CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 21 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 36713/97                       by Geschäftshaus GmbH                       against Germany          The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 21 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM     M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, President                  N. BRATZA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     R. NICOLINI              Mrs    M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 11 June 1997 by Geschäftshaus GmbH against Germany and registered on 25 June 1997 under file No. 36713/97;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant company is a company in liquidation.   Its registered address is in Berlin.   All shares are held by the Warenhaus Wertheim GmbH as successors of the AWAG Grundstücksgesellschaft mbH. In the fifties, the applicant company was struck off the commercial register due to insolvency (Vermögenslosigkeit).   In the proceedings before the Commission, the applicant company is represented by its official liquidators Messr. H. Kreuz and M. Müller, Berlin, and by Mr D. Gerhardt, a lawyer of a Düsseldorf law firm.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant company, may be summarised as follows.   A.    Particular circumstances of the case        Since 1911 the applicant company owned real property in Berlin. The estates concerned were expropriated, without compensation, under the Expropriation of Assets of Nazi Criminals and War Activists Act of 8 February 1949 (Gesetz zur Einziehung von Vermögenswerten der Naziverbrecher und Kriegsaktivisten vom 8. Februar 1949) and by operation of the Decree on further Expropriations under the Act of 8 February 1949 (list no. 3) of 14 November 1949 (Bekanntmachung über weitere Einziehungen nach dem Gesetz vom 8. Februar 1949 (Liste 3). The Decree was published in the official gazette on 2 December 1949. On 3 April 1950 the land register was amended to the effect that the estates were recorded as "state-owned property" (Volkseigentum).        On 5 October 1990 the Warenhaus Wertheim GmbH applied with the Berlin Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions (Landesamt zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen Brandenburg) for the restitution of part of the real property previously owned by the applicant company.        On 5 November 1991 the Berlin Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions, upon the request of the Warenhaus Wertheim GmbH, issued a declaratory decision according to which the Warenhaus Wertheim GmbH was in a legal position to file claims within the meaning of S. 2 para. 1 (defining the persons entitled to file claims) and S. 6 para. 1(a) (defining the persons entitled to file claims for the restitution of firms) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) regarding the former assets of the AWAG Grundstücksgesellschaft mbH. Subject to agreement by the Federal Ministry for Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen) that the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions applied to property expropriated under the Berlin list no. 3, the assets in question could be restituted, if restitution was not excluded for other reasons, pursuant to the said Act.        On 29 September 1992 the Berlin Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions rejected the applicant company's request for restitution of the estates.        The decision was based on S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, excluding the restitution of property expropriated under Soviet occupation law or the authority resulting from the occupational power between 1945 and 1949.        The Office found that S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act was applicable to the real property in question as it had been expropriated under German legal provisions which had been enacted on the basis of authority resulting from occupational power.   In particular, the Municipality of Great Berlin had decided upon the further expropriations (list no. 3) on 10 November 1949, whereas the administrative competences had been transferred from the Soviet Commandant to the Municipality only on 11 November 1949.        On 4 May 1994 the Berlin Administrative Court (Verwaltungs- gericht), upon the applicant company's action challenging this decision, partly quashed the decision of 29 September 1992 and ordered the Office to grant restitution of the real property in question in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions.        In its decision, the Administrative Court found that the applicant was entitled to restitution, in particular that S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act did not extend to the expropriation which had taken place in the applicant company's case.   In this respect, the Court considered that the property had been expropriated under legal provisions enacted by German authorities.   The Court found that it could not be established whether the expropriations of list no. 3 had been effected on behalf of the Soviet occupational powers and were, therefore, based on the sovereign power of the occupation force.   The Court noted that the preparatory works concerning list no. 3 originated in the Expropriation of Assets of Nazi Criminals and War Activists Act of 8 February 1949, which inter alia provided for the preparation of a third list of proposals on how to realize assets placed under forced administration, which had not been included in the first and second list already.   At that time, Soviet influence on the preliminary votes and negotiations could have taken place.   Moreover, the decision had been taken on 11 November 1949, i.e. before the transfer of administration to German authorities.   However, these elements were not sufficient to show direct Soviet influence, the more as the loss of property took effect only on 2 December 1949, when the Decree in question was published.   The burden of proof was on the defendant, relying on a provision stipulating an exception to the rule of restitution.        On 13 February 1995 the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), upon the defendant's appeal on points of law (Revision), quashed the judgment of 4 May 1994 and dismissed the applicant company's action.        In its decision, the Federal Administrative Court found that the applicant company was not entitled to restitution of the real property in question.   Contrary to the opinion of the lower instance, S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions excluded the restitution claimed by the applicant company.   In this respect, the Federal Administrative Court considered that the real estate in question had been expropriated on the basis of the authority resulting from the occupational power.        Referring to its own case-law and the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the Federal Administrative Court recalled that S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act pursued the aim of protecting the Soviet Union against any reproach of wrongdoing regarding expropriations carried out under the responsibility of the occupational power.   Accordingly, any expropriations based upon wishes or suggestions of the Soviet occupational powers or corresponding to their general or particular wishes were regarded as expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power.   The German practice regarding expropriations within the former Soviet occupied zones was imputable to the Soviet occupational powers as the highest public authority.        Expropriations initiated and carried out by German authorities following the creation of the former German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949 were generally no longer imputable to the Soviet occupational powers.   Nevertheless, expropriations implemented after 7 October 1949 were still covered by S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act, where these measures had been prepared under the authority of the Soviet occupational powers and with their general agreement to the effect that the further implementation by the German authorities fell within their sphere of responsibility.        The expropriations according to list no. 3, as published on 2 December 1949, formed part of the latter group of expropriations imputable to the Soviet occupational forces and therefore excluded from restitution.   In this respect, the Federal Administrative Court examined in detail the legal instruments underlying the expropriations in question.   The assets concerned had, as a rule, been placed under sequestration, pursuant to a decree of the Soviet military administration of 30 October 1945.   The Expropriation Act of 8 February 1949 had been enacted against this factual and legal background, and the assets released from Soviet sequestration shortly before had been partly expropriated (list no. 1) or been returned to their owners (list no. 2).   As regards the remainder of assets, the Great-Berlin Municipality instructed its services to elaborate proposals as to their realization.   The Soviet occupational powers had endorsed these measures and thereby assumed responsibility for the implementation of the 1949 Expropriation Act.   The question whether or not they had approved each of the expropriations under the Expropriation Act was irrelevant.        According to the Federal Administrative Court, this result, namely excepting the expropriations under list no. 3 from restitution, was in line with the genesis of S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, as already established in the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court.   Thus, the Soviet Union had requested that the legality and legitimacy of the expropriations effected between 1945 and 1949 with the consent or upon decision of the Soviets should not be put into question.        The Federal Administrative Court finally established that there were no reasons to conclude that S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act should exceptionally not apply in the applicant company's case.        On 19 November 1996 the Federal Constitutional Court refused acceptance of the applicant company's constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde).        In the Federal Constitutional Court's view, the complaint regarding the non-restitution of assets expropriated in the Soviet sector of Berlin pursuant to the so-called Berlin list no. 3 did not raise any fundamental issues of constitutional law.   In this respect, the Federal Constitutional Court referred to and confirmed its established case-law confirming the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Unification Treaty and S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions.        Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that, against this background, acceptance of the complaint was not necessary for securing the rights invoked by the applicant company.   In particular, there was no indication of discrimination against the applicant company, as the Federal Administrative Court's reasoning was conclusive and did not disclose any appearance of arbitrariness.   B.    Relevant law and practice   I.    Unification Treaty and Joint Declaration        According to the Joint Declaration on outstanding property issues (Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) made on 15 June 1990 by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, which is a constituent part of the Treaty on German Unification of 31 August 1990 (Einigungsvertrag), "expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power (1945 and 1949)" ("Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher bzw. besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage (1945-1949)") shall not be reversed.        The international matters concerning German unification were agreed upon in negotiations between the two German States and the four Allied Powers.    In the Treaty of 12 September 1990 on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, the sovereignty of a united Germany was recognised.   In connection with the signing of this Treaty the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the former German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed a Joint Letter (Gemeinsamer Brief) to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers confirming the property regulation reached in the Joint Declaration of 15 June 1990 and aimed at being incorporated in the Unification Treaty.   II.   Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions and related      legislation        The Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) of 12 September 1990, as amended in particular in March 1991, December 1994 and August 1997, reaffirms the principle that there should be no restitution of property expropriated on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power in S. 1 para. 8 (a).   With regard to other expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic without compensation, this Act provides, in principle, for the return of confiscated property, including businesses, where this is still possible and does not violate user rights acquired in good faith.   If a return is excluded compensation has to be paid in accordance with SS. 6(7) and SS. 9 et seq., while for certain cases mentioned in S. 4(1) and (2) new legislation was envisaged.        On 27 September 1994 the Federal German Parliament adopted two laws regulating the legal consequences of expropriations in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic in respect of which the restitution of property was excluded.   Both laws entered into force on 1 December 1994.   They are the Compensation Act (Entschädigungs- gesetz) concerning expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic after 1949 in respect of which the 1990 Act regulating unresolved property questions had reserved further legislation; and the Equalisation Act (Entschädigungs- und Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz) providing for equalisation payments to natural persons who had been expropriated on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power between 1945 and 1949.   III. Case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court        The Federal Constitutional Court, in leading decisions of 23 April 1991 and 18 April 1996, respectively, held that the amendments to the German Basic Law on the basis of the German Unification Treaty, including the Joint Declaration, excluding restitution of property expropriated on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power, were compatible with Article 79 para. 3 of the Basic Law concerning the limits to permissible amendments to the Basic Law.   IV.   Expropriations under Berlin list no. 3        As regards legal classification, for the purposes of S. 1 para. 1 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, of expropriations under Berlin list no. 3 (Liste 3), pursuant to the 1949 Expropriation Act, the applicant company has submitted various documents issued by Federal and Berlin authorities.        In a letter of 27 June 1991, the Federal Minister of Justice stated that S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions did not apply to expropriations on the basis of occupational law which only took effect after the creation of the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949 and that this opinion was in line with the Federal Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of the Unification Treaty.   The expropriation [under Berlin list no. 3] having only taken effect on 2 December 1949, restitution under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions was in principle possible. Any claims for restitution should, accordingly, be filed with the Berlin Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions.        In a letter of 10 September 1991 the Federal Minister of Justice (Bundesminister der Justiz), stated that, in his - though not legally binding - opinion, expropriations under Berlin list no. 3 did not constitute expropriations on the basis of occupational law or the authority resulting from the occupational power and that accordingly the assets concerned could, as a rule, be restored.        In a letter dated 18 September 1991, the Federal Office for Regulating Unresolved Property Questions (Bundesamt zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) stated that it shared the legal opinion expressed by the Federal Minister of Justice, and, as regards the procedure, referred to the competent Berlin authorities.        It follows from a letter sent on 23 April 1992 by the Berlin Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions in another case to the legal representative of third persons in another case that on 1 April 1992 former owners of property expropriated under list no. 3 had been free to proceed with claims for restitution under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions and that the Office had started to examine their request for restitution.      In its session of 2 June 1992 the Berlin Senate (Senat), having regard to a legal opinion of the Senator for Justice (Justizsenator) in Berlin, according to which expropriations under list no. 3 had been effected on the basis of the authority resulting from the occupational power, decided that property expropriated under list no. 3 were not to be restored to their previous owners.        In a letter dated 19 August 1993, the Federal Minister of Justice observed that the question whether or not property expropriated under list no. 3 could be restituted was in dispute (umstritten).   S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions, excluding expropriations under occupational law or the authority resulting from the occupational power could militate against restitution.   As regards its own legal position, the Ministry of Justice observed that, in the official explanations (amtliche Erläuterungen) of the Federal Government on the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions of 12 September 1990 (BT-11/7831) the field of application of S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act was defined as "expropriations on the basis of occupational law or the authority resulting from the occupational power in the period between the end of war (8 May 1945) and the creation of the German Democratic Republic (7 October 1949)".   Accordingly, the legislator had intended to exclude from restitution only those properties expropriated before the creation of the German Democratic Republic.   To the extent that the German Democratic Republic had, after 6 October 1949, applied legal instruments enacted previous to its creation, it had done so in adopting such law as its own law, i.e. law of the German Democratic Republic.   Measures taken on this legal basis could not be regarded as measures on the basis of "occupation law or the authority resulting from the occupational power".   Expropriations under the Berlin list no. 3 had not become effective before the creation of the German Democratic Republic, but only on 2 December 1949 when the list was published.   Accordingly, such expropriations were generally not expropriations on the basis of occupational law or the authority resulting from the occupational power within the meaning of S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the above Act and restitution was not in principle excluded.   The Minister noted that this opinion was shared in legal writing as well as by the Berlin Administrative Court.   The Minister further observed that, according to the contrary view taken by the Berlin Municipality, these expropriations had been based on occupational law or the authority resulting from the occupational power and the property could not be restored.   The Minister concluded that the legal opinion stated was not binding for the authorities competent to implement the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions and that, in case of dispute, the competent courts were called upon to take a final decision.     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant company complains that the refusal of the German authorities, after German unification, to return the previously owned property which had been expropriated under the Berlin list no. 3, pursuant to the 1949 Expropriation Act, amounts to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.        In this respect, the applicant company, referring to the above official statements, inter alia, by the Federal Ministry of Justice and to the Berlin Administrative Court's decision in the present case, submits that initially a legal opinion prevailed, according to which Article 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions was not applicable.   The applicant company had, therefore, a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining restitution of the previously owned property which has in the meantime been held by the Berlin Municipality and the Federal Republic of Germany.   2.    The applicant company further complains under Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that both the refusal of restitution and the exclusion from compensation amount to discrimination.     THE LAW   1.     The applicant company complains that the non-restitution of its property expropriated under the Berlin list no. 3 violates its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.        This provision reads as follows:        "1.    Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        2.     The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems      necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the      general interest to secure the payment of taxes or other      contributions or penalties."        The Commission recalls its decisions of 4 March 1996 concerning Applications Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92 (Mayer et al. v. Germany, D.R. 85-A, p. 5) and of 24 February 1997 concerning Application No. 19918/92 (Geidel et al. v. Germany, unpublished). Complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerning expropriations carried out in 1945 at the instance of the Soviet occupation authorities in Germany were declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae, ratione temporis and ratione materiae with the Convention. The Commission found in particular that these deprivations of property had occurred at the instance of the Soviet occupying forces in Germany at a time when the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet been established and neither the Convention nor Protocol No. 1 had entered into force. There could not, therefore, have been any interference with property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which could have entailed the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany.   Moreover, in the Commission's view, the regulation of property questions in the Unification Treaty did not amount to an interference with any rights of the applicants under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) as there were no "existing possessions" nor any legally recognized compensation claims when the Unification Treaty came into force.        The Commission notes that the applicant company argues that its case is distinguishable from the facts underlying the Commission's decision of 4 March 1996.        As regards the incompatibility ratione materiae of claims that the regulations of the Unification Treaty interfered with rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission held, in the above- mentioned decisions (Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92 and No. 19918/92, op. cit.), as follows:              "..., in any event the applicants could not claim to be      victims of a violation of their rights under Article 1 of      Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) unless the measure complained of affected      their 'possessions' or their 'property' within the meaning of      this provision. A person complaining of an interference with his      property must show that such right existed (No. 7694/76, Dec.      14.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 131).              In this respect, the Commission recalls the constant case-      law of the Convention organs according to which "possessions" may      be either 'existing possessions' (cf. Eur. Court HR, Van der      Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70,      p. 23, para. 48) or valuable assets, including claims, in respect      of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a      "legitimate expectation" that they will realise (cf. Eur. Court      HR, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland judgment      of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51, and      Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of      20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 21, para. 31). By      contrast, the hope of recognition of the survival of a former      property right which has not been susceptible of effective      exercise for a long period (Nos. 7655-7657/76, Dec. 4.10.77,      D.R. 12, p. 111) or a conditional claim which has lapsed as a      result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (No. 7775/77,      Dec. 5.10.78, D.R. 15, p. 143) are not to be considered as      'possessions' within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1      (P1-1).            It is clear that the present case does not concern any      'existing possessions' of the applicants. The applicants'      properties were expropriated a long time ago and the applicants      have been unable for decades to exercise any owners' rights in      respect of the property concerned. Despite the applicants' claim      that the expropriations were contrary to international law and      thus unlawful, it appears that in the German legal order these      expropriations were being considered as legally valid even before      the conclusion of the Unification Treaty. The provisions of the      Treaty cannot therefore be seen as legalising the deprivation of      the applicants' property and thereby as being the source of the      deprivation for the purposes of German law.              It remains to be examined whether the applicants could have      any 'legitimate expectation' to realise claims, either based on      a right to compensation for the loss of their property which      continued to exist until the entry into force of the Unification      Treaty and was affected thereby, or created by the fact that      public-law bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany acquired      part of the expropriated estates by virtue of the unification.              As regards any possible compensation claim generated by the      loss of the property, the Commission refers to its constant      jurisprudence according to which it is not competent ratione      temporis and ratione materiae to examine complaints relating to      the refusal or denial of compensation claims based on facts that      occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention with      respect to the State concerned (cf. No. 7694/76, Dec. 14.10.77,      D.R. 12, p. 131; No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146). The      Commission would add with regard to the particular facts of the      present case that the Federal Republic of Germany was not      responsible for the expropriations in question and that therefore      any compensation claims which might have existed prior to the      Unification Treaty would not have been directed against that      State.              As regards the existence of any claim based on the fact      that, in consequence of the unification, part of the property      concerned passed into the hands of public-law bodies of the      Federal Republic of Germany, the Commission notes the Federal      Constitutional Court's finding that despite this fact there      existed no claim under German law for the restitution of the      available properties and that this situation was, from the      viewpoint of constitutional law, unobjectionable. There is      nothing to show that this finding is arbitrary and incompatible      with the applicable provisions. In particular it does not appear      that the Federal Constitutional Court's conclusion was based on      the Unification Treaty itself and that, without the provisions      of that Treaty, the situation under German constitutional law      would have been judged otherwise. Therefore it cannot be said      that the Treaty interfered with any pre-existing legal position      of the applicants in this respect either."        The Commission finds that the circumstances of the present case do not justify any other conclusions.        The Commission considers in particular that the refusal of restitution did not concern any of the applicant company's "existing possessions", given that the property had been expropriated in 1949 and that, for a period of more than 40 years, the applicant company had no factual possibility to exercise any powers or control regarding the estate.   The expropriation in 1949 is not imputable to the Federal Republic of Germany and the question of its lawfulness is not within the Commission's jurisdiction ratione personae and temporis.        The Commission is further of the opinion that, given the facts that the applicant company, and the shareholding companies, had not been able to exercise any ownership rights in respect of the property concerned for more than forty years and did not have any legally recognised compensation claim at the time of the conlusion of the German Unification Treaty, there could not have been, at that time, any "legitimate expectation" of the revival of the former property right.        The question, however, arises whether or not after views expressed by German administrative authorities after German reunification against the background of the developing case-law on the constitutionality of the legal instruments concerned, including the interpretation of the notion "expropriations on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from occupational power", gave rise to a "legitimate expectation" that property expropriated pursuant to the Berlin list no. 3 was to be restituted (cf., mutatis mutandis,   Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others judgment, op. cit., pp. 23-24, paras. 51-52; Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others judgment, op. cit., pp. 20-21, paras. 29-31).        On this point, the Commission notes that the German authorities were called upon to apply the provisions of the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions and had to interpret the notion of "expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law or the authority resulting from the occupational power (1945 until 1949)".        The Commission finds that decisions taken in other expropriation cases or general public statements concerning the application of S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the said Act, including its possible application to expropriations under the Berlin list no. 3 could not anticipate a decision by the competent authorities on the applicant company's request for restitution.   In the instant case, the Berlin Office of the Regional Office for the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions, in its decision of 29 September 1992, refused the applicant company's request for restitution on the ground that, in its view, the expropriation in question had been carried out on the basis of authority resulting from occupational power.   In this situation, the applicant company was aware that there was a dispute regarding the restitution of the properties expropriated under the 1949 Expropriation Act and the Berlin list no. 3.   Irrespective of the favourable first instance decision, the applicant company was not entitled, prior to the final determination of the issue by the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court, to assume that it would obtain restitution of its previously owned assets.        The Commission further recalls that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (cf. Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others judgment, op. cit., p. 24, para. 52).        The Commission notes that the Federal Administrative Court, as confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court, concluded in a very detailed reasoning that the expropriations under the so-called Berlin list no. 3, such as the expropriation in the applicant company's case, constituted expropriations effected on the basis of the authority resulting from occupational power.   In the Commission's view, such conclusion does not disclose any arbitrariness.        In such circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant company did not establish that it had a "legitimate expectation" that its claim for restitution would be granted.        This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The applicant company further complains that the above decisions amounted to discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1).        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national      minority, property, birth or other status."        The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not presuppose a breach of one or more of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can   be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (Eur. Court HR, Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, para. 36).        As the Commission has found above that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is not applicable to the facts of which the applicant company complains, it cannot claim to have been discriminated against in the enjoyment of its property rights within the meaning of this provision (cf. Eur. Court HR, Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 23, para. 50; Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92, 19549/92 (joined), Dec. 4.3.96, D.R. 85, p. 5; No. 19918/92, Dec. 24.2.97, unpublished)).        This part of the application must therefore also be rejected, according to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2), as being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       M.F. BUQUICCHIO                               M.P. PELLONPÄÄ      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber