a victim of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   She maintains that if she was male, she would be entitled to be exempted from part of her income tax, but because she is female she is not.   She claims that there is no justification for this discriminatory treatment based on sex.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 15 January 1996 and registered on 22 March 1996.        On 9 April 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government, on 1 August 1997, after an extension of the time- limit fixed for the submission of observations, informed the Commission that they were content not to contest the admissibility of the application and did not propose to submit written observations on admissibility, but would reserve their position on the merits.   The applicant noted the Government's position by her letter of 13 August 1997.        On 28 October 1997 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.   THE LAW        The applicant complains that as a result of the application of Section 259 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, she has been a victim of a discriminatory treatment based on sex which is in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1).        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) provides as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as follows:        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national      minority, property, birth or other status."        The respondent Government have made no submission on admissibility and have reserved their position with regard to the merits.   The applicant has noted the Government's position and has not submitted any written observations concerning admissibility of the application.        The Commission considers that the application raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application as a whole.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring them inadmissible have been established.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the      merits of the case.     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber