CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mars 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 26666/95                       by Andrew SMITH                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:              MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President                  N. BRATZA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. CONFORTI                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 19 August 1994 by Andrew SMITH against the United Kingdom and registered on 8 March 1995 under file No. 26666/95;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      19 December 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 22 April 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a British citizen born in 1937 and resident in Iver, Buckinghamshire. He is represented before the Commission by Messrs Lance Kent & Co. solicitors practising at Berkhamstead. The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.   a.    Particular circumstances of the case        The applicant is a gypsy by birth. He was born into a large family and they lived in a horse drawn wagon. He continued travelling when he left the family home. After he married, the applicant and his wife continued travelling, stopping on the roadside. The applicant made a living by breeding and selling horses and from casual farm labour. He found grazing in various places. He also took up scrap metal dealing while they lived on a site in Iver. The applicant and his wife have six children.        In 1962, South Bucks District Council built a gypsy site at Iver, Buckinghamshire and the applicant and his family moved onto it. After a few years on the site, the applicant's wife decided that she wanted to live in a house. The applicant unwillingly agreed and in 1968 the family moved into a council house. The move was not a success because the applicant never adjusted to house dwelling. In order to continue his work as a scrap metal dealer, he required to park his lorry in the neighbourhood but this caused problems. There was constant trouble with neighbours. After four years in the house, the Council informed the applicant and his wife that they would take possession proceedings against them and they were, therefore, obliged to move.        The applicant was not offered a place on an official site. He was, however, advised by officials of the South Bucks District Council to try to buy a piece of land where he could live. They also promised to help and support him in obtaining planning permission to live on it.        In 1973, at an auction, the applicant purchased the land on which he is now living. It was advertised by the selling agents as having planning permission for a residential caravan. The applicant states that he did not discover until some time later that the permission was restricted to a night watchman at the property, relating to previous use of the land as a pig and poultry farm and later a riding stables.        In 1975, Enforcement Notices were served on the applicant. He appealed against them but the appeal failed. In 1978, summonses were issued against the applicant in the Magistrates Court. He was convicted of being in breach of the Enforcement Notices and was fined.        In 1980, the applicant applied for planning permission to re- establish the riding school but permission was refused and the subsequent appeal was dismissed following a Public Inquiry.        In 1982, further Enforcement Notices were served against the applicant's residential caravan and the appeal was dismissed at a Public Inquiry. In 1984, summonses in the Magistrates' Court were issued against the applicant. He elected trial at the Crown Court where he successfully defended the charge on the grounds that, for some years, he had been living in a building already on the land and using a caravan as ancillary accommodation. He was acquitted. A further prosecution by the District Council in 1986 failed on the same grounds.        In 1988, an Enforcement Notice was issued relating to the use of the said building for residential purposes. The applicant appealed against the Notice and a Public Inquiry was held by an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment. The inspector dismissed the appeal by report dated 17 February 1989 on the ground, principally, that the development was in a Green Belt area. His report included, inter alia, a finding that the Council had offered alternative accommodation on authorised gypsy sites to the applicant.        In 1993, the applicant applied for planning permission for residential use of the said building, now known as "The Bungalow". Also in 1993, South Bucks District Council applied for an injunction for the removal of the caravan and for the cessation of use of the bungalow for residential purposes. On or about 16 June 1993, the first part of the injunction was granted, but the second part was suspended pending determination of the planning application.        The applicant's application for planning permission was refused. The applicant appealed and a Public Inquiry was held on 18 May 1994 by an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment. By a decision letter dated 21 June 1994, the inspector dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there were no very special circumstances to permit the continuation of the residential use as an exception to the general presumption against inappropriate development in the Green Belt. He found that the applicant's use of the land detracted from its open, rural appearance, and that the creation of a permanent residential use on this land, in a fragmented area of Green Belt under great pressure for further development, would harm the appearance of the countryside. The inspector also made reference to the several authorised gypsy sites in the area and the availability of pitches on at least one of them and also, to the Council's statement that they would consider offering alternative accommodation in the event of a serious request being made.        Since the appeal failed, the applicant and his wife state that they may, at any time, be subject to enforcement measures requiring them to leave their home. By letter dated 5 February 1997, the Council informed the applicant that the Council may now proceed to obtain a final injunction and that failure to comply with that order would amount to a contempt, potentially leading to a fine or imprisonment.   b.    Relevant domestic law and practice   i.    General planning law        The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991) ("the 1990 Act") consolidated pre-existing planning law. It provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land (section 57 of the 1990 Act).   A change in the use of land for the stationing of caravans can constitute a development (Restormel Borough Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Rabey [1982] Journal of Planning Law 785; John Davies v. Secretary of State for the Environment and South Hertfordshire District Council [1989] Journal of Planning Law 601).        An application for planning permission must be made to the local planning authority, which has to determine the application in accordance with the local development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise (section 54A of the 1990 Act).        The 1990 Act provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of a refusal of permission (section 78).   With immaterial exceptions, the Secretary of State must, if either the appellant or the authority so desire, give each of them the opportunity of making representations to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. It is established practice that each inspector must exercise independent judgment and must not be subject to any improper influence (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 11, § 21).   There is a further appeal to the High Court on the ground that the Secretary of State's decision was not within the powers conferred by the 1990 Act, or that the relevant requirements of the 1990 Act were not complied with (section 288).        If a development is carried out without the grant of the required planning permission, the local authority may issue an "enforcement notice", if it considers it expedient to do so having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations (section 172 (1) of the 1990 Act).        There is a right of appeal against an enforcement notice to the Secretary of State on the grounds, inter alia, that planning permission ought to be granted for the development in question (section 174).   As with the appeal against refusal of permission, the Secretary of State must give each of the parties the opportunity of making representations to an inspector.        Again there is a further right of appeal "on a point of law" to the High Court against a decision of the Secretary of State under section 174 (section 289).   Such an appeal may be brought on grounds identical to an application for judicial review.   It therefore includes a review as to whether a decision or inference based on a finding of fact is perverse or irrational (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] Appeal Cases 696, 764 H-765 D).   The High Court will also grant a remedy if the inspector's decision was such that there was no evidence to support a particular finding of fact; or the decision was made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or made for an improper purpose, in a procedurally unfair manner or in a manner which breached any governing legislation or statutory instrument.   However, the court of review cannot substitute its own decision on the merits of the case for that of the decision-making authority.   ii.   Gypsy caravan sites provision        The Caravan Sites Act 1968        Part II of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 ("the 1968 Act") was intended to combat the problems caused by the reduction in the number of lawful stopping places available to Gypsies as a result of planning and other legislation and social changes in the post-war years. Section 16 defined "gipsies" as:        "persons of nomadic habit of life, whatever their race or      origin, but does not include members of an organised group      of travelling showmen, or of persons engaged in travelling      circuses, travelling together as such".       Section 6 of the      1968 Act provided that it should be the duty of local      authorities:        "to exercise their powers ... so far as may be necessary to      provide adequate accommodation for gipsies residing in or      resorting to their area".        The Secretary of State could direct local authorities to provide caravan sites where it appeared to him to be necessary (section 9).         Where the Secretary of State was satisfied either that a local authority had made adequate provision for the accommodation of Gypsies, or that it was not necessary or expedient to make such provision, he could "designate" that district or county (section 12 of the 1968 Act).        The effect of designation was to make it an offence for any Gypsy to station a caravan within the designated area with the intention of living in it for any period of time on the highway, on any other unoccupied land or on any occupied land without the consent of the occupier (section 10).        In addition, section 11 of the 1968 Act gave to local authorities within designated areas power to apply to a magistrates' court for an order authorising them to remove caravans parked in contravention of section 10.        The Cripps Report        By the mid-1970s it had become apparent that the rate of site provision under section 6 of the 1968 Act was inadequate, and that unauthorised encampments were leading to a number of social problems. In February 1976, therefore, the Government asked Sir John Cripps to carry out a study into the operation of the 1968 Act.   He reported in July 1976 (Accommodation for Gypsies: A report on the working of the Caravan Sites Act 1968, "the Cripps Report").        Sir John estimated that there were approximately 40,000 Gypsies living in England and Wales.   He found that:        "Six-and-a-half years after the coming into operation of      Part II of the 1968 Act, provision exists for only one-      quarter of the estimated total number of gypsy families      with no sites of their own.   Three-quarters of them are      still without the possibility of finding a legal abode ...      Only when they are travelling on the road can they remain      within the law: when they stop for the night they have no      alternative but to break the law."        The report made numerous recommendations for improving this situation.        Circular 28/77        Circular 28/77 was issued by the Department of the Environment on 25 March 1977.   Its stated purpose was to provide local authorities with guidance on "statutory procedures, alternative forms of gypsy accommodation and practical points about site provision and management".   It was intended to apply until such time as more final action could be taken on the recommendations of the Cripps Report.        Among other advice, it encouraged local authorities to enable self-help by gypsies through the adoption of a "sympathetic and flexible approach to [Gypsies'] applications for planning permission and site licences".   Making express reference to cases where gypsies had bought a plot of land and stationed caravans on it only to find that planning permission was not forthcoming, it recommended that in such cases enforcement action not be taken until alternative sites were available in the area.        Circular 57/78        Circular 57/78, which was issued on 15 August 1978, stated, inter alia, that "it would be to everyone's advantage if as many gypsies as possible were enabled to find their own accommodation", and thus advised local authorities that "the special need to accommodate gypsies ... should be taken into account as a material consideration in reaching planning decisions".        In addition, approximately £100 million was spent under a scheme by which one hundred per cent grants were made available to local authorities to cover the costs of creating Gypsy sites.        The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994        Section 80 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ("the 1994 Act"), which came into force on 3 November 1994, repealed sections 6-12 of the 1968 Act and the grant scheme referred to above.        Section 77 of the 1994 Act gives to a local authority power to direct an unauthorised camper to move.   An unauthorised camper is defined as:        "a person for the time being residing in a vehicle on any      land forming part of the highway, any other unoccupied land      or any occupied land without the owner's consent".        Failure to comply with such a direction as soon as practicable, or re-entry upon the land within three months, is a criminal offence. Local authorities are able to apply to a magistrates' court for an order authorising them to remove caravans parked in contravention of such a direction (section 78 of the 1994 Act).        Circular 1/94        New guidance on Gypsy sites and planning, in the light of the 1994 Act, was issued to local authorities by the Government in Circular 1/94 (5 January 1994), which cancelled Circular 57/78 (see above).        Councils were told that:        "In order to encourage private site provision, local      planning authorities should offer advice and practical help      with planning procedures to gypsies who wish to acquire      their own land for development. ... The aim should be as      far as possible to help gypsies to help themselves, to      allow them to secure the kind of sites they require and      thus help avoid breaches of planning control."        However:        "As with other planning applications, proposals for gypsy      sites should continue to be determined solely in relation      to land-use factors.   Whilst gypsy sites might be      acceptable in some rural locations, the granting of      permission must be consistent with agricultural,      archaeological, countryside, environmental, and Green Belt      policies ..."   COMPLAINTS        The applicant claims that his rights under Article 8 of the Convention are being interfered with. He complains of being prevented from living with his wife in a caravan on his own land despite the fact that, since 1957, the land was in continuous occupation as a site for a residential caravan. He claims that South Bucks District Council has discriminated against him by refusing to allow him to continue this use and to use an existing building as part of his family's accommodation. He also claims that he is being prevented from pursuing the traditional gypsy lifestyle and culture. The consequences of the decisions are severe for the applicant and his wife. If they do not remove from their land they face criminal prosecution and forcible eviction.        The applicant alleges that his rights under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention have been violated. The decision to uphold South Bucks District Council's refusal of planning permission was made by an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment. No appeal to a court of law against the Inspector's decision was possible because the issues were of fact and not of law. It is claimed that in these circumstances, since the Inspector is a salaried employee of the Secretary of State, the Inquiry cannot be considered to be an independent and impartial tribunal.        The applicant invokes Article 14 in that he is being discriminated against on the grounds of race, national or social origin, association with a national minority and birth or other status.        The applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of being denied the right to live peacefully with his wife on his own land.        Finally, the applicant refers to lack of an effective remedy, invoking Article 13 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 19 August 1994 and registered on 8 March 1995.        On 29 November 1995,   the Commission decided to communicate the application to the Government but that the Government should not be invited to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application pending the outcome of the Buckley case before the Court (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 23 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, No. 16, p. 1271).        By letter dated 28 October 1996, following the Court judgment, the Government were invited to submit their observations on admissibility and merits.        The Government's observations were submitted on 19 December 1996 and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 22 April 1997 after two extensions in the time-limit.        On 4 March 1997, the Commission decided to grant legal aid to the applicant.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains of a violation of his right to respect for his private and family life and home contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, in that he has been refused permission to live on his own land and is subject to enforcement measures.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority      with the exercise of this right except such as is in      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic      society in the interests of national security, public      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and      freedoms of others."        The Government submit that the applicant has given up his traditional gypsy way of life, pointing out that his latest and relevant application for planning permission related to occupation of the bungalow on his land. They rely on the approach adopted by the Court in the Buckley case (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1271). They refer in particular to the findings of the inspector that the applicant's occupation of his land harmed the rural appearance of the Green Belt area and that there was alternative accommodation available to the applicant and his wife. In those circumstances, they submit that proper regard has been had by the authorities to the applicant's individual circumstances and that the measures are compatible with Article 8 (Art. 8).        The applicant submits that he gave up his nomadic way of life in 1968 reluctantly and returned to living in a caravan within a short time. He was obliged to remove his caravan, which he used for travelling for short periods, by the enforcement action. He used the building on his land only as ancillary to the caravan and submits that the refusal of permission to occupy the building is the latest in a series of decisions preventing him from pursuing his traditional lifestyle. The applicant disputes that alternative official sites are available pointing out that according to the statistics there is a constant shortfall of 46-56 sites in the district. He points out that his special needs as a gypsy were not taken into account in the dismissal of his appeal in relation to use of the building on his land and that he has been subject to a series of coercive measures, including criminal prosecutions and an interim injunction. If, as the Council threatens, it obtains a final order, failure to comply would amount to contempt punishable by fine or imprisonment.        Due to the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the applicant submits that he faces prosecutions and enforcement action if he stations his caravan on highways or other unoccupied land. There are insufficient procedural safeguards, since though appeal lies to the High Court, the High Court will not entertain submissions that the Secretary of State failed to give any weight to a factor, such as the special needs of gypsies. In conclusion, he maintains that the ground of refusal, namely, prevention of harm to the countryside was given disproportionate weight, bearing in mind his gypsy status and the fact that he and his wife, now elderly, have lived on their land for nearly 20 years.        The Commission finds, first of all, that the measures taken in respect of the applicant's occupation of his land, where he has lived with his family for almost 20 years, constitute an interference with his right to respect for his family and private life and his home. It also notes in that respect that the applicant is a gypsy for whom living in a caravan is an integral and deeply-felt lifestyle and that this traditional lifestyle attracts the guarantees of Article 8 (Art. 8) as concerning their private life (see Buckley v. the United Kingdom, No. 20348/92, Comm. Report 11.1.95, para. 64). While it recalls that the recent decision refusing planning permission relates in fact to occupation of a building on the land, the Commission observes that the applicant's application was by way of last resort since the enforcement procedures had resulted in an injunction being issued concerning his occupation of his caravan on his land. It has accordingly had regard, for the purposes of the present application, to the enforcement proceedings as a whole, culminating in the refusal of permission to occupy a building.        According to the constant case-law of the Convention organs, an interference under the first paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) entails a violation unless it is "in accordance with the law", has an aim that is legitimate under Article 8 paragraph 2 (Art. 8-2) and is "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim (see, inter alia, Eur. Court HR, W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27, para. 60 (a)).        As regards the criterion "in accordance with the law", the Commission finds, and the applicant does not dispute, that the measures were taken pursuant to the relevant provisions governing town and country planning and the aims pursued by the measures included the protection of the rights of others, in particular, the preservation of the environment.        The case-law of the Commission and Court establishes that the notion of "necessity" implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that it is proportionate to the aim or aims pursued. In assessing the proportionality, regard must be had to whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. In this context, the importance of the right to respect for home, which is pertinent to personal security and well-being, must be taken into account. The case- law indicates that while there are no explicit procedural requirements in Article 8 (Art. 8), the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the individual's interest (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1292, para. 76). Further, in determining whether an interference is justified the Commission and Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States, which are in principle in a better position to make an initial assessment of the necessity of a given interference (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68). In the area of town planning which involves the exercise of discretionary judgment in the implementation of policies adopted in the interest of the community, the Court has stated that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment, op. cit., p. 1292, para. 75).        The Commission recalls that the applicant's latest appeal against refusal of planning permission was considered by the planning inspector who held a public inquiry. In his decision of 21 June 1994, the inspector had regard to the applicant's arguments and his personal circumstances noting the families' links with the district and difficulties in their present situation but considered that these were outweighed by the planning considerations, ie. that the development would seriously harm the scenic qualities of the rural landscape.        The Commission further observes that, according to the planning inspector, at least one vacancy was available at official sites in the district and the Council was prepared to offer alternative accommodation if a serious request was made. Alternative accommodation had previously found to be available during earlier proceedings (see for example, the Inspector's report of 17 February 1989). Notwithstanding the applicant's submissions as to the shortfall of official sites in the area, the Commission is not satisfied that it would not have been possible to apply, with some prospect of success, in respect of the vacancies which periodically arose. It is not apparent that the applicant made any enquiries or took any steps with a view to finding out alternative solutions.        The Commission concludes that, notwithstanding the impact on the applicant's home and private and family life of the refusal of planning permission and the requirement to move elsewhere, it is not established that he has no viable alternative or that it is disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The responsible planning authorities in exercising their discretion had proper regard to the applicant's interests, which were protected by adequate procedural safeguards (see, mutatis mutandis, the Buckley judgment, op. cit., pp. 1294-5, para. 84). Even though the applicant alleges pursuant to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 that stationing his caravan on the highway or on other unoccupied land will place him at the risk of criminal proceedings and enforcement measures, the Commission does not find that the applicant has established that he has no alternative open to him but to resort to the unauthorised stationing of his caravan. It notes that the local authority has been engaged in enforcement proceedings in respect of his   unlawful occupation over a considerable period of time and finds that the difficulties which the applicant may face on leaving his land at this stage do not in the circumstances of this case render the measures disproportionate.        Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation, the Commission finds that the measures may be regarded as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant has invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), in regard to being denied the right to live peacefully on his land. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention provides:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of      his possessions except in the public interest and subject      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general      principles of international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it      deems necessary to control the use of property in      accordance with the general interest or to secure the      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."        The Commission notes that the applicant is owner of the land on which he has lived for almost 20 years. It has therefore examined whether the decisions and enforcement measures which relate to his occupation of the land may be considered as interfering with his peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in violation of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.        In this context, having regard to the Convention case-law, it has considered whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the applicant's fundamental rights (Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 26, para. 69). It recalls however its findings with respect to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and concludes, in the circumstances of the present case,   having regard to the fact that the applicant took up occupation on his land without the necessary permission and to the findings of the various inspectors as to the detrimental impact on the countryside of the unauthorised occupation and the availability of alternative accommodation, that the measures cannot be said to be incompatible with the fair balance required by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.        It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in respect of the planning procedures determining his right to occupy his land. Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides as relevant:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing... by      an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."        The applicant complains that his planning application appeal was decided by an inspector, who, as an employee of the Secretary of State, cannot be considered as independent or impartial. While an appeal lay to the High Court on points of law, this could not provide review of the issues of fact which arose in his case.        Recalling the decision of the Court in Bryan v. the United Kingdom (Eur. Court HR, judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335, pp. 13-18, paras. 30-47) and having regard in particular to the Court's finding that in the area of town planning full review of facts may not be required by Article 6 para. 1, (Art. 6-1) the Commission finds that the scope of the review of the planning decision available in the High Court which enables, inter alia, challenge of a decision as being perverse or irrational, or as having no basis in evidence or having been made with reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors, was sufficient to comply with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. While the applicant argues that the scope of review is narrower than the Court has previously described (eg. Eur. Court HR, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., p. 1293, para. 79), since the authorities show that domestic courts will not entertain submissions that the Secretary of State gave undue or no weight to a factor, the Commission notes that this does not contradict that the position, as stated by the Court, that the domestic courts will examine whether the Secretary of State had regard to all relevant factors.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The applicant complains of discrimination in that his status as a gypsy was not given any weight in the planning decisions. He invokes Article 14 (Art. 14) which provides:        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any      ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,      political or other opinion, national or social origin,      association with a national minority, property, birth or      other status."        The Government dispute that the applicant was subject to any difference in treatment based on his gypsy status and that the refusal to allow him to do what the settled population would not be allowed to do, namely, settle in the Green Belt, cannot disclose discrimination.        The applicant submits that he is being treated as if he were any other developer applying for residential permission in a Green Belt, without reference to the need for special provision for gypsies which amounts to discrimination.        Even assuming that the applicant can claim, as a person with the special needs of a gypsy, to be penalised by the application of general planning laws, the Commission recalls that whether a difference in treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of Article 14 (Art. 14) depends on whether or not there exists an objective and reasonable justification (eg. Eur. Court HR, Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 19, para. 60). This requires that any difference pursues a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In this assessment of whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment, Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation which will vary according to the circumstances, subject- matter and background (eg. Eur. Court HR, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para. 177).        To the extent that it is alleged that the applicant's gypsy status was not adverted to directly in the latest planning appeal, the Commission notes this concerned the applicant's application to occupy a building and it finds that as regards the occupation of conventional housing it was not unreasonable for the planning authority to treat the case with regard to the criteria applied in other cases. The Commission recalls that in this application and in previous ones the inspectors did take into account the applicant's personal circumstances and had found that the local planning authorities had made offers of alternative accommodation to him at various times. It also notes the importance of control of development and preservation of the environment and the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the domestic authorities in the area of town and country planning and control. It concludes that the applicant's complaints do not disclose discrimination contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.        It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.    The applicant also invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which provides that:        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy      before a national authority notwithstanding that the      violation has been committed by persons acting in an      official capacity."        The Commission recalls however its findings above under Article 8 and 6 (Art. 8, 6) of the Convention, with regard to the procedural safeguards and access to court furnished by the proceedings before the inspector and the possibility of appeal to the High Court. It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.          M.F. BUQUICCHIO                             M.P. PELLONPÄÄ         Secretary                                  President    to the First Chamber                       of the First Chamber