CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 20 avril 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 30210/96                       by Andrzej KUDLA                       against Poland         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 20 April 1998, the following members being present:              MM     S. TRECHSEL, President                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J. -C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            MM     R. NICOLINI                  A. ARABADJIEV              Mr     M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission.         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 12 April 1995 by Andrzej KUDLA against Poland and registered on 15 February 1996 under file No. 30210/95;         Having regard to :   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       25 June 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 18 September 1997;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Polish citizen born in 1962.   He is a technician by profession and resides in Kraków, Poland.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:   A.     Particular circumstances of the case         On 8 August 1991 the Kraków Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) charged the applicant with fraud and forgery and detained him on remand.   Shortly afterwards the applicant reported to the investigating prosecutor that he was suffering from various ailments, including depression.   On an unspecified date the authorities ordered that the applicant be examined by a doctor.   The medical examination concerned did not reveal circumstances militating in favour of his release.   The applicant was placed in the Kraków Detention Centre.         On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the detention order.         On 21 August 1991 the Kraków Regional Court (S*d Wojewódzki) dismissed his appeal in view of the high probability that the applicant had committed the offences in question.   The court also found that according to the medical examination previously ordered there were no circumstances concerning the applicant's health which might have argued for his release.         Between August 1991 and the end of July 1992 the applicant lodged thirty applications for release and appeals against decisions to maintain his detention.         In the meantime, on an unspecified date in October 1991, the applicant attempted to commit suicide in prison.   As from 4 November 1991 he went on hunger strike for an unspecified period.   Subsequently, the authorities ordered that the applicant be examined by doctors.   The relevant report by experts of the Faculty of Forensic Psychiatry of the Jagiellonian University, dated 25 November 1991, stated that the applicant could not be detained in an ordinary prison.   Therefore, if his detention was to be continued, he should be confined in a psychiatric ward of a prison hospital.   The applicant was placed in the Bytom Prison Hospital where, at the material time, there was no psychiatric ward.   He was placed in an internal diseases ward and received treatment for his mental illness.   The applicant stayed in the hospital for an unspecified period following which he was brought back to the Kraków Detention Centre.         On 20 January and 27 February 1992 the applicant was examined by medical experts.   They concluded that the applicant needed psychiatric treatment in prison but that it was not necessary to place him in a psychiatric ward of a prison hospital.         On 30 April 1992 a bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Kraków Regional Court.   The case-file comprised nineteen volumes.   In all twenty-nine charges were brought against the applicant and nine co-defendants.   The prosecution requested the court to hear evidence from ninety-eight witnesses.         On 15 June 1992 experts from the Kraków Clinic of Psychiatry and the Faculty of Medicine of the Jagiellonian University prepared a report concerning the applicant's psychological state.   The report stated, inter alia:         " ... The patient shows persistent suicidal tendencies. Following       the medical examination we find that he suffers from a deep       syndrome of depression coupled with thoughts of suicide.   In the       light of the intensity of suicidal thoughts and of the fact that       he has already attempted to commit suicide, he should receive       psychiatric treatment.   His detention on remand amounts to a       serious danger to his life (a grave risk of a further attempt to       commit suicide)... ."         On 27 July 1992 the Kraków Regional Court quashed the detention order.         On 26, 27 and 28 October, and 14 and 15 December 1992 the court held hearings in the applicant's case.   The hearings scheduled for 8 February and 16 March 1993 were cancelled due to the applicant's absence.   On both occasions his defence counsel submitted medical certificates confirming that the applicant was ill.   In the meantime, on 18 February 1993, the Kraków Regional Court ordered that the applicant be redetained in view of the fact that he had not attended   hearings.   Subsequently, on an unspecified date, the authorities issued a warrant to search for the applicant by means of a wanted notice.         The detention order concerned had not been enforced by 4 October 1993, when the applicant was redetained apparently in connection with the fact that he had committed a traffic offence.   He was placed in the Kraków Detention Centre.         The court scheduled the next hearings for 6 October, 15 and 17 November 1993 but cancelled all of them as the applicant's mental state (in particular, his difficulties in concentrating) did not allow him to participate properly in the trial.   According to a further expert report requested by the court on an unspecified date at this time, the applicant's mental state did not militate against his continued detention.         Meanwhile, on 18 October 1993, the applicant's lawyer appealed against the detention order, arguing that the applicant, following his release on 27 July 1992, had received continuous treatment for his severe depression and that his illness had apparently influenced his behaviour.         On an unspecified date the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the above appeal.         Between October 1993 and November 1994 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged twenty-one requests for release and appeals against the decisions to maintain his detention.         On 13, 14 and 16 December 1993 the court held hearings in the applicant's case.   On 19 January 1994 the next hearing was cancelled as, in the meantime, the applicant had attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose.         On 14, 15 and 16 February 1994 the court held hearings in the applicant's case.   The hearings scheduled for 9 and 10 March 1994 were cancelled as the presiding judge was ill.   The next hearings took place on 14, 15 and 16 June 1994.   In the meantime, the applicant underwent psychiatric observation in the Wroclaw Prison Hospital in connection with a different set of proceedings.         On 11 July 1994 the court held a hearing but cancelled the hearings scheduled for 12 and 14 July 1994 since the applicant revoked a power of attorney granted to his defence counsel.   The hearings continued on 20, 21 and 22 September, 25 and 26 October and 14 and 15 November 1994.   On 15 November 1994 the applicant refused to enter the courtroom.   The hearings scheduled for 20, 21 and 22 December 1994 were cancelled as the applicant's co-defendant had failed to appear.         In the meantime, on 17 November 1994, the applicant complained to the Chief Justice of the Kraków Regional Court about the length of his detention on remand and the conduct of the proceedings in his case. He asserted, in particular, that all of his nine co-defendants had been released while he was still being detained, and that the overall period of his detention had meanwhile exceeded two years.   He also submitted that the minutes of the court hearings had not reflected the witnesses' testimonies and that the court had omitted to note his and his lawyer's submissions and had not let him freely express his version of the facts of the case.   Finally, he contended that the fact that the criminal proceedings instituted against him had lasted more than four years had amounted to a "nightmare".         On an unspecified date the applicant again requested the court to release him.   On 8 December 1994 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed his request.         On 4 January 1995, upon the applicant's appeal, the Kraków Court of Appeal (S*d Apelacyjny) upheld the above decision and held that the detention should be maintained in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and the fact that he had been detained because he had absconded.   The court also found that the situation of the applicant's family, although difficult, did not argue for his release.         On 25 January 1995 the applicant's lawyer requested that the detention order be quashed or replaced by police supervision.   He argued that on 23 January 1995 the applicant had again attempted to commit suicide (i.e. he had attempted to hang himself) which, coupled with his chronic depression, had given a serious indication that continuing detention could jeopardise his life.   He submitted that the applicant had been redetained solely because of his absence at the hearings and, as the evidence against him had been presented, there was no necessity to maintain the detention further.         On 13 February 1995 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the above request.   The court held that according to a statement from the prison authorities, the applicant's attempt to commit suicide had constituted a "tactic to demonstrate" and that the previous reasons for continuing the detention had not ceased to exist.         On 25 February 1995 the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal against the decision of 13 February 1995.   He submitted that the applicant's mental health had deteriorated as he was constantly suffering from depression.   He also requested the court to call psychiatric and other medical experts to assess the applicant's state of health instead of relying on the assessment given by the prison authorities.   He argued that the length of the criminal proceedings in question was excessive and that the period of the applicant's detention on remand had meanwhile exceeded two years and four months.         On 2 March 1995 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal. The court held, inter alia, that it was not necessary to call medical experts and that the detention should be maintained in order to ensure the due course of proceedings.         Between 8 March 1995 and 1 June 1995 the applicant filed four unsuccessful applications for release and appeals against decisions to maintain his detention.         On 13, 14 and 15 March, 3, 4 and 5 April, and 4, 5, 30 and 31 May 1994 the court held hearings during which evidence from witnesses was heard.         On 1 June 1995 the Kraków Regional Court convicted the applicant of fraud and forgery and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment and a fine of PLN 5,000.         On 2 June 1995 the applicant and his lawyer filed a notice of appeal.         On 1 August 1995 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice that the statement of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance had not been prepared within the statutory time- limit.   He submitted that the delay in question amounted to two months.         On an unspecified date the applicant requested to be released, arguing that his prolonged detention had entailed burdensome effects on his health and the well-being of his family.         On 14 August 1995 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed his request.   On 31 August 1995, upon the applicant's appeal, the Kraków Court of Appeal upheld this decision and held that the detention should be maintained in view of the fact that the applicant had been sentenced to six years' imprisonment by the court of first instance.         On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice about the length of the proceedings in his case, stressing that the Kraków Regional Court had failed to provide him with the written reasoning of the judgment within the statutory time-limit, thus unnecessarily prolonging the appellate proceedings.           On 28 August 1995 the Head of the Criminal Department of the Ministry of Justice, in reply to the applicant's complaint, informed him that it was likely that the written reasoning of the judgment would exceed two hundred pages and that the non-compliance with the statutory time-limits had resulted from the fact that the judge-rapporteur was on vacation.         On 6 October 1995 the applicant received a statement of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance.         In October 1995, on an unspecified date, the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Kraków Regional Court of 1 June 1995.         On 14 November 1995 the case-file was transferred to the Kraków Court of Appeal.         On 22 February 1996 the Kraków Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the court of first instance.   It remitted the case to that court on the ground that the court had been improperly composed and that there had been serious violations of procedural provisions.         In the course of the appellate hearing the applicant's lawyer unsuccessfully requested the court to quash the detention order.         On 11 April 1996 the case was remitted to the court of first instance.         On 30 April 1996 the applicant requested that the preventive measure imposed on him be quashed or altered.         On 28 May 1996 the Kraków Regional Court gave a decision which stated, inter alia, that:         "... At the present stage of the case the due course of the       proceedings can be ensured by imposing preventive measures other       than detention on remand. ... The court therefore subjects the       quashing of the detention order to the condition that the       applicant will secure bail in the amount of PLN 10,000 within one       month from the date on which this decision is served on him. ..."         On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the above decision, requesting, in particular, that the amount of bail be lowered in accordance with his financial situation or that another preventive measure be imposed on him, i.e. police supervision.         On 11 June 1996 a psychiatric expert submitted a report to the court, stating that the applicant was in a state of chronic depression coupled with suicidal thoughts.   He also asserted that the applicant was able to participate in hearings but that continuing detention could jeopardise his life in view of the likelihood that he would attempt to commit suicide.         On 20 June 1996 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 28 May 1996, holding that the amount of bail was not excessive.           On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Ombudsman that the overall length of his detention on remand had meanwhile exceeded three years.   This complaint was referred to the Chief Justice of the Kraków Court of Appeal.         In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the applicant's lawyer again requested the Kraków Regional Court to alter the preventive measure imposed on his client or to lower the amount of bail fixed by the decision of that court of 28 May 1996.   On 2 July 1996 the court dismissed this request.         On 12 July 1996 the Chief Justice of the Kraków Court of Appeal replied to the applicant's complaint (which had originally been addressed to the Ombudsman) stating, in particular:         "... You were indicted of fraud and forgery on 30 April 1992.       The bill of indictment concerned ten co-defendants and evidence       from ninety-eight witnesses was to be taken.   The proceedings       were delayed due to the fact that you had been in hiding until       your subsequent detention in October 1993.   You have also lodged       numerous requests for release. ...   The length of the proceedings       between the date of the judgment of the court of first instance       and the date on which the case-file was sent to the Court of       Appeal was justified by the volume of your case-file and the       length of the statement of reasons for the judgment (twenty-nine       volumes and one hundred and forty pages, respectively). ... The       written reasoning of the judgment was ready before 16 August 1995       and was sent on 16 September 1995 due to the fact that the judge-       rapporteur was on leave.   The only delay concerned the       examination of your request for release of 30 April 1996 as it       was examined on 28 May 1996 due to the fact that between 1 May       and 5 May 1996 there had been a public holiday. ..."         In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the applicant's lawyer appealed against the decision of the Kraków Regional Court of 2 July 1996, arguing that in the light of the psychiatric report of 11 June 1996 the detention order should be quashed in view of the fact that the applicant's life was in danger.         On 18 July 1996 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the above appeal and found that the danger to the applicant's life was not absolute as, in the court's opinion, he could obtain psychiatric consultation in prison.   The court also held that the detention order could be quashed provided the bail of PLN 10,000 was paid.         On 31 July 1996 the applicant again requested the Kraków Regional Court to lower the amount of bail fixed or to alter the preventive measure imposed, submitting that he did not have sufficient financial resources to secure such an amount of bail.         On 19 August 1996 the court dismissed this request and found that the applicant's submissions concerning the problem of bail had amounted to an "unjustified polemic with the organs of justice" and that bail could be also offered by "third persons".         On an unspecified date the applicant requested the Kraków Regional Court to release him in order to enable him to pay the sum of bail fixed.         On 10 September 1996 the court dismissed this request finding, inter alia, that:         "... It is logical that the applicant should be released after       the bail is paid.   The accused's request to reverse the sequence       of events is against the rules of procedure and common sense and,       therefore, it must be dismissed. ..."         On 29 October 1996 the detention order was quashed by the Kraków Regional Court since the applicant's family had meanwhile paid the bail of PLN 10,000 into court.         From 22 February 1996, i.e. the date on which the appellate hearing before the Kraków Court of Appeal took place, to at least 18 September 1997 no hearing on the merits was held in the applicant's case.         The proceedings are pending before the Kraków Regional Court.     B.     Relevant domestic law and practice   1.     Preventive measures, in particular, detention on remand.         The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure lists as preventive measures, inter alia, detention on remand, bail and police supervision.         Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:         "Preventive measures may be imposed in order to secure the due       course of proceedings if the evidence against the accused       sufficiently justifies the opinion that he has committed a       criminal offence."         The Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the margin of discretion as to maintaining the specific preventive measure.   Detention on remand is regarded as the most extreme among the preventive measures and the domestic law lays down that in principle it should not be imposed if more lenient measures are adequate or sufficient.         Section 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:         "1.   A preventive measure (including detention on remand) shall       be immediately quashed or altered, if the basis therefor has       ceased to exist or new circumstances have arisen which justify       quashing or replacing a given measure with a more or less severe       one."         Section 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:         "Detention on remand shall be imposed only when it is mandatory;       this measure shall not be imposed if bail or police supervision,       or both of these measures, are considered adequate."         Within the above margin of discretion the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out a list of particular instances in which detention on remand may be imposed.         Section 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the version applicable at the material time, insofar as relevant, provided:         "Detention on remand may be imposed if:         1.    there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or       go into hiding, in particular when his identity cannot be       established or he has no permanent domicile [in Poland], or:         2.    there is a reasonable risk that he will attempt to induce       witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the due course       of the proceedings by any other unlawful means. ..."         Finally, the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to particular situations in which detention on remand shall not, in principle, be maintained.         Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the version applicable at the material time, provided:         "If there are no special reasons to the contrary, detention on       remand shall be quashed, in particular when:         (1)   it may seriously jeopardise the life or health of the            accused, or         (2)   it would entail excessively burdensome effects for the       accused or his family."         As regards bail, according to the domestic practice, the sum of money required from an accused must be paid into court before the person concerned is released.   2.     Medical treatment of an accused in the course of detention on remand.         Section 219 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure provides:         "If the state of health of an accused requires treatment in a       medical establishment, he cannot be further detained except in       such an establishment."   3.     Statutory time-limits for preparing the statement of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance where appellate proceedings have been brought.         Section 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as relevant, provides:         "1.   The statement of the reasons for the judgment shall be       prepared within seven days from the date on which a notice of       appeal has been lodged; in a complex case, when it is impossible       to prepare it within the prescribed time-limit, the chief justice       of the court may extend the time-limit for a specified time..."         The above statement is a prerequisite for lodging an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance.   4.     Request for release.         According to Section 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused may, at any time, lodge a request for release with the court competent to deal with his case.   Such a request must be decided by the court within a period not exceeding three days.   5.     Domestic remedies against excessive length of proceedings.         The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure provides for two principal remedies, i.e. so-called "appellate measures": an appeal which, under Section 374 et seq. of the Code, may be brought solely against a judgment of a court and an interlocutory appeal which, under Section 409 et seq. of the Code, may be brought against decisions other than judgments and against orders for preventive measures.   There is no specific provision explicitly providing remedies against inactivity on the part of the judiciary or the lack of a decision in the course of criminal proceedings.         On 2 April 1997 the new Constitution of Poland was adopted by the National Assembly.         Article 45 para. 1 of the Constitution states:         "1.   Everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing,       without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and       independent court."         Article 79 para. 1 of the Constitution, which refers to a constitutional complaint, states:         "1.   In accordance with principles specified by statute,       everyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been       infringed, shall have the right to appeal to the Constitutional       Court for a judgment on the conformity with the Constitution of       a statute or another normative act on the basis of which a court       or organ of public administration has made a final decision on       his freedoms, rights or   obligations as specified in the       Constitution."         Regardless of the fact that, to date, there has been no relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court relating to the manner of exercise of the right to make a constitutional complaint, such a remedy can be attempted only after a final decision in court or other proceedings has been given.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains first under Article 3 of the Convention that the refusals to release him from detention on remand in view of his state of health and his family situation were contrary to this provision of the Convention.     2.     He complains under Articles 5 and 6 para. 2 of the Convention that his detention on remand lasted for an unreasonably long time and was, therefore, contrary to the principle of the presumption of innocence.   3.     The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings in his case have not been conducted within a "reasonable time".   4.     He further submits, invoking Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, that the above proceedings have been conducted unfairly in view of the fact that co-defendants were treated differently, that he could not express himself freely before the courts and that the minutes of the hearings did not reflect the witnesses' testimonies.   5.     Finally, the applicant complains under Article 13 of the Convention that he has no domestic remedy against the length of the proceedings in his case and against various violations of his procedural rights.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 12 April 1995 and registered on 15 February 1996.         On 26 February 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 25 June 1997, after the second extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicant replied on 18 September 1997.         The translation of the Government's observations was submitted on 15 February 1998.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention that the refusals to release him from detention on remand in view of his state of health and his family situation were contrary to this provision of the Convention.          Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention states:         "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading       treatment or punishment."   a)     The Government submit that the Convention entered into force with respect to Poland on 19 January 1993.   Poland recognised the Commission's competence to receive individual applications "from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation by Poland of the rights recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event occurring after 30 April 1993".   Since all the complaints submitted by the applicant, including the present one, relate to the criminal proceedings against him which commenced on 8 August 1991, i.e. before 30 April 1993, the application, insofar as it relates to events prior to this date, is outside the competence ratione temporis of the Commission.         The applicant does not address this issue.         The Commission observes that the present application relates in part to a period prior to 1 May 1993, the date on which Poland's declaration acknowledging the right of individual petition took effect. Since, in that declaration Poland, limited the Commission's competence to facts subsequent to the declaration, the Commission, by reason of its competence ratione temporis, can examine the applicant's complaints only insofar as they relate to the period after this date.         It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible as being incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention withion the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   b)     The Government maintain further that in any event the applicant's complaint under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention is manifestly ill- founded.         They stress that the applicant received medical treatment adequate for his state of health during the entire period of his detention.   Nevertheless, he consistently deteriorated his condition by his repeated attempts to commit suicide which were of a purposefully demonstrative nature.   The authorities concerned followed the recommendations given by medical experts, in particular by placing him in the psychiatric ward of the Bytom Prison Hospital in 1991 and by releasing him on 27 July 1992.   The applicant, however, following his release on this date, had recourse to psychiatric treatment on three occasions only.         Moreover, the Government point out that the applicant was subsequently redetained due to the fact that he had failed to appear before the trial court.   As a consequence, the refusals to release him complained of were justified by the need to ensure his presence at hearings.         The applicant replies that, first of all, in 1991 there was no psychiatric ward in the Bytom Prison Hospital where he was placed allegedly in accordance with the recommendations given by the medical experts.   Such a ward existed, for instance, in Kraków, where he had been detained before being confined in Bytom.   For unspecified reasons he had initially been detained in a prison ward and, following his further attempt to commit suicide, placed in an internal diseases ward. The authorities did not, therefore, follow the recommendations of the medical experts' report of 25 November 1991 according to which his detention could have been continued only on condition that he was placed in a psychiatric ward.         As from 4 October 1993, when he was redetained, the authorities did not provide him with adequate psychiatric treatment either.   They totally disregarded the nature of his mental suffering which, taken together with his isolation, resulted in his having repeatedly attempted to commit suicide in prison.   The whole attitude presented by the authorities, including their lack of any serious attempt to treat his chronic depression, their total disregard for the fact that his detention might have resulted in a serious danger to his life and their highly offensive comments on his suicidal tendencies deeply humiliated him and exposed him to feelings of fear and inferiority. The fact that he is still alive as his attempts to commit suicide proved unsuccessful cannot in itself suffice as evidence that the authorities provided him with adequate treatment.   In contrast, it shows that the psychiatric treatment received by him was superficial and insufficient.         The applicant stresses that the other co-defendants were released on bail at an early stage of the proceedings even though they were charged with equally serious offences.   Moreover, as early as 28 May 1996, when the psychiatrist submitted his report, the authorities were aware of the fact that his continued detention might have seriously endangered his life.   In response to this, they required an extraordinarily high sum of bail from him, notwithstanding his state of health and financial standing, thus subjecting him to further stress and uncertainty.   He concludes that his continued detention, maintained regardless of the fact that it could have endangered his life, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.         The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this complaint raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of its merits.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   2.     The applicant also complains under Articles 5 and 6 para. 2 (Art. 5, 6-2) of the Convention that his detention on remand lasted for an unreasonably long time and was, therefore, contrary to the principle of the presumption of innocence.         The Commission, noting that this complaint relates solely to the question of the length of the applicant's detention on remand, has examined it under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, provides:         "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions       of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article ... shall be entitled to trial       within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.   Release       may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial."         The Government maintain that, having regard to the Commission's competence ratione temporis, the applicant's detention on remand, which lasted from 4 October 1993, when he was redetained, to 1 June 1995, when he was convicted at first instance, and again from 22 February 1996, when his conviction was quashed, to 29 October 1996, when he was released on bail, did not exceed a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.         They emphasize that the applicant, in particular before 1 June 1995, lodged numerous requests for release and appeals against the decisions refusing to release him.   Moreover, after 22 February 1996 the applicant could have been released immediately, if had secured bail of PLN 10,000 which was equal to approximately twelve average monthly salaries in Poland at the material time.   His failure to secure bail resulted in the court being unable to alter the preventive measure imposed on him.         The applicant contests the Government's submissions.   He asserts that on 4 October 1993 he was redetained because of his absence at the hearings even though his counsel had submitted medical certificates confirming that he had not been able to appear before the court on account of his illness.   This was an extreme measure as the court could have first ordered a verification of the circumstances relating to his state of health if it had not regarded the medical certificates in question as credible or sufficient.   It is true that his detention was eventually replaced by release on bail; this was, however, solely due to the fact that for a period of several months following the appellate hearing the proceedings did not progress at all.         He further submits that the authorities conditioned his release on an unusually high sum of bail.   This was fixed without any reference to his actual financial situation, since it was equal to a twenty-five months' salary of his wife, who had less than an average income at the material time.   It took his family five months to collect the sum in question and pay it into court.   During this time all his requests to have the bail lowered were to no avail.   This inevitably and unnecessarily prolonged his detention and resulted in deepening his depression.   Thus, as early as 11 June 1996 the psychiatrists concluded that his continued detention could jeopardise his life.         The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this complaint raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of its merits.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   3.     The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings in his case were not conducted within a "reasonable time".         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, states:         "In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,       everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time       by ... [a] ... tribunal established by law. ..."         The Government submit that the applicant's case was a complex one.   It concerned a significant number of serious charges of fraud against ten co-accused.   The court had to hear voluminous evidence. The hearings were scheduled frequently, that is to say at intervals not exceeding one month.   The applicant obstructed the due course of the trial since between 8 February and 4 October 1993, i.e. for a period of nearly eight months the case remained adjourned as his absence from hearings prompted the authorities to issue a warrant to search for him by a wanted notice.   Moreover, the fact that the applicant was placed under psychiatric observation in another set of proceedings, and the illness of a judge contributed to the overall length of the proceedings before the court of first instance.           As regards the appellate proceedings, the Government point out that they lasted for an acceptable period of approximately six months. They conclude that the length of the proceedings in the applicant's case has not exceeded a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         The applicant replies that the overall length of the proceedings complained of has, to date, exceeded six years and this period in itself shows that the charge against him has not been determined in a reasonable time.   Moreover, from 22 February 1996, i.e. the date on which the appellate hearing took place, to 18 September 1997, the date on which he filed his reply to the Government's observations, no further hearing on the merits was held in his case.         In the applicant's opinion, his absence from the hearings did not contribute to the length of the proceedings; the relevant medical certificates, which were disregarded by the court, clearly confirmed that his absence was due to illness rather than a deliberate attempt to upset the due course of the proceedings.         The Commission considers, in the light of the criteria established by the case-law of the Convention organs on the question of "reasonable time", and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.   4.     The applicant complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention that he has no domestic remedy against the length of the proceedings in his case and against various violations of his procedural rights.         The Commission, noting that the present complaint concerns