CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 23 avril 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 32220/96                     by Jacek CHOJAK                     against Poland          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 23 April 1998, the following members being present:               MM    S. TRECHSEL, President                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS                F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS           Mrs   J. LIDDY           MM    L. LOUCAIDES                B. MARXER                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                G. RESS                A. PERENIC                C. BÎRSAN                P. LORENZEN                K. HERNDL                E. BIELIUNAS                E.A. ALKEMA                M. VILA AMIGÓ           Mrs   M. HION           MM    R. NICOLINI                A. ARABADJIEV             Mr    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 20 December 1995 by Jacek CHOJAK against Poland and registered on 11 July 1996 under file No. 32220/96;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      18 April 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 18 June 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1971, is a bricklayer currently detained in Lowicz prison.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:   A.    Particular circumstances of the case        On 1 June 1995 the Trzebnica District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) issued a warrant to search for the applicant by a wanted notice.   This was due to the fact that the applicant, who was suspected of committing robbery, had apparently gone into hiding.   On 13 June 1995 the applicant was arrested by the police.        On   14 June 1995 the Trzebnica District Prosecutor charged the applicant with robbery and detained him on remand for three months in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged.        On 11 September 1995 the Trzebnica District Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Wroclaw Regional Court (S*d Wojewódzki). The applicant was indicted of robbery and common assault committed together with two accomplices.        On 5 October 1995 the applicant requested the Wroclaw Regional Court to release him.   On 13 October 1995 the court dismissed his request.   He did not appeal against this decision.        From 21 November to 1 December 1995 the applicant was serving another sentence since, in the meantime, a fine previously imposed on him had been converted into ten days' imprisonment.        On 5 December 1995 the applicant requested the Wroclaw Regional Court to release him.   He asserted that his prolonged isolation from his family argued for his release and that as he had confessed his guilt he had clearly shown his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.        On 14 December 1995 his request was dismissed on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a serious crime and that the need to ensure the due course of proceedings still existed.   The Wroclaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) participated in the court session which was held in camera.        On an unspecified date in January 1996 the applicant appealed against the above decision.   He submitted that under the recent amendments to the Polish Criminal Code, which were introduced on 1 January 1996, a person who committed a trivial robbery had a right to make a plea in mitigation.        On 8 January 1996, the Wroclaw Regional Court, sitting in camera, declared that, due to the amendment to the Criminal Code of 29 June 1995 which had been introduced on 1 January 1996, it no longer had jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter of the case and ordered the case to be transferred to the Trzebnica District Court (S*d Rejonowy).        On 9 January 1996, upon the applicant's appeal, the Wroclaw Court of Appeal (S*d Apelacyjny) upheld the decision of 14 December 1995 and held that, notwithstanding the existence of mitigating circumstances which would be relevant to the final judgment, the detention should be maintained in view of the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime in question and the need to ensure the due course of proceedings.   The Wroclaw Prosecutor of Appeal (Prokurator Apelacyjny) participated in the court session.        On 16 January 1996 the applicant requested the Trzebnica District Court to quash the detention order or to replace it by police supervision.        On 15 February 1996 his request was dismissed.   The court found that the need to maintain the detention still existed and that no circumstances militated in favour of the applicant's release.   The Trzebnica District Prosecutor took part in the court session.        On 1 March 1996 the applicant appealed to the Wroclaw Regional Court, submitting that his detention should no longer be maintained on account of the fact that the criminal proceedings instituted against him had been going on for an unreasonably long time.        On 4 March 1996 he again requested the Trzebnica District Court to release him.   The court dismissed his request on 13 March 1996.   The applicant did not appeal against this decision.        On 6 March 1996 the court ordered that evidence be taken from psychiatric experts in order to establish whether tempore criminis the applicant's co-defendant had acted in a state of diminished responsibility.   The experts submitted their report to the court on 14 April 1996.        In the meantime, on 8 March 1996, the Wroclaw Regional Court upheld the decision of 15 February 1996 on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question and that the need to ensure the due course of proceedings still existed.   The court held that the length of proceedings did not militate against continuing the detention.   The Wroclaw Regional Prosecutor participated in the court session.        On 16 April 1996 the Trzebnica District Court scheduled a hearing for 17 June 1996.        On 7 June 1996 the applicant filed an application form addressed to the European Commission of Human Rights.   It transpires from the first page of the   application that it was stamped by the Trzebnica District Court on 17 June 1996.        The hearing of 17 June 1996 was cancelled and rescheduled for 5 August 1996.        On 5 August 1996 the trial commenced before the Trzebnica District Court.   The court heard evidence from the defendants.   The hearing was adjourned as one of the co-defendants had failed to appear. In the course of the hearing the applicant requested the court to quash the order for detention.   Apparently, his request was dismissed on the same day.        On 12 August 1996 the subsequent hearing was adjourned on the ground that one of the co-defendants had failed to appear.   In the course of the hearing the applicant again requested the court to quash the detention order.   The request was dismissed on the same day.        On 26 August 1996 the next hearing was adjourned as the injured party had appeared before the court in a state of intoxication.   In the course of the hearing the applicant requested the court to quash the detention order.   On the same day the court released the applicant in view of the fact that the latter had confessed his guilt and had given comprehensive testimony.        On 6 September 1996 the Wroclaw Regional Court, upon the Trzebnica District Prosecutor's appeal, quashed the decision of the Trzebnica District Court of 26 August 1996.   The court ordered that the applicant should be redetained in view of the need to ensure the due course of proceedings and the likelihood of a severe penalty.   The court also held that the further detention on remand was justified because the applicant had gone into hiding before he was arrested.   The court's session was held in camera.   The Wroclaw Regional Prosecutor participated in the court session.        On 16 September 1996 the subsequent hearing was cancelled because the presiding judge was ill.        On 23 September 1996 the applicant was redetained.        On 7 October 1996 the trial before the Trzebnica District Court came to an end. However, the court ordered that the judgment be given on 9 October 1996.        In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the defence lawyer of one of the co-defendants requested the court to confront certain witnesses with each other.        On 9 October 1996 the Trzebnica District Court ordered   the trial to be re-opened and to re-hear those witnesses.        On 21 October 1996 the court heard the witnesses and ordered that the judgment be rendered on 23 October 1996.        On 23 October 1996 the Trzebnica District Court convicted the applicant of trivial robbery and sentenced him to two years and six months' imprisonment.   The applicant's lawyer lodged a notice of appeal with the Trzebnica District Court; however neither the applicant nor the lawyer lodged an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance.   B.    Relevant domestic law and practice   1.    Preventive measures, in particular detention on remand.        The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure lists as "preventive measures", inter alia, detention on remand, bail and police supervision.        Until 4 August 1996 (i.e. the date on which the Law on Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and Other Criminal Statutes entered into force) detention on remand was imposed by an investigating prosecutor.   A detainee could appeal, within a seven-day time-limit, to the court competent to deal with his case against an order for his detention; however, he was not entitled to be brought before a judge, whereas the court examined his appeal in the presence of a prosecutor. A detention order was enforceable on the date of its issue.   It became final either after the expiry of the seven-day time-limit set out for lodging an appeal, or on the date on which it was upheld by a court dealing with the appeal.        Section 210 paras. 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in the version applicable at the material time) stated:        "1.   Preventive measures shall be imposed by the court; before      a bill of indictment has been lodged with the competent court,      the measures shall be imposed by the prosecutor.        2.   A prosecutor may impose a preventive measure only with      respect to a person who has been interrogated in the case as a      suspect.   Before ordering detention on remand or deciding on bail      the prosecutor shall personally hear the suspect."        According to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in the version applicable at the material time) the prosecutor could order detention on remand for a period not exceeding three months.   When, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, the investigation could not be terminated within this period, detention on remand could, if necessary, be prolonged by the court competent to deal with the case, upon the investigating prosecutor's request, for a period not exceeding one year.        Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated:        "Preventive measures may be imposed in order to secure the due      course of proceedings if the evidence against the accused      sufficiently justifies the opinion that he has committed a      criminal offence."        The Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the margin of discretion as to maintaining the specific preventive measure.   Detention on remand is regarded as the most extreme among the preventive measures and the domestic law lays down that in principle it should not be imposed if more lenient measures are adequate and sufficient.        Section 213 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:        "1.   A preventive measure [including detention on remand] shall      immediately be quashed or altered, if the basis therefor has      ceased to exist or new circumstances have arisen which justify      quashing a given measure or replacing it with a more or less      severe one."   2.    Prosecutor.        Chapter III of the Code of Criminal Procedure entitled "Parties to proceedings, defence counsel, representatives of victims and representatives of society" describes a prosecutor as a party to criminal proceedings.   According to all the relevant provisions of the Code read together, a prosecutor performs investigative and prosecuting functions in the course of criminal proceedings.   In particular, after completing the investigation, he draws up a bill of indictment and represents the prosecuting authority before the court competent to deal with the case.        Under Section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "... organs conducting criminal proceedings [including a prosecutor] shall examine and take into account exonerating as well as incriminating evidence.        As regards the general position of a prosecutor at the material time, he was subordinate to the Prosecutor General.   He was not, therefore, independent of the executive since the Minister of Justice carried out the duties of the Prosecutor General.   3.    Domestic remedies relating to the lawfulness and length of detention on remand.        At the material time there were three different proceedings enabling a detainee to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and thus possibly obtain release.   Under Section 212 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he could appeal to a court against a detention order made by a prosecutor.   Under Section 222 paras. 2(1) and 3 he could appeal against a further decision by that court prolonging his detention on a prosecutor's request.   Finally, Section 214 of the Code stated that an accused could at any time apply to the competent authority to have a preventive measure quashed or altered.   Such an application had to be decided by the prosecutor or, after the bill of indictment had been lodged, by the court competent to deal with the case, within a period not exceeding three days.     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention that:   a)    he was deprived of his liberty by the decision of the prosecutor, who was a party to the proceedings and not a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power; and   b)    the length of his detention on remand exceeded a "reasonable time" within the meaning of this provision.   2.    He further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings instituted against him were lasting for an unreasonably long time.   3.    Finally, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention that he was deprived of his defence rights on account of the fact that he was never brought before a judge competent to review his requests for release, nor was his lawyer entitled to attend any court session concerning the lawfulness of his detention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 20 December 1995 and registered on 11 July 1996.        On 17 January 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 18 April 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicant replied on 18 June 1997, stating that he wished to pursue his application only insofar as it concerned the complaints submitted by him under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.   He also stated that he wished to withdraw the remainder of his complaints.        On 3 February 1997 the Government submitted a translation of their observations.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that he was deprived of his liberty by the decision of the prosecutor, who was a party to the proceedings and not a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power.        Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides:        "3.   Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the      provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought      promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to      exercise judicial power ..."   a)    "Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention "the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken".        The Government maintain, first, that the applicant did not exhaust the remedies available to him under domestic law as he failed to submit an appeal, under Section 212 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the detention order of 14 June 1995.   They further submit that the applicant could, by means of such an appeal, have challenged both substantive and formal aspects of the lawfulness of his detention on remand.   In the Government's opinion, the applicant could, therefore, also contest the fact that it was a prosecutor who had ordered his detention on remand.        The applicant admits that he failed to appeal against the detention order of 14 June 1994.        The Commission notes that under Polish law applicable at the material time the applicant could, by lodging an appeal against the detention order, have contested the lawfulness of his detention.   He could not, however, on the domestic level, have challenged the power of the prosecutor to order his detention because, under Section 210 para. 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, only a prosecutor was competent to detain a suspect on remand during the investigative stage. Moreover, under the national law, the applicant was not entitled to be brought before a judge dealing with an appeal against the detention order.   Accordingly, an appeal against the detention order of 14 June 1995 cannot be regarded as a remedy whereby the applicant could have been promptly brought before a judge.        It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for non- exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   b)    The Government maintain, secondly, that the applicant also failed to submit this complaint within the six-month period referred to in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.        They further submit that the applicant complains about a single, concrete fact, namely that the investigating prosecutor, who, in his opinion, was not impartial, ordered his detention on remand.   Hence, the concept of "continuing violation" does not apply to the present case (see No. 214/56, Yearbook 2, p. 214 and No. 8317/78, Dec. 15.5.1980, D.R. 20, p. 44 and 76).        In this respect the Government point out that the Trzebnica District Prosecutor made an order for the applicant's detention on 14 June 1995 and, accordingly, the six-month period began running on this date.   Since the applicant introduced his complaints on 20 December 1995, he clearly failed to respect the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.        The applicant replies that at the time of introducing his complaints he was not aware of how the period concerned should be calculated.        The Commission recalls that where no domestic remedy is available the six-month period runs from the act alleged to constitute a violation of the Convention; however, where it concerns a continuing situation, it runs from the end of the situation concerned (see, e.g. No. 14807/89, Dec. 12.2.92, D.R. 72, p. 148; No. 19601/92, Dec. 19.1.95, D.R. 80-B, p. 46; No. 34578;/97, Dec. 1.12.97, unpublished)).        As regards the present case, the Commission notes that the applicant's complaint that his detention on remand was ordered by the investigating prosecutor arose out of domestic legislative provisions, i.e. Sections 210 and 222 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, which, at the material time, explicitly excluded the possibility of a person detained at the investigative stage being brought before anyone other than a prosecutor.   The existence of such provisions created, therefore, a situation in which the person concerned could be for a long time deprived of his right to be brought before an authority, which could be considered to constitute "a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        The Commission further notes that the applicant was brought before a trial judge on 5 August 1996, when the first hearing in his case took place and that, during this hearing, he requested the court to release him. This day he was personally present before a person clearly acting in a judicial capacity for the first time since his detention had been ordered by the prosecutor on 14 June 1995.        The Commission therefore considers that the breach of the Convention of which the applicant complains continued until the point at which he eventually appeared before a trial judge and could even be considered to have been gradually aggravated during that period.        Accordingly, the Commission considers that the running of the six-month period in respect of the present complaint commenced on 5 August 1996.        It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected as being lodged out of time.   c)    The Government contend that in any event this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded.   Thus, under the domestic law, a prosecutor is considered to be a guardian of the public interest. Under Section 7 of the Act of 20 June 1985 on Public Prosecutors he must, when carrying out his duties, follow the principle of impartiality.   Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Section 3, he is, at any stage of the proceedings, bound by the general principle of objectivity and obliged to take into account exonerating as well as incriminating evidence.        They maintain that a prosecutor's function is not limited to a duty to collect evidence in criminal proceedings.   He is obliged to assess evidence and, when he finds that a given offence does not create a danger to society, he may order that the investigation be discontinued either conditionally or unconditionally.   Such a decision should be considered as an act of administration of justice.        The Government admit that in criminal proceedings a prosecutor acts as a party.   This, however, does not absolve him from his general duty to follow the principles of impartiality and objectivity.   For instance, he may file any appeal on behalf of a defendant if he considers this justified.        They further stress that in the present case the Trzebnica District Prosecutor personally heard the applicant before ordering his detention.   Thus, the procedural requirements prescribed by Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention were complied with.   They conclude that this fact taken together with the general position of a prosecutor in criminal proceedings fully justifies the opinion that the investigating prosecutor, when detaining the applicant, acted in the capacity of a "judicial officer"   within the meaning of para. 3 of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention (see Eur. Court HR, Schiesser v. Switzerland judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A no. 34, pp. 13-14, para. 31).        The applicant generally contests the Government's submissions, asserting that the Trzebnica District Prosecutor, when ordering his detention, did not offer sufficient guarantees of independence as required under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this complaint raises complex issues of law and of fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of its merits.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   2.    The applicant further complains under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention that the length of his detention on remand exceeded a "reasonable time" within the meaning of this provision.        Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides:        3.    Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the      provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article ... shall be      entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending      trial.   Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for      trial."   a)    Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, "the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law."        The Government submit that the applicant has not complied with the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention since he has not exhausted all the remedies available to him under Polish law. Firstly, the applicant failed to appeal against the detention order made by the Trzebnica District Prosecutor on 14 June 1995.   Secondly, he did not appeal against the two subsequent decisions dismissing his requests for release given by the Wroclaw Regional Court on 13 October 1995 and by the Trzebnica District Court on 13 March 1996.   As a consequence, the applicant did not avail himself of remedies which were adequate and effective and which, in case of a favourable decision, would have resulted in his release.        The applicant admits that he did not appeal against the above- mentioned decisions.   However, any such appeals by him would have poor prospects of success, especially at an early stage of the proceedings. At this stage, the purpose of which was to collect evidence in support of the charge laid against him, it was unlikely that the authorities would have released him, given that they subsequently refused to do so even though he had confessed his guilt and cooperated with them. Moreover, any appeal by him against the above-mentioned court decisions might have resulted in the proceedings being prolonged.        The applicant contends that there is no failure on his part as regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies, since, on several other occasions, he requested the authorities to release him and lodged appeals against their refusals to release him.        The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention an applicant must make a normal use of those domestic remedies which are likely to be effective and sufficient.   When a remedy has been attempted, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (No.11471/85, Dec. 19.1.89, D.R. 59, p. 67).   It further recalls that the rule concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies does not require that an appeal be introduced which would have no chance of success (see No. 13251/87, Dec. 6.3.91, D.R. 68, p.138; No. 13134/87, Dec. 13.12.90, D.R. 67, p. 216).        The Commission notes that the applicant failed to appeal against the decisions referred to by the Government.   However, on   5 December 1995 he requested the Wroclaw Regional Court to release him.   He filed an appeal against that court's decision dismissing his request.   On 16 January 1996 he lodged a similar, unsuccessful request with the Trzebnica District Court and, subsequently, appealed to the Wroclaw Regional Court against a further refusal to release him.        Under Polish law such requests and appeals secure a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention on remand and their purpose is to obtain release.   They constitute, therefore, an adequate and effective remedy against the length of detention.   Since the remedies relied on by the Government would have the same objective, the applicant should not, in the Commission's opinion, be required to avail himself of such other remedies.        It follows that this complaint cannot be rejected for non- exhaustion of domestic remedies.   b)    The Government further submit that it cannot be said that the applicant's detention on remand, which lasted for approximately one year and three months, was in itself long enough to exceed a "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.        Furthermore, they point out that the charge laid against the applicant was of a serious nature.   Had the applicant been convicted of robbery, a sentence of up to fifteen years' imprisonment might have been imposed on him.   There was another aggravating factor, namely that the applicant had a previous criminal record, which had to be taken into account by the authorities concerned.   Finally, at the initial stage of the proceedings he went into hiding which prompted the prosecutor to issue a warrant to search for him by a wanted notice. As a consequence, there was a risk that the applicant might abscond or obstruct the due course of the proceedings.   This justified his continuing detention.        According to the Government, the authorities pursued the applicant's case with due diligence.   In particular, there were no periods of inactivity on their part.   The prolongation of the proceedings resulting from the fact that, due to the amendment to the Code of Criminal Proceedings relating to the jurisdiction of criminal courts which took effect on 1 January 1996, the applicant's case was transferred from the Wroclaw Regional Court to the Trzebnica District Court was not attributable to the courts dealing with the applicant's case.        The applicant submits that the issue of the warrant to search for him by a wanted notice was premature and unnecessary as at the material time he was remaining at home where, finally, he was arrested by the police.   Moreover, at an early stage of the investigation he confessed his guilt.   This clearly showed his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.   There was, therefore, no risk that he would obstruct the due course of the proceedings. Finally, as he had decided to make a plea in mitigation, it was not in his interest to evade justice or any sentence which might have been imposed.        The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this complaint raises complex issues of law and of fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of its merits.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   3.    The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings instituted against him lasted for an unreasonably long time.   Under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention he submits that he was deprived of his defence rights on account of the fact that he was never brought before a judge competent to review his requests for release, nor was his lawyer entitled to attend any court session concerning the lawfulness of his detention.        The Government contend that these complaints are manifestly ill- founded.        The applicant submits that he does not wish to pursue this part of the application.        In these circumstances, the Commission, having regard to the fact that the applicant does not intend to pursue this part of his petition, concludes, in accordance with Article 30 para. 1 (a) and (c) (Art. 30-1-a, 30-1-c) of the Convention that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application.        The Commission also finds no reasons of a general character, affecting respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention, which require the further examination of the present complaints by virtue of Article 30 para. 1 in fine(Art. 30-1)   of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission,        by a majority,      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the      applicant's complaints that he was detained on remand by the      investigating prosecutor who was neither a judge nor another      officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and that the      length of his detention on remand exceeded a "reasonable time";        unanimously,      DECIDES TO STRIKE THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION OUT OF ITS      LIST OF CASES.               M. de SALVIA                         S. TRECHSEL          Secretary                            President       to the Commission                    of the Commission