CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mars 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 29691/96                       by Grzegorz and Wiktor JEDAMSKI                       against Poland        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:              MM     J.-C. GEUS, President                  M.A. NOWICKI                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 1 June 1995 by Grzegorz and Wiktor JEDAMSKI against Poland and registered on 4 January 1996 under file No. 29691/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:     THE FACTS        The first applicant, who was born in 1954, is a farmer.   The second applicant, who was born in 1957, is a technician.   They are Polish citizens and both reside in Mikolajki Pomorskie, Poland.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows:   Particular circumstances of the case:   a)    Proceedings relating to the annulment of the resolution taken by the Board of Receivers of the Lódz Bank of Development.        From January 1990 to September 1991 both applicants bought shares of the Lódz Bank of Development, a public company.   Their shares represented in total 20.1% of the company's share capital.        On 28 November 1991 the President of the National Bank of Poland, having regard to the difficult situation of the bank and the danger of its insolvency, began the process of improving its financial standing by appointing a Board of Receivers (Zarz*d Komisaryczny) which replaced the existing governing and supervisory bodies of the company.        On 13 November 1992 the Board of Receivers made a notarised resolution by virtue of which the company's memorandum of association was amended.   Firstly, the nominal value of the bank's share capital was reduced to old PLZ 28,800,000,000 and, at the same time, this amount was transferred to the company's reserve capital fund. Secondly, the share capital of the bank was increased to old PLZ 28,800,000,000 by issuing new shares with extra voting rights. These new shares were offered to the Bank of Economic Activity (Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych), whereas all existing shareholders were excluded from the right to acquire them.   Finally, several members of the Council of the Lódz Bank of Development, including the first applicant, were removed and a new council was appointed.        On 11 January 1993 the first applicant and, on 20 January 1993, the second applicant lodged a civil action against the above-mentioned resolution with the Lódz Regional Court (S*d Wojewódzki), seeking the annulment of the resolution.   They submitted that it had arbitrarily lowered the value of their lawfully-acquired shares, excluded them from the right to acquire new shares and had, for all practical purposes, resulted in the Bank of Economic Activity taking over full control of the company.   They also challenged the legality of the resolution, submitting that the Board of Receivers had not had the power to pass this decision.   Finally, they claimed that, as a consequence, they had suffered a significant financial loss.        On an unspecified date the National Bank of Poland joined the proceedings in support of the defendant.        On 25 June 1993 the Lódz Regional Court dismissed the applicant's action, finding that either the process of improving the company's financial standing or the appointment of the Board of Receivers had been lawfully decided by the President of the National Bank of Poland, within whose competence such issues clearly fell.   Furthermore, the contested resolution had been passed under the supervision of the President and after her consent to the amendment of the company's memorandum of association had duly been obtained.   It had been necessitated by the extremely difficult financial situation of the company and by the need to protect savings deposits belonging to third parties.   It was true that, as a result, the value of the applicants' shares had been significantly lowered.   However, at the material time, the company's assets had not sufficed to cover its obligations.        On 20 October 1993 the Lódz Bank of Development was formally taken over by the Bank of Economic Activity.        On 7 June 1994, upon the applicant's appeal, the Lódz Court of Appeal (S*d Apelacyjny) upheld the judgment of the court of first instance and the reasons given therefor.        On 5 November 1994 the applicants requested the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to grant them leave to file an extraordinary appeal against both above-mentioned judgments. The requests were dismissed on 5 December 1994 and on 13 February 1995, respectively.   b)    Proceedings relating to the first applicant's election petition.        On 19 November 1995 presidential elections were held in Poland.        On 22 November 1995 the applicant lodged an election petition within the Supreme Court, requesting it to declare the elections void in view of the fact that A.K., the president-elect, had made false statements during the election campaign, in particular by alleging that he had had a university education, whereas he had been expelled from his university for failing to complete courses in international trade. The applicant also submitted that in the meantime he had been detained on remand solely on the grounds that he had attempted to issue public statements concerning various ex-communist State officials, including the president-elect.        On an unspecified date the applicant's petition was joined with 6,415 similar petitions lodged under Section 72 of the Law of 27 September 1990 on the Election of the President of the Republic of Poland.        On 5 December 1995 the Supreme Court (S*d Najwyzszy), sitting in camera, rejected all the petitions.   The Court found that even though A.K. had neither had a university education, nor obtained a masters degree, his objectively untrue statements had not affected the electoral vote to such an extent as to warrant declaring the elections void.        On   19 February 1997 the decision of the Supreme Court was served on the applicant.   c)    The first applicant's detention on remand.        On an unspecified date at the beginning of 1993 the Lódz Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of fraud.   On 16 August 1993 the prosecutor charged the applicant with fraudulently obtaining a loan from the Lódz Bank of Development and detained him on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged.   The applicant unsuccessfully appealed to the Lódz District Court (S*d Rejonowy) against the detention order.        On 13 October 1993, upon the applicant's request, the Lódz District Court released the applicant under police supervision.        Subsequently, on an unspecified date, upon the Lódz Regional Prosecutor's appeal, the Lódz Regional Court quashed the decision of the court of first instance and ordered that the applicant be redetained in view of the need to ensure the due course of the proceedings.          In November 1993, on an unspecified date, the Lódz Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Lódz District Court. The Bank of Economic Activity, which had meanwhile taken over the Lódz Bank of Development, joined the proceedings as an injured party.        On 17 December 1993 the applicant was released under police supervision.        It appears that, subsequently, on an unspecified date, a fresh order for detention on remand was again imposed on the applicant; however it was not enforced.        On 20 September 1994, upon the Lódz District Court's request, a court expert examined the applicant and found that detention on remand, if imposed, would seriously jeopardise the applicant's health.        On 3 October 1994 the Lódz District Court, having regard to the expert's report, quashed the unenforced detention order, finding that the due course of the proceedings could be secured by the imposition of police supervision on the applicant.        In the meantime, on 15 February 1994, the applicant, apparently suffering from depression, commenced psychiatric treatment.        On 26 October 1994, upon the Lódz Regional Prosecutor's appeal, the Lódz Regional Court quashed the decision of the court of first instance, ordering that the applicant be placed in the medical ward of the Lódz Prison. This decision had not been enforced by 18 August 1995, when the applicant was arrested by the police and detained on remand in the Gdansk Prison Hospital under a warrant for arrest issued by the Lódz District Court on an unspecified date on the basis of the above- mentioned decision.        On 2 September 1995 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the Lódz District Court to release him on account of his bad state of health.   He submitted that the decision of the Lódz Regional Court of 26 October 1994 was unlawful since no reasons had been given to justify his detention which, in his opinion, was contrary to Article 5 of the Convention.        In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the Lódz Regional Court took over the applicant's case from the Lódz District Court.        On 5 January 1996 the Lódz Regional Court released the applicant on bail, i.e. on condition that he paid new PLZ 100,000.   On 23 January 1996, upon the prosecutor's appeal, the Lódz Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance and ordered that the applicant's detention be continued in view of the serious nature of the charges laid against him and the risk that he would obstruct the due course of the proceedings.   The court stressed the fact that the applicant had already evaded the enforcement of two previous detention orders.        On 19 February 1996, upon a further request by the applicant, the Lódz Regional Court accepted the bail previously offered by him and ordered that the applicant be released.        On 21 October 1996 the Lódz Regional Court gave judgment and convicted the applicant of conduct detrimental to the financial interests of the company of which he had been a shareholder, sentencing him to one year and four months' imprisonment suspended for two years and a fine of new PLZ 10,000.   The court, having regard to the penalty imposed and to the fact that there was no need to ensure the due course of any appellate proceedings by means of bail, quashed its decision of 19 February 1996.        On 21 October 1996 the injured party, i.e. the Bank of Economic Activity, appealed against this decision, submitting that it was premature since the bail amount in question should be retained until the final judgment was given and because the need to ensure the due course of the proceedings still existed.        On 25 October 1996 the court stayed the enforcement of the above- mentioned decision and, as a consequence, the bail amount was not returned to the applicant.        On 28 October 1996 the Lódz Regional Prosecutor appealed against the decision, asserting that the bail should be retained because the applicant had previously obstructed the due course of the proceedings.        On 26 November 1996 the Lódz Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance, holding that the bail should be maintained due to the need to ensure the due course of the proceedings. It found that the applicant had evaded the execution of the previous detention orders and that the contested decision had been premature as criminal proceedings against him were still pending.   Thus, the opposing parties had lodged their notices of appeal.   Since the judgment of the court of first instance could be altered to the applicant's disadvantage, the court held that some preventive measure should still be imposed on him.        On 13 February and 3 March 1997 the applicant requested the Lódz Regional Court to quash the bail order or to replace it by police supervision,   submitting that the fact that the opposing parties had lodged their appeals could not be decisive.   After all, he had also lodged his appeal and the judgment in question could be altered in his favour.   The court seemed, however, to attach no importance to the principle of the presumption of innocence.   Furthermore, the significant sum of money which he had paid into court as the bail still belonged to him.   This was his property and he retained the right freely to use, enjoy and dispose of it.   It should, therefore, be returned to him once he had withdrawn his offer to pay bail.   By the refusal to do so, the courts had deprived him of his property. Since under Polish law there was no legal requirement for either the imposition or the offer of bail, the courts were obliged to give the bail amount back to him.        On 21 February and 11 March 1997, respectively, the court dismissed the applicant's request, holding that preventive measures, including bail, could be imposed at any stage of criminal proceedings until the final judgment was given.   Moreover, there were no new developments in his case which could justify replacing the contested measure.   d)    Proceedings relating to claim for payment against the first applicant.        On 22 December 1992 the Lódz Bank of Development, submitting a bill of exchange payable to bearer which required the applicant to pay on demand old PLZ 19,777,167,300, requested the Lódz District Court to issue an order for payment against the applicant.        On 14 January 1993 the court granted the plaintiff's request, ordered the applicant to pay the sum in question within seven days from the date of service of the order or, alternatively, within the same time-limit, to lodge an appeal against the order for payment.        On 23 January 1993 the applicant lodged his appeal with the Lódz District Court, submitting that the order was premature since the bill of exchange had been endorsed by him in order to secure the payment of a loan which, according to the terms of the relevant loan agreement, was to have been paid off on 31 December 1992.   He also requested the court to stay the enforcement of the order.        On an unspecified date the case was referred to the Lódz Regional Court which, after the applicant's appeal had been submitted, was competent to deal with the case in ordinary civil proceedings.        On   28 January 1993 the plaintiff requested the court to issue a writ of execution in respect of the order of 14 January 1993.   On 1 February 1993 the court issued a provisional writ of execution (i.e. under which assets   may be frozen in order to protect claims). The final writ of execution was issued on 12 May 1993.   Subsequently, on an unspecified date, the plaintiff requested the court to issue two further such writs in view of the fact that it was to institute enforcement proceedings against the applicant before several different courts.   It was due to the fact that the applicant's real and personal property was situated in various towns.        On 23 September 1994 the Lódz Regional Court issued one writ of execution, dismissing the remainder of the request.   On 23 November 1994, upon the applicant's appeal, the Lódz Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance.        The proceedings are pending before the Lódz Regional Court.   e)    Proceedings relating to the first applicant's appeals against the actions taken by the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court in the enforcement proceedings.        On 11 February 1993, acting under the provisional writ of execution of 1 February 1993 and upon a request by the creditor, i.e. the Lódz Bank of Development, the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court (Komornik S*du Rejonowego), made an order freezing the applicant's shares in the Bank of Development of Export (Bank Rozwoju Eksportu), by way of security for the creditor's claim for payment of PLZ 19,777,167,300 pending before the Lódz Regional Court.   On 26 February 1993 the applicant lodged an appeal against the actions taken by the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court, based on Section 767 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   On 10 September 1993 the court dismissed the applicant's appeal.        On 8 September 1993, acting under the final writ of execution of 12 May 1993 and a request by the Bank of Economic Activity, the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant, i.e. he attached the assets frozen on 11 February 1993.        On 20 September 1993 the applicant appealed, under Section 767 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the actions taken by the bailiff in the enforcement proceedings to the Warsaw District Court. He submitted that the bailiff's actions had been incorrect and unlawful since he had enforced the order of 14 January 1993 against matrimonial property whereas the final writ of execution had been issued against the applicant alone.   Moreover, the civil claim in question had not yet been determined as the relevant proceedings were pending before the Lódz Regional Court because he had appealed against the order for payment of 14 January 1993.   He, therefore, requested the court to quash the attachment and to stay the enforcement proceedings.        On 8 February 1996 the Warsaw District Court, sitting in camera, rejected the applicant's appeal of 20 September 1993, finding that it had already been examined, and finally dismissed, by the same court on 10 September 1993.   In the court's opinion, the applicant was again appealing against the actions taken by the bailiff on 11 February 1993 and had clearly lodged this further appeal out of the seven-days time- limit prescribed by Section 767 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   In any event, the matter in question had finally been adjudicated on 10 September 1993 and, according to the principle of res iudicata, the present appeal had to be rejected.        The applicant appealed on 25 March 1996 to the Warsaw Regional Court, submitting that the court of first instance had manifestly confused his two appeals: the appeal of 26 February 1993 against the freezing of his shares ordered by way of security and the appeal of 20 September 1993 against the actions taken by the bailiff in the subsequent enforcement proceedings.        On 18 July 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court quashed the decision of the court of first instance and remitted the case to that court. It found that the lower court had failed to distinguish between two separate appeals by the applicant which concerned two evidently separate actions taken by the bailiff.        On 27 December 1996 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that objections raised by the applicant, in particular those contesting the enforcement of the writ of execution while the civil dispute was pending, had to be rejected.   It found that the bailiff's actions had been correct and lawful as the means of enforcement were provided by law.        On 21 April 1997, upon the applicant's appeal, the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance.   Relevant domestic law and practice   1.    Law of 27 September 1990 on the Election of the President of the Republic of Poland (as amended)        Under Section 72 of the Law, an elector whose name has been entered in the electoral roll or an electoral college may lodge an election petition with the Supreme Court.   He/it may request the court to declare an election void if election law has been infringed, or an offence against the elections has been committed.   The Supreme Court shall declare the election void if the infringement of the election law or the offence committed might have affected the result of the ballot.   2.    Preventive measures, in particular bail        The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure lists as preventive measures, inter alia, detention on remand, bail and police supervision.        According to Section 210 of the Code, preventive measures shall be imposed by the court; before a bill of indictment has been lodged with the competent court, the measures shall be imposed by a prosecutor.   They may, under Section 209 of the Code, at any stage of criminal proceedings, be imposed in order to secure the due course of the proceedings.   In principle, the choice of measure, and of how long it should be maintained, is left to the authorities' discretion.   This does not, however, apply to detention on remand which may be prolonged beyond the statutory time-limits only in exceptional cases.        According to Section 229 of the Code, bail expires on the date on which the judgment has become final unless it has been quashed at an earlier stage.   3.    Order for payment        According to Section 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order for payment, if issued on the basis of a bill of exchange, is enforceable notwithstanding that a defendant has appealed against it, and that proceedings relating to the final determination of the claim arising from the endorsement of the bill are still pending.        A district court is competent to issue an order for payment; however, upon an appeal by a defendant, the case may subsequently be referred to a regional court if, in view of the value of the claim, that court is competent to deal with the case in ordinary civil proceedings.   4.    Appeal against the actions taken by a bailiff in enforcement proceedings        Under Section 767 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure a debtor may appeal against any action taken by a bailiff in enforcement proceedings.   He may, in particular, seek a ruling as to whether the bailiff's actions were correct, i.e. taken in accordance with a writ of execution and lawful, i.e. whether the means of enforcement used were provided by law.   Such an appeal is examined by a district court under the provisions of Volume II of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to enforcement proceedings.     COMPLAINTS   1.    Both applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the Lódz Regional Court and the Lódz Court of Appeal, by their refusal to annul the resolution taken by the Board of Receivers of the Lódz Bank of Development, which arbitrarily deprived them of their shareholders' rights, violated their right to enjoy their lawfully-acquired possessions.   2.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning his election petition contesting the presidential election in Poland were conducted unfairly as the court failed to examine all the arguments raised in his petition.   3.    Under Article 5 para. 3 he also complains that his detention on remand was unjustified and that it lasted for an unreasonably long time.   4.    The first applicant complains that the Lódz Regional Court and the Lódz Court of Appeal, by their decisions arbitrarily ordering that the preventive measure imposed on him, i.e. the payment of bail, should be maintained throughout the appellate proceedings, deprived him of a significant amount of his property without any justified basis.   Thus, the Polish authorities violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, according to which "no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to conditions provided by law ..."   5.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention about the length of the civil proceedings against him which commenced on 22 December 1992 and are still pending before the Lódz Regional Court.   6.    Finally, under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention the first applicant complains that the length of the proceedings relating to his appeal of 20 September 1993 against the actions taken by the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court in the enforcement proceedings exceeded a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.     THE LAW   1.    Both applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention that the Lódz Regional Court and the Lódz Court of Appeal, by their refusal to annul the resolution taken by the Board of Receivers of the Lódz Bank of Development, which arbitrarily deprived them of their shareholders' rights, violated their right to enjoy their lawfully-acquired possessions.        The Commission notes that the final decision regarding the applicants' case was given by the Lódz Court of Appeal on 7 June 1994, i.e. prior to 10 October 1994, the date on which Protocol No. 1 to the Convention entered into force with respect to Poland.   The Protocol only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with respect to that Party.        It is true that, subsequently, the applicants requested the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to grant them leave to file an extraordinary appeal against the above-mentioned judgment and that their requests were dismissed on 5 December 1994 and 13 February 1995, respectively.   However, an extraordinary remedy, the use of which depends upon the discretionary power of a public authority, cannot be considered as effective within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   It cannot, therefore, affect the date of the final decision either for the purposes of that provision or for the purposes of the Commission's competence ratione temporis (see, mutatis mutandis, No. 14545/89, Dec. 9.10.90, D.R. 66, p. 238).        It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning his election petition, contesting the presidential election in Poland, were conducted unfairly as the court failed to examine all his arguments raised in the petition.        The Commission observes that the proceedings relating to the applicant's election petition submitted under Section 72 of the Law of 27 September 1990 on the Election of the President of the Republic of Poland concerned the question of whether the candidate for the President of Poland was validly elected in the elections held on 19 November 1995.   Accordingly, these proceedings related to the exercise by the applicant of the electorate's rights, namely to participate in and to monitor the legality of presidential elections. Such rights, by their nature itself, are political rights.   They fall outside the concept of "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, No. 11068/84, Dec. 6.5.85, D.R. 43, p. 195).   As a consequence, this provision of the Convention does not apply to the proceedings complained of.        It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   3.    The first applicant further complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that his detention on remand was unjustified and that it lasted for an unreasonably long time.        The applicant was detained on remand for the first time on 16 August 1993 and released on 17 December 1993.   He remained in custody for four months and one day.   Subsequently, he was again detained from 18 August 1995 to 5 January 1996, i.e. for four months and eighteen days.   Accordingly, the whole period of his detention on remand to be considered under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention lasted eight months and nineteen days.        The Commission has examined the applicant's complaints in the light of the criteria relating to the determination of the reasonableness of detention on remand set out in the Convention organs' case-law (see Eur. Court HR, Toth v. Austria judgment of 12 December 1991, Series A no. 224, p. 18, para. 67).        However, having regard to the fact that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged, and that the authorities considered that the need to ensure the due course of the proceedings militated in favour of his detention, the Commission finds that the length of the applicant's detention does not exceed a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The first applicant complains that the Lódz Regional Court and the Lódz Court of Appeal, by their decisions arbitrarily ordering that the preventive measure imposed on him, i.e. the payment of bail, should be maintained throughout the appellate proceedings, deprived him of a significant amount of his property without any justified basis. Thus, the Polish authorities violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention provides:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."        The Commission recalls that the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1) does not come into play unless the person concerned is deprived of the ownership of his possessions (see Eur. Court HR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, para. 62).   As a result, to require an accused or convicted person to provide financial guarantees in order to be released does not raise an issue under the first paragraph of this provision but, at the most, may fall under the second paragraph (No. 10307/83, Dec. 6.3.84, D.R. 37, p. 113).        Hence, the Commission has examined the applicant's complaint under para. 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2) to the Convention.        It finds that the measure concerned was imposed under Section 209 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which the courts may impose preventive measures, including bail, in order to secure the due course of the proceedings.   It further observes that, in principle, the choice as to whether or not to maintain a specific measure in criminal proceedings is left to the judicial authorities' discretion and that it may be imposed at any stage of the proceedings.   Bail, however, can be maintained only until the termination of the criminal proceedings which, in the applicant's case, are currently pending upon appeal.        Accordingly, it cannot be said that the applicant was permanently deprived of the ownership of his property.   Rather, the measure in question is of a temporary nature since it merely prevents the applicant, for the time being, from enjoying and disposing of his property.   Moreover, the applicant himself offered to pay bail and thus took the risk that he might not recover the sum in question before the final outcome of his case.        In conclusion, the Commission considers that, as the measure complained of had sufficient legal basis in Polish law and since its purpose was to secure the due course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, it was ordered in the "general interest" within the meaning of para. 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2) to the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.    Finally, the first applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention about the length of the civil proceedings against him which commenced on 22 December 1992 and are still pending before the Lódz Regional Court and about the length of the proceedings relating to his appeal of 20 September 1993 against the actions taken by the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court in the enforcement proceedings.        The Commission considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, to give notice of this complaint to the respondent Government.          For these reasons, the Commission,        DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the first applicant's      complaints concerning the length of civil proceedings      against him which are pending before the Lódz Regional      Court and the length of the proceedings relating to his      appeal of 20 September 1993 against the actions taken by      the Bailiff of the Warsaw District Court in the enforcement      proceedings,        unanimously,      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.        M.-T. SCHOEPFER                                J.-C. GEUS       Secretary                                    President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber