CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 26 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 28945/95                       by TP and KM                       against the United Kingdom          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 26 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM     S. TRECHSEL, President                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     A. ARABADJIEV              Mr     M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 2 August 1995 by TP and KM against the United Kingdom and registered on 26 October 1995 under file No. 28945/95;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the Commission's decision of 19 January 1997 to communicate the      application   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      29 April 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 24 September 1997;   -     the written brief submitted by the applicants on 12 May 1998;   -     the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 26 May 1998;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant, TP, is a British citizen born in 1965. She is the mother of the second applicant, KM, also a British citizen, who was born in 1983. Both applicants live in Chelmsford, Essex and are represented before the Commission by Clinton Davis and Co, solicitors, of Clapton, London E5.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, can be summarised as follows.   a.    Particular circumstances of the case        Between 1984 and 1986, the local authority, the London Borough of Newham, suspected that the second applicant was being sexually abused, partly as a result of the second applicant having a persistent urinary tract infection.        In 1987, the health visitor attended the applicants' home and obtained information regarding their living arrangements including the fact that "XY", the first applicant's boyfriend, lived with the applicants. Concern was expressed regarding the first applicant's care of her daughter and a case conference was held to which the first applicant was not invited. As a result of the conference the second applicant was placed on the Child Protection Register under the category of emotional abuse.        The first applicant continued to try to find a cause for the second applicant's urinary infection. However, none of the doctors who saw the second applicant could identify a physical cause for the infection. On 13 November 1987, the second applicant was interviewed by a consultant child psychiatrist, Dr V, employed by Newham health authority. A social worker, "Mr P", was present during the interview whilst the first applicant waited in an adjoining room. The interview was recorded on videotape.        In the course of the interview the second applicant disclosed that she had been abused by someone named "X". The social worker asked the first applicant for the names of her husband, father and boyfriend. The boyfriend, "XY", shared the same first name, "X", as the abuser. However, the second applicant indicated that "XY" was not the abuser and stated that "X" had been thrown out of the house.        The first applicant was then interviewed, again on video, and informed that the second applicant had disclosed that she had been sexually abused by "XY". She was told that the first applicant could not be returned home but would be taken to a local hospital for further examination. When the second applicant asked whether or not her daughter was being taken into care, she received no reply. Dr V also told the first applicant that she could see the recording of the interview with her daughter at some point.        After the interview, the first applicant asked her daughter if she had been abused by "XY". The second applicant denied that she had been abused by "XY" and the first applicant, believing her daughter, told this to Mr P. Neither Mr P nor Dr V appear to have given any consideration to what the second applicant told her mother. When the first applicant became agitated and angry, Dr V and Mr P both concluded, wrongly, that the first applicant would be unable to protect the second applicant from abuse and that she was attempting to persuade the second applicant to retract her allegation. Mr P and Dr V came to the conclusion that it would be necessary to remove the second applicant from the care of her mother immediately.        Later, on 13 November 1987, the local authority applied successfully to Newham magistrates court for a place of safety order. The local authority stated that the second applicant had been abused, had identified "XY" as the abuser and there was a risk of further direct abuse or that the first applicant would pressure the second applicant into retracting her allegation. The first applicant was not in court. A place of safety order was granted for 28 days.        On 24 November 1987, the first applicant, having excluded all men from her home, applied for the second applicant to be made a ward of court. The local authority attended the application and argued that they should have care and control of the second applicant in order to protect her from the risk of abuse. The local authority was awarded care and control of the second applicant and the first applicant was granted very limited access. The local authority did not volunteer the videos of the interviews with the child.        Contact between the first and the second applicant was severely restricted between November 1987 and November 1988. It appears that the first applicant had only one hour of supervised contact with her daughter each week. The second applicant was also denied contact with her extended family, including her maternal grandmother who was terminally ill and died whilst the second applicant was in the care of the local authority.        During 1988, the first applicant gave birth to a son, D, fathered by "XY". D was made a ward of court but the local authority did not apply to remove D from the care of his mother and "XY".        On 1 November 1988, during the wardship proceedings regarding D, Registrar Conn ordered that the video be disclosed. Dr V and the health authority attempted to prevent the disclosure of the video on the basis that it was confidential. However, the first applicant by that stage had already seen the transcript of the interview.        The transcript showed clearly that the second applicant had said that "XY" had not abused her. An opinion was sought from a psychiatrist, Dr Baker, who confirmed that the second applicant had stated that "XY" was not the abuser. The local authority were informed of Dr Baker's opinion. They agreed that there was no evidence to support the assertion that "XY" had abused the second applicant.        On 21 November 1988 at a hearing in the High Court the local authority recommended that the second applicant be rehabilitated to the first applicant and "XY". Mr Justice Lincoln ordered this course of action and rehabilitation commenced shortly afterwards. At the final hearing on 17 November 1989 the local authority advised the court that there was no longer any reason for the second applicant to remain a ward of court. The wardship was therefore discharged.        Both applicants were seen by a psychiatrist who diagnosed that they were suffering from psychological disturbance known as anxiety neurosis.        On 8 November 1990, the applicants issued proceedings making numerous allegations of negligence and breach of statutory against the local authority, the central allegation being that the social worker and psychiatrist failed to investigate the facts with proper care and thoroughness and failed to discuss their conclusions with the first applicant. The applicants claimed that as a result of their enforced separation each of them had suffered a positive psychiatric disorder.        On 19 November 1992, Master Topley struck out the application on as revealing no cause of action on the basis that Dr V and Mr P enjoyed immunity in suit as a witness or potential witness in proceedings concerning the abuse of the second applicant. The applicants appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 17 March 1993 by Mr Justice Phelan who held that no claim could arise from any alleged right to custody of a child which would give rise to a right to damages.        In the Court of Appeal the High Court's striking out decision was upheld on 23 February 1994. However, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Bingham, dissented and stated that he believed that it could be argued that a common law duty of care was owed to the second applicant by the psychiatrist and the local authority (reported as M v Newham LBC; X v Beds CC (CA) 2WLR 554). He held as regarded the child and the local authority:        "Those who engage professionally in social work bring to      their task skill and expertise, the product partly of      training and partly of experience which ordinary members of      the public are bound to lack. I have no doubt that they      should be regarded as members of a skilled profession.      Their task is one of immense difficulty, and frequently      they are exposed to unjust criticism: but both these things      may, to a greater or lesser extent be said of other      professions also.            In considering the legal relationship between the      child and the local authority, much of what I have said      above concerning the child's relationship with the      psychiatrist is in my view equally applicable. I will not      repeat the conclusions already expressed about      foreseeability, proximity, witness immunity, public policy,      causation and damage, which mutatis mutandis apply in this      context also. But a number of different points arise also.            It was argued that since, as I have accepted,      Parliament has omitted to impose on local authorities a      specific statutory duty breach of which will entitled an      injured party to recover damages, the courts should not      themselves step into impose such a duty. If there were any      indication that Parliament intended no such duty to be      imposed, I would agree, But I find no such indication.      Parliament's omission is to my mind more readily explained      by the extreme difficulty of adequately defining and      circumscribing such a duty in a general provision; I can      see no reason to suppose Parliament would have wished to      deny the child a claim against the local authority on the      detailed (if assumed) facts of this particular case. Had it      wished to do so it could have adopted some such formula as      is found in section 1(4) of the Banking Act 1987.....              One argument on public policy was addressed to us      which seemed to have more relevance to the local authority      than to the health authority and the psychiatrist. If a      duty of care were imposed on the local authority and claims      such as the child's were permitted to continue, the already      overstretched resources of local authorities, human and      financial, would be diverted from the valuable purpose of      looking after children an wasted on the sterile processes      of litigation. One must accept that this must to a greater      or lesser extent be so, and a somewhat similar argument      found favour in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire      [1989] AC 53 p63. But this is an argument frequently (and      not implausibly) advanced on behalf of doctors: it has not      prevailed, Other professions resist liability on the ground      that it will in the end increase the cost to the paying      customer; that resistance has not on the whole been      effective either. Save in clear cases, it is not for the      courts to decide how public money is best spent nor to      balance the risk   that money will be wasted on litigation      against the hope that the possibility of suit may      contribute towards the maintenance of the highest      standards"        On appeal to the House of Lords the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal was upheld on 29 June 1995. Lord Browne-Wilkinson delivered the leading judgment concerning three cases, the Bedfordshire case, the Newham case (the applicants' case) and the Dorset case (reported as X and others v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 AER 353).        As regarded the claims for breach of statutory duty, he held:        "... My starting point is that the Acts in question are all      concerned to establish an administrative system designed to      promote the social welfare of the community. The welfare      sector involved is one of peculiar sensitivity, involving      very difficult decisions how to strike the balance between      protecting the child from immediate feared harm and      disrupting the relationship between the child and its      parents. In my judgment in such a context it would require      exceptionally clear statutory language to show a      parliamentary intention that those responsible for carrying      out these difficult functions should be liable in damages      if, on subsequent investigation with the benefit of      hindsight, it was shown that they had reached an erroneous      conclusion and therefore failed to discharge their      statutory duties. ...        When one turns to the actual words used in the primary      legislation to create the duties relied upon in my      judgement they are inconsistent with any intention to      create a private law cause of action."        In respect of the applicants' claim that the local authority and the health authority were vicariously liable for the actions of the social worker and psychiatrist respectively, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said as follows:              "Like the majority in the Court of Appeal, I cannot      accept these arguments. The social workers and the      psychiatrists were retained by the local authority to      advise the local authority, not the plaintiffs. The subject      matter of the advice and activities of the professionals is      the child....the fact that the carrying out of the retainer      involves contact and relationship with the child cannot      alter the extent of the duty owed by the professionals      under the retainer from the local authority.....              In my judgment in the present cases, the social      workers and the psychiatrist did not, by accepting the      instructions of the local authority assume any general      professional duty of care to the plaintiff children....              Even if contrary to my view the social workers and      psychiatrist would otherwise have come under a duty of care      to the plaintiffs, the same considerations which have led      me to the view that there is no direct duty of care owed by      the local authorities apply with at least equal force to      the question whether it would be just and reasonable to      impose such a duty of care on the individual social workers      and the psychiatrist"        The applicants in this case had not alleged that the local authority had been under any direct duty of care towards them. However, in the Bedfordshire case, where the applicant children did so claim, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated, insofar as relevant, as follows:              "I turn then to consider whether, in accordance with      the ordinary principles laid down in Caparo [1990] 2 A.C.      605, the local authority ... owed a direct duty of care to      the plaintiffs. The local authority accepts that they could      foresee damage to the plaintiffs if they carried out their      statutory duties negligently and that the relationship      between the authority is sufficiently proximate. The third      requirement laid down in Caparo is that it must be just and      reasonable to impose a common law duty of care in all the      circumstances ...              The Master of the Rolls took the view, with which I      agree, that the public policy consideration that has first      claim on the loyalty of the law is that wrongs should be      remedied and that very potent counter considerations are      required to override that policy ( see [1994] 4 AER 602 at      619). However, in my judgment there are such considerations      in this case.              First, in my judgment a common law duty of care would      cut across the whole statutory system set up for the      protection of children at risk. As a result of the      ministerial directions contained in "Working Together" the      protection of such children is not the exclusive territory      of the local authority's social services. The system is      inter-disciplinary, involving the participation of the      police, educational bodies, doctors and others. At all      stages the system involves joint discussions, joint      recommendations and joint decisions. The key organisation      is the Child Protection Conference, a multi-disciplinary      body which decides whether to place the child on the Child      Protection Register. This procedure by way of joint action      takes place, not merely because it is good practice, but      because it is required by guidance having statutory force      binding on the local authority. The guidance is extremely      detailed and extensive: the current edition of "Working      Together" runs to 126 pages. To introduce into such a      system a common law duty of care enforceable against only      one of the participant bodies would be manifestly unfair.      To impose such liability on all the participant bodies      would lead to almost impossible problems of disentangling      as between the respective bodies the liability, both      primary and by way of contribution, of each for reaching a      decision found to be negligent.              Second, the task of the local authority and its      servants in dealing with children at risk is      extraordinarily delicate. Legislation requires the local      authority to have regard not only to the physical well-      being of the child but also to the advantages of not      disrupting the child's family environment. ... In one of      the child abuse cases, the local authority is blamed for      removing the child precipitately; in the other for failing      to remove the children from their mother. As the Report of      the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987 (Cmnd. 412)      ("Cleveland Report 1987") said, at p. 244:              '...It is a delicate and difficult line to tread            between taking action too soon and not taking it            soon enough. Social services whilst putting the            needs of the child first must respect the rights            of the parents; they also must work if possible            with the parents for the benefit of the            children. These parents themselves are often in            need of help. Inevitably a degree of conflict            develops between those objectives.'              Next, if liability in damages were to be imposed, it      might well be that local authorities would adopt a more      cautious and defensive approach to their duties. For      example, as the Cleveland Report makes clear, on occasions      the speedy decision to remove the child is sometimes vital.      If the authority is to be made liable in damages for a      negligent decision to remove a child (such negligence lying      in the failure properly first to investigate the      allegations) there would be a substantial temptation to      postpone making such a decision until further inquiries      have been made in the hope of getting more concrete facts.      Not only would the child in fact being abused be prejudiced      by such delay, the increased workload inherent in making      such investigations would reduce the time available to deal      with other cases and other children.              The relationship between the social worker and the      child's parents is frequently one of conflict, the parent      wishing to retain care of the child, the social worker      having to consider whether to remove it. This is fertile      ground in which to breed ill-feeling and litigation, often      hopeless, the cost of which both in terms of money and      human resources will be diverted from the performance of      the social service for which they were provided. The      spectre of vexatious and costly litigation is often urged      as a reason for not imposing a legal duty. But the      circumstances surrounding cases of child abuse make the      risk a very high one which cannot be ignored.              If there were no other remedy for maladministration of      the statutory system for the protection of children, it      would provide substantial argument for imposing a duty of      care. But the statutory complaints procedures contained in      section 76 of the 1980 Act and the much fuller procedures      now available under the 1989 Act provide a means to have      grievances investigated though not to recover compensation.      Further, it was submitted (and not controverted) that the      local authorities Ombudsman would have power to investigate      cases such as these.              Finally, your Lordships' decision in Caparo [1990] 2      A.C. 605 lays down that in deciding whether to develop      novel categories of negligence the court should proceed      incrementally and by analogy with decided categories. We      were not referred to any category of case in which a duty      of care has been held to exist which is in any way      analogous to the present cases. Here, for the first time,      the plaintiffs are seeking to erect a common law duty of      care in relation to the administration of a statutory      social welfare scheme. Such a scheme is designed to protect      weaker members of society (children) from harm done to them      by others. The scheme involves the administrators in      exercising discretion and powers which could not exist in      the private sector and which in many cases bring them into      conflict with those who, under the general law, are      responsible for the child's welfare. To my mind, the      nearest analogies are the cases where a common law duty of      care has been sought to be imposed upon the police (in      seeking to protect vulnerable members of society from      wrongs done to them by others) or statutory regulators of      financial dealing who are seeking to protect investors from      dishonesty. In neither of these cases has it been thought      appropriate to superimpose on a statutory regime a common      law duty of care giving rise to a claim in damages for      failure to protect the weak against the wrongdoer. ... In      my judgment, the courts should proceed with great care      before holding liable in negligence those who have been      charged by Parliament with the task of protecting society      from the wrong doings of others."     b.    Relevant domestic law and practice        The power of the High Court to make a child a ward of court derives from its inherent jurisdiction. The effect is that the court assumes responsibility for the child and may make orders concerning any aspect of the child's life. The child's welfare must be the first consideration of the court.        A child becomes a ward of court as soon as an originating summons is issued. Thus once the first applicant applied for the second applicant to be made a ward of court, custody of the child vests in the court. Thus, the local authority has only the powers given to it by the court in relation to the child.        The local authority's duties in respect of child welfare at the relevant time were set out in the Child Care Act 1980.        Section 1 of the Child Care Act 1980 provided:        "1(1) It shall be the duty of every local authority to make      available such advice, guidance and assistance as may      promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need to      receive children into or keep them in care under this Act      or to bring children before a juvenile court; and any      provisions made by a local authority under this subsection      may, if the local authority think fit, include provision      for giving assistance in kind or, in exceptional      circumstances, in cash"        Section 18 of the Child Care Act 1980 provided:        "18(1) In reaching any decision relating to a child in      care, a local authority shall give first consideration to      the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child      throughout his childhood; and shall so far as practicable      ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding      the decision and give due consideration to them, having      regard to his age and understanding."        Section 76 of the Child Care Act 1980 provided:        "76(1) The Secretary of State may cause an inquiry to be      held into any matter relating to-      (a)    the functions of the social services committee of a      local authority, in so far as those functions relate to      children      (3)    Subsections (2) to (5) of section 250 of the Local      Government Act 1972 (powers in relation to local inquiries)      shall apply in relation to an inquiry under this section as      they apply in relation to a local inquiry"        Domestic case-law        The decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council 1995 3 AER 353 is the leading authority in the United Kingdom in this area. The leading judgment is reported at length in the facts above.     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicants argue that by virtue of the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 AER 353 they have been denied the right to a fair hearing pursuant to Article 6 para 1 of the Convention.   2.    The applicants invoke Article 8 of the Convention to argue that the removal of the second applicant from her mother, the first applicant and the restriction of access between mother and daughter was an interference with their rights to respect for family life which was not in accordance with the law, was unnecessary and did one of the legitimate aims listed at Article 8 para. 2   3.    The applicants invoke Article 13 of the Convention and claim that the effect of the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 AER 353 has been to deny them their only effective remedy, that of suing the local authority in negligence and/or breach of statutory duty. The applicants also argue that the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (op. cit.) prevents the facts of the case from being investigated.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 2 August 1995 and registered on 26 October 1995.        On 19 January 1997 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 29 April 1997, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicants replied on 24 September 1997, also after an extension of the time-limit.        On 28 May 1997, the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.        On 1 December 1997, the Commission decided to hold an oral hearing at which the parties were invited to make submissions on the admissibility and merits. It was decided to hold this hearing consecutively with a hearing in the case KL and others v. the United Kingdom, No. 29392/95.        On 24 April 1998, the Commission decided to join this application to No. 29392/95 for the purposes of the oral hearing only.        On 12 May 1998, the applicants submitted a written brief.        At the hearing which was held on 26 May 1998 in Strasbourg, the Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Susan McCrory, Baroness Scotland QC and Mr David Anderson, as Counsel, and Ms Sue Ryan, Ms Ann Gross and Ms Jenny Gray, as Advisers. The applicants were represented by Mr Robert Sherman, as Counsel and Ms Catharine O'Hanlon, trainee solicitor. The first applicant also attended.   THE LAW        The applicants complain of the actions and procedures whereby the local authority removed the second applicant into care on the basis of careless assumptions of fact. They complain of a lack of procedural safeguards, of a lack of access to court and of a lack of effective remedies   in respect of their complaints. They invoke Articles 6, 8 and 13 (Art. 6, 8, 13) of the Convention.        The relevant provisions of the Convention provide:                    Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention        "1.    In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or      of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a      fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an      independent and impartial tribunal established by law...                    Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life...        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."                   Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."        As regards Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention        The respondent Government submit, firstly, that insofar as the applicants complain of a violation of their rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention their complaints fail to comply with the six month time-limit imposed by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. They submit that the application should have been introduced within six months of the conclusion of the wardship proceedings which ended in November 1989.        The applicants submit that their application is not out of time, since it would have been premature to introduce their complaints before the termination of the proceedings in which they claimed damages from the local authority for negligence.        Article 26 (Art. 26) provides as relevant:        "The Commission may only deal with the matter ... within a      period of six months from the date on which the final      decision was taken."        The Commission recalls, however, that Article 26 (Art. 26) cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Commission of a complaint before her position in connection with the matter has finally been settled at the domestic level (see eg. No. 9599/81, Dec. 11.3.85, DR 42, p. 33)        In the present case, the Commission observes that, following the wardship proceedings, the applicants pursued claims for negligence and breach of statutory duty which concerned their allegations, inter alia, that the local authority was liable for the negligence of its social worker, which caused the unjustifiable and harmful separation of mother and child. Even though their claims were ultimately rejected, they were found sufficiently arguable for the applicants to be granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the proceedings may be taken into account as concerning the subject matter of their present application and as part of the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Accordingly, since the application was introduced within six months of the judgment of the House of Lords on 29 June 1995, the Commission finds that the Government's objection that the applicants' complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention are out of time must be rejected.        As to the substance of the application        The Government contend that any interference with the applicants' right to respect for family life under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention was justified as being in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of the aim of protecting the rights of the second applicant who had been subject to sexual abuse over a number of years. They submit that the first applicant was provided with the opportunity to participate effectively and fairly in the decision- making procedure, which involved an adjudication of the issues before a court in which the first applicant was legally represented. They point out that the first applicant took no steps for over a year to have the video and the transcript brought to the attention of the court.   They deny that the mere fact that Dr. V and Mr. P drew erroneous conclusions from the interview with the second applicant is sufficient to disclose a violation of the Convention        The Government deny that there was any denial of access to court for determination of the applicants' civil claims contrary to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. They point out that the applicants' claims were examined thoroughly by the domestic courts and that the House of Lords reached its decision rejecting their claim on an application of the ordinary principles of substantive law relating to the imposition of a duty of care. Further, the applicants had available to them an effective remedy in respect of their complaints as required by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, namely, the wardship proceedings before the High Court, pursuant to which the measures taken in respect of the second applicant were swiftly ended.        The applicants contend that the measures removing the second applicant into care disclose a violation of their right to respect for their family life as guaranteed under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. They submit that the removal was not necessary or supported by relevant and sufficient reasons. Further, the procedures adopted did not provide them with adequate and effective safeguards in respect of their interests; in particular, the evidence of the video was not disclosed to the first applicant earlier or brought immediately before a court and both mother and child were unrepresented at the time of the separation.        The applicants submit, in respect of Article 6 (Art. 6), that their claims in negligence against the local authority had a basis in domestic law and that the decision of the House of Lords acted, effectively, to bestow an immunity on local authorities from actions. This immunity is disproportionate and deprived the applicants of the essence of their right of access to court. Under Article 13 (Art. 13), they submit that they had no effective remedies in respect of their complaints.        The Commission has conducted a preliminary examination of the parties' arguments.   It considers that the application raises complex and serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend upon an examination of the merits of the application as a whole.   Consequently, the application cannot be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THIS APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.            M. DE SALVIA                                    S. TRECHSEL       Secretary                                       President    to the Commission                               to the Commission