CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 20 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 29010/95                       by the Credit and Industrial Bank                       and Antonín MORAVEC                       against the Czech Republic          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 20 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM     J.-C. GEUS, President                  M.A. NOWICKI                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 4 May 1995 by the Credit and Industrial Bank and Antonín MORAVEC against the Czech Republic and registered on 31 October 1995 under file No. 29010/95;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      4 November 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicants on 17 January 1997 and 25 September 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant is a bank, a joint stock company with a registered office in Prague ("the bank").   The second applicant, a Czech citizen born in 1945, was the President of the bank's Board of Directors and a majority shareholder of the bank ("Mr Moravec"). Before the Commission, the applicants are represented by Mr Oldrich Chodera, a lawyer practising in Prague.        The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.   A.    The particular circumstances of the case        On 27 September 1993 the Czech National Bank (Ceská národní banka), pursuant to Section 26(1)(a) of the Banks Act No. 21/1992 (Zákon o bankách) ("the Banks Act"), took the bank into compulsory administration with effect from 30 September 1993 to 31 March 1994, due to its repeatedly unsatisfactory financial situation.   At the same time, a compulsory administrator was appointed to act in place of the bank's statutory organ.   The decision (rozhodnutí) on compulsory administration contained a notice that the provisions of administrative procedure did not apply to it and that no appeal lay against it.        On 29 September 1993 the compulsory administration decision was published in the Commercial Bulletin (Obchodní vestník).        By ruling (usnesení) of 30 September 1993 of the Prague 1 District Court (Obvodní soud) the compulsory administration decision and the appointment of the compulsory administrator were entered in the Companies Register (Obchodní rejstrík).   The bank was not served with the ruling.        On the same day, the compulsory administrator and a representative of the Czech National Bank came to the bank and informed all employees that the bank had been taken into compulsory administration.   The representative of the Czech National Bank notified Mr Moravec of the decision of the Czech National Bank of 27 September 1993.        On 4 October 1993 the Prague 1 District Court approved the ruling by issuing a legal validity clause.        On 18 March 1994 the Czech National Bank extended the compulsory administration until 30 June 1994.   On 30 March 1994 the extension was published in the Commercial Bulletin.   By ruling of 30 March 1994 of the Prague 1 District Court the extension was entered in the Companies Register.   On the same day the Prague 1 District Court approved the ruling by a legal validity clause.   The bank was not served with the ruling.        On 1 and 6 April 1994 respectively, the bank, having become aware of the existence of the rulings of 30 September 1993 and 30 March 1994, appealed against them to the Prague Municipal Court (Mestsky soud). It claimed that it should have been considered as a party to the proceedings by which the compulsory administration was ordered and contended that the rulings had not been served on the bank.   It also claimed that the decision of the Czech National Bank of 27 September 1993 could not be reviewed and, therefore, the bank was not able to say whether the compulsory administration had been imposed in accordance with the law or not, and that it contained an incorrect notice about impossibility to appeal.   The bank added that when it would be served with the rulings, it would make more complete submissions.        In its ruling of 17 May 1994, rejecting the appeals, the Prague Municipal Court stated inter alia:        "... the Czech National Bank's decisions in question were      adopted in accordance with Section 25 of [the Banks Act].       ... In view of the decision of 27 September 1993, the      compulsory administration was imposed due to the repeatedly      unsatisfactory financial situation ... of the bank.      Section 26(4) of [the Banks Act] expressly states that      administrative law applies to the procedure concerning the      imposition of penalties ...   Accordingly, the      administrative law does not apply to other decisions taken      in accordance with Section 26 of this Act ...   It is true      that the appellant did not receive the court's rulings.      However, it is apparent from the appeals which the      appellate court dealt with as introduced in time, that the      Credit and Industrial Bank has got familiar with both of      them ..."        On 21 June 1994 the bank filed a cassation appeal with the Court of Cassation (Vrchní soud) against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994, pursuant to Sections 237(f) and 241(3)(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.        On 22 June 1994 the bank lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994.        On 23 June 1994 the Czech National Bank extended the compulsory administration until 31 December 1994.   On 29 June 1994 the extension was published in the Commercial Bulletin.   By ruling of 30 June 1994 of the Prague 1 District Court the extension was entered in the Companies Register.   On the same day the Prague 1 District Court approved the ruling by a legal validity clause.   The ruling was sent, as a private mail, to the bank's legal representative's office.   On 21 July 1994 the bank appealed against the ruling to the Prague Municipal Court.        In the meantime, on 29 June 1994, the Constitutional Court had declared the bank's constitutional appeal inadmissible finding that the ruling of 17 May 1994 had not been served on the parties to the proceedings and, therefore, had not become final.        On 29 July 1994 Act No. 156/1994, which amended the Banks Act in particular as to the procedure on compulsory administration, came into force.   According to Article IV, the Act has become retroactively applicable to all compulsory administrations imposed before that date.        On 30 August 1994 the ruling of the Prague Municipal Court of 17 May 1994 was served on the bank and thereby became final.        On 15 September 1994 the bank filed another cassation appeal against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994 asking the Court to stay the proceedings on the first cassation appeal which had been lodged before the notification of the ruling.        On 15 September 1994 the bank introduced a second constitutional appeal against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994.   It pointed out that the ruling had became final by its notification and was, therefore, subject to appeal before the Constitutional Court.   The bank submitted that it should have been a party to the proceedings on registration in the Companies Register and should have been served with all decisions relating to these proceedings.   It further challenged an allegedly wrong interpretation of Section 26(4) of the Banks Act by the Prague Municipal Court and suggested that the provision together with Section 41(2) of the Banks Act should be repealed.        On 13 October 1994 the Prague Municipal Court dismissed the bank's appeal against the Prague 1 District Court's ruling of 30 June 1994 as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   The Court found that the bank's statutory organ, pursuant to Section 29(2) of the Banks Act as amended, had been replaced by the compulsory administrator, who alone could represent the bank or authorise a legal representative.        On 1 December 1994 the Czech National Bank decided that the compulsory administration would not finish on 31 December 1994, but it would terminate for one of the reasons indicated in Section 33 of the Banks Act as amended.   On 7 December 1994 the decision was entered in the Companies Register.        In the meantime, on 6 December 1994 the bank had lodged a third constitutional appeal, this time against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 13 October 1994.   It complained in particular that the Prague Municipal Court had violated the bank's right to be protected by a court in that it considered its appeal as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   It claimed that Act No. 156/1994 entered into force after the compulsory administration had been imposed and, therefore, could not be applied to this case.        On 13 December 1994 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the bank's second constitutional appeal against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994.   The Court held that when the constitutional appeal had been lodged, the Prague Municipal Court was dealing with the bank's appeal and the cassation appeal (dovolání) introduced in the meantime was still being dealt with.   Accordingly, there was no final decision at all.        On 31 January 1995 the Constitutional Court dismissed the bank's third constitutional appeal as being unsubstantiated and as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   The Court stated in particular:        "... the Prague Municipal Court founded its decision      expressly on Section 29(2) of [the Banks Act] ... according      to which a compulsory administrator replaces the statutory      organ of a bank during compulsory administration.   ...      [the bank's legal representative] was not authorised by the      compulsory administrator of the bank to make an appeal or      lodge a constitutional appeal.        It is not true that, as of the date of the entry into force      of Act No. 156/1994, the compulsory administration was not      in force as against the bank.   The Constitutional Court      found from the case file of the Prague 1 District Court      that the decision imposing the compulsory administration      ... was ordered by the Czech National Bank on 27 September      1993 ...   The compulsory administration became effective,      in accordance with Article 29(1) of [the Banks Act], by its      registration in the Companies Register, pursuant to the      Prague 1 District Court's ruling of 30 September 1993 which      became final on 4 October 1993. ...        Moreover, according to [the Banks Act], administrative law      was not applicable to the proceedings concerning compulsory      administration, with the exception of cases explicitly      stated by this Act (Sections 26(4) and 41). The      administrative law became applicable only after the entry      into force of Act No. 156/1994 (Section 26(4)). In this      respect, an administrative complaint could be lodged      against a decision given by the Czech National Bank      (Section 26(8)).   An administrative complaint could also be      made under Section 41(1) of [the Banks Act].   However, only      by Section 26(7) of the Banks Act as amended, did the Czech      National Bank become obliged to notify its decision on      compulsory administration to [the bank]. ..."        On 15 June 1995, pursuant to Section 33(1) of the Banks Act as amended, the Czech National Bank withdrew the bank's business licence (povolení pusobit jako banka) and on 15 August 1995, upon the bank's appeal, it confirmed this decision.        On 23 August 1995 an application form with a form of authority dated 10 August 1995 and made on behalf of Mr Moravec was submitted to the Commission.        On 2 October 1995 the Prague Regional Commercial Court (Krajsky obchodní soud) instituted bankruptcy proceedings against the bank.        On 5 January 1996 a second form of authority dated 29 November 1995 on behalf of Mr Moravec was sent to the Commission by his representative.        By letter of 12 June 1996 the bank's and Mr Moravec's representative confirmed that the application had been introduced on behalf of both applicants.        On 7 January 1997 the Prague Regional Commercial Court, to which the bank's cassation appeal had been transferred, stayed the proceedings on the ground that the bank had not paid the court fees although it was ordered to do so by the Court's ruling of 22 May 1995 (amended on 10 July 1996 and served on the bank on 12 August 1996).   B.    Relevant domestic law        Until 29 July 1994 the compulsory administration proceedings were regulated by the Banks Act No. 21/1992 ("the Banks Act").        According to Section 26(1), compulsory administration is a measure which the Czech National Bank, as an administrative authority under Section 1(3) of the Czech National Bank Act No. 6/1993, can impose upon a bank if it does not respect the conditions laid down in its business licence and/or if it infringes the law (i.e. if its financial situation and solvency considerably or repeatedly fail to satisfy the conditions laid down in the law, and prior measures have not remedied the situation).        According to Section 26(4), administrative law applied to proceedings concerning the imposition of penalties.   The Act did not oblige the Czech National Bank to notify its decision concerning the imposition of compulsory administration to the bank concerned.   It did not specify the parties to the proceedings and did not indicate any remedy against a decision imposing compulsory administration.        According to Section 29(1), compulsory administration became effective on the day of its registration in the Companies Register. Before registration, the decision of compulsory administration had been published in the Commercial Bulletin.        Compulsory administration proceedings were modified by Act No. 156/1994 ("the Banks Act as amended") which entered into force on 29 July 1994 and which was retroactively applied to all compulsory administrations imposed before this date.   According to this Act, administrative law does now apply to the proceedings concerning imposition of compulsory administration.   It determines the obligation for the Czech National Bank to notify its decision to the bank concerned and specifies the parties to the proceedings.   A defendant bank can lodge an administrative complaint (rozklad) against such a decision.        Section 14 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Act No. 71/1967) recognises as a party to proceedings any person whose rights, obligations or interests protected by law are to be dealt with, or, whose rights, obligations or interests protected by law may be directly affected by an administrative decision.        According to Section 61 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, any administrative decision taken by a central state administrative authority at first instance can be contested by an administrative complaint lodged within 15 days from the date on which the administrative decision was served.        The following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure were applied in the present case:        Section 167 provides inter alia that "Unless provided by law otherwise, the court decides by a ruling.   Where it is not stated otherwise, the provisions relating to judgments shall be deemed to apply to such rulings".          Section 159(1) provides that "a judgment which is not subject to appeal shall become final as soon as it has been served".        According to Section 161(2), "if a judgment does not create an obligation, it becomes enforceable when it becomes final".        Section 168(2) provides inter alia that "a ruling is served on the parties where it cannot be appealed".        Section 171(2) provides inter alia that "if a ruling does not create an obligation, it becomes enforceable on the day on which it is served".        According to Section 206, "if an entitled person makes, in time, an appeal against a ruling, the ruling becomes final only after an appeal court has decided on the appeal".        According to Section 200a, the proceedings concerning entries into the Companies Register shall be instituted upon a request of a natural or legal person concerned or a person entitled by law to do so.        According to Section 200b, the court shall decide on the contents of an entry into the Companies Register by a ruling, without a hearing.        According to Section 236(1), any decision of the court of appeal, which has become final, may be challenged by a cassation appeal (dovolání) in cases provided by law [the Code of Civil Procedure].        According to Section 237(1)(f), a cassation appeal may be lodged against a decision of the court of appeal if a party to the proceedings was prevented from acting before the court due to a wrong court procedure.        According to Section 240, a party to the proceedings can lodge a cassation appeal within one month from the date on which the decision of the court of appeal which decided at first instance became final.        Section 241(3)(d) provides that a cassation appeal can be lodged against a decision based on incorrect legal examination of the matter.        The administrative appeal (správní zaloba) is governed by the following sections:        Under Section 247, any person who claims to have been affected by a decision taken by an administrative authority may challenge the lawfulness of that decision before the court.        According to Section 250i(1) the facts at the time when the decision in question was given are decisive.   No examination of evidence takes place.        Section 250j(1) provides that the court, upon finding that the decision in question has been made in accordance with law, rejects the administrative appeal.        Section 250j(2) provides that the court, upon finding that the decision in question has not been made in accordance with law, may quash the decision and return the matter to the indicated administrative authority for further proceedings.   The court may also quash a decision when it appears during the course of the proceedings that the decision cannot be reviewed for lack or confusion of reasons.        The relevant provision of the Commercial Code (Act No. 513/1991), Section 27(2), provides that the facts entered in the Companies Register become effective with respect to everyone from the date on which the entry was made.        The powers of the Constitutional Court and proceedings before it are governed by Constitutional Court Act No. 182/1993.        According to Section 72(2), a constitutional appeal shall be lodged within a period of 60 days from the date on which the decision on the last domestic remedy available to the applicant under law became final.   According to Section 75(1), the constitutional appeal shall be inadmissible where the applicant has not exhausted all remedies available to him under the law.        The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in a judgment of 3 February 1994 in case No. III. ÚS 40/93 ruled on the principles of the exhaustion of a cassation appeal before introduction of a constitutional appeal.   The Court held in particular:        "In cases where the law [Code of Civil Procedure] does not admit      a cassation appeal, the latter cannot be regarded as a procedural      remedy available under the law for protecting the rights and      freedoms recognised in a constitutional law or an international      treaty within the meaning of Article 10 of the Constitution of      the Czech Republic.   In these cases, the time-limit for      introducing a constitutional appeal starts running on the day on      which the decision of the court of appeal becomes final.   A      decision by which the cassation appeal was declared inadmissible      must be regarded as a decision of declaratory character      confirming the non-existence of a right - in this case the right      to lodge a cassation appeal against the final decision of the      court of appeal. ..."   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicants complain that they were not considered to be parties to the proceedings on registration of the compulsory administration in the Companies Register.   Therefore, neither the ruling on the registration of the compulsory administration nor the rulings on its two extensions were communicated to them.   They also allege that their right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention was breached in that their appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was rejected as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   2.    They further maintain that during the period of the compulsory administration they were deprived of their right to participate in the financial administration of the bank.   They claim that the measures taken by the Czech National Bank constituted an unlawful interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   They submit that the compulsory administrator was appointed on the basis of unlawful legal acts which have never come into effect.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 4 May 1995 and registered on 31 October 1995.        On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2(b) of the Rules of Procedure.        The Government's observations were submitted on 4 November 1996. The applicants replied after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose on 17 January 1997.   They complemented their observations on 25 September and 8 October 1997.   THE LAW        The applicants complain that during the period of the compulsory administration they were deprived of their right to participate in the financial administration of the bank, and claim that the measures taken by the Czech National Bank constituted an illegal interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.   They further claim that neither the ruling on the registration of the compulsory administration nor the rulings on its two extensions were communicated to them.   They also allege that their right of access to court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was breached in that their appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was rejected as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention        The respondent Government first submit that the application was not presented on behalf of the bank as a legal person, but only on behalf of Mr Moravec as a natural person, whose rights are not involved notwithstanding that he is a shareholder of the bank.   The Government refer to the application form of 23 August 1995 which was completed in the name of Mr Moravec only.        The applicants maintain that according to a basic legal principle, any legal act must be interpreted according to its contents and the intention of the person concerned, and not according to the form of the legal act.   The applicants emphasise that from the text of the application it is clear that the Credit and Industrial Bank was a party to the compulsory administration proceedings.   Therefore, the claim of Mr Moravec that the compulsory administration proceedings to which the bank was a party, were incompatible with the Convention, should be accepted as a statement of intention on the part of the bank to bring an application.   The applicants further refer to the extract from the Companies Register of 7 October 1997 from which it appears that Mr Moravec as the President of the bank's Board of Directors was entitled to represent the bank and to commence proceedings in domestic law when the compulsory administration came into effect.        The Commission recalls that under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention, it may receive petitions from any person, non- governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention.        The bank was affected by the compulsory administration in that it prevented the bank from managing its affairs.   It is therefore clear that the bank has an interest in the subject-matter of the application. The Commission finds that even though the application form was formally completed in Mr Moravec's name only, it appears from the substance of the application that the bank through Mr Moravec wished to introduce an application.   Therefore, the forms of authority submitted by Mr Moravec can be accepted as sufficient to introduce the application on behalf of the bank.        In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the bank lodged an application with the Commission within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention and the Commission has competence to examine it.   In this respect the Commission recalls that not only substantive rights under Section I of the Convention or its Protocols but also Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, which confers upon individuals and non-governmental organisations a right of a procedural nature, must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory (see Eur. Court HR, Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 36, para. 99).        It follows that the Government's objection on this point must be rejected.        As to Mr Moravec in his personal capacity, the Commission observes that it is not contested by the Government that he validly introduced a petition with the Commission.   However, the Commission finds that as a shareholder of the bank, albeit a majority shareholder, he may not claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of the bank's rights under the Convention (see Eur. Court HR, Agrotexim and Others v. Greece of 24 October 1995, Series A no. 330, pp. 25-26, paras. 68- 71).        It follows that, insofar as the application has been lodged by Mr Moravec as a majority shareholder of the bank, it must be rejected as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) thereof.   Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention        To the extent that the bank is an applicant before the Commission, the Government object that the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust all domestic remedies.        The Government submit that on 30 September 1993, when the bank was informed about the compulsory administration and received the Czech National Bank's original decision of 27 September 1993, it had no objections. Only seven months later did the bank appeal, unsuccessfully, against three rulings of the Prague 1 District Court concerning the registration in the Companies Register of the compulsory administration and its two extensions.        The Government also maintain that two constitutional appeals lodged against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 17 May 1994, by which the appeals made by the bank against the registrations of the imposition of the compulsory administration and of its first extension were dismissed, were declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that there was no final decision.   The Government stress that no other constitutional appeal against this ruling, after it became final, was lodged by the bank although it was informed by the Constitutional Court about this remedy.   They note that on 6 December 1994 the bank filed another constitutional appeal, this time against the Prague Municipal Court's ruling of 13 October 1994, by which the bank's appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was dismissed.   The Constitutional Court, having regard to the registrations in the Companies Register of the compulsory administration and of its first extension, considered only the extension of the compulsory administration and rejected the constitutional appeal as being manifestly ill-founded.   The Government add that the bank never invoked Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in any of its constitutional appeals.        The applicants dispute the Government's submission concerning the second constitutional appeal.   They note that the constitutional appeal was dismissed because, in the meantime, they had lodged a cassation appeal.   However, according to the applicants, they used this remedy as a matter of procedural prudence because the Code of Civil Procedure provides for very strict conditions of its access.   They submit that, according to Section 72(2) of the Constitutional Court Act, a constitutional appeal shall be lodged within a 60 days' time-limit from the date on which the decision regarding the last admissible remedy became final.   Therefore, if the applicants had delayed their constitutional appeal until the decision on the cassation appeal became final, they might have run the risk of being outside the prescribed time-limit.   In their view, the Constitutional Court should either have discontinued the proceedings until the applicants' cassation appeal had been considered, or it should have made a preliminary ruling of its own.   Finally, the applicants declare that, contrary to the Government's allegation, they received no indication from the Constitutional Court that it would deal with their constitutional appeal.        The applicants also object to the Government's submission that having failed to exhaust all remedies upon the imposition of the compulsory administration, they could not subsequently challenge the decisions on its extension as it was only the compulsory administrator who was authorised to do so after the compulsory administration had come into effect.   In the applicants' view this opinion violated the fundamental principles of a democratic legal state.   Indeed, there existed an obvious collision of two opposing interests: one can hardly expect a remedy to be requested by someone whose function would be put at risk thereby.   The applicants conclude that the statutory organ of the bank should have continued to enjoy limited competence even after the imposition of compulsory administration.        The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.   Article 26 (Art. 26) also requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently at Strasbourg should have been submitted to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law and, further, that any procedural means that might prevent a breach of the Convention should have been used.   Moreover, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success.   However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement (see Eur. Court HR, Akdivar and Others judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1210- 1211, paras. 66-68).        The Commission observes that the constitutional appeal was pursued in the present case.   It is true that the first constitutional appeal was declared inadmissible on the ground that the ruling of 17 May 1994 of Prague Municipal Court against which the appeal was directed had not become final.   However, on 30 August 1994 this ruling became final and on 15 September 1994 the bank lodged the second constitutional appeal within the 60 days' time-limit under Section 72(2) of the Constitutional Court Act.   In this regard, the Commission cannot agree with the Government's submission that "no other constitutional appeal against this ruling after it became final has been lodged".        Even if the Government considered that the above mentioned ruling was not a final decision at the relevant time as the Court of Cassation had not decided on the bank's cassation appeal, the Commission must consider whether this appeal can be regarded as a remedy to be exhausted under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention in the present case.        The Commission notes that according to Section 75(1) of the Constitutional Court Act, a constitutional appeal is inadmissible where the applicant has not exhausted all remedies available to him under national law except for a request for re-opening of the trial. However, this provision does not specify whether the applicant must exhaust other extraordinary remedies; in Czech law these are a cassation appeal in civil matters and an appeal by the Minister of Justice to the Supreme Court against a decision contravening a statutory provision in criminal matters.   The Constitutional Court has clarified this problem in civil matters by its case-law, according to which in cases where the cassation appeal is not admissible, it cannot be regarded as a procedural remedy before introducing the constitutional appeal.   Accordingly, the 60 days' time-limit begins from the date on which the judgment of the court of appeal became final (cf. III. ÚS 94/93).        The case-law of the Constitutional Court has not, however, resolved the situation where the admissibility of a cassation appeal is not clear, in particular when the cassation appeal is lodged, as in the present case, under Section 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure because its admissibility depends on the findings of the Court of Cassation.   Moreover, according to Section 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the cassation appeal is available only to the parties to the proceedings.   However, in the instant case, this was a disputed point and subject of the proceedings before the national courts.   The Commission finds, therefore, that the cassation appeal did not offer the bank reasonable prospects of success and cannot be said to be effective for the purposes of the present case.        Accordingly, the application cannot be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention        The applicants complain that they were not considered to be parties to the proceedings on registration of the compulsory administration in the Companies Register.   Therefore, neither the ruling on the registration of the compulsory administration nor the rulings on its two extensions were communicated to them.   They also allege that their right of access to a tribunal guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was breached in that their appeal against the second extension of the compulsory administration was rejected as introduced by an unauthorised person.        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law. ..."        The Government contend that the right of the bank to access to a court under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was not violated.        The Government first submit that the bank could have, under Section 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed an administrative appeal to a court against the Czech National Bank's original decision and claimed that the latter breached its property rights guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.   Invoking Article 36 para. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the bank could have insisted on examination by the court of the Czech National Bank's decision as it concerned the bank's fundamental rights and freedoms.        As to the registration of the imposition of compulsory administration and of its first extension which were then objected to before the Constitutional Court, the Government submit that the constitutional appeals had to be dismissed without decision on the merits because the bank did not follow the instructions of the Constitutional Court.   Consequently, the Constitutional Court refused also the third constitutional appeal concerning the registration of the second extension.        The Government further contend that the bank's submission that this right was breached by the fact that the appeal against the second extension of the compulsory administration was rejected by the Prague Municipal Court as being introduced by an unauthorised person, is unsubstantiated.   In the Government's view, the main issue is not that the Prague Municipal Court denied justice to the bank, but that the latter disposed of an effective domestic remedy (a constitutional appeal) to challenge the decision in question but failed to exhaust it. The Government add that in the course of the proceedings before the national courts, the bank never invoked Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which is a part of the Czech legal order.        The applicants emphasise that they did not wish to challenge the merits of the imposition of the compulsory administration which evaluation is a matter for administrative deliberation.   For this reason they did not introduce an administrative appeal under Section 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Government submit. They claim that upon this appeal, an administrative decision may only be attacked on grounds of legality.   According to Section 250(j)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may quash an administrative decision only for (i) incorrect legal evaluation, (ii) inconsistency between the established facts and the content of documents, (iii) impossibility to verify the facts or (iv) insufficient evidence.   The question of necessity or inevitability of the compulsory administration cannot be,   therefore, the subject of an administrative appeal.   The applicants submit that the extent of the necessity can be evaluated only by an administrative authority and within the framework of administrative proceedings.   The decision of the Czech National Bank should therefore have contained information indicating the admissibility of a remedy in order to maintain the principle of two levels of jurisdiction in administrative proceedings.   This should have entailed an administrative complaint in accordance with Section 61 of the Code of Administrative Procedure.   Moreover, the applicants did not lodge an administrative appeal because the compulsory administration came into effect by the registration in the Companies Register.        The applicants further submit that the compulsory administration infringed their rights and obligations.   They maintain that even during the compulsory administration, the statutory organ of the bank should have retained limited competence regarding the acts of public administration.   They submit that they were not notified about the registration of the compulsory administration and of its first extension and that their appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was dismissed as being introduced by an unauthorised person.   Thus, the statutory organ of the bank was deprived of any means of redress.        The applicants contend that the decision of the Czech National Bank concerning the imposition of the compulsory administration instructed them that no remedy was admissible.   In their view, this violated the principle of two levels of jurisdiction in administrative proceedings.   They recall that it was impossible to lodge an administrative appeal because, within the framework of administrative jurisdiction, only the legality of the decision could be examined, not the administrative review itself.        The applicants also object to the Government's submission that having failed to exhaust all remedies upon the imposition of the compulsory administration, the applicants could not subsequently challenge the decisions on its extension as it was only the compulsory administrator who was authorised to do so after the compulsory administration had come into force.   The applicants conclude that they had not sufficient access to a court with sufficient powers or review.            The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that this part of the case raises complex issues of law and of facts under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application as a whole. The   Commission concludes, therefore, that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention        The applicants maintain that during the period of the compulsory administration, they were deprived of their right to participate in the financial administration of the bank.   They claim that the measures taken by the Czech National Bank constituted an unlawful interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.   They submit that the compulsory administrator was appointed on the basis of unlawful legal acts which have never come into effect.        Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention provides:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provis