CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 26 mai 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 29392/95                       by K.L. and Others                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 26 May 1998, the following members being present:              MM     S. TRECHSEL, President                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            Mrs    J. LIDDY            MM     L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs    M. HION            Mr     A. ARABADJIEV              Mr     M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 9 October 1995 by K.L. and Others against the United Kingdom and registered on 28 November 1995 under file No. 29392/95;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      18 February 1997 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 16 June 1997;   -     the written observations submitted by the respondent Government      on 6 March 1998 on the issues arising under Article 6 of the      Convention;   -     the written brief submitted by the respondent Goverment on      12 May 1998:   -     the further information and documents submitted by the applicants      on 18 and 22 May 1998;   -     the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 26 May 1998;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicants are five full siblings: K, a girl, born in 1982; D, a boy, born in 1984; T, a boy, born in 1986; Ki, a girl born in 1988 and J, a girl, born in 1990. All the applicants were placed in foster care in 1992. The three girls have now been adopted. The applicants are British citizens and are represented by Ms. Penny Wood, a solicitor of Conway Wood and Co. acting for the Official Solicitor, and by Ms. Nuala Mole at the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe ("the Aire centre").        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   a.    Particular circumstances of the case        The applicants' parents were married in November 1981. The applicants' mother appeared to have had a difficult childhood during which she assumed a considerable amount of responsibility for two younger, disabled siblings.        The family was first referred to social services in October 1987 by their health visitor because of concerns about the children and marital problems. K was reported to be stealing food at night. Following the referral, a professionals' meeting, involving the relevant agencies,   was held on 24 November 1988, at which it was decided that a social worker and health visitor should visit. The family were reviewed at a further meeting in March 1988 and as it appeared that concerns had diminished, the file was closed.        In September 1988, a neighbour reported that the children were locked outside the house for the most of the day. In April 1989 the police reported that the children's bedrooms were filthy and a referral was also made by their General Practitioner that the children's bedrooms were filthy and that their doors were locked. The children's headteacher, Mrs Armstrong, expressed concern in May 1989 and requested a case conference. In June 1989, the NSPCC and the Emergency team made a referral after complaints by neighbours stating that the house was filthy and the children spent most of the day in their bedrooms, rarely being allowed out to play and crying frequently. In August 1989, the maternal grandmother complained to social services about the mother's care and discipline of the children.        At a professionals' meeting on 4 October 1989, at which social services, the applicants' headteacher, general practitioner and health visitor attended, it was decided that no social worker would be allocated to the family. The school was to monitor the older childrens' weight and the health visitor was to continue to visit the family regularly.        In October 1989, whilst the applicants were on holiday their house was burgled. The police found it in a filthy state. Used sanitary towels and dirty nappies were discarded in a cupboard and the children's mattresses were sodden with urine. The house was cleaned and new bed linen provided. At a professionals' meeting on 13 December 1989, the health visitor requested that the older four children be placed on the at risk register as she felt that their mother could not offer consistent care. This suggestion was rejected. However, a social work assistant, Ms Merry, was assigned to the family. It was not considered appropriate to convene a case conference at this stage. Prior to the meeting K had mentioned that her brothers had been hit with a poker. It was decided that this statement would be investigated.        At a professionals' meeting on 23 March 1990, an improvement was noted in respect of the cleanliness of the house, the children's bedding being clean save on two occasions. However, it was reported that K and D were taking food from bins at the school. Ms Merry explained that the applicants' mother also expressed concern about D's aggressiveness and his bed-wetting and soiling. There was still considered to be cause for concern, especially since the birth of the fifth applicant, J, was expected.        At a professionals' meeting on 11 July 1990, the applicants' headmistress reported a deterioration in the children's well-being; K and D were still taking food from bins and D was soiling himself. Ms Merry was visiting weekly at this stage and said that she was checking the children's bedrooms. She had noted that the children ate at 16.00-16.30 hours and then did not eat again until the morning. The children were also sent to bed at 18.00 hours. A voluntary agency also planned to give the applicant's mother further assistance.        In or about September 1990, D and T were both reported to have bruising on their faces. The police investigated after neighbours had reported screaming at the applicants' home but apparently found no signs of bruising. They made a referral to the social services stating that the conditions of the house were appalling and not fit for five children to live in.        At a further professionals' meeting on 3 October 1990, the assistant social worker, Ms Merry, stated that she was concerned about the applicants' soiling and their mother's disinterest. There were concerns that the children were defecating in their bedroom and smearing excrement on their windows. The headteacher expressed concern, particularly, concerning the boys, D and T and stated that the children had described blocks of wood being placed against their bedroom doors. It was decided to continue monitoring the children.        A decision was made to arrange a case conference for January 1991 at a professionals' meeting on 5 December 1990 as a result of concern regarding the applicants' care and the state of their bedroom. Ms. Merry considered that standards in the boys' bedroom had dramatically dropped. She found the room to be damp and smelly. D's bed was broken so it was sloping and had a metal bar sticking out. The bedding was damp and grubby with soil marks.        In a report dated 24 January 1991, the headmistress stated that D was shabby, ill kempt and often dirty and that he had been raiding the playground bins for apple cores. K was pathetic, lacking in vitality and frequently and inexplicably tearful, becoming increasingly isolated from the other girls in her peer group with unfortunate incidents in which detrimental remarks were made about her appearance. T presented as withdrawn, pathetic and bedraggled. He regularly arrived cold, was frequently tearful and craved physical contact from adult helpers. He also appeared to crave for food.   She concluded that they were still concerned that the childrens' needs were not being adequately met and that home conditions and family dynamics gave rise for concern.        At the case conference held on 28 January 1991, Ms Merry stated that the boys' bedroom had no light, carpet or toys and that their bedding was wet, smelly and soil-stained. Their mother did not change the beds. Their headteacher stated that K was tearful and withdrawn, D had been raiding school bins and was often dirty and T was very withdrawn, craved attention and was ravenously hungry. The Chairman of the Conference concluded that despite the many concerns about the parenting of the applicants and the conditions in the home there was little evidence to support going to court. It was felt that the parents were not wilfully neglecting their children and bearing in mind their own poor upbringing, it was considered that the applicants' parents were doing what they could and that continued support was required to try and improve the situation. It was decided not to place the children on the Child Protection Register.        At a later social services' meeting in April 1991, no change to the children's living conditions was noted. The headteacher stated that K and D were still taking food from bins and that D was becoming more withdrawn.        In May 1991, the applicants' mother left home for a day leaving the children with her husband. In July 1991, she left home again and informed social services that the children would be better off living in care. On 12 August 1991, the social services received a phone call from a neighbour who stated that the children were frequently locked outside in a filthy back garden, that they constantly screamed and that they were kept for long periods in their bedrooms where they smeared faeces on their windows. The maternal grandparents later told the guardian ad litem that K, who was treated by her mother as a little servant, was expected to clean the excrement from the windows.        From 19 to 28 August 1991, the three older children spent several weeks with foster carers as respite care. The foster carers reported that D did not know how to wash, bathe or clean his teeth on arrival. He wet his bed every night and stole food from his brother. T was described as being "very frightened .. He could not understand how he could play in the garden and the door was left open for him to come back in, he expected to be locked out." He also had to be taught to use the toilet properly and to clean himself.        At a professionals' meeting on 18 September 1991, Ms Merry stated that conditions in which the boys were sleeping was deteriorating. The mattresses in the boys' bedroom were ripped and the springs were coming through. The boys were stealing food, and Ki had also been seen to do this. Their mother stated that she could not control them. It was decided not to arrange a child protection meeting but to carry out a monthly weight check on the older three children at school and for the health visitor to check the weight of the youngest two children. It was also decided to arrange respite care for K, D and T in the holidays and one weekend in four.        At a professionals' meeting on 21 November 1991, it was reported that the applicants' mother had said that she could not control the applicants' behaviour which consisted of refusing to go to bed when asked and stealing food. It was considered that the home was in an acceptable condition, though the boys' room still needed attention. The children's weights were recorded. It was noted that K had put on 2lbs in the previous two months whereas she had only put on 21/2 lbs in the preceding two years. D had only put on 3lbs in a year. T had put on 1/2lb in a year and was on 50% centile for height. Ki was on 25% for weight and J on 50% for her height and 73% for weight.   There was a discussion about the three elder children being accommodated by the local authority to allow the mother "to get back on her feet". The social services considered a six week period whilst the general practitioner envisaged a period of 18 to 24 months.        K, D and T were accommodated voluntarily between January and March 1992 when they gained weight. In March and again in April, their mother asked if D and T could be placed for adoption.        At a further professionals' meeting on 9 March 1992, it was decided that further respite care would be considered. The childrens' weights were noted, increases being seen for K, D and T.        The parents divorced in April 1992.        At another professionals' meeting on 30 April 1992, it was decided that   applicants' mothers request that D and T be placed for adoption be followed up. The headmistress reported that D and T had not been stealing food. She also voiced concern over the fundamental pattern of the mother's care of the children, in particular in relation to K's role in the home and the mothering role which she played. Ms Merry reported that conditions were deteriorating for D and T.        On 10 June 1992, the applicants' mother demanded that the children to be placed in care as she could not cope. She stated that if they were not removed from her care she would batter them. The applicants were placed in emergency foster care. The applicants were entered onto the Child Protection Register under the categories of neglect and emotional abuse after a Child Protection Meeting on 29 June 1992. No court proceedings were initiated.        The applicants were all fostered separately. Initially, K was noted to have dirty, ill-fitting clothes. She stated that she did not like living with her siblings as she did not like having to look after them all the time. D wet the bed every night, shunned physical contact and suffered nightmares. T did not know how to use the toilet or use toilet paper. Ki and J bonded very quickly with their foster parents.        The applicant's father was assessed as a potential carer whilst the children remained in foster care. The local authority decided to seek care orders in respect of the children on 8 October 1992. Interim care orders were made on 7 December 1992.        A guardian ad litem was appointed on 18 January 1993 who recommended that all the applicants should be the subject of care orders in order to protect them from further harm. She stated that there was "an abundance of evidence that the children have been subjected to physical and mental ill-treatment." She noted that their health had also been neglected by their parents who frequently missed appointments with opticians and doctors.        All the applicants were seen by Dr Dora Black, a consultant child psychiatrist in January 1993. Dr Black stated that the three older children were all showing signs of psychological disturbance. K was exhibiting signs of serious depressive illness and had assumed responsibility for her family and for its breakdown; her mother's behaviour towards her was described as cruel and emotionally abusive. D and L, who suffered from nightmares, were both identified as showing signs of post-traumatic stress disorder and D was also chronically under-attached. Dr Black noted that all children had been deprived of affection and physical care. She described their experiences as, "to put it bluntly, horrific" and added that the case was the worst case of neglect and emotional abuse that she had seen in her professional career. In her opinion, social services had "leaned over backwards to avoid putting these children on the Child Protection Register and had delayed too long, leaving at least three of the children with serious psychological disturbance as a result".        Full care orders were made in respect of the applicants on 14 April 1993 by Judge Tyrer sitting at Milton Keynes County Court.        In June 1993, the Official Solicitor, acting as the applicants' next friend, commenced proceedings against the local authority claiming damages for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty arguing that the authority had failed to have regard to their welfare as was required by statute and should have acted more quickly and more effectively when apprised of their condition. It was argued that the local authority's failure to act had resulted in psychological damage. The application was struck out as revealing no cause of action by Mr Justice Turner on 12 November 1993.        The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 28 February 1994 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Mr Justice Turner to strike out the action. However, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Bingham, dissented to the extent that he felt that no public policy issues arose to prevent the finding of a duty of care.        The applicants appealed to the House of Lords. On 29 June 1995 the House of Lords decided on public policy grounds that local authorities enjoyed immunity from suit in respect of actions brought in negligence or breach of statutory duty concerning the discharge of their duties relating to the welfare of children under the Children Act 1989 in respect of child care. The case is reported as X and others v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 AER 353.        Lord Browne-Wilkinson gave the leading judgment in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council [op.cit.]. In respect of claims for breach of statutory duty he stated, insofar as relevant, as follows :        "... My starting point is that the Acts in question are all      concerned to establish an administrative system designed to      promote the social welfare of the community. The welfare      sector involved is one of peculiar sensitivity, involving      very difficult decisions how to strike the balance between      protecting the child from immediate feared harm and      disrupting the relationship between the child and its      parents. In my judgment in such a context it would require      exceptionally clear statutory language to show a      parliamentary intention that those responsible for carrying      out these difficult functions should be liable in damages      if, on subsequent investigation with the benefit of      hindsight, it was shown that they had reached an erroneous      conclusion and therefore failed to discharge their      statutory duties. ...        When one turns to the actual words used in the primary      legislation to create the duties relied upon in my      judgement they are inconsistent with any intention to      create a private law cause of action."        As regards the claims that the local authority owed a duty of care to the applicants pursuant to the tort of negligence, Lord Browne- Wilkinson stated, insofar as relevant, as follows:              "I turn then to consider whether, in accordance with      the ordinary principles laid down in Caparo [1990] 2 A.C.      605, the local authority ... owed a direct duty of care to      the plaintiffs. The local authority accepts that they could      foresee damage to the plaintiffs if they carried out their      statutory duties negligently and that the relationship      between the authority is sufficiently proximate. The third      requirement laid down in Caparo is that it must be just and      reasonable to impose a common law duty of care in all the      circumstances ...              The Master of the Rolls took the view, with which I      agree, that the public policy consideration that has first      claim on the loyalty of the law is that wrongs should be      remedied and that very potent counter considerations are      required to override that policy ( see [1994] 4 AER 602 at      619). However, in my judgment there are such considerations      in this case.              First, in my judgment a common law duty of care would      cut across the whole statutory system set up for the      protection of children at risk. As a result of the      ministerial directions contained in "Working Together" the      protection of such children is not the exclusive territory      of the local authority's social services. The system is      inter-disciplinary, involving the participation of the      police, educational bodies, doctors and others. At all      stages the system involves joint discussions, joint      recommendations and joint decisions. The key organisation      is the Child Protection Conference, a multi-disciplinary      body which decides whether to place the child on the Child      Protection Register. This procedure by way of joint action      takes place, not merely because it is good practice, but      because it is required by guidance having statutory force      binding on the local authority. The guidance is extremely      detailed and extensive: the current edition of "Working      Together" runs to 126 pages. To introduce into such a      system a common law duty of care enforceable against only      one of the participant bodies would be manifestly unfair.      To impose such liability on all the participant bodies      would lead to almost impossible problems of disentangling      as between the respective bodies the liability, both      primary and by way of contribution, of each for reaching a      decision found to be negligent.              Second, the task of the local authority and its      servants in dealing with children at risk is      extraordinarily delicate. Legislation requires the local      authority to have regard not only to the physical well-      being of the child but also to the advantages of not      disrupting the child's family environment. ... In one of      the child abuse cases, the local authority is blamed for      removing the child precipitately; in the other for failing      to remove the children from their mother. As the Report of      the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987 (Cmnd. 412)      ("Cleveland Report 1987") said, at p. 244:              '...It is a delicate and difficult line to tread            between taking action too soon and not taking it            soon enough. Social services whilst putting the            needs of the child first must respect the rights            of the parents; they also must work if possible            with the parents for the benefit of the            children. These parents themselves are often in            need of help. Inevitably a degree of conflict            develops between those objectives.'              Next, if liability in damages were to be imposed, it      might well be that local authorities would adopt a more      cautious and defensive approach to their duties. For      example, as the Cleveland Report makes clear, on occasions      the speedy decision to remove the child is sometimes vital.      If the authority is to be made liable in damages for a      negligent decision to remove a child (such negligence lying      in the failure properly first to investigate the      allegations) there would be a substantial temptation to      postpone making such a decision until further inquiries      have been made in the hope of getting more concrete facts.      Not only would the child in fact being abused be prejudiced      by such delay, the increased workload inherent in making      such investigations would reduce the time available to deal      with other cases and other children.              The relationship between the social worker and the      child's parents is frequently one of conflict, the parent      wishing to retain care of the child, the social worker      having to consider whether to remove it. This is fertile      ground in which to breed ill-feeling and litigation, often      hopeless, the cost of which both in terms of money and      human resources will be diverted from the performance of      the social service for which they were provided. The      spectre of vexatious and costly litigation is often urged      as a reason for not imposing a legal duty. But the      circumstances surrounding cases of child abuse make the      risk a very high one which cannot be ignored.              If there were no other remedy for maladministration of      the statutory system for the protection of children, it      would provide substantial argument for imposing a duty of      care. But the statutory complaints procedures contained in      section 76 of the 1980 Act and the much fuller procedures      now available under the 1989 Act provide a means to have      grievances investigated though not to recover compensation.      Further, it was submitted (and not controverted) that the      local authorities Ombudsman would have power to investigate      cases such as these.              Finally, your Lordships' decision in Caparo [1990] 2      A.C. 605 lays down that in deciding whether to develop      novel categories of negligence the court should proceed      incrementally and by analogy with decided categories. We      were not referred to any category of case in which a duty      of care has been held to exist which is in any way      analogous to the present cases. Here, for the first time,      the plaintiffs are seeking to erect a common law duty of      care in relation to the administration of a statutory      social welfare scheme. Such a scheme is designed to protect      weaker members of society (children) from harm done to them      by others. The scheme involves the administrators in      exercising discretion and powers which could not exist in      the private sector and which in many cases bring them into      conflict with those who, under the general law, are      responsible for the child's welfare. To my mind, the      nearest analogies are the cases where a common law duty of      care has been sought to be imposed upon the police (in      seeking to protect vulnerable members of society from      wrongs done to them by others) or statutory regulators of      financial dealing who are seeking to protect investors from      dishonesty. In neither of these cases has it been thought      appropriate to superimpose on a statutory regime a common      law duty of care giving rise to a claim in damages for      failure to protect the weak against the wrongdoer. ... In      my judgment, the courts should proceed with great care      before holding liable in negligence those who have been      charged by Parliament with the task of protecting society      from the wrong doings of others."        K, Ki and J, the three female applicants, have now been adopted. D and T remain in foster care.        In March 1996, applications were made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (CICB)on behalf of all the children by the adoption society to whom the local authority had delegated certain responsibilities.        In February 1997, the CICB awarded K. £1000, D £3000 and T 3000 for injuries suffered between 1987 and 1992; Ki £2000 for injuries suffered between 1988 and 1992; and J £ 1000 for injuries suffered between 1990 and 1992.   In a letter dated 20 May 1998 from the CICB to the Official Solicitor, it was stated:        "The Board Member who assessed these cases recognised that      the children were exposed to appalling neglect over an      extended period but explained to their advisers that the      Board could not make an award unless it was satisfied on      the whole available evidence that an applicant had suffered      an injury - physical or psychological - directly      attributable to a crime of violence... He was nevertheless      satisfied, that setting aside "neglect" the children had      some physical and psychological injury inflicted upon them      as enabled him to make an award to each child..."   b.    Relevant domestic law and practice        Local authority's duties in respect of child care        Prior to the coming into force of the current legislation, the Children Act 1989, on 14 October 1991, the local authority's duty in respect of child care was governed by the Child Care Act 1980.        Section 1 of the Child Care Act 1980 provided that:        "1.    It shall be the duty of every local authority to make      available such advice, guidance and assistance as may      promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need to      receive or keep them in care.        2(1)   Where it appears to a local authority with respect to      a child in their area appearing to them to be under the age      of seventeen-      (a)    that he has neither parent nor guardian or has been      and remains abandoned by his parents or guardian or is      lost;      (b)    that his parents or guardian are, for the time being      or permanently, prevented by reason of mental or bodily      disease or infirmity or other incapacity or any other      circumstances from providing for his proper accommodation,      maintenance and upbringing; and      (c)    in either case, that the intervention of the local      authority under this section is necessary in the interests      of the welfare of the child,      it shall be the duty of the local authority to receive the      child into their care under this section".        Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 provides that:        "17. Provision of services for children in need, their      families and others      (1)    It shall be the general duty of every local authority      (in    addition to the other duties imposed on them by this      Part)-      (a)    to safeguard and promote the welfare of children      within their area who are in need; and      (b)    so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the      upbringing of such children by their families,      by providing a range and level of services appropriate to      those children's needs.        (2)    For the purpose principally of facilitating the      discharge of their general duty under this section, every      local authority shall have the specific duties and powers      set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 ...        (10)   For the purposes of this Part a child shall be taken      to be in need if-      (a)    he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the      opportunity of achieving or maintaining a reasonable      standard of health or development without the provision for      him of services by a local authority under this Part;      (b)    his health or development is likely to be      significantly impaired or further impaired, without the      provision for him of such services; or      (c)    he is disabled...        (11)   ... in this Part      "development" means physical, intellectual, emotional,      social or behavioural development; and      "health" means physical or mental health".        Part III of the Children Act 1989 deals with local authority support for children and families. The policy of the Act is made clear by paragraph 7 of Part i of Schedule 2, which requires local authorities to take reasonable steps designed to reduce the need to bring proceedings relating to children.        Section 20 provides that:        "20(1) Every local authority shall provide accommodation      for any child in need within their area who appears to them      to require accommodation as a result of-      (a)    there being no person who has parental responsibility      for him;      (b)    his being lost or having been abandoned; or      (c)    the person who has been caring for him being prevented      (whether or not permanently, and for whatever reason) from      providing him with suitable accommodation or care.        (4)    A local authority may provide accommodation for any      child within their area (even though a person who has      parental responsibility for him is able to provide him with      accommodation) if they consider that to do so would      safeguard or promoted the child's welfare".        Part V of the Children Act 1989 deals with the protection of children. Section 47 provides as follows:        "47(1)       Where a local authority -....      (b)    have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who      lives or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely      to suffer, significant harm,      the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such      enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to      decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or      promote the child's welfare...        (8)    Where, as a result of complying with this section, a      local authority conclude that they should take action to      safeguard or promote the child's welfare they shall take      action (so far as it is within their power and reasonably      practicable for them to do so)".        The complaints procedures        The complaints procedure is provided by section 26 of the Children Act 1989:        "26.   Review of cases and inquiries into representations....        (3)    Every local authority shall establish a procedure for      considering any representations (including any complaint)      made to them by -      (a)    any child...who is not being looked after by them but      is in need;      (b)    a parent of his;...      (e)    such other person as the authority consider has a      sufficient interest in the child's welfare to warrant his      representations being considered by them,      about the discharge by the authority of any of their      functions under this Part in relation to the child.      (4)    The procedure shall ensure that at least one person      who is not a member or officer of the authority takes part      in-      (a)    the consideration; and      (b)    any discussions which are held by the local authority      about the action (if any) to be taken in relation to the      child in the light of this consideration...      (7)    Where any representation has been considered under the      procedure established by the local authority under this      section, the authority shall -      (a)    have due regard to the findings of those considering      the representation; and      (b)    take such steps as are reasonably practicable to      notify (in writing)-      (i)    the person making the representation;      (ii)   the child (if the authority consider that he has      sufficient understanding) and      (iii) such other persons (if any) as appear to the      authority to be likely to be affected,      of the authority's decision in the matter and their reasons      for taking that decision and of any action which they have      taken, or propose to take.      (8)    Every local authority shall give such publicity to      their procedure for considering representations under this      section as they consider appropriate".        The powers of the Secretary of State to investigate the actions of the local authority are set out in sections 81 and 84 of the Children Act 1989:        "81(1) The Secretary of State may cause an inquiry to be      held into any matter connected with -      (a)    the function of the social services committee of a      local authority, in so far as those functions relate to      children;...        84.    Local authority failure to comply with statutory duty:      default power of Secretary of State      (1)    If the Secretary of State is satisfied that any local      authority has failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply      with any of the duties imposed on them by or under this Act      he may make an order declaring that authority to be in      default with respect to that duty....      (3)    Any order under subsection (1) may contain such      directions for the purpose of ensuring that the duty is      complied with, within such period as may be specified in      the order, as appears to the Secretary of State to be      necessary.      (4)    Any such directions shall, on the application of the      Secretary of State, be enforceable by mandamus."        Domestic case-law        The decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (1995 3 AER 353) is the leading authority in the United Kingdom in this area. The leading judgment is reported at length in the facts above.   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicants complain that their rights under Article 3 of the Convention have been violated. They argue that the failure by the local authority to take appropriate steps to protect them from the abuse and neglect which they suffered at the hands of their parents, having been informed of the treatment on numerous occasions over the course of over 4 years, amounts to a failure by the State to take sufficient steps to protect its most vulnerable citizens, children, from inhuman treatment or degrading punishment.   2.    The applicants invoke Article 13 of the Convention and claim that the effect of the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (op. cit) has been to deny them their only effective remedy, that of suing the local authority in negligence and/or breach of statutory duty. The applicants also argue that the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council prevents the facts of the case from being investigated.   3.    The applicants invoked Article 6 of the Convention in their observations dated 16 June 1997 to argue that by virtue of the decision in X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (op. cit.) they have been denied the right to a fair hearing pursuant to Article 6 para 1 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 9 October 1995 and registered on 28 November 1995.        On 21 October 1996, the Commission decided to communicate the application concerning to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 18 February 1997 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The applicants replied on 16 June 1997 also after an extension of the time-limit.        On 19 March 1997, the Commission granted the applicants legal aid.        On 1 December 1997, the Commission decided to hold an oral hearing at which the parties were invited to make submissions on the admissibility and merits. It was decided to hold this hearing consecutively with a hearing in the case TP and KM v. the United Kingdom, No. 28945/95. A question was also communicated to the Government concerning issues arising under Article 6 of the Convention.        On 6 March 1998, the Government submitted written observations on the issues arising under Article 6 of the Convention.        On 24 April 1998, the Commission decided to join this application to No. 28945/95 for the purposes of the oral hearing only.        On 12 May 1998, the Government submitted a written brief.        On 18 and 22 May 1998, the applicants submitted further information and documents