CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 17 septembre 1998

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .s598389F9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s6A5D7EE7 { width:29.33pt; display:inline-block } .sFD1C8E96 { width:16.01pt; display:inline-block } .sC193FC6E { width:309.87pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sA047E36C { width:24.66pt; display:inline-block } .sD5FA77C7 { width:276.54pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s432467A4 { width:269.87pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s4D28B2E2 { width:24pt; display:inline-block } .sA65C943 { width:263.19pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s6863D229 { width:26pt; display:inline-block } .sFDA24ED9 { width:303.2pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sC035E8BD { width:259.86pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s5BA4079A { width:22.66pt; display:inline-block } .s1A01829 { width:289.85pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s7E14516C { width:279.86pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s119EADC4 { width:256.52pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sFD15FD10 { width:243.18pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s5AC7619E { width:249.84pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sE04FE99E { width:249.18pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sFEAA6458 { width:236.51pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s8CC3409 { width:273.19pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sD21AEBF { width:243.17pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sEB86F1CA { width:25.34pt; display:inline-block } .s47A3EB59 { width:259.21pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sA221C665 { width:183.21pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s728C969F { width:161.89pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .sC4E6C0D9 { width:4.65pt; display:inline-block } .s95B7955A { width:119.18pt; font-family:'Lucida Console'; display:inline-block } .s21B97EC1 { width:25.99pt; display:inline-block } .sB11B45BD { width:19.32pt; display:inline-block } .s9782B425 { width:22.01pt; display:inline-block } .sBF11BE31 { width:22.68pt; display:inline-block } .s3D66DD5D { width:15.98pt; display:inline-block } .s8AFB426F { width:32.67pt; display:inline-block } .sE0EA7154 { width:21.33pt; display:inline-block } .s64B1589E { width:19.33pt; display:inline-block } .sFAEFE316 { width:32pt; display:inline-block } .sCB9BA41C { width:17.13pt; display:inline-block } .sE4B66E67 { width:21.73pt; display:inline-block } .s76EAD327 { width:12.64pt; display:inline-block } .s281EA54F { width:19.94pt; display:inline-block }     EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS         Application No. 28396/95       Herbert Wille         against       Liechtenstein       REPORT OF THE COMMISSION     (adopted on 17 September 1998)         TABLE OF CONTENTS                                       Page   I.   INTRODUCTION               (paras. 1-16) .......................................... 1     A.   The application                         (paras. 2-4) ...................................... 1     B.   The proceedings                         (paras. 5-11) ..................................... 1     C.   The present Report                         (paras. 12-16) .................................... 2     II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS             (paras. 17-42) ......................................... 3     A.   The particular circumstances of the case                         (paras. 17-33 ) ................................... 3     B.   Relevant domestic law                         (paras. 34-42) .................................... 8     III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION             (paras. 43-110) ........................................ 11     A.   Complaints declared admissible                         (para. 43) ...................................... 11     B.   Points at issue                         (para. 44) ...................................... 11     C.   As regards Article 10 of the Convention                         (paras. 45-88) ................................... 11       a. Whether there was an interference                             (paras. 47-61) ................................. 12       b. Whether the interference was justified                             (paras. 62-87) ................................. 14       CONCLUSION                         (para. 88) ...................................... 18     D.   As regards Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention                         (paras. 89-101) .................................. 19       a. As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention                             (para. 93-96) .................................. 19       CONCLUSION                         (para. 97) ...................................... 20       b. As regards Article 13 of the Convention                             (paras. 98-101) ................................ 20       CONCLUSION                         (para. 102) ..................................... 20     E.   As regards Article 14 of the Convention                         (paras. 103-105) ................................. 20       CONCLUSION                         (para. 106) ..................................... 21     F.   Recapitulation                         (paras. 107-110) ................................. 21     DISSENTING OPINION OF MR F. MARTINEZ JOINED BY MR K. HERNDL ................................... 22   DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS J. LIDDY ......................... 24   DISSENTING OPINION OF MR B. CONFORTI ...................... 25   APPENDIX :   DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                        ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION ................ 26     I.   INTRODUCTION     1.   The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.   The application   2.   The applicant is a Liechtenstein citizen, born in 1944 and resident in Balzers. He was represented before the Commission by Mr. A. Kley-Struller, a lawyer practising in St. Gallen, Switzerland, and by Mr. W.E. Seeger, a lawyer practising in Schaan, Liechtenstein.   3.   The application is directed against Liechtenstein. The respondent Government were represented by Mr. N. Marxer, Head of the Legal Division of the respondent Government, and by Mr. H. Golsong, Attorney, as Acting Agent.   4.   The case concerns the applicant's complaint that, on account of the views expressed by him in the course of a public lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut on issues of constitutional law, the monarch of Liechtenstein, His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II, as announced in a letter to the applicant, decided not appoint the applicant to public office in future. In this context, the applicant further complains about lack of access to a tribunal and about discrimination.   The applicant invokes Articles 6, 10, 13 and 14 of the Convention.   B.   The proceedings   5.   The application was introduced on 25 August and registered on 31 August 1995.   6.   On 26 January 1996 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.     7.   The Government's observations were submitted on 2 June 1996. The applicant replied on 11 September 1996.   8.   On 3 December 1996 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of the parties. The hearing was held on 27 May 1997. The applicant attended the hearing in person and was assisted by Mr. A. Kley-Struller and Mr. W.E. Seeger as advisers. The respondent Government were represented by Mr. N. Marxer, Head of the Legal Division of the respondent Government, Mr. H. Golsong, Attorney, as Acting Agent, Mr. T. Stein, Professor at Saarbrücken University, and Mr. M. Walker, Attorney, as Counsels.   9.   On 27 May 1997 the Commission declared the application admissible.   10.   The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties in July 1997 and they were invited to submit further observations on the merits as they wished. The Government submitted observations on 15 October 1997, to which the applicant replied on 20 February 1998.   The Government filed a rebuttal to the applicant's reply on 7 May 1998, to which the applicant replied on 4 June 1998. In their submissions of 7 May 1998, the Government requested the Commission to apply Article 29 of the Convention and to declare the application inadmissible for abuse of the right of petition pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention.   The Commission noted that the conditions required for the application of Article 29 were not met.   11.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.   The present Report   12.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:       MM   S. TRECHSEL, President       M.P. PELLONPÄÄ       G. JÖRUNDSSON       A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK       A. WEITZEL       H. DANELIUS     Mrs   G.H. THUNE     Mr   F. MARTINEZ     Mrs   J. LIDDY     MM   L. LOUCAIDES       B. CONFORTI       N. BRATZA       A. PERENIČ       P. LORENZEN       K. HERNDL       E.A. ALKEMA       M. VILA AMIGÓ     Mrs   M. HION     Mr   A. ARABADJIEV   13.   The text of this Report was adopted on 8 September 1998 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   14.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:     (i)   to establish the facts, and     (ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.   15.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.   16.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.     II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.   The particular circumstances of the case   17.   In 1992 a controversy arose between His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (hereafter "the Prince") and the Liechtenstein Government on political competences in connection with the plebiscite on the question of Liechtenstein's accession to the European Economic Area.   At the relevant time, the applicant was a member of the Liechtenstein Government.   Following an argument between the Prince and members of the Government at a meeting on 28 October 1992, the matter was settled on the basis of a common declaration by the Prince, the Diet (Landtag) and the Government.     18.   Following elections and the constitution of the new Diet in May 1993, discussions on various constitutional issues took place between the Prince and the Government, when the applicant no longer held a Government office.   The applicant had not stood for re-election in May 1993, and he was appointed President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court (Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz) in December 1993.   19.   On 16 February 1995, in the context of a series of lectures on questions of constitutional jurisdiction and fundamental rights, the applicant gave a public lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut, a research institute, on the "Nature and Functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court" ("Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes").   In the course of the lecture, the applicant expressed the view that the Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the "interpretation of the Constitution in case of disagreement between the Prince (Government) and the Diet" ("Entscheidung über die Auslegung der Verfassung bei einem Auslegungsstreit zwischen Fürst (Regierung) und Landtag").   20.   On 17 February 1995 the newspaper "Liechtensteiner Volksblatt" published an article on the lecture given by the applicant, mentioning inter alia his views on the competence of the Constitutional Court.      21.   On 27 February 1995 the Prince addressed a letter to the applicant concerning the above lecture, as summarised in the article published in the "Liechtensteiner Volksblatt".     22.   The letter, written on heraldic letter paper, read as follows:   (German)       "Schloss Vaduz, 27. Februar 1995     Herrn Dr. Herbert Wille   Präsident der Fürstlich Liecht.   Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz   Rietle 22   9496 Balzers     Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident     Mit Erstaunen habe ich im Liechtensteiner Volksblatt vom 17. Februar den Bericht über Ihren Vortrag am Liechtenstein Institut zum Thema 'Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes' gelesen. Ich nehme an, dass Ihre Aussagen über die Zuständigkeitsbereiche des Staatsgerichtshofes in diesem Bericht korrekt wiedergegeben wurden, insbesondere jene, in der Sie feststellen, dass der Staatsgerichtshof als Interpretations-gerichtshof bei unterschiedlichen Auffassungen zwischen Fürst und Volk angerufen werden könne.     Sie werden sich bestimmt noch an die Auseinandersetzung zwischen der Regierung und mir vor dem 28. Oktober 1992 erinnern, bei der Sie als stellvertretender Regierungschef anwesend waren. Ich habe damals bei der Aussprache auf Schloss Vaduz die Regierung darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass sie sich nicht an die Verfassung hält, und die entsprechenden Artikel aus der Verfassung der Regierung vorgelesen. Sie haben dazumal sinngemäss geantwortet, dass Sie mit diesen Teilen der Verfassung sowieso nicht einverstanden seien, und sich deshalb auch nicht an die Verfassung gebunden fühlten. Nachdem die anderen Regierungsmitglieder Ihrer Aussage nicht widersprochen haben, musste ich davon ausgehen, dass die gesamte Regierung der Auffassung ist, dass sich zwar die beiden Souveräne, Volk und Fürst, an Verfassung und Gesetze zu halten haben, nicht aber die Regierungsmitglieder, welche einen Eid auf die Verfassung abgelegt haben.     Ich habe Ihre damalige Aussage sowie die Haltung der Regierung als unglaubliche Arroganz empfunden, und deshalb habe ich der Regierung in sehr klaren Worten mitgeteilt, dass sie mein Vertrauen verloren hat. Beim Kompromiss, der glücklicherweise etwas später zwischen Regierung und Landtag auf der einen Seite und mir auf der anderen Seite erzielt wurde, habe ich der Regierung wieder mein Vertrauen ausgesprochen. Ich habe dies auch in der Hoffnung getan, dass die einzelnen Regierungsmitglieder ihre unentschuldbare Haltung gegenüber unserer Verfassung eingesehen haben und die Verfassung für sie wieder als bindend anerkennen. Ebenso wie ich Herrn Brunhart bei einem Sieg seiner Partei wiederum zum Regierungschef ernannt hätte, so habe ich Sie über Vorschlag des Landtages zum Präsidenten der Verwaltungs-beschwerdeinstanz ernannt.     Leider muss ich aufgrund des Berichtes im Liechtensteiner Volksblatt nun feststellen, dass Sie sich nach wie vor nicht an die Verfassung gebunden fühlen und Auffassungen vertreten, die eindeutig gegen Sinn und Wortlaut der Verfassung verstossen. Jeder wird beim Lesen der einschlägigen Verfassungsartikel feststellen können, dass der Staatsgerichtshof eben nicht Interpretationsgerichtshof bei unterschiedlichen Auffassungen zwischen Fürst und Volk (Landtag) ist. In meinen Augen sind Sie, Herr Dr. Wille, aufgrund Ihrer Haltung gegenüber der Verfassung ungeeignet für ein öffentliches Amt. Ich habe nicht die Absicht, mich mit Ihnen öffentlich oder privat in eine lange Auseinandersetzung einzulassen, aber ich möchte Ihnen rechtzeitig mitteilen, dass ich Sie nicht mehr für ein öffentliches Amt     ernennen werde, sollten Sie mir vom Landtag oder sonst irgendeinem Gremium vorgeschlagen werden. Es verbleibt mir die Hoffnung, dass Sie sich während des Restes Ihrer Amtszeit als Präsident der Verwaltungsbeschwerdeinstanz in Ihren Urteilen an Verfassung und Gesetze halten.                 Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung                 Hans-Adam II.               Fürst von Liechtenstein" (Translation)       "Vaduz Castle, 27 February 1995     Dr Herbert Wille   President of the Liechtenstein   Administrative Court   Rietle 22   9496 Balzers     Sir,     I was astonished to read the report in the 17 February issue of the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt on your lecture on the theme of the 'Nature and functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court. I assume that the statements you made on the Court's areas of responsibility have been correctly reproduced in this report, in particular the comment that the Constitutional Court can, as a court that interprets the law, be appealed to in the event of a disagreement between the Prince and the people.     You will doubtless remember the discussion between the Government and me in the period before 28 October 1992, at which you were present as deputy head of Government. I drew the Government's attention during this exchange of views at Vaduz Castle to the fact that it was not abiding by the Constitution and read out the relevant Articles thereof. You replied that you did not agree (or words to that effect) with these parts of the Constitution in any case and that you therefore did not consider yourself bound by it. Since the other members of the Government did not contradict you, I was forced to assume that the entire Government was of the opinion that the two bodies that hold supreme power, the people and the Prince, must observe the Constitution and the ordinary laws but not the members of the Government, who have sworn an oath of allegiance to the Constitution.     I considered your statement at that time and the Government's attitude to be incredibly arrogant and therefore informed the Government in no uncertain terms that it had lost my confidence. Following the compromise that was fortunately reached a little later between the Government and the Diet, on the one hand, and myself, on the other, I declared that I once again had confidence in the Government, doing so in the hope that individual members had realised that they had taken up an inexcusable position in relation to our Constitution and now recognised that they were bound by it. Like I would have appointed Mr Brunhart head of Government, had his party won the election, I appointed you President of the Administrative Court on the Diet's recommendation.     Unfortunately, I had to realise following the publication of the report in the Liechtensteiner Volksblatt that you still do not consider yourself bound by the Constitution and hold views that are clearly in violation of both the spirit and the letter thereof. Anyone reading the relevant Articles of the Constitution will be able to establish that the Constitutional Court has no competence to decide as a court of interpretation in the event of a disagreement between the Prince and the People (the Diet). In my eyes your attitude, Dr Wille, makes you unsuitable for public office. I do not intend to get involved in a long public or private debate with you, but I should like to inform you in good time that I shall not appoint you again to a public office should you be proposed by the Diet or any other body. I only hope that in your judgments as President of the Administrative Court you will abide by the Constitution and the ordinary laws for the rest of your period of office.     Yours sincerely,     Hans-Adam II   Prince of Liechtenstein"   23.   By letter of 9 March 1995 the applicant informed the President of the Diet about the letter of 27 February 1995.   He denied having ever made a statement to the effect that he did not consider himself bound by the Constitution or parts thereof.    He further explained his research on the competences of the Constitutional Court in constitutional matters.   According to him, the expression of an opinion not shared by the Prince could not be regarded as a failure to comply with the Constitution.   However, taking into account the conclusions drawn by the Prince in the said letter, his office as President of the Administrative Court was called into question.   The President of the Diet subsequently informed the applicant that the Diet had discussed the matter in camera and had unanimously come to the conclusion that the applicant's office was not called into question on account of his legal opinions as stated in the context of his lecture.   24.   On 20 March 1995 the applicant replied to the letter sent by the Prince on 27 February 1995, and enclosed a copy of his letter to the President of the Diet.   He explained in particular that it was his conviction as a lawyer that his statements on the occasion of the lecture of 16 February 1995, namely that the Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case of dispute between the Prince and the people (Diet), were correct and did not infringe the Constitution.   The applicant concluded that the declaration made by the Prince that he did not intend to appoint the applicant to a public office amounted to an interference with his rights to freedom of opinion and to freedom of thought, as guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.   It further called into question the constitutional right to equal access to public office and constituted an attempt to interfere with judicial independence.   25.   In his letter in reply dated 4 April 1995, the Prince noted that the applicant had distributed the letter of 27 February 1995 to a large group of persons.   The Prince stated that it had been his intention to avoid a public discussion in informing the applicant, in a personal letter, about his decision as early as possible.   He considered that a long debate between them on the question of the applicant's qualification for the office as judge was inappropriate, as the applicant had remained in office and his criticism had not been directed at the decisions of the Administrative Court, but against the applicant's general attitude towards the Constitution.     26.   The Prince added that it was left to his discretion whether or not to appoint a candidate for public office and that he was not obliged to give any reasons for such a decision.   However, as he had known the applicant for many years he had considered it appropriate to state the reasons for his decision regarding the applicant.   Moreover, his decision no longer to appoint the applicant to the office of President of one of the highest Courts, on account of his attitude in the past as well as the opinions expressed by him,   did not amount to an interference with the applicant's rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of thought.   All citizens were free to propose and to plead for amendments to constitutional or other legal provisions.   However, the applicant, during his term of office as a member of the Government and in his lecture, had not availed himself of such constitutional and democratic means, but had simply ignored those parts of the Constitution with which he disagreed.   27.   The Prince further explained that the relevant constitutional provision, namely Article 112 of the Constitution, concerned the competence of the Constitutional Court to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case of dispute between the Government and the Diet.   Confusing the terms 'Government' and 'Diet' with 'Prince' or 'people', as the applicant had done,   would undermine the rule of law.   As Head of State, he was obliged to safeguard the constitutional order and the democratic rights of the people.   He would fail to observe his duties if he were to appoint to one of the highest judicial offices a person whom, owing to his attitude and the statements he had made, he had to regard as not being committed to upholding the Constitution.   28.   On 2 June 1995 the Prince addressed an open letter to the applicant, President of the Administrative Court, which was published in Liechtenstein newspapers.   The Prince noted that the applicant had made at least part of the Prince's letter of 27 February 1995 publicly known.   As this had given rise to various comments, the Prince considered it necessary to explain his point of view in an open letter.     29.   In his opinion, in a democratic constitutional State (demokratischer Rechtsstaat), a distinction had to be drawn between   freedom of expression and the means used by an individual for imposing his views in such a society.   In the latter respect, the individual should respect the rules defined in the Constitution and other statutory provisions.   The Prince further stated that it was the right of the applicant, in his position as a judge, to express the opinion that the monarchy was no longer opportune; that Article 7 of the Constitution should be amended; that the Prince should be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Liechtenstein judiciary and the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court be given supplementary competences.   However, the applicant was not entitled to place himself above the existing Constitution or incite the Constitutional Court to lay claim to competences which were not vested in it in the Constitution.   The Prince considered that the applicant, having regard to his education and professional experience, knew that the terms "people" ("Volk"), "Diet" ("Landtag"), "Government" ("Regierung") and "Prince" ("Fürst") and their respective rights and obligations were clearly defined in the Constitution.   The applicant's contention that these terms were interchangeable would jeopardise the Constitution and the constitutional State as a whole.     30.   The Prince also made reference to the political events in autumn 1992 and, lastly, he stated that, on the basis of the article in a Liechtenstein newspaper of 17 February 1995, he was forced to conclude that the applicant continued to have the intention to place himself above the Liechtenstein Constitution.   He explained that he had therefore intended to inform the applicant, in a personal letter and as early as possible, about his decision not to appoint him to public office in future.   31.   In spring 1997 the applicant's term of office as President of the Administrative Court expired.   On 14 April 1997 the Liechtenstein Diet decided to propose the applicant again as President of the Administrative Court.     32.   By letter of 17 April 1997, addressed to the President of the Diet, the Prince did not accept the proposed appointment.   He explained that, considering his experiences with the applicant, he had become convinced that the applicant did not feel bound by the Liechtenstein Constitution.   In these circumstances, he would violate his duties as Head of State if he were to appoint the applicant as President of the Administrative Court.   The Prince further stated that the applicant,   on account of his other professional qualifications, made important contributions as a judge of the Administrative Court and that he (the Prince) could therefore have some understanding for the proposal made.   If the Diet did not share his doubts regarding the applicant, it could elect him as associate judge of the Administrative Court.   33.   The applicant is currently employed by the Liechtenstein-Institut.   B.   Relevant domestic law   34.   The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional, hereditary monarchy upon democratic and parliamentary basis; the power of the State is inherent in and emanates from the Prince and the people and shall be exercised by both of them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 2 of the Constitution of 24 October 1921). 35.   Chapter II of the Constitution is entitled "The Prince".   In its Article 7, it stipulates that the Prince is the head of the State and exercises his sovereign authority in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and of the other laws; and that his person is sacred and inviolable.   Further competences are laid down in Articles 8 to 13.   According to Article 11, the Prince appoints the State officials, in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution (cf. Article 79 concerning the Head of the Government, the Government Councillors and their substitutes; Article 97 concerning the President of the Administrative Court and his Deputy; Article 99, in conjunction with the Court Organisation Act, concerning the first instance judges; Article 102 para. 3 concerning the members of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Justice).   By letter of 28 April 1997, the Prince informed the Liechtenstein Government that he charged them to exercise within their competence the appointment of State officials in 1997, who, pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, have to be appointed by the Prince.   36.   Chapter IV of the Constitution contains the general rights and obligations of citizens of the Principality.   Article 31 stipulates the equality of all citizens before the law, and also provides that the public offices are equally open to them, subject to observance of the legal regulations.   37.   Pursuant to Article 97 of the Constitution, all decisions or orders by the Government are subject to appeal before the Administrative Court.   The Administrative Court consists of a President trained in the law, and of his Deputy,   who are appointed by the Prince on the proposal of the Diet, and of four appeal judges and their substitutes, who are elected by the Diet.   The president and his deputy must be nationals of Liechtenstein.   Their term of office coincides with that of the Diet, and ends at such time as they are replaced.   38.   According to Article 104 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is, inter alia, competent to protect rights accorded by the Constitution.   S. 23 of the Constitutional Court Act (Staats-gerichtshofgesetz) provides that decisions of a court or of an administrative authority may be challenged before the Constitutional Court, alleging that there has been an infringement of constitutional rights or of rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.     39.   Pursuant to Article 105 of the Constitution, in conjunction with S. 4 of the Constitutional Court Act, the judges of the Constitutional Court are elected by the Diet; the election of the President and the Deputy President are subject to confirmation by the Prince.     40.   Article 112 of the Constitution reads as follows:   (German)     "Wenn über die Auslegung einzelner Bestimmungen der Verfassung Zweifel entstehen und nicht durch Übereinkunft zwischen der Regierung und dem Landtage beseitigt werden können, so hat hierüber der Staatsgerichtshof zu entscheiden."   (Translation)     "If doubts arise as to the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution and cannot be dispelled on the basis of an agreement between the Government and the Diet, the Constitutional Court is called upon to decide on the matter."   41.   In 1991 the Liechtenstein Government introduced a bill in Parliament with the object of amending the Constitutional Court Act of 1925.   In their comments on the provision regarding the Constitutional Court's competence to decide on the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution, the Government explained, inter alia, their views on the wording and purpose of Article 112 of the Constitution and in particular on the term "Government" which should be understood as referring to the Prince.   In the preparatory stage, the Prince, in a letter addressed to the applicant who held the office of Deputy Head of the then Liechtenstein Government, had stated his disagreement with the proposed interpretation.   The applicant explained the bill in Parliament when it received its first reading in April 1992.   In the course of the discussions, the President of the Parliament questioned the interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution, as contained in the Government's comments.   The bill was passed by the Diet on 11 November 1992; however, the Prince failed to sign it so that it did not enter into force.   42.   Under S. 20 of the Liechtenstein Court Organisation Act (Gerichtsorganisations-Gesetz, LGBL 1922 Nr. 16), judges are required to swear an oath, including the duties of loyalty to the Prince and of obedience to the laws and the Constitution.   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.   Complaints declared admissible   43.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints:   -   that his right to freedom of expression had been violated;   -   that he had not had access to a tribunal for the protection   of his professional reputation;   -   that he had not had access to a remedy before a national authority;   -   that he had been discriminated against on account of his legal opinion.     B.   Points at issue   44.   Accordingly, the points at issue are:   -   whether there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;   -   whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention;   -   whether there has been a violation of Article 13, in conjunction with Article 10, of the Convention;   -   whether there has been a violation of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 10, of the Convention.     C.   As regards Article 10 of the Convention   45.   The applicant complains that, on account of the views expressed by him in the course of a public lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut on issues of constitutional law, the monarch of Liechtenstein, His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II, as announced in a letter to the applicant, decided not to appoint the applicant to public office in future.   He considers that this constitutes a breach of his right to freedom of expression secured under Article 10 of the Convention.     46.   Article 10, as far as relevant, provides as follows:     "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.   This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.     2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."   a.   Whether there was an interference   47.   The applicant submits that the Prince's decision constitutes a sanction for the legal opinion stated by him in the course of the lecture on constitutional issues of 16 February 1995.   Referring to the case-law of the Convention organs, he states that his case does not relate to a specific procedure for recruitment to the civil service, but concerns the general decision taken by the Prince, as an immediate reaction to the views expressed at his lecture, not to appoint him to any public office in future, irrespective of his professional performance or personal qualifications.   48.   The Government contend that the present application primarily raises the question of access to public office, and more precisely, the question whether, in the case of a limited term of office, access to public office which has been available to an individual in the past is required to be made available to that individual when his term of office expires.   However, the Convention does not provide a right of access, or of fair, or equal access, to public office.     49.   The Government maintain that there is a limitation inherent in the Convention where high governmental officials who disagree with the persons appointing them, or reappointing them, are concerned.   Furthermore, the holder of high judicial office has a special reason to exercise extreme caution in public statements which have political overtones, as a judge, like the head of state, is directly responsible for maintaining public order and must be seen by the public to be acting in concert with the other branches of government (notably the sovereign) in order to promote civil stability.   The Government also mention a more pragmatic reason that a judicial candidate for appointment or reappointment should exercise restraint in his public statements, namely not to render himself unpalatable as a candidate or lose the support of the authorities having the discretion to decide whether or not to reappoint him.   However, according to them, these considerations are no issues under the Convention.   50.   In the Government's opinion, the advance announcement that access to a particular public office, or to any public office, will be denied because of an individual's political expression is not, therefore,   covered by Article 10.   In the present case, the applicant could finish, without any interference, the remaining term of his office as President of the Administrative Court.   The Prince's decision not to reappoint him to public office was based on a determination that the applicant no longer possessed a necessary qualification, as he had breached his duties of obedience and of loyalty.   51.   Since the Prince's announcement could not be equated to a sanction, it did not constitute an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention.     52.   Moreover, the Government submit that, even if an interference with the applicant's right of free expression had occurred, no injury resulted therefrom.   They note that several posts in the Liechtenstein civil service do not require appointment or confirmation by the Prince.   Furthermore, as regards any possible damage to the applicant's reputation and standing, the Government note that the Prince's letter of 27 February 1995 was private and that the applicant himself published its contents.   In any event, the applicant did not suffer any such damage in an objective sense, as shown by his renomination in 1997.   Finally, in the Government's view, there is no cognisable injury to the applicant's ability to earn his living.   53.   The Commission observes at the outset that the existence of a violation of the Convention is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice, the latter being relevant only in the context of Article 50 (cf. Eur. Court HR, Amuur v. France judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, para. 36, with further reference).   54.   According to the case-law of the Convention organs, the responsibility of a Contracting State is engaged if a violation of one of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention is the result of non-observance by that State of its obligation under Article 1 to secure those rights and freedoms in its domestic law to everyone within its jurisdiction (cf. Eur. Court HR, Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria judgment of 19 December 1994, Series A no. 302, p. 14, para. 27 with further reference).     55.   The Commission recalls, and in this respect reference is made to its decision on admissibility in the present case (cf. Appendix), that the right of recruitment to the civil service was deliberately omitted from the Convention.   Consequently, the refusal to appoint a person as a civil servant cannot as such provide the basis for a complaint under the Convention.   This does not mean, however, that a person who has been appointed as a civil servant cannot complain of being dismissed if that dismissal violates one of his or her rights under the Convention.   Civil servants do not fall outside the scope of the Convention.   In Articles 1 and 14, the Convention stipulates that "everyone within [the] jurisdiction" of the Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section I "without discrimination on any ground".   Moreover, Article 11 para. 2 in fine, which allows States to impose special restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and association by "members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State", confirms that as a general rule the guarantees in the Convention extend to civil servants (cf. Eur. Court HR, Glasenapp and Kosiek v. Germany judgments of 28 August 1986, Series A nos. 104, p. 26, para. 49, and 105, p. 20, para. 35, Vogt v. Germany judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 22-23, para. 43).     56.   Accordingly, the status of civil servant that the applicant had obtained when he was appointed member and President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court did not deprive him of the protection of Article 10.   57.   In order to determine whether this provision was infringed, it must be ascertained whether the disputed measure amounted to an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression - in the form, for example, of a "formality, restriction or penalty" - or whether the measure lay within the sphere of the rights of access to the civil service, a right that is not secured in the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Glasenapp and Kosiek judgments, op. cit.).   58.   The Commission recalls that, in the cases of Glasenapp and Kosiek, the authorities' action was analysed as a refusal to grant the applicants access to the civil service on the ground that they did not possess one of the necessary qualifications.   Access to the civil service had therefore been considered to be at the heart of the issue submitted to the Court, which accordingly concluded that there had been no interference with the right protected under paragraph 1 of Article 10 (Eur. Court HR, Glasenapp and Kosiek judgments, op. cit., p. 27, para. 53, and p. 21, para. 39).   In the Vogt case, the Convention organs found an interference with the exercise of the right protected by Article 10.   The applicant, who had been a permanent civil servant for more than seven years, was first suspended and subsequently dismissed, as a disciplinary penalty, for having allegedly failed to comply with the duty owed by every civil servant to uphold the free democratic system within the meaning of the German Basic Law.   She had, according to the authorities, expressed views inimical to the said system (cf. Eur. Court HR, Vogt judgment,   op. cit., p. 23, para. 44).   59.   In the present case, the applicant had been appointed President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court in December 1993.   On 27 February 1995 the Prince of Liechtenstein, in a letter to the applicant, informed him of his decision that he would not appoint him again to public office, should he be proposed by the Diet or any other body.    The Commission notes that the power to make appointments to a range of posts in the Liechtenstein civil service is vested in the Prince under the relevant provisions of the Liechtenstein Constitution.   The Prince's decision was prompted by a report in the "Liechtensteiner Volksblatt" of the applicant's lecture of 16 February 1995 on the nature and functions of the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court, including a statement that the competences of this Court under the Constitution could, in matters of interpretation of the Constitution, extend to disputes involving the Prince.   According to the Prince, the views expressed by the applicant infringed the Constitution, and the applicant's attitude towards the Constitution made him unsuitable for public office. The Prince confirmed his intention in subsequent statements.   60.   The Commission considers that the measure complained of occurred in the middle of the applicant's term of office as President of the Administrative Court; it was unconnected with any concrete recruitment procedures involving an appraisal of personal qualifications.   In these circumstances, the Prince's action constituted a censure of the opinion expressed by the applicant in the course of a lecture on issues of constitutional