CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 19 décembre 1997

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display:inline-block } .sF1D05512 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }         CASE OF HELLE v. FINLAND   (157/1996/776/977)                       JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG     19 December 1997     The present judgment is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997. These reports are obtainable from the publisher Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (Luxemburger Straße 449, D-50939 Köln), who will also arrange for their distribution in association with the agents for certain countries as listed overleaf.   List of Agents     Belgium : Etablissements Emile Bruylant (rue de la Régence 67,   B-1000 Bruxelles)   Luxembourg : Librairie Promoculture (14, rue Duchscher   (place de Paris), B.P. 1142, L-1011 Luxembourg-Gare)   The Netherlands : B.V. Juridische Boekhandel & Antiquariaat   A. Jongbloed & Zoon (Noordeinde 39, NL-2514 GC 's-Gravenhage) SUMMARY [1] Judgment delivered by a Chamber Finland – consequences of respondent State’s reservation on applicant’s right to an oral hearing before an i n dependent and impartial tribunal and whether the domestic proceedings were unfair on account of domestic courts ’ alleged failure to state reasons for their decisions and/or to respect equality of arms principle article 6 § 1 of the convention A.   Applicability Not disputed – Court sees no reason to find otherwise – there was a dispute over applicant’s right to pecuniary benefits, which was a “civil right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. B.   Compliance 1.   Absence of oral hearing before independent and impartial tribunal Supreme Administrative Court was an independent and impartial tribunal with full appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of Cathedral Chapter and had discretion to organise an oral procedure – that Cathedral Chapter’s decisions were subject to control of a court satisfying requirements of Article 6 § 1 is sufficient for the purposes of compliance with that provision. Admittedly Finland’s reservation had excluded a right to an oral hearing before Supreme Administrative Court – nevertheless, that reservation complied with substantive and procedural requirements of Article 64 of Convention – that applicant did not obtain an oral hearing at any stage of domestic proceedings must be seen as a consequence of the operation of a valid reservation – result not therefore incompatible with the Convention. Conclusion : no violation (unanimously). 2.   Alleged unfairness of domestic proceedings Applicant cannot maintain that there was a breach of “equality of arms” – he availed himself of possibility to comment on opinions submitted by Cathedral Chapter to Supreme Administrative Court in both appeal proceedings. Whether succinctness of reasons given by Supreme Administrative Court for rejecting applicant’s two appeals complied with Article 6 § 1 requirements to be determined in light of all circumstances of case – Supreme Administrative Court incorporated in its two decisions reasons given by Cathedral Chapter and appended latter’s decisions to its own rulings – Cathedral Chapter had given due consideration to applicant’s arguments on (1) his employment status and (2) level of compensation to which entitled – by incorporating reasons of Cathedral Chapter to reject applicant’s arguments, Supreme Administrative Court indicated that it had no reasons of its own to depart from decisions of Cathedral Chapter and that applicant had not adduced any new arguments – Supreme Administrative Court had addressed essence of applicant’s arguments and did not merely rubber-stamp decisions of Cathedral Chapter. Conclusion : no violation (unanimously). COURT'S CASE-LAW REFERRED TO 26.3.1992, Editions Périscope v. France; 27.10.1993, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands; 9.12.1994, Ruiz Torija v. Spain; 20.11.1995, British-American Tobacco Company Ltd v. the Netherlands; 23.10.1996, Ankerl v. Switzerland; 18.2.1997, Nideröst ‑ Huber v. Switzerland; 26.8.1997, De Haan v. the Netherlands   In the case of Helle v. Finland [2] , The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article   43 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) and the relevant provisions of Rules   of Court B [3] , as a Chamber composed of the following judges:   Mr   R. Ryssdal , President ,   Mr   N. Valticos ,   Mr   I. Foighel ,   Mr   R. Pekkanen ,   Mr   A.N. Loizou ,   Mr   L. Wildhaber ,   Mr   D. Gotchev,   Mr   B. Repik,   Mr   P.   van   Dijk , and also of Mr   H. Petzold , Registrar , and Mr   P.J. Mahoney , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 25   September and 27 November 1997, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 5   December 1996, within the three-month period laid down by Article   32 §   1 and Article   47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no.   20772/92) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Commission under Article   25 by a Finnish citizen, Mr   Pekka Helle, on 28   September 1992. The Commission’s request referred to Articles   44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby Finland recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article   46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. 2.     In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule   35 §   3 (d) of Rules   of Court B, the applicant designated the lawyers who would represent him (Rule   31). 3.     The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr   R. Pekkanen, the elected judge of Finnish nationality (Article   43 of the Convention), and Mr   R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule   21 §   4 (b)). On   21 January 1997, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr   L.-E. Pettiti, Mr   B. Walsh, Mr   N.   Valticos, Mr   I. Foighel, Mr   A.N. Loizou, Mr   L. Wildhaber and Mr   P.   van   Dijk. Subsequently Mr   D. Gotchev and Mr   B. Repik, substitute judges, replaced Mr Pettiti and Mr   Walsh who were unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule   22 §§ 1 and 2 and Rule   24 §1). 4.     As President of the Chamber (Rule   21 §   6), Mr   Ryssdal, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Finnish Government (“the Government”), the applicant’s lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules   39 §   1 and 40). Pursuant to the order made in consequence on 10   March 1997, the Registrar received the Government’s memorial on 24   June 1997 and the applicant’s memorial on 7   July 1997. 5.     In accordance with the President’s decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24   September 1997. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.   There appeared before the Court: (a)   for the Government Mr   H. Rotkirch , Ambassador, Director General       for Legal Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Mr   A. Kosonen , Ministry for Foreign Affairs,   c o-Agent ; Ms   T. Lybeck , Ministry of Education, Ms   A. Manner , Ministry of Justice,   Advisers ; (b)   for the Commission Mr   M.P. Pellonpää ,   Delegate ; (c)   for the applicant Mr   H. Salo , Advokat , Helsinki Bar, Mr   J. Kortteinen, Assistant Professor,       University of Helsinki,   Counsel.   The Court heard addresses by Mr   Pellonpää, Mr   Salo, Mr   Kortteinen and Mr   Rotkirch. AS TO THE FACTS                Particular circumstances of the case A.   The applicant 6.     The applicant, Mr   Pekka Helle, is a retired verger of the Evangelical-Lutheran parish of Mäntsälä. According to the applicant his family have for four generations provided a verger to the parish. 7.     Although he had performed duties for the parish since 1952, it was only on 21   September 1966 that a decision (hereinafter, “the 1966 decision”) was taken by the Parish Council ( kirkkovaltuusto , kyrkofullmäktige ) to establish officially the post of verger and to confirm the applicant as the verger (see paragraph 8 below). B.     The 1966 decision of the Parish Council and the creation of the post of verger 8.     In creating the post, the Parish Council noted that the Parish Management Board ( kirkkohallintokunta ) had proposed that the verger be paid 75% of the salary on the Grade 9 salary scale for employees of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church. However the Parish Council ultimately decided that the verger’s post was to be considered as the main occupation (päätoimi) of the post holder and the holder remunerated according to Grade   A3 of the salary scale. In salary terms, this in fact amounted to the same level of remuneration as suggested by the Parish Management Board. However, there was no indication as to whether it was a full-time or part-time post. The Parish Council further decided that Mr   Helle, as the post holder, should not be remunerated for the performance of any extra duties and that he should be authorised, as was proposed by the Parish Management Board, to manage a funeral home. C.   The new collective agreement arrangements 9.     As from the beginning of 1975 a new collective agreement for Church employees came into force. Under that agreement a new salary scheme was introduced under which salaries were fixed in respect of the various posts and the terminology was clarified so that a main occupation of a Church employee could henceforth either be full-time or part-time. The new salary system was applied in 1977 to the Church employees of the parish of Mäntsälä. D.   The 1977 decision of the Parish Board 10.     In a decision taken on 16   November 1977 (hereinafter “the 1977 decision”) in the context of the application of the new collective agreement arrangements to its employees, the Parish Board (( kirkkoneuvosto, kyrkorådet) noted that the decision of the Parish Council of 21   September 1966 creating the post of verger (see paragraph 8 above) did not specify whether that post was full-time or part-time. The view was taken that since the Parish Management Board at the relevant time had proposed that Mr   Helle be granted permission to manage a funeral home it was probable that his post was a part-time main occupation. The Parish Board confirmed that the verger’s working hours were thirty ‑ five hours per week and that his salary was 87% of that payable to a full-time verger on the revised salary scales. The applicant’s salary however remained the same as before. Further, the Parish Board authorised Mr Helle to manage a funeral home alongside his duties as verger. 11.     From the moment of taking up his employment as verger, the applicant carried out his duties on the understanding that his post was in fact a full-time one. He was never informed of the 1977 decision and its implications were not apparent to him since he continued to receive the same salary and to work forty hours per week. 12.     It was only in December 1988 when he enquired about his pension rights that he reached the conclusion that the Parish Board had in 1977 considered his post to be part-time and that some of his salary-related entitlements including pension rights were as a consequence lower than those of a full-time post holder. E.     The legal proceedings 13.     On 9   January 1989 the applicant appealed against the 1977 decision to the Parish Council claiming arrears of salary owed to him as a full-time parish verger and other lost benefits.           1.   The Parish Council decision of October 1989 14.     In its decision of 10   October 1989 the Parish Council noted that, according to the decision of the Parish Board of 16   November 1977 (see paragraph 10 above), Mr   Helle’s post was a part-time main occupation. The Parish Council considered that it was not legally obliged to grant the applicant any pecuniary benefits in addition to those he already received on the basis of the 1977 decision of the Parish Board (see paragraph 10 above). It nevertheless decided on an ex gratia basis that the applicant should be paid the difference between his part-time salary and a full-time salary as from 1   January 1987. It also increased his pension benefits and awarded him a compensatory lump sum. 2.   The decision of the Cathedral Chapter of June 1990 15.     In the meantime, on 25   January 1989, the applicant had also lodged an appeal with the Cathedral Chapter   ( tuomiokapituli , domkapitlet ) of the Helsinki Diocese ( hiippakunta , stift ), complaining that the Parish Board’s 1977 decision amounted to a unilateral change by the Board to the nature of his post and had prejudiced him financially. Under section   443 of the Church Act 1964 ( kirkkolaki , kyrkolag 635/64), the Cathedral Chapter acted as “a court of first instance” in cases concerning salary claims of parish officials. On 15   November 1989, following the Parish Council’s decision of 10   October 1989, the applicant lodged a supplementary appeal with the Cathedral Chapter, complaining about the low level of the benefits granted to him in that decision and claiming, inter alia , compensation. 16.     The Cathedral Chapter joined the two appeals. In its decision of 1   June 1990 it stated that the applicant had locus standi and that the appeal could not be considered as time-barred since the applicant had not been notified of the 1977 decision as required by Finnish law (see paragraph   11 above). As regards the merits, the Cathedral Chapter noted that, in its opinion, the 1977 decision of the Parish Board was primarily a decision on the working hours for the verger’s post. It had not been possible to ascertain from the documents produced in the case whether the post in question was created in 1966 as a full-time or part-time main occupation. In any event, the Parish Board lacked the competence to convert a full-time post into a part-time one since the Parish Council was solely competent in 1977 to take such a decision. On the other hand, the Parish Board’s specification of the working hours for the post had been the basis for the revised method of calculating salaries under the new collective agreement arrangements. On these grounds the Cathedral Chapter found that the 1977 decision had not altered the applicant’s post from a full-time to a part-time one. In view of the fact that the parish had sole competence to decide on the working hours for a post, the Cathedral Chapter dismissed the verger’s appeal in that regard. It further considered that it was not competent to examine his claims for compensation and dismissed this part of the appeal without examining the merits. 3.   The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of March 1991 17.     On 28   June 1990 the applicant appealed against the Cathedral Chapter’s decision to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), claiming that the decisions of the Cathedral Chapter, the Parish Council and the Parish Board should be repealed and that he should be compensated for the financial loss suffered since 1   January 1978 through not being recognised as a full-time verger. At the Supreme Administrative Court’s request, the Cathedral Chapter submitted on 5   September 1990 an opinion in which it stated that the appeal should be rejected. The applicant filed his comments on the opinion on 16   October 1990. 18.     In a decision of 8   March 1991 the Supreme Administrative Court, without having held an oral hearing, upheld the Cathedral Chapter’s decision as regards the effects of the 1977 decision, finding no reason to alter it. On the other hand, the Supreme Administrative Court considered that the Cathedral Chapter did have jurisdiction to examine the dispute regarding his compensation claim and therefore referred the case back for fresh examination. The Cathedral Chapter’s decision of 1   June 1990 was appended to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court but the latter decision did not refer to the Cathedral Chapter’s opinion or to the applicant’s comments thereon. 4.   The decision of the Cathedral Chapter of August 1991 19.     In a fresh appeal of 31   May 1991 to the Cathedral Chapter the applicant maintained his previous complaints in respect of both the 1977 decision and the level of compensation set by the earlier decision of the Parish Council. Moreover, he maintained that in the event of the Cathedral Chapter not being satisfied that his post had been full-time since its creation, he requested the Cathedral Chapter to hold an oral hearing and hear witnesses on the matter. In this connection, the applicant submitted a written statement by six former members of the Parish Council who had participated in the creation of his post in 1966. In their view, the Parish Council had been aware of the fact that the anticipated number of working hours clearly sufficed for the purposes of a full-time post and it had therefore rejected a proposal to establish a part-time post. The applicant also submitted a written statement of his trade union to the effect that the parish had never contested the fact that he had worked at least forty hours per week, although he had only been paid a salary based on thirty-five hours per week. The fact that he had (in 1966) been granted permission to have a secondary occupation (to manage a funeral home) had not entitled the parish to amend his employment contract unilaterally. 20.     In its decision of 29   August 1991 the Cathedral Chapter took account of the various written statements submitted in support of the applicant’s claims. Having regard to the evidence adduced and to the fact that it had not been possible to submit further evidence concerning his working hours especially as the applicant had a secondary occupation closely related to his duties as verger, the Cathedral Chapter upheld the decision of the Parish Council of 10   October 1991 and rejected his other claims for compensation for lack of sufficient evidence. The applicant’s request for an oral hearing was not mentioned in the decision. 5.   The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of March 1992 21.     The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against the decision of the Cathedral Chapter, claiming that the compensation had been fixed at too low a level. 22.     On 11   December 1991 the Cathedral Chapter, at the request of the Supreme Administrative Court, submitted a further opinion to the court in which it stated that the applicant’s appeal should be rejected. The applicant filed his comments on the opinion on 16   January 1992. 23.     On 31   March 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court, without holding an oral hearing, upheld the Cathedral Chapter’s decision of 29   August 1991, finding no reason to alter it. The decision referred to section   538b of the Church Act   1984 as well as to the Regulations on Posts and Salaries of the parish as adopted by the Cathedral Chapter in 1988. According to section 538b the terms of employment for posts within the Church were to be specified in regulations adopted by the Church Assembly ( kirkolliskokous , kyrko-mötet ), to the extent that they were not indicated in already existing regulations and collective agreements. The decision of the Cathedral Chapter of 29   August 1991 was appended to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court but the latter decision did not refer to the Cathedral Chapter’s opinion or to the applicant’s comments thereon. II.   Relevant domestic law 24.     Under   the Church Act 1964 ( kirkkolaki , kyrkolag 635/64) a decision by the Church Council could be appealed against to the Cathedral Chapter by any person claiming that the decision entailed a violation of his or her private rights (section   323 (1) as in force at the relevant time). 25.     The Cathedral Chapter is both an administrative and a judicial body of the Diocese (section   432). At the relevant time its members included the Bishop, as the chair, three Church assessors and one legal assessor. One of the Church assessors was Dean of the Cathedral Congregation ( tuomiokirkko-seurakunnan tuomiorovasti , domkyrkoförsamlingens domprost ) and also Vice-Chairman of the Cathedral Chapter. The two others were elected by the priests and curates of the Diocese from among its permanent priests. The Church assessors sat for a period of three years. As long as they were priests in the same parish or parish confederation they could not sit on the Cathedral Chapter for more than two periods. The legal assessor was a lawyer appointed by the Cathedral Chapter (sections   433 ‑ 435). 26.     The statutory rules on the disqualification of judges extended to the members of the Cathedral Chapter (section   436 (3)). Before taking up their duties, the members had to swear a judicial oath (section   437). 27.     In determining cases brought before it, the Cathedral Chapter was to base itself on the case file. If it was deemed necessary to hear witnesses, evidence was to be taken by an ordinary court of first instance on request by the Cathedral Chapter submitted via the County Administrative Board (section   455). On 1 January 1994 the 1964 Act was replaced by the 1993 Church Act ( kirkkolaki , kyrkolag 1054/93) which expressly provides that the Cathedral Chapter may hold oral hearings (Chapter   19, sections   6 and 7). 28.     Under section 15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act 1918 (no.   74/18), in order to clarify the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court may request opinions and reports, hold oral hearings and carry out an investigation. Under the 1996 Act on Judicial Procedure in Administrative Matters ( hallintolainkäyttölaki , förvaltningsprocesslag 588/96 – “the 1996 Act”, which entered into force on 1 December 1996) the Supreme Administrative Court must hold an oral hearing if a private party has requested this, but may nevertheless refuse this in certain circumstances (section   38 (1)). III.   FINLAND’S RESERVATION TO ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 29.     The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the Finnish Government on 10   May 1990 contained the following reservation, made in accordance with Article   64 of the Convention, in respect of the right to a public hearing guaranteed by Article   6 §   1: “ For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an oral hearing insofar as the current Finnish laws do not provide such a right. This applies to: 1.   proceedings before the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the Water Courts and the Water Court of Appeal in accordance with Chapter 26 Sections   7 and 8, as well as Chapter   30 Section 20, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, and Chapter 15 Section   23, as well as Chapter   16 Sections   14 and 39, of the Water Act; 2.   proceedings before the County Administrative Courts and the Supreme Administrative Court in accordance with Section   16 of the County Administrative Courts Act and Section   15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act; 3.   proceedings, which are held before the Insurance Court as the Court of Final Instance, in accordance with Section   9 of the Insurance Court Act; 4.   proceedings before the Appellate Board for Social Insurance in accordance with Section   8 of the Decree on the Appellate Board for Social Insurance. The provisions of the Finnish laws referred to above are attached to this reservation as a separate annex.” 30.     According to the annex to the above reservation, the relevant part of section   15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act reads: “In investigating a case, the Supreme Administrative Court may ... hold oral hearings ... In an oral hearing the parties, witnesses and experts may be heard, and other evidence may be taken. The Supreme Administrative Court may decide that oral hearings ... be conducted by one or more members of the Court together with the referendary.” 31.     On 20   December 1996, following the entry into force of the 1996 Act, Finland withdrew the above reservation, inter alia , in respect of proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court concerning decisions taken after 1   December 1996.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 32.     The applicant lodged his application (no. 20772/92) with the Commission on 28   September 1992. He complained that, in breach of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention, he had not been afforded a fair and oral procedure before an independent and impartial tribunal in the domestic proceedings. In addition, he alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article   6 §   1. Finally, he claimed that the refusal of the Finnish authorities to award him all the benefits to which he was entitled as the holder of a full-time post since 1966 gave rise to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention. 33.     On 7   March 1996 the Commission declared admissible the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 §   1 of the Convention and declared the remainder of his complaint inadmissible. In its report of 15   October 1996 (Article   31), it expressed the opinion that there had been no violation of Article   6 §   1 on account of the absence of an oral hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal (unanimously) and no violation of the same provision with regard to the fairness of the domestic proceedings (twenty-five votes to five). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the two separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [4] . FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 34.     The applicant requested the Court to find that he was denied the right to a fair and oral procedure before an independent and impartial tribunal, in breach of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. He also requested the Court to award him just satisfaction under Article   50 of the Convention. The Government maintained that the conduct of the domestic proceedings disclosed no breach of the requirements of Article   6 §   1 and accordingly no award should be made to the applicant under Article   50. AS TO THE LAW alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the convention 35.     Mr Helle contended that he had never received an oral hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal at any stage of the domestic proceedings nor obtained adequate reasons from the Cathedral Chapter or the Supreme Administrative Court for their rejection of his claims. Moreover, the fairness of the procedure before the Supreme Administrative Court was vitiated on account of the influence exerted by the Cathedral Chapter on the proceedings. He pleaded that these basic shortcomings in the domestic proceedings must be seen as a breach of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention which provides, to the extent relevant: “1.     In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law …” The Government contested the applicant’s assertions. The Commission concluded that there had been no breach of the guarantees laid down in Article 6   §   1 in the impugned domestic proceedings. Applicability of Article   6 §   1 36.     It was not contested that the proceedings taken by the applicant involved the determination of his civil rights and that Article   6 §   1 was accordingly applicable. 37.     The Court sees no reason to reach a contrary conclusion. The applicant and his employer, the parish, were in dispute over his claim to have held a full-time post since 1966 and to be entitled to the remuneration and related financial benefits associated with such a post. The rights invoked by the applicant were pecuniary in nature and thus fell within the category of “civil” rights, irrespective of the administrative nature of the proceedings in issue (see, mutatis mutandis , the Editions Périscope v. France judgment of 26   March 1992, Series A no. 234-B, p. 66, § 40). Article   6 §   1 is therefore applicable. B.     Compliance with Article   6 §   1 1.   As to the absence of an oral hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal 38.     The applicant maintained that at no stage in the proceedings before the Parish Council, the Cathedral Chapter and the Supreme Administrative Court had he been given an opportunity to state his case orally. Notwithstanding the fact that he may not have specifically requested the Supreme Administrative Court to hold an oral hearing there were compelling public-interest reasons which should have persuaded that court to organise an oral procedure of its own motion. In the first place, the Supreme Administrative Court provided the only independent and impartial judicial forum for challenging the 1977 decision of the Parish Board, having regard to the fact that the Cathedral Chapter was an administrative body with appellate functions within the Evangelical-Lutheran Church and was closely associated with the interests of his employer, the parish. In brief, it lacked, as did the Parish Council, the essential qualities of independence and impartiality required of a tribunal within the meaning of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention. Secondly, it was crucial to the success of his case that he be given an opportunity at some stage in the litigation to argue points of fact and law and to call and have questioned his witnesses who could confirm that it was the intention of the Parish Council in 1966 to establish a full-time post of verger. The applicant further contended that the Cathedral Chapter was under a duty to organise an oral hearing since it had not been included in the exhaustive list of tribunals covered by the terms of Finland’s reservation. Its failure to do so, despite his request (see paragraph 19 above), should have been remedied on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court itself holding an oral procedure. 39.     At the hearing the applicant claimed that his grievances could not be countered by the argument that Finland’s reservation (see paragraph   29 above) provided a watertight defence to the lack of an oral hearing at all stages of the proceedings. To allow the reservation to produce such general and far-reaching effects in the domestic legal order would be contrary to the requirements of Article   64 of the Convention. 40.     The Government stressed that the decisions of the Cathedral Chapter, irrespective of whether or not it could properly be referred to as an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article   6 §   1, were subject to the supervision of the Supreme Administrative Court in the exercise of the latter’s appellate jurisdiction. The independence and impartiality of that court had never been disputed. While it was true that the Cathedral Chapter had not held an oral hearing when adjudicating on the applicant’s grievances, the organisation of an oral procedure before the Supreme Administrative Court would have fully met the requirements of Article   6 §   1 in this respect and compensated for the deficiencies in the proceedings before the Cathedral Chapter. This was all that was required under Article   6 §   1. 41.     It was true that the Supreme Administrative Court did not hold an oral hearing in the appeal proceedings. However, the applicant had never in fact requested the Supreme Administrative Court to organise an oral procedure and he could be considered to have waived his right to one; nor did there appear to be any reasons of public interest which would have compelled the Supreme Administrative Court to do so given that the dispute in reality concerned the applicant’s entitlement to additional financial benefits. Notwithstanding this point, the Government stressed as a primary submission that Finland’s reservation clearly applied to proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court and provided a complete defence to the absence of an oral procedure in the applicant’s proceedings on appeal. That reservation was fully compatible with the substantive and procedural requirements of Article   64 of the Convention. 42.     The Commission agreed with the Government’s conclusions on the efficacy of the guarantees offered by the Supreme Administrative Court to remedy the absence of an oral hearing before the Cathedral Chapter and any doubts as to the latter’s independence and impartiality. Admittedly the Supreme Administrative Court never held an oral procedure. However, Finland’s reservation had validly excluded the right to such a procedure before that court. The Commission concluded therefore that there had been no violation of Article 6 §   1. 43.     The Court notes at the outset that the application of Finland’s reservation to the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court is central to the Government’s argument that the absence of an oral hearing before that court cannot be impugned under Article   6 §   1. The merits of that contention depend on the validity of that reservation, which falls to be assessed from the standpoint of Article 64 of the Convention. Article   64 provides: “1.   Any State may, when signing [the] Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article. 2.   Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.” 44.     Having regard to the terms of the reservation the Court, like the Commission, takes the view that it satisfied the substantive and procedural requirements of Article   64. In particular, it cannot be construed as a reservation of a general character. The scope of the reservation was, at the relevant time (see paragraph 31 above), limited to relieving the Supreme Administrative Court and certain other defined courts (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above) from the obligation to hold an oral hearing, having regard to the domestic laws then in force, including section   15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act 1918. It must be concluded therefore that the reservation was valid and that Finland was not under a Convention obligation to ensure that an oral hearing took place before the Supreme Administrative Court. 45.     As to the Cathedral Chapter’s refusal to hold an oral hearing when deciding afresh on the compensation issue (see paragraph 19 above), the Court observes that it has not been disputed by the applicant that the decisions of the Cathedral Chapter were subject to the full jurisdictional supervision of the Supreme Administrative Court acting as an independent and impartial tribunal. That court was competent to examine all questions of fact and law submitted to its appellate jurisdiction and could at the relevant time, in accordance with section   15 of the Supreme Administrative Court Act 1918 (see paragraph 28 above), have held an oral hearing allowing the applicant to state his case and, as appropriate, call witnesses in support of his claims. In these circumstances it must be concluded that the two sets of appeal proceedings which the applicant lodged before the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraphs 17 and 21 above) were capable of ensuring reparation of, firstly, the absence of an oral hearing before the Cathedral Chapter either on the issue of the effects of the 1977 decision or on the level of compensation fixed by the Parish Council (see paragraph 14 above) and, secondly, of any perceived shortcomings in the Cathedral Chapter’s independence and impartiality. 46.     The Court recalls in this regard that, according to its settled case-law, a violation of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention cannot be grounded on the alleged lack of independence or impartiality of a decision-making tribunal or the breach of an essential procedural guarantee by that tribunal if the decision taken was subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and ensures respect for the guarantees laid down in that provision (see, for example, the British-American Tobacco Company Ltd v. the Netherlands judgment of 20   November 1995, Series A no. 331, pp.   25 ‑ 26, § 78; and, most recently, the De Haan v. the Netherlands judgment of 26   August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p.   1393, §   52). 47.     As the Court noted previously (see paragraph 44 above), Finland was under no Convention obligation to ensure in respect of the Supreme Administrative Court that an oral hearing was held, having regard to the terms of Finland’s reservation (see paragraphs 29 and 44 above). While it is true that the effect of the reservation was to deny Mr   Helle a right to an oral hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal, this result must be considered to be compatible with the Convention and a consequence of the operation of a valid reservation. The aim of the reservation was to relieve the Supreme Administrative Court from the Convention requirement to hold an oral hearing during a transitional period and that requirement cannot be re-imposed during the subsistence of the reservation’s validity in order to compensate for the absence of such a hearing downstream in the domestic legal order. 48.     The Court accordingly con