CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 14 janvier 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 33127/96                       by T.D.                       against the Netherlands        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 14 January 1998, the following members being present:              MM     J.-C. GEUS, President                  M.A. NOWICKI                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV            Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 10 September 1996 by T.D. against the Netherlands and registered on 24 September 1996 under file No. 33127/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1946, and is currently serving a prison sentence in Maastricht. Before the Commission, he is represented by Ms I.N. Weski, a lawyer practising in Rotterdam.   a.    Particular circumstances of the present case        On 14 February 1992, the applicant was arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed offences under the Opium Act (Opiumwet), i.e. production and trafficking of amphetamines ("XTC").        Following hearings held on 20 May, 10 August and on 3, 4, 5 and 6 November 1992, the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam, by judgment of 20 November 1992, convicted the applicant of participation in a criminal organisation and a number of offences under the Opium Act and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.        In the subsequent proceedings on appeal before the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam, hearings were held on 13 May, 10 June, 6, 7 and 9 September, 24 November, 1, 8 and 10 December 1993, 1, 11 and 21 February 1994, 21 April and 25 and 27 May 1994. The witnesses heard before the Court of Appeal included the police officer and general Interregional Criminal Investigation Team (Interregionaal Recherche Team, hereinafter referred to as "IRT") leader Mr Van Baarle, the PTT employees Mr J. and Mr S., the police officer Van den Berg, the chief public prosecutor of Amsterdam Mr Vrakkink, the chief commissioner of the Amsterdam police Mr Nordholt, the executive IRT team leader Mr Lith, and the public prosecutor at the Amsterdam Regional Court Mr Wortel. Although the proceedings remained formally separated, the hearings in the applicant's case were held simultaneously with the hearings in the cases of seven co-accused.        When on 1 February 1994 the Court of Appeal took evidence from the witness Wortel, one of the three public prosecutors involved in the investigation against the applicant, Mr Wortel confirmed that the criminal investigation against the applicant had started on the basis of information provided by the Criminal Intelligence Service (Criminele Inlichtingen Dienst, hereinafter referred to as "CID") and that thus use had been made of informers not being police officers. He refused, however, to answer the question put by the defence whether after the start of the criminal investigation against the applicant further use had been made of such informers. He further stated that he preferred not to answer questions giving an insight in crime detecting working methods.        The defence objected to the witness' refusal to answer this question. Having deliberated, the Court of Appeal accepted Mr Wortel's refusal, holding:   <Translation>      "...the witness Wortel does not have to answer the precited      questions, as <the court> does not see that answering these      questions can add anything to any decision to be taken by the      court in this case, to which moreover it considers:      - as to the question whether after the start of the investigation      use has been made of informers, not answering this question can      be considered as justified from the point of view of protection      of investigation interests as the methods used by the police in      detecting punishable acts which have probably been committed do      not have to be made public without due reasons."        By judgment of 9 June 1994, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 20 November 1992, convicted the applicant of participation in a criminal organisation and various offences under the Opium Act and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment with deduction of the time spent in pre-trial detention. It further ordered the confiscation of a large number of items and assets. It declared the request of the prosecution also to deprive the applicant of any unlawfully obtained proceeds inadmissible on formal grounds.        In the determination of its sentence, the Court of Appeal stated that the duration of the criminal proceedings against the applicant constituted a mitigating factor, although the extensive investigation before the Court of Appeal had mainly been caused by requests of the defence.        Insofar as the defence had argued that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible, the Court of Appeal held that the placement of a printer on a telephone line in order to obtain information as to which numbers were dialled, the time and duration of any connections established via that telephone line and, upon request, the transmission of this information, which did not concern the contents of any telephone conversations, to the public prosecutor was provided for by Article 125f of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering, hereinafter referred to as "CCP"). The Court of Appeal accepted that requests by the prosecution to be provided with information obtained by the use of such printers constituted an interference with the personal sphere, but held that it could be regarded as foreseen in the law and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime.        The Court of Appeal further held that in any event a judicial control over the activities of the prosecution should remain possible. It considered that, therefore, the position taken by the public prosecutor at the Regional Court, to the effect that the Note of 2 September 1991 of police officer Van den Berg, in which the latter requested the use of the powers under Article 125f CCP, and the prosecutor's decision of 4 September 1991 on this request, should not be included in the case-file, was incomprehensible and unlawful. The Court of Appeal noted, however, that at the order of the Regional Court these documents had been added to the applicant's case-file.        The Court of Appeal considered it established on the basis of the formal report (proces-verbaal) of police officer Van den Berg and his testimony before the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal, that the data obtained through the printers had been destroyed at the order of the public prosecutor. In view of judicial control that was required, the Court of Appeal considered the decision to destroy these data incomprehensible and unlawful.        It found that this destruction had infringed the rights of the defence, but that this infringement was of such a limited nature that it could not lead to the consequences suggested by the defence. It held on this point: <Translation>      "The court considers it to have been made plausible, in the      absence of any elements for finding that the statements of <the      police officer who wrote the formal reports> Van den Berg should      be or could be put in doubt, that in the present investigation      the printer has been attached exclusively on grounds of      efficiency to only two telephone connections, only in order to      verify whether in fact use was made of these telephone lines,      that already shortly after the placement of these printers it has      been decided to continue the investigation only in respect of one      of those telephone lines by requesting the investigating judge      to authorise the tapping of telephone conversations on this one      line, and that the data from the printers do not in any event      contain any information relevant for the investigation. In this      connection the court further remarks that ... it has not been      made plausible in any way that in this case telephone      conversations have been tapped without the required authorisation      from the investigating judge."        As to the alleged unlawful start of the investigation regarding the applicant, the Court of Appeal found it established, on the basis of evidence obtained in the proceedings at issue, that the IRT had been informed on 23 August 1991 by the CID that the applicant and one other identified person, Mr R.E., were involved in the production of and trafficking in XTC and/or amphetamines. According to the witness Lith, the executive IRT team leader, this information had come from a reliable source. Further information from other sources had subsequently been received. On 2 September 1991, police officer Van den Berg had requested the public prosecutor to connect a printer to the two telephone lines used by R.E. This request had been granted on the same day. As from 5 September 1991, observations had taken place and, on 10 September 1991, a request to commence a preliminary judicial investigation had been made which had been granted by the investigating judge the same day. In the course of this investigation telephone conversations had been tapped.        Insofar as the defence argued that the above course of action had not in fact taken place in that way, the Court of Appeal found that this argument was based on an incorrect reading of the investigating judge's formal report on the hearing of the witness Lith. As to the argument advanced by the defence that the start of the investigation had been unlawful in that the information received on 2 September 1991 had been insufficient to warrant placing a printer on two telephone lines, the Court of Appeal found that the public prosecutor had not been wrong when deciding to authorise the placement of the printers. In this respect the Court had regard, on the one hand, to the nature and intrusive character of this method of investigation in connection with the information obtained which could justify the suspicion that serious offences were being or could be committed and, on the other hand, the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.        The Court further held that the rights of the defence did not include a right to obtain more information about the background of the initial CID information than the information which had been provided by the witness Lith. The Court considered that no facts or circumstances had been submitted by the defence which would justify a finding that the CID information had been obtained unlawfully. The defence had further not in any other way corroborated this contention.        As to the allegation of the defence that the investigating judge had been misled in respect of the request for authorisation of the tapping of telephone conversations, the Court of Appeal considered that this was not supported by the facts. As to the allegation that telephone conversations had been tapped without authorisation of the investigating judge, the Court of Appeal concluded that this was also not supported by the facts. It considered that in relation to this allegation several witnesses had been heard before the Regional Court as   well as before the Court of Appeal. Only one of these witnesses had given evidence - of a hearsay nature - that unauthorised tapping had occurred. However, this statement was not in the least supported by the other testimonies. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court of Appeal further concluded, in particular as regards conversations tapped on telephone number 01807-5****, that it had not been made plausible that telephone conversations had been tapped without the required authorisation of the investigating judge, that the connection between that telephone number and a particular address would have been known to the IRT prior to 22 January 1992, or that this address had been identified unlawfully. It further rejected the defence's argument that the search carried out at this address had been unlawful.        The Court of Appeal further rejected a request by the defence, in which it relied on Article 6 of the Convention, to add to the case- file the unpublished part of the Report of the Wierenga Commission, which had carried out an investigation following the disbandment of the IRT. It held on this point that the necessity for granting this request had not appeared.        In this respect it stated, inter alia:   <Translation>      "Together with counsel the Court considers that the finding of      the truth is the primary purpose in a trial concerning the      determination of a criminal charge, and that this point of      departure, which may be labelled inquisitorial, should be      maintained. To this extent it can thus not be said that such      proceedings are of an accusatory character. The Court agrees ...      with counsel's opinion that only adversarial proceedings, in      which the direct evidence rule, interpreted reasonably, is      respected, enhance the chance of finding the truth.        Noting the above point of departure the Court does not subscribe      to the opinion, as expressed by the procurator-general, that in      cases where it is argued, for instance, that irregularities have      occurred during the investigation, it is up to the defence to      substantiate this claim.        Depending on the circumstances of the case it must be determined      what may be asked from the defence in this respect. In any event,      it is generally for the defence to submit facts and circumstances      which in its opinion put the lawfulness of the investigation in      doubt and it cannot confine itself merely to submitting that such      lawfulness should or may be in doubt. In addition, the purpose      of the investigation at the trial is not, at least not in the      first place, to fill in lacunae in respect of the possibilities      to verify the course of events during the pre-trial investigation      by hearing witnesses or adding further elements to the case-file.      The general, and, in the eyes of the Court, realistic point of      departure is that the case-file submitted to the judge contains      sufficient elements on the basis of which it can be assessed      whether the investigation has taken place in compliance with the      relevant rules of law. The Court notes in this respect ... that      it is the explicit task of the judge to form his own opinion as      to the question whether the investigation has taken place in the      said manner.        In certain circumstances it must be accepted that no more can be      asked of the defence than that it give an indication in general      terms of, in its opinion, possible shortcomings in the pre-trial      investigation, and that it is for the prosecution or the      investigating authorities to elaborate on those facts and      circumstances which render a well-balanced judicial opinion      possible. This may occur, for instance, where the use and      permissibility of certain investigation methods are concerned -      i.e. subjects which the procurator-general has classified as      belonging to the "grey area". In this connection the Court      considers in the first place that it is finally and exclusively      for the judge to decide, with due regard to the law and thus the      relevant statutory rules and case-law, whether or not applicable      limits have been respected, and in the second place and connected      to the foregoing, whether or not the prosecution and the      investigating authorities were at liberty to withhold, by      invoking the interests of the investigation, information from the      judge which, given the task that he must carry out, should be      known to him. As an aside the Court would note that it does not      follow from the above that it is also required that facts which      are irrelevant for the examination of the case concerned should      be disclosed; moreover, in certain circumstances it should be      possible, but for a judge to determine, that whilst sufficient      information is being provided, the justified interests of      investigation and prosecution are taken into account at the same      time. In this respect the Court finally considers in the first      place and on the one hand, ... that it is normal for a certain      selection to take place when a case-file is being compiled and      when, especially at first sight, some of the information      contained therein may be deemed irrelevant, and that, therefore,      the mere fact that at the trial additions and clarifications are      found to be required cannot lead to the conclusion that      irregularities have taken place; and in the second place and on      the other hand, that the deliberate withholding of relevant      information or the failure to provide such information when      subsequently requested cannot remain without consequence for the      assessment of the questions at issue in the trial.        As regards the case at issue, the Court has, as a result of      public information about the disbandment of the IRT, investigated      in the course of various trials, by hearing a number of      witnesses, the question whether there were reasons to doubt the      lawfulness of the pre-trial investigation.        The Court has further taken note of the published Report of the      above-mentioned Wierenga Commission and the various widely      publicised articles and comments concerning the IRT. The Court      considers that this information is in the public domain and of      common knowledge.        The Court finds it established that no facts or circumstances      have been made plausible which would justify the conclusion that      the unpublished part of the Report of the Wierenga Commission      contains information concerning the investigation in the present      case, and neither can this be assumed in any other way. This      follows in the first place from the statements made by the      witnesses at the trial. It also follows from the published part      of the Report seen against the background of various press      reports. The Court deduces from these elements that the pre-trial      investigation or investigations by IRT teams under the direction      of public prosecutors and police officers, in respect of which      an inquiry has been held, did not concern the pre-trial      investigation in the present case. This finding is also supported      by the established fact that the charges in the present case      concerned - production and export of   - the substances MDA and/or      MDMA (XTC), whereas it appears clearly from the said Report and      publications that they are concerned with - import of - the      substances hashish and/or cocaine. Moreover, as regards the      specific points concerning the (un)lawfulness of the pre-trial      investigation indicated by counsel in the present case, the Court      has carried out a further investigation and according to its      findings stated above has each time reached the conclusion in      respect of those points that there was no unlawfulness or,      insofar as there was a certain flaw, that this flaw could be      considered as limited in character and not to have any connection      with the use of unlawful methods of investigation.        Apart from the said points, counsel has not referred to other      aspects, in any way specified, as regards the pre-trial      investigation which would require the Court to carry out a      further investigation.        Although the Court is aware that absolute certainty in this      matter can never be obtained, and therefore also not in the      present case, and although it finds that it should be considered      unacceptable, in view of the consideration mentioned above that      in a trial the finding of the truth is the primary aim, if      information known to the prosecution and the police authorities      is withheld from a judge, whereas the nature of this information      is such that, if he would have been aware of it, the judge could      or should reach a different finding, the Court finds on the basis      of the above considerations that there is sufficient ground for      its finding reached above that for a sound decision in this case      it does not find it necessary to add the unpublished part of the      Report of the Wierenga Commission [to the case-file]."        The Court of Appeal based the applicant's conviction on, inter alia, formal police reports on observations, statements made by various persons before the police, forensic evidence and the contents of forty-two telephone conversations tapped between 7 October 1991 and 6 February 1992 with authorisation by the investigating judge.        The applicant's appeal in cassation was rejected by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on 12 March 1996. Insofar as the applicant's complaints could be examined in proceedings in cassation, which are limited to points of law, the Supreme Court accepted the findings of the Court of Appeal and found that the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal were sufficient.        Insofar as the applicant complained of the Court of Appeal's decision that the witness Wortel did not have to answer the question whether after the investigation regarding the applicant had started further use was made of informers as it had not appeared that a reply to this question could contribute anything to the decision to be taken by the Court of Appeal in the proceedings against the applicant, the Supreme Court stated:   <Translation>      "The reasons stated by the Court of Appeal as to why it availed      itself of its powers under Article 288 CCP in conjunction with      Article 415 CCP, contain its finding that the general interest      of an effective investigation and the importance of protecting      informers against possible disclosure of their identity which in      the present case is connected with that general interest outweigh      the interest of the suspect in obtaining an answer to this      question.        This finding does not constitute an incorrect legal finding, in      particular not as regards Article 288 CCP and Article 6 of the      Convention. Furthermore, no additional reasons are required in      order to comprehend this finding, in view of the fact that it      does not appear that the defence has indicated that and why the      answer to this question was relevant for any decision to be taken      by the Court of Appeal."   b.    Relevant domestic law        Article 125f CCP, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:   <Translation>      "In case of flagrante delicto or of a crime which allows for      detention on remand, anyone working in a telephone agency shall      provide the public prosecutor or, during a preliminary judicial      investigation, the investigating judge at his demand with the      required information concerning all communications effected      through this agency where there is a suspicion that the suspect      has participated in these communications."        Article 125g CCP reads as follows:   <Translation>      "During the preliminary judicial investigation the investigating      judge may, if the investigation urgently so requires and if it      concerns a crime which allows for detention on remand, authorise      the investigating official to tap or record telephone      conversations where there is a suspicion that the suspect has      participated in them. A formal report of the tapping or recording      shall be drawn up within forty-eight hours."        Article 125h CCP provides:   <Translation>      "1.    The investigating judge shall have destroyed, in his own      presence, formal reports and other items from which data can be      derived which have been obtained as a result of the information,      referred to in Article 125f, or by means of tapping or recording,      within the meaning of the preceding Article (125g), and which are      not relevant to the investigation. A formal report of the      destruction shall immediately be drawn up.        2.     The investigating judge shall likewise have destroyed      immediately formal reports and other items referred to in the      preceding paragraph, insofar as they concern statements made by      or to a person who, on the basis of Article 218 (CCP), could      refuse to testify if he would be asked as a witness about the      contents of those statements.        3.     The investigating judge shall include further formal      reports and other items referred to in the first paragraph in the      case-file at the latest when the decision to close the      preliminary judicial investigation becomes irrevocable.        4.     The public prosecutor shall have destroyed, in his own      presence, formal reports and other items from which data can be      derived which have been obtained as a result of the information      referred to in Article 125f, if he has not demanded a preliminary      judicial investigation within a month after obtaining that      information. He shall draw up a formal report of the      destruction."   c.    General background        On 26 January 1994, the Minister of Justice (Minister van Justitie) and the Minister of the Interior (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken) informed the Lower House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten- Generaal) of the disbandment in December 1993 of the IRT Noord- Holland/Utrecht. The task of the IRT, which had been established in December 1988, was to combat serious organised crime through concerted activities of different regional police forces.        The methods of criminal investigation applied by the IRT gave rise to serious criticism, in particular in respect of certain practices where, for instance, considerable sums of money were paid to informers, where important narcotics transactions were allowed to proceed under IRT observation - which entailed these narcotics reaching the market -, and where use was made of infiltrators and so-called "peeping-Tom" operations ("inkijkoperaties"). The use of the so-called "Delta method" was one of the reasons which led to the disbandment of the IRT Noord-Holland/Utrecht.        This Delta method consisted of using informers, under the direction of the police and the prosecution department, who provided criminal organisations with facilities. These informers were used by the police in order to gather information as to the functioning of the criminal organisation. These informers, including persons working in the transport industry, had in one way or another contacts with members of criminal organisations. These informers would inform the police of the expected arrival of a container in which drugs were concealed. The police would make sure that this container would not be checked by the customs authorities and would ensure proper importation papers and clearance of the container. The police would proceed to check the contents and weigh the drugs found. These drugs would then be transported by the informer to the location indicated by the criminal organisation. Such drugs could then either be seized by the police or deliberately left unhindered in order to protect the informer or to allow an increase in the latter's prestige in the criminal organisation or the trust placed in him. In the latter case the drugs were enabled to reach the market. In some cases the police lost track of the drugs as not all deliveries could be placed under observation. The informers were paid for their activities by the criminal organisations and did not have to surrender this income to the police. The aim of the Delta method was to gain an insight into the distribution network and the persons in charge of a criminal organisation.        On 31 January 1994, upon request of the Lower House, the Ministers of Justice and the Interior requested an extraordinary commission of inquiry (bijzondere onderzoekscommissie) under the presidency of H. Wierenga, a former Member of Parliament, to: -     conduct an independent inquiry into the creation, functioning and      disbandment of the IRT; -     determine and assess the grounds on which the decision to disband      had been based and the way in which this decision had been      implemented; and -     formulate conclusions and recommendations.        The Report of the Wierenga Commission was presented to the Ministers of Justice and the Interior on 24 March 1994. In its public report, it concluded:   <Translation>      "As regards the working methods of the IRT, the Commission has      determined that these have been applied in a well-considered and      careful manner and not unlawfully. The Commission further finds      that the application fell within the scope of the directives      determined within the framework of the Public Prosecutions      Department. As to the application of the methods like the present      one, both in general and in concrete cases, differences of      opinion remain possible. The decision lies with the Public      Prosecutions Department. The Minister of Justice must be able to      carry the political responsibility for that decision. The      Commission, however, is of the opinion that, noting the aim of      the present inquiry, the application of the methods was sound."        The Report contained a number of classified annexes, consisting of a cover letter, parts of formal reports (processen-verbaal) of hearings of 27 persons and two formal reports on findings (processen- verbaal van bevindingen) of the hearings of a public prosecutor and a chief of police.        The Wierenga Commission recommended the Ministers not to publish these annexes in order to prevent damaging the interests of third persons. This recommendation was accepted by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and they also undertook to keep certain statements secret where certain persons heard had been promised that their statements would remain classified. Only the Ministers concerned and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security Services (Vaste Commissie voor de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten uit de Tweede Kamer) were provided with this part of the Report of the Wierenga Commission.        The subsequent parliamentary debate on 7 April 1994 in the Lower House resulted in the opening of a parliamentary inquiry (parlementaire enquête) into the methods of criminal investigation used in the Netherlands. The appointed parliamentary commission of inquiry (parlementaire enquêtecommissie) was given the task to inquire into: -     the nature, seriousness and scope of the serious organised crime; -     the factual application, the lawfulness, the amount of      consideration given to, and the effectiveness of the methods of      criminal investigation; and -     the organisation, the functioning of and the supervision over the      criminal investigation.        The parliamentary commission of inquiry presented its final report containing its findings and recommendations on 1 February 1996. In the opening remarks of this report, the President of the commission stated that in the report certain changes in the structure of the investigation authorities were recommended, as it had been found that the prosecution department did not always have sufficient authority over the police. In his words, the police should be made aware that in a democratic legal order it could not operate outside the authority and direction of the prosecution department and public administration, and that the gap, large at times, between distant persons in positions of authority and the day to day reality of crime fighting should be bridged.     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that the connection of printers to the telephone lines at issue is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.   2.    The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 of the Convention that he did not receive a fair trial in that it was not possible for him to verify the print-outs as regards the telephone lines to which a printer had been connected.   3.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 of the Convention that he was unable to investigate the origins of the information held by the police and to verify whether the investigation methods used by the police in gathering this information were in conformity with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. He submits that it is within the realm and the duty of the prosecution to disclose fully all police proceedings leading to the origin of the charges against him.   4.    The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention of the rejection of his request to add to his case-file the contents of the unpublished part of the Report of the Wierenga Commission which could have shed light on the investigation conducted prior to the official judicial investigation.   5.    The applicant finally complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 of the Convention that the Court of Appeal allowed the witness Wortel not to answer questions put by the defence as to the possible use by the police of informers after the start of the criminal investigation against him.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that the connection of printers to the telephone lines at issue is contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life      ... and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the      prevention of ... crime..."        The Commission recalls that communication by telephone falls within the concepts of "private life" and "correspondence" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur Court HR, Kruslin and Huvig v. France judgments of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A and 176-B, p. 20, para. 26 and p. 52, para. 25 respectively; and Halford v. United Kingdom judgment of 25 June 1997, Reports 1997-III, no. 39, para. 44). The surveillance by criminal investigation authorities of communications by telephone, either by tapping and recording telephone conversations or by registering other data in this area by the use of surveillance devices, does therefore constitute an interference by a public authority with the exercise of a right guaranteed under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.        The question therefore arises whether this interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        As to the question whether the placement of the printer on the telephone lines at issue was "in accordance with the law", the Commission has previously examined the Dutch rules on secret surveillance of communications by telephone as contained in, inter alia, Articles 125f-h of the Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure and found that these rules are sufficiently precise to be considered as "law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (cf. No. 21207/93, Dec. 30.11.94, D.R. 79, p. 31).        The Commission notes that, in the present case, the domestic courts found that the use of the printers was in conformity with Article 125f of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Commission finds no reason to take a different view.        The Commission further considers that, in the present case, the use of printers in the course of a preliminary investigation into suspected large scale narcotics offences can reasonably be considered as being necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        It follows that this complaint must be rejected for being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) of the Convention that he did not receive a fair trial in that it was not possible for him to verify the print-outs of the telephones lines to which a printer had been connected, in that he could not verify the origins of the information held by the police which had led to the investigation against him and whether this information had been obtained by lawful means, in that the Court of Appeal rejected his request to add the unpublished part of the Wierenga report to his case-file and in that the Court of Appeal allowed the witness Wortel not to answer a specific question, i.e. whether after the start of the criminal investigation against the applicant further use had been made of police informers.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "1.    In the determination of ... any criminal charge against      him, everyone is entitled to a fair .. hearing ... by a ...      tribunal established by law.   ...        2.     ...        3.     Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following      minimum rights:      ...            b.     to have adequate time and facilities for the      preparation of his defence;      ...            d.     to examine or have examined witnesses against him and      to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his      behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;      ..."        The Commission recalls that the guarantees of paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are specific aspects of the general right to a fair trial contained in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83, p. 77). The Commission will therefore examine this part of the application under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1+6-3) taken together.        The Commission further recalls that questions concerning the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The task of the Convention organs under the Convention is not to give a ruling as to whether evidence was properly admitted, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way evidence was taken, were fair (cf. Eur. Court, Doorson v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1996, Reports 1996-II, no. 6, p. 470, para. 67).        The Convention does not preclude reliance, at the investigation stage, on sources such as anonymous informants. The subsequent use of information provided by such sources by a trial court to found a conviction may, however, raise issues under the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Windisch v. Austria judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 186, p. 11, para. 30).        As to the origins of the information which led to the police investigation against the applicant, the Court of Appeal found that it had not been made plausible that this information had been unlawfully obtained and that, given the nature of this information, the public prosecutor had not been wrong in ordering the connection of printers to the two telephone lines at issue.        Noting that the applicant's conviction was not based on any initial information communicated to the police prior to the start of the police investigation against the applicant, but on other evidence obtained in the course of the police and judicial investigation and that the evidence thus obtained was subsequently examined in the course of adversarial proceedings before the trial courts, whereas in these proceedings the trial court did in fact examine the question whether unlawful investigation methods had been used in obtaining this initial information, the Commission cannot find that, in this respect, the proceedings against the applicant fell short of the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.        Insofar as the applicant complains that he was unable to verify the data collected by the printers connected at the order of the public prosecutor, the Commission notes that the Court of Appeal held that these data only disclosed whether or not use had been made of the telephone lines at issue and had not served any other purpose useful for the investigation, although it acknowledged that the decision of the public prosecutor to destroy these data had been unlawful and had infringed the rights of the defence to a limited extent.        Noting the limited scope of the information which can be obtained through the use of such printers and considering that the applicant's conviction was not at all based on the data obtain