CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 16 avril 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 33770/96                     by Wanda PARUSZEWSKA                     against Poland          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:             MM    J.-C. GEUS, President                M.A. NOWICKI                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS           Mrs   G.H. THUNE           MM    F. MARTINEZ                I. CABRAL BARRETO                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY                P. LORENZEN                E. BIELIUNAS                E.A. ALKEMA                A. ARABADJIEV             Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 30 October 1996 by Wanda Paruszewska against Poland and registered on 13 November 1996 under file No. 33770/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;          Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1933, is a retired engineer and employee of the State administration, residing in Warsaw.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:     Particular circumstances of the case        By a letter of 9 December 1992 the applicant's immediate superior asked the Ombudsman whether Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act was compatible with the provisions of the Constitution concerning the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex in that it set forth different retirement ages for men and women.        In a reply of 9 February 1993 the Ombudsman's office stated that the impugned provision was not incompatible with the Constitution, given that it conferred on women a right to retire at sixty, not an obligation to do so.   Thus, it did not amount to discrimination.        By a letter of 8 March 1993 the applicant requested the Constitutional Court (Trybunal Konstytucyjny) to institute, of its own motion, proceedings in order to examine whether Article 13 para. 1 item 5 of the State Administration Employees Act was compatible with the provisions of the Constitution concerning the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex and with Poland's relevant obligations under international law.        On 17 March 1993 the applicant's employer, the Polish Committee of Normalisation, Measures and Quality (Polski Komitet Normalizacji, Miar i Jakosci) served the applicant with notice of termination of her contract, due to the fact that, in pursuance of Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act, on 15 March 1993 she had acquired her retirement entitlements as she had turned sixty.   The contract was to expire on 30 June 1993.        The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny S*d Administracyjny). She submitted that the impugned decision was based on legal provisions which were in breach of the constitutional principle of equality of men and women in that the age of retirement for men was fixed at 65 years, whereas for women it was 60 years.   Consequently, she was forced to retire against her will, which in itself amounted to a non-pecuniary injury.   Further, as the period in which she had been paying contributions towards her pension rights was shorter than that of male employees, her retirement pension would consequently be lower.   Thus, the obligation to retire earlier was in fact to her detriment, even though technically it was construed by the legislator as a privilege.   The applicant further argued that the impugned legal provisions and, in consequence, the decision concerned, were in breach of the international instruments prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender.   She invoked in particular Article 2 paras. 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the International Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on Discrimination Against Women.   The applicant finally requested the court to stay the proceedings in view of her request to the Constitutional Court of 8 March 1993.          On 22 June 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal.   The court first found that there were no grounds on which the proceedings should be stayed as the applicant had not shown that the Constitutional Court had in fact instituted the proceedings following her request of 8 March 1993.   The court went on to state that it had not established any reasons for a finding that the decision of 17 March 1993 was not in conformity with the applicable laws.   The applicant had been working for approximately 38 years and had turned sixty on 15 March 1993.   Pursuant to Article 13 para. 1 item 5 of the State Administration Employees Act, her employer was entitled to give notice on her contract as she had thereby acquired her retirement pension rights by virtue of the generally applicable regulations governing pension rights.   It was true that this provision left the decision whether or not to give notice to a particular employee in such circumstances to the discretion of an employer, but the employer was free to decide whether or not to terminate the employment of a particular person, who was eligible for retirement, in accordance with its human resources policy.        On 7 September 1994 the Constitutional Court instituted, of its own motion, proceedings in order to examine whether Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act was compatible with the Constitution, and in particular with the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex.   The Court had regard to the motion of the President of the Court of 21 June 1994 in which he had submitted that complex problems were involved in the assessment of Article 13, in particular as doubts had arisen as to whether the lower age of retirement for female employees of the State administration, construed as a privilege, was not in fact to their detriment and whether it did not amount to de facto discrimination.   The Court considered that State employees were entitled under the law to special protection of their employment, whereas the effect of Article 13 was such that it deprived female employees of this reinforced protection. Thus, the intended privilege of allowing women to retire at a lower retirement age turned out to be costly as it effectively diminished for them the possibility of acquiring entitlement to higher retirement pensions.        On 15 November 1994 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings, having found that the impugned provision of the Employees of the State Administration Act had entered into force on 8 October 1982.   The court therefore had no jurisdiction to analyse its compatibility with the Constitution as, pursuant to the provisions on its competence and procedure, it was only competent to examine laws which had entered into force less than five years before the date on which a request for examination of their compatibility with the Constitution was submitted to the Court.        On 4 December 1995 the First President of the Supreme Court (Prezes S*du Najwyzszego) lodged an extraordinary appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 1993.   He first submitted that the Supreme Administrative Court had breached its procedural rules in that, in view of the complexity of the legal issues involved in the applicant's case, it should, before pronouncing the judgment, have requested the Constitutional Court to examine the issue of the compatibility of Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the Employees of the State Administration Act with the Constitution.   The court declined to do so, having disregarded the decision of the Constitutional Court of 24 September 1991 in which the latter court had found that the ex lege termination of employment of female university professors at the end of an academic year in which they had turned sixty, whereas for men this age was sixty-five, was unjustified as there were no relevant reasons for this difference in treatment.   It was further argued in the appeal that the Supreme Administrative Court's interpretation of Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act was superficial in that it had not addressed the issue of whether this provision in fact amounted to discrimination against women on the ground of sex and whether it was compatible with the constitutional prohibition of discrimination.        On 14 May 1996 the Supreme Court (S*d Najwyzszy) dismissed the extraordinary appeal.   The court first considered that the Supreme Administrative Court was under no legal obligation to refer the legal question of the compatibility of any given statute with the Constitution to the Constitutional Court, since the relevant procedural provisions merely opened such a possibility to it, without imposing an obligation to do so.        The court went on to state that there were no reasons   to find that the impugned judgment was in flagrant breach of the law.   This was so firstly   because the Supreme Administrative Court had correctly applied Article 13 of the State Administration Employees Act, and, secondly, because this provision was not incompatible with the Constitution.   The court observed in this respect that Article 13, in conjunction with generally applicable social insurance regulations allowed for a termination of service of a female civil servant five years earlier than for men.   Such a situation was a direct consequence of the privileged position of women in that they were entitled to acquire retirement pension rights earlier than men.   The court referred here to the Constitutional Court's decision of 7 September 1994 to institute proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Article 13, in which the Constitutional Court considered that in the assessment of this provision it must be examined whether the lower age of retirement for female civil servants, construed as a privilege, was not in fact to their detriment and whether it did not amount to discrimination. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court considered that any situation in which the law confers a certain privilege on an individual, without any adverse consequences, might be seen as discrimination against persons who do not enjoy the privilege concerned.   Thus, the negative results of a privileged position were the inherent and inevitable costs to be borne by the privileged persons.        The Supreme Court further held that the prohibition of discrimination not only prohibited different treatment, without any objective and reasonable justification, of persons in relevantly similar situations, but also banned identical treatment of persons in different situations according to the relevant criteria.   The court invoked here its decision of 24 October 1989 (K 6/96) in which it had found that the regulations fixing a lower retirement age for women did not amount to discrimination against men, and that fixing the same age for both sexes would amount to discrimination against women.   The court had held in this judgment that if the biological and social differences between men and women were of relevance for the process in which human resources are depleted by working, then fixing identical legal conditions of acquisition of retirement pension rights would be in breach of the principle of equality and of international treaties ratified by Poland.        The court went on to state that from a global point of view - and it was only this general aspect, not the situation, feelings and needs of a particular woman which were pertinent in this respect - the lower retirement age for women was for them a particularly valuable and advantageous solution.   This conclusion could not but be reinforced by recent vehement protests against the idea of an equal retirement age for men and women.   Therefore, in this respect the advantages of different treatment outweighed any possible drawbacks.        Having regard thereto, the court continued, there was no contradiction between Article 13 of the Civil Servants Act and the constitutional principle of equality.   Consequently, if there were sufficient grounds for more advantageous regulations as regards women's retirement entitlements, the same held true for different regulations as regards termination of their employment in the civil service.   In this sense, earlier termination of service was the price to be paid for an earlier retirement age.   Therefore, there were no grounds for finding that the said difference in treatment amounted to discrimination against women.     Relevant domestic law        Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act provides that employment of a tenured employee can be terminated if that person has acquired his or her pension rights in pursuance of the generally applicable provisions concerning pension rights.         Article 26 of the Retirement Pension Rights Act of 1982 provides that an employee acquires pension rights if two conditions are satisfied: the retirement age has been reached and the person concerned has been working for a certain length of time.   The retirement age for women is 60 years and for men 65.   The required periods of work are twenty years for women and twenty-five years for men.        On 1 January 1997 the Civil Service Act came into force, but the State Administration Employees Act remained in force.   The Civil Service Act created a special category of civil servants of higher qualifications which must be certified by special examinations.   The employment of persons who had started to work in the State administration before 1 January 1997 in pursuance of the provisions of the State Administration Employees Act is to be governed by the provisions of that Act and is to remain valid until 31 December 2007.        Article 44 para. 2 item 1 of the Civil Service Act provides that employment of a civil servant can be terminated, on the expiry of a three-months notice period, if that person has acquired his or her pension rights in pursuance of   the generally applicable provisions concerning pension rights.        On 3 April 1997 the Ombudsman lodged with the Constitutional Court a request for examination of the compatibility of this provision with the constitutional principle of equality of sexes.   He submitted in particular that the impugned provision, identical with Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act, could not in fact be regarded as creating any privilege for female civil servants.   Its effect was to leave to the employer the decision whether to terminate the service of a particular person or not, whereas a female civil servant did not have any influence on this decision and could not herself decide whether she wanted to remain in service or not.   Consequently, even those female civil servants who wished to continue working, were obliged to leave at the age of 60 if their employer wanted them to do so.   This effectively shortened their careers and entailed all negative consequences thereof, both regarding their   salary and other benefits normally linked with their work, and regarding their   pension rights, the latter being normally inferior to those they would have been entitled to had they been allowed to work longer.   Such a situation could not be deemed compatible with the principle of equality of sexes, enshrined in the Constitution.        On 29 September 1997 the Constitutional Court rendered a decision concerning the Ombudsman's request.   The court referred to Articles 77 and 78 of the Constitution which prohibited discrimination on any grounds and further enshrined the principle that women had equal rights to those of men.   The court considered that these provisions reflected the legislator's conviction that there was a special need for specific guarantees to ensure equality of women.   The court subsequently recalled its case-law in this respect and emphasised that its principal ideas were, firstly, that in order to ensure genuine equality it was necessary in certain situations to undertake positive measures which would counterbalance the disadvantages of women's generally more difficult social situation.   Thus, in view of the constitutional principle of equality, such measures could not be regarded as amounting to discrimination or constituting a privilege.   Quite to the contrary, in certain situations in which the differences between men and women were particularly relevant, the Constitution obliged the legislator to take such measures.   The necessary consequence of this was that the assessment of any concrete legal provisions or institutions should necessarily be made also from the point of view of whether their effect was such that they de facto contributed to the elimination of inequalities between men and women.   The court further referred to certain international treaties and decisions of international bodies in which this idea was expounded.   The court concluded that the impugned provision was in fact to the detriment of women civil servants as it gave them no choice of age at which to leave the civil service since this decision was left entirely to the employer. Consequently, they were forced to retire even in those cases in which they had no wish to do so.   The court further held that the differences between men and women were irrelevant here in that there were no convincing reasons why a female civil servant aged sixty could not continue in service. Thus, the impugned regulation amounted to discrimination against female civil servants and as such was not compatible with the Constitution.     COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains under Article 3 read together with Article 14 of the Convention that the decisions in her case amounted to degrading treatment of her as a woman.   She refers in particular to the Supreme Court's argument that "if the biological and social differences between men and women were of relevance for the process in which human resources were depleted by working - then fixing of identical legal conditions of acquisition of retirement pension would be in breach of the principle of equality".   She further refers to the Supreme Court's argument that "from a global point of view - and it was only this general aspect, not the situation, feelings and needs of a particular woman which were pertinent in this respect - the lower retirement age for women was for them a particularly valuable and advantageous solution".        The applicant further submits various complaints under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, alleging that the proceedings in her case were unfair.          The applicant finally submits that the decisions in her case were in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention read together with Article 14 of the Convention.   She contends that, by being forced to retire five years earlier than male employees, she lost her possessions in that she did not receive the salary or any of the normal benefits which she would have received as an employee for a further five years, had she remained in the service.   She also submits that she lost her possessions in that, as a result of retiring five years earlier than a man, her retirement entitlements, which are calculated on the basis of salary, are lower than they would have been if she had been allowed to work and given a possibility to earn for five more years.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains under Article 3 read together with Article 14 (Art. 3+14) of the Convention that the decisions in her case amounted to degrading treatment of her as a woman.   She refers to certain statements in the Supreme Court's judgment of 14 May 1996.        Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads:        "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or      degrading treatment or punishment."        The Commission recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention as established in the case-law of the Convention organs (Eur. Court HR., Ireland v. United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1979, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 162).   In the present case the treatment complained of consisted of certain arguments in the Supreme Court's judgment.   Whereas the Commission agrees that the applicant might have legitimately felt that they were paternalistic and that, in their sweeping character, the court did not show regard for her personal situation and personal feelings, the treatment complained of does not fall within the ambit of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.        It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further submits different complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, alleging that the proceedings in her case were unfair.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in its relevant part reads:        "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and      obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair .... hearing      within a reasonable time by (a) ... tribunal ..."        The Commission must ascertain whether Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is applicable to the proceedings concerned.        The Commission observes that the applicant's case was first decided by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 1993.   The present application was introduced on 30 October 1996. Therefore the Commission cannot examine those proceedings, as, pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it can only deal with the matter within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.   However, the Commission observes that subsequently the President of the Supreme Court lodged the extraordinary appeal against this judgment with the Supreme Court which pronounced its judgment on 14 May 1996.   It is therefore necessary to examine whether the character of the proceedings instituted before the Supreme Court by its President's extraordinary appeal was such as to bring them within the ambit of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.        The Commission observes that it was within the powers of the Supreme Court to examine, and in fact it did examine, whether the Supreme Administrative Court's judgment was in conformity with the substantive law or ill-founded, or whether there had been a substantial breach of procedure.   The Supreme Court in the extraordinary appeal proceedings was competent to quash or to uphold the judgment of the Administrative Court.   These proceedings must therefore be regarded as having the same character as the original proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court in that the decision on the merits of the case was to be taken by the Supreme Court.        It thus remains to be examined whether the proceedings in the applicant's case, both at the stage which ended with the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 1993 and at the later stage before the Supreme Court, concerned in any way the applicant's "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, regard being had to the character of the rights concerned.        The Commission recalls in this respect that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention only applies to disputes over "rights and obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law.   Article 6 (Art. 6) does not in itself guarantee any particular content for "rights and obligations" in the substantive law of the Contracting States (cf. Eur. Court HR, James and others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 46, para. 81, and Lithgow and others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 70, para. 192).   The dispute which gives a right to a determination by a court must be "genuine and of a serious nature" (see Eur. Court HR, Benthem v. the Netherlands judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97, p. 14, para. 32).        In the present case there clearly was a dispute between the parties regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the State Administration Employees Act and, consequently, the lawfulness of the decision issued in pursuance of this Act, by virtue of which the applicant was forced to retire.        However, the Commission recalls that, according to the Convention organs' case-law, disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service of public servants are, as a general rule, outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Massa v. Italy judgment of 4 August 1993, Series A no. 265-B, p. 20, para. 26; Neigel v. France judgment of 17 March 1997, para. 12;   Reports, 1997; Huber v. France judgment of 17 February 1998,   Reports 1997-II no. 32, para. 36).   The Commission further recalls its decision in which it found that the proceedings relating to the termination of service which had been governed by the State Administration Employees Act fell outside the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (No. 25871/94, Dec. 2.7.97, unpublished).        In the present case the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court and subsequently before the Supreme Court related to the lawfulness of the decision of 17 March 1993.   Pursuant to this decision, the applicant's employment was terminated in conformity with Article 13 para. 1 point 5 of the State Administration Employees Act. The applicant, in her appeal against the decision of 17 March 1993, called into question the compatibility with the Constitution of the termination of her career in the civil service.   It is true that the applicant argued in her appeal that she had a pecuniary interest in the case in that she maintained that, as she had retired earlier, the period in which she had been paying contributions to the Social Insurance authorities was shorter than that of male employees, which meant that her retirement pension would be lower.   However, the proceedings before the Supreme Court did not relate to the applicant's pension rights.   Therefore, the Commission considers that the dispute in the instant case related essentially to the termination of the applicant's service and that her pecuniary interests would not be directly affected by their outcome so as to bring the proceedings within the ambit of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.        Therefore, the Commission considers that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not applicable to the proceedings concerned.   It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant submits that the decisions in her case were in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention read together with Article 14 of the Convention (P1-1+14).   She contends that, by being forced to retire five years earlier than male civil servants   would have been obliged to, she lost her possessions in that she did not receive a salary throughout that period and any of the normal benefits which she would have received as an employee for a further five years, had she remained in employment.   She also complains that her retirement benefits were lower as they were calculated on the basis of her salary, which would have been higher had she been allowed to work for a further five years.        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of      his possessions except in the public interest and subject      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general      principles of international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it      deems necessary to control the use of property in      accordance with the general interest or to secure the      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."        The Commission observes that Poland ratified Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on 10 October 1994.   It follows that the Commission is competent to examine this complaint insofar as it relates to events which occurred after that date.        The Commission recalls that, according to the Convention organs' case-law, the making of contributions to a pension fund may, in certain circumstances, create a property right in a portion of such fund and such right may be affected by the manner in which the fund is distributed (No. 4130/69, Yearbook 14, pp. 224 and 240 et seq.; No. 5849/72, Dec. 16.12.74, D.R. 1, p. 46; No. 9776/82, Dec. 3.10.83, D.R. 34, p. 153; No. 12264/86, Dec. 13.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 131). Further, the rights originating from social insurance systems are pecuniary rights for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, no. 14, p. 1142, para. 41).   However, even if it is assumed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) guarantees persons who have paid contributions to a social insurance system the right to derive benefits from the system, it cannot be interpreted as entitling that person to a pension of a particular amount (5849/72, Müller v. Austria, Comm. Report 1.10.75, D.R. 3, p. 25; No. 10671/83, Dec. 4.3.85, D.R. 42, p. 229).        According to the Convention organs' case-law, a person complaining of an interference with his property must show that such right existed (No. 7655-7657/76, Dec. 4.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 111). Moreover, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention does not recognise any right to become the owner of property (No. 11628/85, Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47, p. 270).        The Commission further recalls that "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) may be either "existing possessions" (Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, para. 48) or claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right (Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51; Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 21, para. 31).        In the present case the essence of the applicant's complaint is that the legal regulations in force at the relevant time obliged her to retire, and, as a result, she lost the salary which she could have earned had she remained in the civil service.   Secondly, had she remained in service, she would have been entitled to a higher retirement pension.   In this sense her complaint does not concern any "existing possessions".        It remains to be examined whether the applicant could have any "legitimate expectation" of having her claims satisfied.   The Commission observes that the Supreme Court, by its judgment of 14 May 1996, dismissed the Ombudsman's   request to have the 17 March 1993 decision on the termination of the applicant's service set aside. As regards the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 29 September 1997, even though in principle it was in line with the applicant's argument, it did not concern any individual situation, but was limited to an analysis of the constitutionality of the Civil Servants Act. This Act entered into force on 1 January 1997, a long time after the applicant retired.   This judgment did not directly relate to the 1993 decision by which the applicant was obliged to take her retirement and did not have any bearing on the applicant's individual situation. Moreover, the Commission observes that the Civil Servants Act is applicable only to the category of civil servants in the full sense of the term.   This category was in fact created by the Act, which sets out their special rights and obligations.   As this group did not exist before that date, the findings of the Constitutional Court cannot have any influence on the applicant's status, either past or present.        It follows that the applicant has not shown that she has any relevant "existing possessions" or any legally recognised claims which could be regarded as "legitimate expectations" of enjoying property rights.        The application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).          For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,          DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.        M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               J.-C. GEUS       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber