CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 14 avril 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 25046/94                       by Erika GROF                       against Austria          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 14 April 1998, the following members being present:              MM     S. TRECHSEL, President                  J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            MM     R. NICOLINI                  A. ARABADJIEV              Mr     M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 21 February 1994 by Erika GROF against Austria and registered on 14 September 1994 under file No. 25046/94;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      12 July 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 17 September 1996;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1959 and residing in Linz.   Before the Commission she is represented by Mr. G. Schmid, a lawyer practising in Linz.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case        On 21 May 1991 the applicant's son was born and she went on maternity leave.   On 19 August 1991 she requested the granting of maternity leave payments (Karenzurlaubsgeld).   Thereupon the Linz Labour Office (Arbeitsamt) granted the requested payments for the period from 27 July 1991 to 21 May 1993 in the amount of some AS 160 per day.        On 16 December 1992 the Labour Office withdrew maternity leave payments for the periods from 1 October 1991 to 31 January 1992, 1 March 1992 to 30 June 1992 and from 1 October 1992 onwards.   It found that under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungs- gesetz) mothers were only entitled to maternity leave payments if they were unemployed.   The applicant, however, had a teaching appointment as lecturer at University.   Her income from this appointment, even if it was not a full-time employment, exceeded the minimum income level (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze).   From 1 February 1993 onwards the applicant again received maternity leave payments.   However, on 9 March 1993 maternity leave payments were withdrawn as from 1 March 1993 onwards because the applicant had a further teaching appointment.        On 26 February and 23 March 1993 the applicant appealed.   She submitted that maternity leave payments could only be revoked for the periods in which she actually had held her lectures but not for the whole academic year.   Thus, it should have been taken into account that she had held her lectures in a concentrated form during a few weeks.        On 23 August 1993 the Upper Austrian Regional Labour Office (Landesarbeitsamt) dismissed the applicant's appeals. It noted that during the periods for which the maternity leave payments had been withdrawn she had received as income from the University payments between ATS 12,000 and 20,000 per month.   These payments had been considerably above the minimum income level of AS 2,772 for 1991, AS 2,924 for 1992 and AS 3,102 for 1993.        On 6 October 1993 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, introduced a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungs- gerichtshof) against the above decision and, in case the Constitutional Court would decline to deal with the case, requested the transfer of the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).   She submitted that the labour authorities had, in an arbitrary manner, misinterpreted the law, that it had not been clear which officials of the Regional Labour Office had taken the impugned decision as the decision had not been properly signed and that, in any event, the Regional Labour Office could not be considered a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.        On 30 November 1993 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant's complaint for lack of prospect of success and transferred the case to the Administrative Court.        On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the applicant's lawyer to remedy procedural defects of her complaint, namely, pursuant to S. 24 para. 1 and 29 of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), to submit a further copy for service (Ausfertigung) of the complaint.        Thereupon, the applicant's lawyer sent a photocopy of the complaint.   This photocopy was not signed by the applicant's lawyer.        On 22 March 1994 the Administrative Court decided to discontinue the proceedings (Verfahrenseinstellung) on the ground that the applicant had failed to comply with its request of 24 January 1994, as the document submitted by the applicant's lawyer was merely a photocopy but not a proper copy for service since it did not bear the lawyer's signature.   Under S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act complaints which were not in compliance with the procedural requirements as to the form and contents had to be considered as having been withdrawn if the complainant did not remedy the defect within the time-limit fixed by the Court.   The Administrative Court pointed out that in accordance with its constant jurisprudence this provision also applied in cases such as the one at issue where the complainant had complied in an incomplete manner with the Court's order to remedy the defect.   B.    Relevant domestic law   1.    The relevant provisions of the Administrative Court Act, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:        S. 21 para. 1:        "Parteien im Verfahren vor dem Verwaltungsgerichtshof sind der Beschwerdeführer, die belangte Behörde und die Personen, die durch den Erfolg der Anfechtung des Verwaltungsaktes in ihren rechtlichen Interessen berührt werden (Mitbeteiligte)."   <translation>        "The parties in the proceedings before the Administrative Court are the applicant, the respondent authority and any person who will be affected in its legal interests if the complaint would be successful."        S. 22:        "In Angelegenheiten der Bundesverwaltung kann der zuständige Bundesminister, in Angelegenheiten der Landesverwaltung die zuständige Landesregierung, an Stelle eines anderen beschwerdeführenden staatlichen Organs oder einer anderen belangten Behörde jederzeit in das Verfahren eintreten."   <translation>        "The competent Federal Minister in matters of federal administration and the competent Regional Government in matters of regional administration, may at any time enter into the proceedings replacing as party the public authority which has lodged the complaint or which is acting as respondent authority."        S. 24:        "(1) Die Beschwerden und sonstigen Schriftsätze sind unmittelbar beim Verwaltungsgerichtshof einzubringen.   Von jedem Schriftsatz samt Beilagen sind so viele gleichlautenden Ausfertigungen beizubringen, daß jeder vom Verwaltungsgerichtshof zu verständigenden Partei oder Behörde eine Ausfertigung zugestellt und überdies eine für die Akten des Gerichtshofes zurückbehalten werden kann.   Sind die Beilagen sehr umfangreich, so kann die Beigabe von Abschriften unterbleiben.        (2) Die Beschwerden und die Anträge auf Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand ... müssen mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes versehen sein."   <translation>        (1) The complaint and any other writ shall be filed with the Administrative Court. Every writ, accompanied by its supporting documents, must be filed in so many identical copies for service that the Administrative Court is enabled to serve on all parties or authorities one authentic copy and that one can be retained for the file.   If the supporting documents are very voluminous it is not necessary to submit copies.        (2) The complaints and applications for proceedings to be reinstituted ... must bear the signature of a lawyer.        S. 29:        "Ist die belangte Behörde in einer Angelegenheit der Bundesverwaltung nicht ein Bundesminister, in einer Angelegenheit der Landesverwaltung nicht die Landesregierung, so ist außer den sonst erforderlichen Ausfertigungen der Beschwerde samt Beilagen noch eine weitere Ausfertigung für den zuständigen Bundesminister oder die zuständige Landesregierung beizubringen."   <translation>        "If, in matters of federal administration, the respondent authority is not a Federal Minister or in matters of regional administration not the Regional Government a further copy for service together with the supporting documents for the competent Federal Minister or the competent Regional Government has to be submitted."        S. 34:        "(1) Beschwerden die sich wegen Versäumung der Einbringungsfrist oder wegen offenbarer Unzuständigkeit des Verwaltungsgerichtshofes nicht zur Verhandlung eignen oder denen offenbar die Einwendung der entschiedenen Sache oder der Mangel der Berechtigung zur Erhebung der Beschwerde entgegensteht, sind ohne weiteres Verfahren in nichtöffentlicher Sitzung mit Beschluß zurückzuweisen.        (2) Beschwerden, denen keiner der im Abs. 1 bezeichneten Umstände entgegensteht, bei denen jedoch die Vorschriften über die Form und den Inhalt (§§ 23, 24, 28, 29) nicht eingehalten wurden, sind zur Behebung der Mängel unter Anberaumung einer kurzen Frist zurückzustellen; die Versäumung dieser Frist gilt als Zurückziehung."     <translation>        "(1) Complaints which have been lodged out of time or which are not fit for consideration because the Administrative Court is manifestly incompetent to deal with the matter as well as applications which concern a matter already dealt with by the Administrative Court or which have been lodged by a person not entitled to do so shall be rejected without any further procedure by a decision taken in camera.        (2) A complaint which is not in conformity with the provisions on form and contents of a complaint (SS. 23, 24, 28, 29) but which nevertheless is not suffering from the defects mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be returned for the purpose of remedying the defect and a short time-limit shall be set for doing so;   if the defect is not remedied within the time-limit the complaint shall be considered as withdrawn."   2.    With regard to S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act the Administrative Court has repeatedly found as follows:        "Unter Ausfertigung der Beschwerde (im Sinne des § 29 VwGG) ist nur ein mit der Unterschrift eines Rechtsanwaltes versehenes Geschäftsstück zu verstehen. Die Nachreichung der Ablichtung des ursprünglichen Beschwerdeschriftsatzes, auf welcher keine Unterschrift des einschreitenden Rechtsanwaltes - auch nicht in Ablichtung - aufscheint, kann nicht als Befolgung des Mängelbehebungsauftrages angesehen werden."   (B. 17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; B. 12.9.1983, 83/10/212; B. 11.12.1984, 84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, 3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.   <translation>        "Only a document bearing the signature of a lawyer may be considered a copy for service (within the meaning of S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act).   The mere submission of a photocopy of the writ of complaint, which does not bear the signature of the intervening lawyer - not even in photocopy - cannot be considered as compliance with the court's order to remedy procedural defects." (Decision 17.12.1982, 82/04/0219; Decision 12.9.1983, 83/10/212, 11.12.1984, 84/04/0188, 0189) quoted after DOLP, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, 3rd Edition, Vienna 1987, p. 175.   3.    By Federal Act of 13 August 1997 the Constitutional Court Act (Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz), the Administrative Court Act and the Administration Fees Act (Gebührengesetz) were amended (Federal Gazette- I 88/1997).   This amendment, inter alia, introduced the obligation to pay court fees for complaints to the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court by means of stamps to be added to one of the copies for service and amended the rules on public hearings. Furthermore, a new paragraph 4 was added to S. 34 according to which further copies for service need not bear the signature of a lawyer. This amendment entered into force on 1 September 1997.     COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains that she was arbitrarily denied access to the Administrative Court and that consequently she had no possibility to have her claim to maternity leave payments, which in her submissions is a civil right, determined by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   She also invokes Article 13 of the Convention.        In her observations of 17 September 1996 the applicant also complains that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention has been violated because the Constitutional Court had refused to deal with her complaint.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 21 February 1994 and registered on 14 September 1994.        On 15 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 12 July 1996.   The applicant replied on 17 September 1996.        On 18 August 1997 the applicant made further submissions.   The Government did not reply thereto.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that she was denied access to the Administrative Court and thereby arbitrarily denied a fair hearing of her complaint relating to the withdrawing of maternity leave payments.        The applicant has invoked Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention but the Commission considers that in the circumstances of the present case the complaint has to be examined exclusively under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which in its relevant part reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and      obligations...everyone is entitled to a fair and public      hearing....by an independent and impartial tribunal..."        The Government submit that in the proceedings before the Administrative Court the applicant was represented by a lawyer.   It must have been known to the applicant's lawyer that the Administrative Court applies rather strict criteria as regards its interpretation of the formal conditions applicable to the procedure of lodging a complaint and that, therefore, compliance with these formal conditions is imperative.   According to the Administrative Court's case-law non-compliance with an order to submit the required number of copies for service of a complaint will result in the discontinuation of the proceedings.   Nevertheless, the applicant's lawyer failed to comply properly with the Administrative Court's order of 24 January 1994 because he submitted the copy of an unsigned document instead of a further copy for service of the applicant's complaint.   The applicant therefore has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   In any event, in view of the above considerations, there is no violation of the applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        This is disputed by the applicant.   In her view the requirement to submit a further copy for the Ministry of Social Affairs was an outdated anachronism, as it would have been much easier for the Administrative Court to make a photocopy and send it to the Ministry concerned.   Her lawyer nevertheless submitted a copy to the Administrative Court.   To discontinue proceedings merely because the signature of the lawyer was missing was an excessive formalism.   Since on the document at issue there was the name and address of the lawyer there could have been no doubts as to his identity.   In any event the applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention has been violated because the Administrative Court cannot be considered a tribunal within the meaning of this provision.        The Commission observes that the proceedings before the Administrative Court were discontinued by the latter because it considered that the applicant had failed to comply fully with an order to remedy procedural defects.   The Commission recalls in this respect that there is no exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention when an appeal has been rejected because of a procedural mistake by the applicant (see No. 13467/87, Dec. 10.7.89, D.R. 62, p. 269; No. 18079/91, Dec. 4.12.91, D.R. 72, p. 263).   The Commission finds, however, that in the present case the question whether or not the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is so closely related to the substantive issues of the application that it cannot be determined separately.        The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way the Article embodies the "right to a court", of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only (Eur. Court HR, Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18-A, p. 18, para. 36; Fayed v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B, p. 49, para. 65).        As to whether the proceedings at issue concerned a determination of the applicant's civil rights and obligations, the Commission recalls that it is today the general rule that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies in the field of social insurance, including even welfare assistance, insofar as the person concerned claims an individual economic right flowing from specific rules laid down in a statute (Eur. Court HR, Salesi v. Italy judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-E, p. 59, para. 19; Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 17, para. 46).        In the present case the applicant wished to have established that during certain periods she had been entitled to maternity leave payments and that the refusal of payments was not in accordance with the law.   The Commission therefore finds that the outcome of these proceedings was decisive for private rights and obligations and hence for "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies.        The applicant was therefore entitled to a determination of her claims by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   The Labour Office and the Regional Labour Office, being administrative bodies, cannot be considered as such tribunals. As regards the Administrative Court the Commission recalls that the Convention organs have repeatedly found that this Court fulfils the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in matters which are not exclusively within the discretion of administrative authorities and where the Administrative Court considers the submissions on their merits, point by point, without ever having to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or ascertaining various facts (Eur. Court HR, Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 21 September 1993, Series A no. 266-A, pp. 12-13, paras. 31-32; Ortenberg v. Austria judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no. 295-B, p. 50, paras. 33-34).        In the present case the Administrative Court did not consider the merits of the applicant's complaint.   However, there is nothing to suggest that in case the Administrative Court would have admitted the applicant's complaint for examination it would have declined jurisdiction or that its review would have been too narrow.        The   Commission has therefore to examine whether the Administrative Court's decision to discontinue proceedings on the applicant's complaint respected her right of access to a court.        In this respect the Commission recalls that the right to a court, of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard.   However, these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person's access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired; lastly, such limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Eur. Court HR, Levages Prestations Services v. France judgment of 23 October 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1543, para. 40; Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment of 19 December 1997, para. 33, to be published in Reports 1997).        Furthermore the Commission has repeatedly recognised the right of the High Contracting States to make access to courts dependent on the respect by the parties of formal rules relating in particular to the form of their submissions to a court and to time-limits (No. 8407/78, Dec. 6.5.80, D.R. 20, p. 179 with further references). The Commission has found in particular that decisions by the Austrian Administrative Court to discontinue proceedings after a request for remedying procedural defects had not properly been complied with because a further copy for service submitted had not been identical with the original writ of complaint did not constitute an undue restriction of the right of access to a tribunal under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (No. 13202/87, Dec. 15.3.90, unpublished; No. 14452/88, Dec. 3.9.90, unpublished).        In the present case the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, introduced a complaint with the Administrative Court against the Regional Labour Office's decision of 23 August 1993.   Since the Regional Labour Office is not a Federal Ministry or a Regional Government, she had to file her complaint in three copies for service, according to S. 24 and S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act.   The complaint had, however, only been submitted in two copies for service. On 24 January 1994 the Administrative Court requested the applicant's lawyer to remedy this procedural defect by submitting a further copy for service within a short time-limit.   Thereupon, the applicant's lawyer sent a photocopy of the complaint.   This photocopy was not signed by the applicant's lawyer.   On 22 March 1994 the Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings according to S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act on the ground that the applicant had failed to comply with the above request as the document submitted by her lawyer did not bear his signature.        In order to satisfy itself that the very essence of the applicant's "right to a tribunal" was not impaired by the discontinuation of the proceedings in the Administrative Court, the Commission will first examine whether the procedure to be followed for a complaint, in particular with respect to the production of documents, could be regarded as foreseeable from the point of view of a litigant and whether, therefore, the penalty for failure to follow that procedure did not infringe the proportionality principle (see Levages Prestations Services v. France judgment, op. cit., p. 1543, para. 42).        As regards the foreseeability of the Administrative Court's decision the Commission observes that on the basis of S. 24 para. 1 and S. 29 of the Administrative Court Act the necessary number of copies for service of a complaint can be calculated without difficulty as these provisions are not couched in ambiguous terms. Also the requirement that all copies for service must bear the signature of a lawyer can be derived from S. 24 of the Administrative Court Act, which distinguishes between "copies" (Abschriften) and "copies for service" (Ausfertigungen), and has been clarified in the extensive case-law of the Administrative Court.   The applicant's lawyer could therefore reasonably have foreseen what number of copies for service in the proceedings on her complaint was necessary and that all such copies had to bear his signature.        As regards the proportionality of the sanction, the Commission finds that the requirement that an important procedural document bears the signature of the person who submits it and that the same requirement is laid down for copies of this document which have to be brought to the notice of the other parties to the proceedings constitutes a formal condition established for the purpose of ensuring the proper administration of justice.        In this respect the Commission observes that pursuant to S. 24 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act a person filing a complaint with the Administrative Court need not necessarily be represented by a lawyer but that, more specifically, the complaint must bear the signature of a lawyer.   This shows that in this procedural framework specific attention is paid to the element whether or not a complaint is signed by a lawyer.        The Commission also observes that the Administrative Court is one of the highest judicial organs in the Austrian judiciary.   In this respect the Commission recalls that the manner in which Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies to courts of appeal or of cassation must clearly depend on the special features of the proceedings concerned and account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and the role of these courts in them (Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain judgment, op. cit., para. 38).   The procedure followed in such courts may be more formal.   It is precisely for ensuring that a higher level of formality does not unduly hinder access to these courts that representation or assistance by a lawyer is normally required.   In the present case the applicant was represented by a lawyer.        The Commission also notes that the Administrative Court did not immediately reject the applicant's complaint on the ground that the necessary number of copies for service had not been submitted.   Rather, pursuant to S. 34 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act, it issued a request to remedy the procedural defects and asked the applicant's lawyer to submit a further copy for service of the complaint.   The Administrative Court also informed the applicant's lawyer that failure to comply with this request would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings.   The Commission therefore finds that the Administrative Court made the applicant's lawyer aware of the procedural defect, gave him the possibility to remedy it and warned him of the possible consequences (see Eur. Court HR, Vacher v. France judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2149, para. 30).        It is true that as part of an amendment of the Administrative Court Act (see above "Relevant domestic law", point 3) further copies for service no longer need to bear the signature of a lawyer.   However this subsequent change of the law as such cannot lead to the conclusion that the legal situation in force previously had unduly restricted the applicant in her right of access to a court.        In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the applicant was unduly hindered in her right of access to a court by the Administrative Court's decision to discontinue the proceedings. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant also complains that the Constitutional Court's refusal to deal with her complaint constituted a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        However, the Commission need not determine whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.        The Commission observes that the applicant for the first time raised this complaint in her observations of 17 September 1996, while the last domestic decision in her case had been taken by the Administrative Court on 22 March 1994.   The applicant has, therefore, not complied with the time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.          For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.                 M. de SALVIA                         S. TRECHSEL          Secretary                             President       to the Commission                    of the Commission