CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 21 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 24430/94                       by Bernhard LANZ                       against Austria          The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President                 N. BRATZA                 E. BUSUTTIL                 A. WEITZEL                 C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs   J. LIDDY            MM    L. LOUCAIDES                 B. MARXER                 B. CONFORTI                 I. BÉKÉS                 G. RESS                 A. PERENIC                 C. BÎRSAN                 K. HERNDL                 M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs   M. HION            Mr    R. NICOLINI              Mrs   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 23 March 1992 by Bernhard LANZ against Austria and registered on 17 June 1994 under file No. 24430/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1949 and presently detained at the Graz prison.        The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case   1.    Preliminary investigations against the applicant and his      detention on remand        On 25 October 1991 the Investigating Judge at the Graz Regional Court (Landesgericht) issued a warrant of arrest against the applicant on suspicion of having committed fraud and falsification of documents. The suspicion related to the applicant's business activities, and in particular two real estate investment projects.   The Investigating Judge also issued a search warrant ordering a house search at the premises of the SDBV company, a private company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) for which the applicant acted as general manager and to seize documents relating to the real estate investment projects. The applicant was arrested, the house search was carried out in the presence of the Investigating Judge and numerous documents were seized. Later in the day the Investigating Judge questioned the applicant on the suspicion against him.   The Investigating Judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand as he found that there existed a danger of the applicant's absconding and of collusion.   The Investigating Judge found that the applicant frequently travelled abroad, had close connections with the United States and an apartment in New York at his disposal.   There was also the risk that the applicant would attempt to influence the employees of the SDBV company and to remove documents which had not been found at the house search.        On 27 October 1991 the applicant requested his release from detention on remand.        On 5 November 1991, after having questioned the applicant again, the Investigating Judge ordered his detention on remand also on the ground of danger of his committing offences. He found that there was the risk that the applicant, if released, would continue to realise the investment project at issue or other projects, using financial sources not yet detected.   The applicant appealed against this decision claiming that he had not committed any criminal offence.        On 6 November 1991 the Judges' Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Graz Regional Court, after an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant, his defence counsel and the Public Prosecutor, dismissed the applicant's request for release from detention on remand.   The Judges' Chamber found that no danger of absconding existed.   However, the danger of collusion continued to exist as there was the risk that the applicant would try to influence witnesses not yet heard and to remove traces of the offence.   There was also the danger of his committing offences.        On 11 November 1991 the Investigating Judge ordered that the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel should take place under the surveillance of the court because of the existence of a danger of collusion.   The Investigating Judge found that this measure was necessary because co-suspects were still at large and several witnesses had not yet been heard and there was a risk that the applicant could influence them.   The Investigating Judge stated that the validity of this order would expire at the latest when the two months statutory time limit for detention on remand based on the risk of collusion would end.   The applicant appealed against this decision.   He submitted that he did not oppose this measure in principle, however the measure constituted an unnecessary limitation of his defence rights and the Investigating Judge had failed to order this measure within 14 days as prescribed by law.        On 20 November 1991 the applicant appealed against the refusal of the Judges' Chamber to release him from detention on remand.        On 21 November 1991 the Judges' Chamber dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Investigating Judge's search warrant and the order for surveillance of the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel. As regards the complaint about the house search, the Judges' Chamber found that this measure had been carried out in a lawful manner.   As regards the complaint about the surveillance of the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel, the Judges' Chamber found the Investigating Judge's decision to be correct.   This order did not involve any criticism of the defence counsel or any reproach against them of conduct contrary to law or the disciplinary rules of the members of the bar, but merely had the purpose of preventing any contacts whatsoever with third persons in order not to endanger the success of the criminal investigations.   The present case concerned complicated business relations of the SDBV company managed by the applicant and several other companies managed by him and the flow of money between them.   Further witnesses could be identified only after all the documents seized had been examined and the applicant should be prevented from influencing them.   Furthermore, the decision had been taken within the time limit prescribed by S. 193 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The Judges' Chamber also found the applicant complaint that he did not have sufficient access to his case file as unfounded.   The Investigating Judge had granted access to the file to the official receiver of the SDBV company and to the applicant's defence counsel and the latter had also been given the possibility of making copies of the documents in the file.   The applicant's defence counsel had visited him repeatedly and could have given him copies if he so wished.   Moreover when questioned by the Investigating Judge the applicant had been informed of the contents of the file and about the statements of witnesses already heard.        On 28 November 1991 the Graz Senior Public Prosecutor's Office commented on the applicant's appeal against the Judges' Chamber's decision of 6 November 1991.        On 12 December 1991 the Graz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) decided on the appeals by the applicant and the Public Prosecutor's Office against that decision.   It found that a serious suspicion existed against the applicant and referred to the details of the criminal investigations.   In particular there also existed the danger that the applicant would abscond.   He had close connections abroad, in particular with the United States.   His financial situation in Austria was desperate and there were also reasons to assume that the applicant had financial sources which had not yet been detected.          On 15 January 1992 the Judges' Chamber, after an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant, his defence counsel and the Public Prosecutor, dismissed a further request of the applicant for release from detention on remand after an oral hearing.   The Judges' Chamber referred to its previous decision of 6 November 1991 and the Court of Appeal's decision of 12 December 1991.        On 13 February 1992 the Court of Appeal, after having heard the Senior Public Prosecutor's Office, dismissed the applicant's appeal against the above decision.        On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber, after having heard the Public Prosecutor's Office, dismissed a further request by the applicant for release from detention on remand.        After his conviction on 21 June 1992 the applicant filed further requests for release from detention on remand.   Such requests were refused by the Judges' Chamber on 3 February 1993 and 6 April 1993. Appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 February 1993 and 29 April 1993 respectively.   2.    The trial against the applicant        On 14 February 1992 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office filed a bill of indictment against the applicant.   The Public Prosecutor's Office stated that the applicant had between 1987 and 1991, misappropriated funds paid by investors for two real estate development projects.   Although he had promised to the investors to refurbish two buildings owned by the investment scheme no significant construction had been carried out and the money had disappeared.   The applicant did not file objections against the bill of indictment.        On 4 March 1992 the Graz Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for legal aid.   It noted that the applicant was already assisted by two defence counsel chosen by himself namely Mr. K. and Mr. D. and that in particular the former had intensively prepared the applicant's defence and contacted the applicant almost daily.   Since both defence counsel were still representing the applicant it could not be seen that the applicant needed a third one.        On 10 March 1992 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) dismissed the applicant's challenge for bias of all the judges of the Graz Court of Appeal.   The Supreme Court found that the applicant had failed to show any elements which would indicate bias of all judges of the Court of Appeal.        On 24 March 1992 Judge Grygar issued the summons for the applicant's trial (Ausschreibung der Hauptverhandlung).   He scheduled the beginning of the trial for 21 April and summoned 15 witnesses.   He also instructed the court appointed expert for book-keeping to make an exhaustive list of the documents used for the expert report. Subsequently, on 7 April 1992, the Judge informed the applicant's defence counsel thereof and invited him to inspect these documents at the court.   In view of the large number of documents he asked the defence counsel to specify after inspection of the file the documents of which he wished to receive a copy.   Since the applicant did not make any requests the Judge ordered on 15 April 1992 that copies of all documents be made.   On 17 April 1992 the copies were sent to the applicant.        Meanwhile, on 8 April 1992 the applicant requested that he be given the possibility to meet his defence counsel also on Saturdays and Sundays.   On 10 April 1992 the Presiding Judge of the trial court informed the applicant that this request could not be granted for organisational reasons.   Meetings with defence counsel had to take place between 7 and 17 hours from Monday to Friday.        On 9 April 1992 the Graz Court of Appeal dismissed the challenge for bias of all judges of the Graz Regional Court.   The Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had argued that the judges of the Regional Court interpreted the law in an arbitrary manner.   The applicant, however, had failed to give elements which would indicate bias of all judges.   The mere allegation that the courts interpreted the law in an arbitrary manner was not sufficient.        On 16 April 1992 the President of the Graz Regional Court dismissed a challenge of bias of Judge Grygar, the trial judge.   He noted that according to the applicant a tendency of bias could be seen in the way the judge dealt with the applicant's request that the transcript of the trial should be taken by a parliamentary shorthand writer.   However, no subjective reasons for bias could be seen. Insofar as the applicant had challenged all judges in the area of the Graz Court of Appeal for bias the President referred to the Court of Appeal's decision of 9 April 1992.        On 16 April 1992, the last Thursday before Easter, the applicant's defence counsel Mr. D. and Mr. K. revoked the power of attorney given to them by the applicant.        On 17 April 1992 Judge Grygar appointed an ex-officio defence counsel for the applicant and requested the Bar Association to nominate such a defence counsel.        On 21 April 1992 Mr. Ku. was nominated as the applicant's ex- officio defence counsel.        On 21 April 1992 the trial against the applicant started.   The Regional Court established the applicant's identity and the bill of indictment was read out.   The applicant objected to the appointment of Ku. as his ex officio defence counsel because Ku. had allegedly represented in the past third persons in civil proceedings against the applicant and the firms he managed.   Ku. stated that he was not aware of such proceedings but requested the adjournment of the trial in order to find out about these circumstances and to prepare the applicant's defence.   Thereupon the applicant requested that the trial should not be adjourned.   The Regional Court, however, decided to adjourn.   From 23 April 1992 on the applicant was represented again by Mr. K. as defence counsel.   Further court hearings were held on 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26 and 27 May and on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 June 1992.        In the course of the trial the Regional Court heard 52 witnesses, some of them repeatedly on the applicant's request.   Furthermore 5 experts, on book-keeping, building and construction matters, real estate assessment, medicine and psychiatry were heard.        The applicant challenged the Presiding Judge for bias on various occasions.   These requests were dismissed on 16 April 1992, 11 June 1992, 25 September 1992 and 1 March 1993.   The President of the Graz Regional Court consistently found that no reasons for bias could be made out.   The Presiding Judge had dealt correctly with the applicant's unusual request that a parliamentary shorthand writer should take the transcript of the trial.   The Presiding Judge furthermore had never acted as Investigating Judge; the mere fact that during breaks of the trial he had phoned witnesses requested in order to find out whether they had any information at all on the subject of the trial and communicating this information to the parties did not make him an investigating judge. Also the fact that after the trial had ended the applicant had filed a private prosecution for defamation against the Presiding Judge was irrelevant.        At the trial the applicant requested the hearing of altogether 180 witnesses and the appointment of five further experts.   On 11, 12 and 13 May 1992 and also on 15 June 1992 the Regional Court granted the requests by the applicant for the hearing of witnesses.   Between 4 May 1992 and 22 May 1992 the defence requested on each day of the trial the hearing of between one and four witnesses.   On 25 May 1992 the applicant requested 21 witnesses to be heard and on 16 June 1992 he requested 127 witnesses.   These requests were refused by the Regional Court, which found that the statements of the witnesses requested were not relevant to the proceedings.   The proceedings concerned two central questions namely whether the applicant had carried out substantial construction works on the apartment houses to which the investment projects related and what had happened to the money of the investors which had been transferred to the SDBV company.   While the applicant had consistently refused to give any valid explanation on these two questions his requests for evidence related to different issues, namely whether he had made unreported payments to his partners and whether the investment project was a viable one.   He had also requested the court to hear all the investors on the question whether they felt cheated by the applicant.        The applicant also repeatedly requested that the trial be adjourned for lengthy periods and, towards the end of the trial, requested that the trial be repeated or that the case be remitted to the investigating judge.   3.    The judgment        On 21 June 1992 the Graz Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud and sentenced him to four and a half years of imprisonment.   The Regional Court also acquitted the applicant of one additional charge of fraud raised by the Public Prosecutor's Office at the trial.   The Regional Court found that in or about the beginning of 1986 the applicant had contacted two medical practitioners, F. and R., and proposed to them a real estate investment project which would reduce their tax burden.   The purpose of the project was to buy apartment houses, to refurbish them and to rent out the apartments therein.   The applicant had used F. and R. as a front to give more weight to his project.   Initial losses could be subtracted by the investors from their income tax. F. and R. agreed and in January 1987 the F.R.KG was founded.   In November 1987 a further company was founded relating to another real estate project.   The applicant was the general manager of these companies. The companies collected some 23 000 000 ATS of investment in 1987.   The projects, however, failed.   The Tax Offices refused to recognise the losses recorded by the investors in their tax declarations, as the project was based on a model which had already years before been considered as not being in conformity with tax regulations.   Moreover, no refurbishing works had been carried out on the buildings. The money invested in the scheme had disappeared and, because of the applicant's chaotic book-keeping, could not be traced. The applicant had deceived the investors by omitting crucial information on the project in the prospectus explaining the investment scheme and, on the other hand, had not kept undertakings vis-a-vis the investors.   He had stated that if the whole sum for the projects could not be raised the investment would be reimbursed.   However, when it became apparent that the subscriptions by investors were not sufficient, he added fictitious investments, transferred payments to the SDBV company, where, due to the applicant's chaotic book-keeping and his habit of concluding only oral contracts, it disappeared.        On 9 September 1992 the judgment of some 150 pages and the transcript of the trial of some 1400 pages were served on the parties.   4.    The appeal proceedings        On 1 October 1992 the Public Prosecutor's Office filed a plea of nullity and appeal against the part of the sentence concerning the applicant's acquittal.        On 5 October 1992 the applicant filed a plea of nullity and appeal.   He complained, inter alia, that he had not been represented properly by counsel on 21 April 1992, the first day of the trial; that he had not been granted sufficient access to the case-file, otherwise he would have been able to find further exonerating documents concerning payments made by the SDBV company; that the court appointed experts had been incompetent, biased and their fees had been too high; that the defence had not been granted the possibility to consult with the applicant during the night and at week ends during the trial; that the court had refused to take evidence requested by the applicant; that the evidence had been assessed incorrectly.        On 14 October 1992 the Presiding Judge dismissed a request by the applicant for an amendment of the transcripts of the trial.   He found that the applicant had made the statements precisely as they were recorded in the transcript and, in effect, his answers had been quite ambiguous.   However, he could not change their meaning retroactively by amending the transcript.        On 22 October 1992 the applicant commented on the plea of nullity lodged by the Public Prosecutor's Office. He submitted, inter alia, that until the expiration of the time limit for filing his plea of nullity the defence had had no sufficient possibility to inspect the file, the contact between the applicant and the defence counsel having been limited to the time between 8.00 and 16.30 hours on week days and no meetings during the week end having been allowed.        On 17 November 1992 the Supreme Court requested the Presiding Judge Grygar to inform it whether during the period for filing the plea of nullity and appeal the defence had not had full access to the whole of the case file.        On 27 November 1992 Judge Grygar submitted the following statement to the Supreme Court:   On 9 September 1992 the judgment was served on the defence counsel and on 13 October 1992 the plea of nullity and appeal of the public prosecutor.   During the whole period the defence had full access to the file.   The file had been kept at the disposal of the court, the applicant and the official receiver.   From further file notes it could be seen that the applicant and the defence counsel had made use of this possibility.   The applicant himself had been granted access only during office hours and in case the file was not needed by the Presiding Judge himself; these restrictions, however, had not applied to his defence counsel.        On 24 December 1992 the Supreme Court decided that the applicant should be granted a new time limit for filing his plea of nullity and appeal since it could not be ruled out with certainty that the defence had not had full access to the case file.   On 7 January 1993 the Graz Regional Court granted the applicant a new time limit of four weeks for filing his plea of nullity and appeal.        On 11 January 1993 Judge Grygar laid a criminal information with the Public Prosecutor's Office.   He noted that one of the elements which had persuaded the Supreme Court to grant a new time limit for filing the plea of nullity and appeal by its decision of 24 December 1992 was that in a statement of the applicant's defence counsel of 22 December 1992 the latter had complained that the Presiding Judge had never dealt with some requests by the applicant. As evidence he had submitted a request for inspection of the file dated 24 September 1992 which had allegedly remained unanswered.   In the file at the prison, however, the original of this request had been found and there it was also noted that on 25 September 1992 the judge had granted the request.   The only explanation was that the applicant had succeeded in secretly passing on a copy of this request to his defence counsel before it had been put on the file.        On 3 February 1993 the Judges' Chamber dismissed a complaint by the applicant that he had not had sufficient access to his case file. The Judges' Chamber noted that on 8 January 1993 the applicant had been granted access to the file and that on the same day the case file had been brought to his cell at the prison.   As the applicant had complained on 11 January 1993 that the file had not been complete since its index had been missing an inspection of the applicant's cell had been carried out on 15 January 193 by Judge Grygar in the presence of five witnesses.   The result had been that the case file was complete and in particular that the index of the case file had not been missing. The complaint was therefore unfounded. On 18 February 1993 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's complaint against the Judges' Chamber's decision of 3 February 1993.        On 19 February 1993 the applicant again filed a plea of nullity and an appeal against the sentence.   The writ repeated in substance the arguments raised earlier.        On 25 February 1993 the Public Prosecutor's Office submitted the following statement to the Regional Court:        "after examination returned with the statement that no      submissions are made on the applicant's "new" plea of nullity and      appeal.              for the use of the attorney general's department a copy of      the judgment should be attached to the file."        On 30 March 1993 the Graz Public Prosecutor's Office withdrew its plea of nullity.        On 27 April 1993 the Procurator General (Generalprokurator) submitted the following comments on the applicant's plea of nullity:          "In the view of the Procurator General the plea of nullity of the      accused Bernhard Lanz can be dealt with under Section 285d of the      Code of Criminal Procedure.   The transmission of a decision is      requested.   The plea of nullity lodged by the Public Prosecutor's      Office has been withdrawn by the attached declaration of      30 March 1993."   5.    The Supreme Court's decision on the applicant's plea of nullity        On 9 June 1993 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicant's plea of nullity.        As regards the applicant's submission that the Presiding Judge had been excluded from presiding over the trial because he had carried out the function of an investigating judge, the Supreme Court noted that the Presiding Judge had never acted as investigating judge.   The Supreme Court noted that in the course of the preparation of the trial he had contacted one of the experts to find out whether the expert's report had to be supplemented.   He had also contacted in the course of the trial a person in order to find out if this person had any relevant knowledge before summoning this person as witness.   These steps were taken by the Presiding Judge in the exercise of his duty to gather evidence ex officio and were not the exercise of the functions of an investigating judge.        As regards the complaint that the applicant had not been properly represented by counsel on the first day of the trial, the Supreme Court noted that on 21 April 1992 the Regional Court had postponed the opening of the trial until the ex-officio defence counsel had appeared. Once the ex-officio defence counsel had requested the adjournment of the trial this request had been granted.   As from 23 April 1992 the applicant was again represented by Mr. K.   The applicant was therefore assisted by a defence counsel throughout the trial.        As regards the applicant's submissions that the court appointed experts were biased, the Supreme Court found that arguments against the independence of an expert could not be based merely on the unfavourable contents of an expert's report.   No other arguments had been raised by the applicant.        As regards the applicant's complaint about the Regional Court's refusal to hear certain witnesses, the Supreme Court noted that the numerous and repeated requests for taking evidence towards the end of the trial had given the Regional Court the impression of an intention to delay proceedings.   This impression was strengthened by the quality of some requests for evidence, such as the request for obtaining a report by an expert for law in order to verify whether the Presiding Judge was competent under the Code of Criminal Procedure to take certain decisions.   Even if the decisions taken by the Regional Court on the applicant's requests for evidence might have been influenced by the concern to avoid unnecessary prolongation of the trial, scrutiny of the decisions given showed that the trial court had acted correctly in refusing the applicant's requests.        The Supreme Court examined one by one the applicant's requests for taking evidence and the reasons for their dismissal by the Regional Court one by one.   It found that most of the requests were not concrete enough as regards the issue to be proved and therefore amounted to inadmissible "fishing expeditions", e.g. the applicant's request to hear more than a hundred investors in order to find out whether they felt deceived by the applicant. Furthermore, some of the requests were irrelevant as they did not bear on the charge laid against the applicant.   It had therefore been irrelevant to take evidence relating to the feasibility of the project because the charge against the applicant consisted in the reproach that he did not have the serious intention to realise the project according to the undertakings given. Also the applicant's request to have the real property evaluated again because any possible increase in the value without the applicant's contribution had nothing to do with the charge that he had used funds contrary to the undertakings given.        Several of the applicant's requests for taking evidence had been made towards the end of the trial.   In such circumstances there could be the impression that the applicant's defence and the modification of his position was merely an adaption to the results of the evidence already taken.   In such a situation a request for evidence must also include arguments as to reasons why   the evidence, if taken, would prove the assertions of the applicant.   This applied in particular to requests to hear again witnesses already heard by the court.   Thus the request to hear again witness R. who would state that he had received the purchase price for the real property was irrelevant as the applicant merely alleged at a very late stage that he had made a payment in cash without recording it in the book-keeping and without giving any details as to time and place of payment.   The Supreme Court therefore found that the Regional Court had correctly rejected the applicant's requests for taking evidence.        Also the requests for repeating the trial because the transcripts of the trial had not been ready were irrelevant as the law did not provide for a repetition of the trial on this ground and a repetition could not remedy the alleged failure complained of.        The Supreme Court also found that during the trial the applicant had sufficient possibility to comment on the statements of the witnesses.        The Supreme Court also rejected the applicant's complaints about the assessment of evidence by the trial court as the Regional Court's judgment did not give rise to any doubts as to the logic of the court's argumentation or its formal completeness.   6.    The Court of Appeal's decision on the applicant's appeal        On 30 August 1993 the Graz Court of Appeal, after an oral hearing in which the applicant and his defence counsel participated, granted the Public Prosecutor's appeal against sentence and increased the sentence of imprisonment to five and a half years.   It referred the applicant as regards his appeal to the decision on the Public Prosecutor's appeal.   The Court of Appel weighed mitigating and aggravating circumstances and found that a higher sentence had to be imposed on the applicant.   7.    The applicant's contacts with his relatives and his defence      counsel        During the applicant's detention on remand, including the period after the proceedings at first instance had been terminated, the judicial authorities took numerous decisions, mainly following requests and complaints by the applicant concerning his contacts with his family, defence counsel and the official receiver.   a.    Visits        On 17 December 1991 the Investigating Judge ordered that the applicant could receive three visits of 15 minutes each per week, not including his escorted leaves to the official receiver.   He found that in the past the applicant had received so many visits at the prison that the high number of these visits had caused difficulties to the prison administration.        On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints lodged by the applicant. As regards the complaint concerning the insufficient possibility to receive visits at the prison the Judges' Chamber noted that the applicant had been allowed to receive visits three times a week which was more than what was provided for in S. 187 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e. two visits of fifteen minutes per week.        On 21 October 1992 the Judges' Chamber again dismissed a complaint by the applicant that visits allowed to him were insufficient and referred to its decision of 11 March 1992.   b.    Correspondence        According to a file note of the Investigating Judge of 14 January 1992, the applicant had complained that prison officers had checked his outgoing mail.   The Judge noted that according to prison rules letters had to be handed to the prison officers unsealed in order to verify that they did not contain any hidden messages.   He also noted that the applicant had admitted to smuggled out three letters with the assistance of his defence counsel.        On 15 January 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed various complaints by the applicant.   As regards a complaint by the applicant about interference with the correspondence with his defence counsel, the Judges' Chamber noted that according to S. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the censoring of the correspondence of a person kept in detention on remand was the sole competence of the Investigating Judge.   The applicant complained that the staff of the prison read his letters.   However the Investigating Judge had no competence to give instructions to the prison staff, this being the task of the prison's director.   The Investigating Judge had informed the director of the prison of the applicant's complaint and the latter had denied that prison officers had ever read letters by or to the applicant.        On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed complaints lodged by the applicant concerning, inter alia, delays caused by the Investigating Judge in forwarding letters written by the applicant. The Judges' Chamber found that no significant delays in dispatching the applicant's letters had occurred taking into account that the applicant wrote numerous letters which had to be censored by the Investigating Judge.   Insofar the applicant had complained that letters to his defence counsel had not been accepted sealed and that letters from his defence counsel had been opened, the Judges' Chamber found that the Investigating Judge had not been responsible for allegedly unlawful acts of the prison staff.   The applicant should have filed a complaint under the Enforcement of Sentences Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz).        On 16 December 1992 the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant's complaint against the Independent Administrative Panel's (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) decision of 6 October 1992 by which a complaint of the applicant concerning interference with the correspondence with his defence counsel had been rejected.   The Administrative Court noted that on 9 July 1992 a prison officer had refused to accept a closed letter addressed to the defence counsel.   On 19 July 1992 a letter had been given to the applicant only after it had been opened.   This complaint was refused by the Independent Administrative Panel because it had not been competent to deal with such a complaint.   The Administrative Court found that the Independent Administrative Panel had correctly rejected the applicant's complaint.   c.    Escorted leave        Following several orders by the Investing Judge and later on by the Presiding Judge the applicant was granted escorted leave on a daily basis to meet the official receiver.   These visits were necessary for the official receiver to organise the bookkeeping of the companies controlled by the applicant.   These visits, which initially had also been granted on Sundays, were subsequently only granted for weekdays because the prison authorities complained that daily escorted leave created serious problems for the organisation of the duties of the prison officers.   During the applicant's trial escorted leave was suspended but it continued after the trial finished.   According to a decision by the Judges' Chamber of 14 December 1992, by which a complaint by the official receiver was dismissed, escorted leave had been reduced for organisational reasons while the official receiver had been granted the right to visit the applicant daily at the prison.   d.    Defence lawyer        On 11 March 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints lodged by the applicant.   As regards the complaint that the applicant had been hindered from meeting his defence counsel the Judges' Chamber noted that the applicant only had a right to confer with his defence counsel in the premises of the court but not when he happened to meet him on the occasion of escorted leave to the official receiver.        On 8 April 1992 the applicant requested that he be given the possibility to meet his defence counsel also on Saturdays and Sundays. On 10 April 1992 the director of the prison at the Graz Regional Court informed the Presiding Judge that it was not possible to organise visits of defence counsel during weekends.   Meetings with defence counsel had to take place between 7 and 17 hours from Monday to Friday. On 10 April 1992 the Presiding Judge of the trial court informed the applicant that this request could not be granted for organisational reasons.   The applicant could therefore meet his defence counsel only during working hours.        On 22 April 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints of the applicant.   As regards the complaint that prison wardens had prevented him from contacting his defence counsel it noted that this contact had occurred on the occasion of an escorted leave.   However, under the Code of Criminal Procedure contacts with defence counsel without any surveillance were only allowed in the prison.        On 13 May 1992 the Court of Appeal rejected several complaints by the applicant.   Concerning measures taken by the Investigating Judge, e.g. regulation of the applicant's contacts with his defence counsel, it found that he should have filed a complaint with the Judges' Chamber.        On 2 October 1992 the applicant requested authorization to meet his defence counsel also on weekends at the prison. On 21 October 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed this and several other complaints.   e.    Press conference        On 22 April 1992 the Judges' Chamber dismissed several complaints by the applicant.   As regards his complaint about the refusal of a press conference in the prison it found that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not grant a detained accused the right to hold press conferences.     B.    Relevant domestic law        The following account of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) is based on the law as in force until 1 January 1994 when the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (Strafprozeßänderungsgesetz 1993) entered into force.        According to S. 12 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Judges' Chamber at the First Instance Court supervises all measures taken by the Investigating Judge at the First Instance Court in the course of preliminary investigations.        According to S. 45 para. 3 a person taken into detention on remand may meet his defence counsel in the absence of the Investigating Judge.   However, if detention on remand has been ordered on the ground of danger of collusion the Investigating Judge may, during the first 14 days of the detention, be present when the remand prisoner meets his defence counsel.   If due to specific circumstances a danger exists that contact with the defence counsel may interfere with evidence the Investigating Judge may order that the surveillance of the contact with the defence counsel be extended until the bill of indictment is served. Surveillance of contact with the defence counsel may only be exercised as long as the detention on remand is based on a danger of collusion (S. 180, S. 193 para. 3).        S. 113 provides in particular that anybody affected by a decision of the Investigating Judge or by a delay in the course of preliminary investigations or in the proceedings after indictment, may apply for review by the Judges' Chamber, which decides in private after having heard the Investigating Judge and the Public Prosecutor. According to S. 114 there is a further appeal against decisions of the Judges' Chamber to the Court of Second Instance, if these decisions concern the severance of proceedings, the institution or discontinuation of the preliminary investigation, bail, or detention on remand without a hearing concerning release having taken place.        Under S. 180 paras. 1 and 2 a person may be held in detention on remand if he is seriously suspected of having committed a criminal offence and if there is a risk of his absconding, of collusion or that the person might commit offences. According to S. 193, detention may not last more than two months where its sole justification is the risk of collusion; it may not last more than six months where one of the other grounds is relied on. The Court of Appeal may, however, if so requested by the Investigating Judge or the Public Prosecutor and if the difficulty or the scope of the investigations makes it necessary, extend the detention. In such cases the maximum duration of detention is three months where the measure is based on a risk of collusion alone, and one year, or even two years, if the term of imprisonment which the suspect risks is ten years or more, in the other circumstances provided for.        By virtue of SS. 194 and 195, it is open to the suspect to apply for release at any time. Such an application and any appeal against a decision ordering detention on remand must be examined by the Judges' Chamber at a private hearing in the presence of the accused or his defence counsel.        Under S. 285 (d) para. 1 a plea of nullity may be rejected by the Supreme Court after deliberation in private if the Supreme Court unanimously finds that the complaint should be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded without any need for further deliberation.        Under Section 120 para. 1 of the Enforcement of Sentences Act prisoners can file a complaint concerning any decision or measure affecting their rights or any conduct of the prison staff affecting their rights.   Such complaints have to be filed within fourteen days. They have to be decided upon by the director of the prison or if the complaint is directed against the director by the Ministry of Justice (S. 121 para. 1).     COMPLAINTS        The applicant raises numerous complaints about his detention on remand, his conviction and the proceedings leading thereto.   In these respects he invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 13 of the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 1 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.        He submits in particular that the Regional Court refused to hear the witnesses and to take other evidence requested by him; that on the first day of the trial he was not properly represented by a defence counsel; that he did not have sufficient access to his case file, and that he did not have computer facilities at his disposal for preparing his defence; that the judges dealing with his case were biased against him; that also the experts appointed by the court were biased, incompetent and had submitted reports which were incorrect and of insufficient quality; that he could not effectively prepare his defence because his defence counsel had only been allowed to visit him in the prison during office hours but not in the evening and at week-ends; that not all documents were read out by the court at the trial; that the authorities did not allow him to hold a press conference; and that he had not been heard by the Supreme Court on his plea of nullity.        The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the Procurator General's comments on his plea of nullity were not served on him and that the Senior Public Prosecutor also made written submissions on his appeal against sentence which were not served on him.        Invoking Article 5 of the Convention the applicant complains about his detention on remand and submits in particular that there had neither been a concrete suspicion against him nor sufficient reasons for ordering his detention on remand; that he was not informed promptly and in detail on the suspicion against him as the questioning by the Investigating Judge on 25 October 1991 did not relate to any precise element of suspicio