CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 21 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 24240/94                       by Béláné BOCSI                       against Hungary          The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President                  N. BRATZA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 15 December 1993 by Béláné BOCSI against Hungary and registered on 31 May 1994 under file No. 24240/94;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      8 November 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 16 December 1996;   -     the supplementary observations submitted by the applicant on      10 April 1997 and the supplementary observations in reply      submitted by the respondent Government on 1 July 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, a Hungarian citizen residing in Füzesabony, Hungary, was born in 1930 and is a pensioner. Before the Commission she is represented by Mr I. Horváth, a lawyer practising in Budapest.        The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case   (a)   The proceedings with a view to terminating the applicant's      placement under guardianship        On 26 June 1986 the applicant was committed to the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, Heves County Hospital (Heves Megyei Kórház), Eger. On 10 July 1986 Judge T.G., a single judge at the Eger District Court (Egri Városi Bíróság), reviewed and approved her forced psychiatric treatment which eventually terminated on 25 September 1986. On 17 November 1986 the Heves County Regional Court (Heves Megyei Bíróság), upon the applicant's appeal, found that the review proceedings of 10 July 1986 concerning her detention at the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry had been improper. The Regional Court, however, discontinued the proceedings having regard to the fact that the detention had meanwhile ended.        In December 1989 the Heves County Public Prosecutor's Office (Heves Megyei Foügyészség) initiated guardianship proceedings against the applicant. The Public Prosecutor's Office recalled that during the preceding years the applicant had continually been intervening, in an inappropriate and querulous way, with various authorities to seek remedies in a civil litigation case of her son. In the opinion of the Public Prosecutor's Office, she suffered from querulous psychosis. The Public Prosecutor's Office proposed that forensic psychiatry expertise be taken.        In March 1990 the Eger District Court found that the applicant suffered from paranoia and placed her under guardianship within the meaning of S. 13 of the Civil Code (a Polgári Törvénykönyvrol szóló 1959. évi IV. törvény).        In 1992 the applicant brought an action to terminate guardianship. In September 1992 the Eger District Court dismissed her action. The District Court found that the applicant was suffering from chronic paranoid psychosis, unchanged for years, which prevented her from appreciating the true state of her affairs generally. The District Court was relying on psychiatry expertise by the Szolnok Institute of Forensic Medicine (Szolnoki Igazságügyi Orvosszakértoi Intézet), according to which the applicant had no insight of her mental disorder and her thoughts and behaviour were governed by a system of wrong ideas.        On 15 December 1992 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court, presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal. Throughout all these proceedings she was represented by the lawyer E.G. - the sister of Judge T.G. - acting as her guardian ad litem (ügygondnok).        On 4 February 1993 the Regional Court notified the applicant and the guardian ad litem that a further handwritten submission, lodged by the applicant personally, would be regarded as a petition for review by the Supreme Court and be forwarded accordingly to the first instance court for further action. In response to yet another submission by the applicant, dated 18 March 1993, the Regional Court confirmed that it had arranged for the first instance court to take action in respect of the review.        On 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court, setting a 15-day deadline, returned the petition to the applicant for supplementation requiring, inter alia, that a legal representative be provided for. This decision was served upon the applicant on 9 April 1993.        On 22 April 1993   E.G. met the applicant and explained to her that, in her view, the Regional Court's decision had been in compliance with the relevant laws and therefore, in the light of S. 270 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (a polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény), no petition for review was called for in the case. The applicant did not accept E.G.'s views and wished to have a new guardian ad litem appointed. On 26 April 1993   E.G. submitted her resignation to the Regional Court and requested that a new guardian ad litem be appointed for the applicant.        On 13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal representative, rejected the petition ex officio. This decision was served upon the applicant on 25 June 1993.        Meanwhile, on 27 May 1993 the applicant's son had unsuccessfully complained   about the conduct of the applicant's former guardian ad litem to the Vice President of the Regional Court (Megyei Bíróság Elnökhelyettese).   (b)   The compensation proceedings        In January 1991 the applicant brought a compensation action before the Füzesabony District Court (Füzesabonyi Városi Bíróság) against the hospital where she had been treated for her mental illness in 1986. She claimed that her impaired eyesight was a consequence of the psychiatric therapies having been applied to her.        For reasons of competence, the Füzesabony District Court subsequently forwarded the action to the Eger District Court. On 27 June 1991 the Heves County Regional Court, upon the applicant's motion to challenge for bias the judges at the Eger District Court, appointed the Gyöngyös District Court (Gyöngyösi Városi Bíróság) to proceed with the case.        In February 1992 the Gyöngyös District Court held a preparatory hearing and, in March 1992, granted the applicant legal aid. Between May 1992 and January 1993 the District Court was awaiting the availability of certain documents which were then kept by the Eger District Court, and subsequently by the Regional Court, in the context of the applicant's action to terminate placement under guardianship.        Meanwhile, on 10 December 1992 the District Court held a hearing and exempted the applicant from all procedural costs. Subsequently the District Court proceeded to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence in the case. On 8 March 1993 the expert presented her opinion finding no causal relation between the impugned therapies and the applicant's eye disease.        On 30 March 1993 the Gyöngyös District Court, relying on the expert's opinion, dismissed the applicant's action.        On 3 June 1993 a panel at the Heves County Regional Court, presided over by Judge T.K., dismissed her appeal.        On 7 October 1993 the District Court forwarded the applicant's petition for review to the Supreme Court. On 28 April 1994 the Supreme Court refused to give the applicant's case priority.        On 7 July 1994 the Supreme Court upheld the second instance decision. The Supreme Court's decision was served upon the applicant's lawyer on 13 October 1994.        During the above proceedings the applicant was represented by three court-appointed lawyers consecutively.   B.    Relevant domestic law   (a)   Guardianship        Section 13 of the Civil Code provides that an adult's capacity to perform legal actions shall be restricted (korlátozott cselekvo- képesség) if he has been placed under guardianship with such effect. The court shall place an adult under such guardianship if his capacity to appreciate the true state of his affairs has - on account of his mental state, intellectual deficiency or pathologic addiction - permanently or periodically decreased to a great extent. According to S. 14, any legal act of a person under such guardianship is valid, with certain exceptions, only if it is agreed or post facto approved by his statutory representative.   (b)   Code of Civil Procedure        According to S. 74, if a party with no capacity to perform legal actions has no statutory representative, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for him.        Section 84 provides that any person who, on account of his lack of sufficient income and property, is not in a position to cover procedural expenses, shall be entitled, in order to facilitate his access to justice, to be (i) exempted from paying stamp duties; (ii) exempted from making down-payments in regard to, and - normally   - from paying, the actual costs incurred during the proceedings; (iii) exempted from depositing security for procedural costs and (iv) assisted by a legal aid lawyer.        Section 87 (1) provides that, if a party has been exempted from procedural costs, the court shall, upon the party's request, appoint for the purposes of the proceedings a local lawyer as the party's legal aid lawyer, on condition that such an appointment is necessitated by the circumstances of the case.        According to S. 270 (1), a party may, unless the law provides otherwise, request the review by the Supreme Court of the final judgment, alleging that a breach of law has taken place. Section 73/A requires the party bringing the petition for review to be represented by a lawyer in default whereof the petition shall first be returned for supplementation and then - in the eventual absence of a legal representative - be rejected ex officio.        Section 312 (2) provides that, in proceedings concerning an action to terminate placement under guardianship, the party under guardianship shall have full capacity to conduct legal proceedings. The court may, nevertheless, appoint a guardian ad litem for him, if need be.   (c)   Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983 on Lawyers (az ügyvédségrol szóló 1983.      évi 4. tvr.) (as in force in the relevant period)        Section 16 (1) provides that a lawyer, (i) who represents the opposing party in another set of proceedings; (ii) who is a relative, the guardian or tutor of the opposing party or (iii) whose interest in the instant case is adverse to that of his client or who is biased towards his client, cannot represent his client as a legal aid lawyer, as a court-appointed defence counsel or as a guardian ad litem or ad hoc.     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention about the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her placement under guardianship.   2.    Moreover, as regards her action to terminate guardianship, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the proceedings were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986. Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her son.   3.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that, in the case concerning the termination of placement under guardianship, she did not have access to a review by the Supreme Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her as her guardian ad litem.   4.    As regards the compensation proceedings, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that, for the above reasons, Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial in this case, either.   5.    Furthermore, she complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 15 December 1993 and registered on 31 May 1994.        On 4 September 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 8 November 1996. On 16 December 1996 the applicant submitted observations in reply.          Meanwhile, on 3 December 1996 the Commission decided to grant the applicant legal aid.        On 10 April 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose, the applicant's lawyer submitted observations in reply to the respondent Government's observations.        On 1 July 1997 the Government submitted supplementary observations.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention about the Hungarian courts' failure to terminate her placement under guardianship.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        The Commission recalls that placement under guardianship may amount to an interference with the right to respect for one's private life within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 8509/79, Dec. 5.5.81, D.R. 24, p. 131).   The Commission considers that in the present case the court decisions refusing to terminate the applicant's placement under guardianship may be seen as an interference with her right to respect for her private life.        It remains to be considered whether this interference can be justified on any of the grounds enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        The Commission notes that the applicant's placement under guardianship was maintained in pursuance of S. 13 of the Hungarian Civil Code and finds, therefore, that the interference was prescribed by law.        The Commission further finds that the relevant provisions of Hungarian law providing the placement under guardianship of persons suffering from mental disorders can be regarded as pursuing the legitimate aim of the protection of "health or morals" and "the rights and freedoms of others".        Furthermore, the Commission considers that the maintenance of the applicant's placement under guardianship could be regarded as being necessary in a democratic society, since on the evidence before the relevant courts the applicant was suffering from an illness which prevented her from appreciating the true state of her affairs generally.          The Commission, therefore, finds that the interference with the applicant's private life was justified in accordance with Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. The applicant's complaint in this respect does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the proceedings regarding her action to terminate the guardianship were rendered unfair by the participation of her allegedly biased guardian ad litem and an allegedly biased judge. She submits in particular that the lawyer E.G. was appointed her guardian ad litem in the case, albeit that she was allegedly biased on account of her sister's involvement in the improper court review of 10 July 1986. Moreover, she alleges that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial since he had previously taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her son.        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, so far as relevant, provides as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... ,      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law."   a.    As regards the complaint about the lawyer E.G.'s appointment as the applicant's guardian ad litem in the case, the Commission observes at the outset that paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention guarantees the impartiality of the tribunal rather than that of lawyers or guardians.        In any event, considering the duties incumbent on courts to ensure an effective exercise of procedural rights, the Commission notes that, according to S. 312 (2) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, in a case concerning an action to terminate placement under guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity to conduct legal proceedings. Consequently, at any time during the proceedings, she could have appointed a lawyer to represent her. Having regard also to S. 16 (1) of Law-Decree No. 4 of 1983, the Commission considers that the relevant Hungarian laws enabled the applicant to dismiss her guardian ad litem and to appoint an independent lawyer. In this respect the Commission notes that the applicant never took any action towards this end in the course of the proceedings.   b.    As regards the complaint about lack of impartiality on the part of Judge T.K., the Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged involvement in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not sufficient to give rise to legitimate doubts as to his impartiality (cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 28, paras. 72-73).        In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal.          It follows that this part of the application must likewise be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that, in the case concerning the termination of placement under guardianship, she did not have access to a review by the Supreme Court given E.G.'s refusal to represent her as her guardian ad litem.        The Government submit that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation requiring that a legal representative be provided for. Since the applicant, despite the Supreme Court's warning, failed to provide for legal representation or to notify the Supreme Court that she was unable to do so, her petition for review was eventually rejected ex officio.         The Government maintain that the review proceedings before the Supreme Court constitute an extraordinary remedy subject to special formal requirements. However, in the light of the relevant jurisprudence of the Court (cf. Eur. Court HR, Granger v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174, p. 17, para. 44; Pretto and others v. Italy judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no. 71, p. 12), the Government consider that in the present case the Supreme Court's procedure was in compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government observe that, in accordance with Sections 84, 87 (1) and 312 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicant had, throughout the proceedings, the right to appoint an independent lawyer. Legal aid was likewise available to her and was actually granted by the Gyöngyös District Court in the second set of proceedings. Lastly, the Government point out that the applicant is free to bring a similar action anew any time in the future, given the very nature of the relevant procedure.        The applicant submits that a petition for review by the Supreme Court is an extraordinary remedy of a sophisticated nature, subject to severe formal requirements, e.g. compulsory representation by a lawyer, the non-observance of which leads to the rejection of the petition. She maintains, recalling the Airey judgment (Eur. Court HR, Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32), that given the resignation of the guardian ad litem, legal aid should have been arranged for in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Legal aid was, in any event, necessitated by the complexity and importance of what was at stake for her in the case.        Furthermore, the applicant observes that her petition for review was rejected by the Supreme Court, due to the absence of a lawyer representing her, on 13 May 1993, although the letter containing the resignation of her former guardian ad litem had been received by the Regional Court on 26 April. The fact that her petition was forwarded to the Supreme Court by the Regional Court without having appointed a new guardian ad litem resulted in the rejection of her petition for review ex officio. In her view, both the Regional Court and the Supreme Court failed to comply with domestic law, i.e. with Sections 74 and 87 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to ensure effective access to review proceedings. Due to the legal limitations applicable to the representation of persons under guardianship, she was not in a position to appoint an independent lawyer, either.        In sum, the applicant, referring to the relevant case-law (Eur. Court HR, Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18; "Belgian Linguistic" judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6), considers that the rejection of her petition for review due to the absence of a legal representative restricted her right of access to court to such an extent that the very essence of the right was impaired.        The Commission observes at the outset that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. Nevertheless, a State which does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 (Art. 6). Therefore, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is indeed applicable to proceedings in cassation. The way in which it applies must, however, clearly depend on the special features of such proceedings (Eur. Court HR, Delcourt v. Belgium judgment of 17 January 1970, pp. 14-15, paras. 25-26); account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order and of the role of the appellate court therein (Eur. Court HR, Fejde v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 67, para. 26). Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not prevent Contracting States from regulating access to appeal jurisdictions, in order to ensure the proper administration of justice (No. 12275/86, Dec. 2.7.91, D.R. 70, p. 47), especially as far as the obligation to be represented by a lawyer is concerned (No. 16598/90, Dec. 11.12.90, D.R. 66, p. 260). The requirement of a lawyer to lodge an appeal before a higher court is a common feature of the legal systems in several member States of the Council of Europe (Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment, op. cit., p. 27, para. 69).        The Commission further recalls that it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation. Special procedural safeguards may be called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Megyeri v. Germany judgment of 12 May 1992, Series A no. 237, p. 11, para. 22). However, a refusal to appoint a guardian to a person not able to litigate in connection with a case which has no prospect of success does not interfere with the right, in civil cases, of access to court (No. 10877/84, Dec. 16.5.85, D.R. 43, p. 184).        The Commission notes that on 6 April 1993 the Supreme Court returned the applicant's petition for review for supplementation requiring that a legal representative be provided for. On 22 April 1993 the then guardian ad litem, while refusing to represent the applicant before the Supreme Court, explained to her that the Regional Court's decision had been in compliance with the relevant laws and, therefore, a petition for review would offer no prospect of success. On 13 May 1993 the Supreme Court, in the absence of a legal representative, rejected the petition ex officio.        The Commission observes that, according to S. 312 (2) of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, in a case concerning an action to terminate placement under guardianship, the plaintiff has full capacity to conduct legal proceedings and, consequently, to appoint an independent lawyer to represent her before the Supreme Court. A legal aid system is provided for by Sections 84 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure, aimed at facilitating low-income litigants' access to justice.        In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the fact that the Supreme Court, subsequent to the ad litem guardian's resignation, did not provide the applicant ex officio with a new guardian ad litem did not amount to a denial of access to review proceedings. The applicant, whose action had been based on the very claim that her mental state no longer required her to be placed under guardianship, could reasonably be expected to arrange for her representation before the Supreme Court. Her submissions do not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a breach of her right of access to court, as enshrined in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application must likewise be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that Judge T.K., the president of the panel in charge at the Regional Court, was not impartial in the compensation proceedings. She submits that Judge T.K. had previously taken unfavourable decisions in respect of other actions brought by her son.        The Commission considers that Judge T.K.'s alleged involvement in previous actions brought by the applicant's son is not sufficient to give rise to legitimate doubt as to his impartiality in this set of proceedings, either (cf. Eur. Court HR, Gillow judgment, op. cit., p. 28, paras. 72-73).        In these circumstances the Commission finds that there is no indication of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal.        It follows that this part of the application must likewise be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.    Lastly, the applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the compensation proceedings lasted unreasonably long.        The Government submit that the overall length of the proceedings cannot be regarded as unreasonably long. There were no substantial periods of inactivity on the part of the courts involved. In particular, between May 1992 and January 1993 the Gyöngyös District Court was awaiting the arrival of documents which were kept by the Eger District Court and the Regional Court for the purposes of the other set of proceedings pursued by the applicant. However, the Gyöngyös District Court was not inactive even during this period, namely, it proceeded to obtain expert ophthalmology evidence.        The applicant submits that the reason forwarded by the Government to explain the delay of a duration of almost a year, i.e. the non- availability of certain documents kept by other courts, cannot justify the protraction of the proceedings.        The Commission observes that the applicant's complaint relates to proceedings which started in 1991, i.e. prior to 5 November 1992 which is the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to Hungary. However, the Commission recalls that the Convention only governs, for each Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with respect to that Party (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146). The proceedings in question had lasted approximately one year and nine months prior to 5 November 1992. This period would, if considered alone, fall outside the scope of the Commission's considerations ratione temporis. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after this date, account must be taken of the then state of proceedings (cf. Eur. Court HR, Foti and others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, para. 53).        The Commission notes that the Supreme Court upheld the second instance decision on 7 July 1994 and this decision was served upon the applicant's lawyer on 13 October 1994. The proceedings in question thus lasted somewhat less than two years subsequent to 5 November 1992.        The Commission recalls that in civil cases the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, namely, its complexity, the conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities and what is at stake for the applicant. In this instance the circumstances call for an overall assessment (cf. Eur. Court HR, Ficara v. Italy judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-A, p. 9, para. 17).        The Commission notes that the proceedings complained of related to a compensation action. The case did not involve any issues of particular complexity. Furthermore, no particular delays can be attributed to the parties. As to the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Commission observes that, subsequent to 5 November 1992, there occurred no particular delays in the first and second instance proceedings. Nevertheless, there was, in the review proceedings, some delay between October 1993 and October 1994.        However, the Commission, having regard to the fact that the applicant's case was dealt with by three court instances, considers that the overall length of the proceedings, i.e. some two years after ratification, does not appear substantial enough to have exceeded an acceptable limit in the circumstances of the present case (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Cesarini v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A no. 245, p. 26, para. 20). In reaching this finding, the Commission has taken into account that the proceedings had lasted less than two years before the Convention's entry into force in regard to Hungary. The applicant's complaint about the length of proceedings does not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.           M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber