CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 20 mai 1999

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text-align:center } .s23860FF7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }         REKVÉNYI v. HUNGARY   (Application no. 25390/94)                       JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG     20 May 1999               In the case of Rekvényi v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article   27 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), as amended by Protocol   No.   11 [1] , and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court [2] , as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:   Mr   L. Wildhaber , President ,   Mrs   E. Palm ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mr   A. Pastor Ridruejo ,   Mr   G. Bonello ,   Mr   J. Makarczyk ,   Mr   P. Kūris ,   Mr   R. Türmen ,   Mrs   F. Tulkens ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   M. Fischbach ,   Mr   V. Butkevych ,   Mr   J. Casadevall ,   Mrs   H.S. Greve ,   Mr   A.B. Baka ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mrs   S. Botoucharova , and also of Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 28 January, 1 February and 21   April   1999, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case was referred to the Court, as established under former Article   19 of the Convention [3] , by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 15 September 1998, by a Hungarian national, Mr   László Rekvényi (“the applicant”), on 21 September 1998 and by the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) on 5 October 1998, within the three-month period laid down by former Articles 32 § 1 and 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 25390/94) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Commission under former Article 25 by Mr Rekvényi on 20 April 1994. The Commission’s request referred to former Articles 44 and 48 of the Convention and to the declaration whereby Hungary recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (former Article 46); the applicant’s application referred to former Article 48 as amended by Protocol 9 [4] , which Hungary had ratified; the Government’s application referred to former Article 48. The object of the request and of the applications was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention taken either alone or together with Article 14 . 2.     The applicant designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule   31 of former Rules of Court B [5] ). 3.     As President of the Chamber which had originally been constituted (former Article 43 of the Convention and former Rule 21) in order to deal in particular with procedural matters that might arise before the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, Mr R. Bernhardt, the President of the Court at the time, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the applicant’s lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the written procedure. Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 30   November 1998. The Government replied on 9 December 1998. 4.     After the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 on 1 November 1998 and in accordance with Article 5 § 5 thereof, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. The Grand Chamber included ex officio Mr   A.B.   Baka, the judge elected in respect of Hungary (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24 § 4 of the Rules of Court), Mr L. Wildhaber, the President of the Court, Mrs E. Palm, Vice-President of the Court, Sir   Nicolas Bratza, President of Section, and Mr M. Fischbach, Vice-President of Section (Article 27 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 §§ 3 and 5 (a)). The other members appointed to complete the Grand Chamber were Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo, Mr G. Bonello, Mr J. Makarczyk, Mr P. Kūris, Mr   R. Türmen, Mrs F. Tulkens, Mrs V. Strážnická, Mr V. Butkevych, Mr   J.   Casadevall, Mrs H.S. Greve, Mr R. Maruste and Mrs S. Botoucharova (Rules   24 § 3 and 100 § 4). 5.     At the Court’s invitation (Rule 99), the Commission delegated one of its members, Mrs M. Hion, to take part in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. 6.     In accordance with the President’s decision, a hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 28 January 1999.   There appeared before the Court: (a)   for the Government Mr   L. Höltzl , Deputy Secretary of State,   Agent , Mr   T. Bán ,     Co-Agent , Mr   Z. Tallódi , Ms   M. Weller ,   Advisers ; (b)   for the applicant Mr   V. Masenko - Mavi , of the Budapest Bar,   Counsel ; (c)   for the Commission Ms   M. Hion ,   Delegate , Ms   M.-T. Schoepfer ,   Secretary to the Commission .   THE FACTS I.     the circumstances of the case 7.     At the material time, the applicant was a police officer and the Secretary General of the Police Independent Trade Union. 8.     On 24 December 1993 Law no. 107 of 1993 on certain amendments to the Constitution ( az Alkotmány módosításáról szóló 1993. évi CVII. törvény ) was published in the Hungarian Official Gazette. This Law amended, inter alia , Article 40/B § 4 of the Constitution to the effect that, as from 1   January 1994, members of the armed forces, the police and security services were prohibited from joining any political party and from engaging in any political activity (see paragraph 13 below for the text of the Article). 9.     In a circular letter dated 28 January 1994, the Head of the National Police requested, in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, that police officers refrain from political activities. He referred to Article   40/B §   4 of the Constitution as amended by Law no. 107 of 1993. He indicated that those who wished to pursue political activities would have to leave the police. 10.     In a second circular letter dated 16 February 1994, the Head of the National Police declared that no exemption could be given from the prohibition contained in Article 40/B § 4 of the Constitution. 11.     On 9 March 1994 the Police Independent Trade Union filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court claiming that Article   40/B § 4 of the Constitution, as amended by Law no. 107 of 1993, infringed constitutional rights of career members of the police, was contrary to the generally recognised rules of international law and had been adopted by Parliament unconstitutionally. 12.     On 11 April 1994 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint, holding that it had no competence to annul a provision of the Constitution itself. II.     relevant domestic law 13.     The relevant Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Law no. 20 of 1949, as amended on several occasions) provide: Article 40/B § 4 (as in force since 1 January 1994) “Career members of the armed forces, the police and the civil national security services shall not join any political party and shall not engage in any political activity.” “A fegyveres erők, a rendőrség és a polgári nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatok hivatásos   állományú tagjai nem lehetnek tagjai pártnak és politikai tevékenységet nem folytathatnak.” Article 61 § 1 (as in force since 23 October 1989) “In the Republic of Hungary everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression and to receive and impart information of public interest.” “A Magyar Köztársaságban mindenkinek joga van a szabad véleménynyilvánításra, továbbá arra, hogy a közérdekű adatokat megismerje, illetőleg terjessze.” Article 78 § 1 “… [T]he Government shall ensure that the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary are implemented.” “A Magyar Köztársaság alkotmánya … végrehajtásáról a Kormány gondoskodik.” Article 78 § 2 “The Government shall submit to Parliament such bills as are necessary to implement the Constitution.” “A Kormány köteles az alkotmány végrehajtásához szükséges törvényjavaslatokat az Országgyűlés elé terjeszteni.” 14.       Law no. 17 of 1989 on referenda, as in force at the material time, provided: Section 1(4) “No signatures may be collected … from persons serving in the armed forces or armed bodies on station or while such persons are discharging their duties …” “Nem gyűjthető aláírás … fegyveres erőknél és fegyveres testületeknél szolgálati viszonyban levő személyektől, a szolgálati helyen vagy szolgálati feladat teljesítése közben …” Section 2(1) “Citizens eligible to vote or stand in elections … shall have the right to participate in referenda …” “A népszavazásban … való részvételre választójoggal rendelkező állampolgárok … jogosultak.”   15.     Law no. 34 of 1989 (as amended on several occasions) on parliamentary elections, as in force at the material time, provided: Section 2(1) “In the Republic of Hungary every Hungarian citizen … who has attained his [or her] majority (hereinafter: “constituent”) shall have the right to vote in parliamentary elections.” “A Magyar Köztársaságban az országgyűlési képviselők választásán választójoga van … minden nagykorú magyar állampolgárnak (a továbbiakban: választópolgár).” Section 2(3) “Everyone who is entitled to vote and has a permanent residence in Hungary shall be entitled to stand for election.” “Mindenki választható, aki választójoggal rendelkezik és állandó lakóhelye Magyarországon van.” Section 5(1) “Constituents … of each individual constituency shall be entitled to nominate candidates [in relation to that constituency] …” “Az egyéni választókerületben a választópolgárok … jelölhetnek.…” Section 10(1) “Constituents shall be entitled to collect nomination coupons, expound election programmes, promote candidates and organise election campaign meetings …” “Bármely választópolgár gyűjthet jelöltet ajánló szelvényeket, ismertethet választási programot, népszerűsíthet jelöltet, szervezhet választási gyűlést …” Section 10(3) “Nomination coupons may not be collected … from persons serving in the armed forces or armed bodies … on station or while such persons are discharging their duties …” “Nem gyűjthető jelöltet ajánló szelvény … a fegyveres erőknél, a rendőrségnél … szolgálati viszonyban lévő személytől, a szolgálati helyen vagy szolgálati feladat teljesítése közben …” 16.     Law no. 55 of 1990 on the legal status of members of Parliament, as in force at the material time, provided: Section 1(1) “Employers of employees who are candidates in parliamentary elections … shall grant them unpaid leave on request from the moment of their registration as candidates until the end of the elections or, where they are elected, until they take up their seat.” “Az országgyűlési képviselő … jelöltet jelöltségének nyilvántartásba vételétől a választásának befejezéséig, illetve megválasztása esetén a mandátuma igazolásáig a munkáltató – kérésére – köteles fizetés nélküli szabadságban részesíteni.” Section 1(4) (as in force until 30 September 1994) “Paragraph 1 … [of Section 1] shall apply as appropriate to candidates … serving … in the … police …” “A … rendőrségnél … szolgálati viszonyban … álló képviselőjelöltre az [1.§] (1) … bekezdés rendelkezéseit kell megfelelően alkalmazni.” Section 8(1) (as in force until 3 April 1997) “A member of Parliament … shall put an end to any situation incompatible with his office within a period of thirty days from the moment he takes up his seat …” “A képviselő a mandátuma érvényességének megállapításától … számított harminc napon belül köteles a vele szemben fennálló összeférhetetlenségi okot megszüntetni …” 17.       Law no. 64 of 1990 on the election of members of local authorities and mayors, as in force at the material time, provided: Section 23(1) “Constituents shall be entitled to expound election programmes, canvass on behalf of candidates or organise election campaign meetings … from the thirty-fifth day prior to the date of the elections.” “Bármely választópolgár – a szavazást megelőző 35. naptól – ismertethet választási programot, népszerűsíthet jelöltet, szervezhet választási gyűlést …” Section 25(1) “A constituent who exercises his right to vote in an individual constituency shall be entitled to nominate candidates [in relation to that constituency] …” “Jelöltet ajánlhat az a választópolgár, aki a választókerületben választójogát gyakorolhatja …” 18.       Law no. 34 of 1994 on the police (“the 1994 Police Act”), which entered into force on 1 October 1994, provides: Section 2(3) “The police shall discharge their duties in a manner free from any party influence.” “A Rendőrség a feladatának ellátása során pártbefolyástól mentesen jár el.” Section 7(9) “If a police officer wishes to stand as a candidate in elections to Parliament, to a local authority or to the office of mayor, he shall in advance notify the head of the police department [concerned] of his intention to do so. In such cases his service shall be suspended from the sixtieth day preceding the elections until the day on which the results of the elections are published.” “Ha a rendőr országgyűlési vagy helyi önkormányzati képviselői, illetőleg polgármesteri választáson jelöltként indul, köteles e szándékát a rendőri szerv vezetőjének előzetesen bejelenteni. A választás napját megelőző 60. naptól kezdődően a választás eredményének közzétételéig a szolgálati jogviszonya szünetel.” Section 7(10) “Police officers shall have the right to join professional or other organisations which are aimed at protecting or representing their interests and are related to their professional duties, and to hold office therein; they shall not suffer any disadvantage in their careers on account of their membership and activity. Police officers shall inform the head of the police department [concerned] of their existing or intended membership of organisations unrelated to their professional duties. The head of the police department [concerned] may prohibit the police officer in question from becoming or remaining a member of such organisation if it is incompatible with the profession or duties of a police officer, or if it interferes with or endangers the interests of the force. Such a prohibition shall take the form of a decision. An appeal against such a decision lies to the head of the superior police authority. The decision of the superior authority on the appeal may be challenged in the courts.” “A rendőr a hivatásával összefüggő szakmai, érdekvédelmi, érdekképviseleti szervezetnek tagja lehet, abban tisztséget vállalhat, e tagsági viszonya és tevékenysége miatt szolgálati jogviszonya körében hátrányt nem szenvedhet. A rendőr köteles a hivatásával össze nem függő társadalmi szervezettel fennálló, illetőleg az újonnan létesülő tagsági viszonyt előzetesen a rendőri szerv vezetőjéhez bejelenteni. A rendőri szerv vezetője a tagsági viszony fenntartását vagy létesítését megtilthatja, ha az a rendőri hivatással vagy szolgálati beosztással nem egyeztethető össze, illetőleg a szolgálat érdekeit sérti vagy veszélyezteti. E döntést határozatba kell foglalni. A határozat ellen a felettes szerv vezetőjénél panasszal lehet élni. A felettes szervnek a panasz kivizsgálása eredményeként hozott határozata a bíróság előtt megtámadható.”   19.       Decree no. 1/1990 of 10 January 1990 of the Minister of the Interior (“the 1990 Regulations”), which laid down service regulations for the police, was in force until 30 March 1995 and provided: Regulation 430 “… No party political activity may be carried out on police premises; no questions related to party politics shall be discussed during staff meetings.” “… A rendőrségen pártpolitikai tevékenység nem folytatható, munkahelyi értekezleteken pártpolitikai kérdések nem tárgyalhatók.” Regulation 432 “With the exception of political parties, police officers shall … be entitled to form and maintain social organisations [ társadalmi szervezet ] (trade unions, mass movements, organisations protecting their interests, associations, etc.) provided that their aims are not contrary to the legal provisions and rules regulating police service.” “Rendőrök önmagukból – párt kivételével – … a szolgálati viszonyra vonatkozó jogszabályokkal, rendelkezésekkel nem ellentétes célú társadalmi szervezetet létrehozhatnak és működtethetnek (szakszervezet, tömegmozgalom, érdekképviseleti szervezet, egyesület stb.).” Regulation 433 “Police officers shall be entitled to join any social organisation [ társadalmi szervezet ], including a political party, which has been lawfully founded and registered by a court. Police officers shall not enjoy any advantage or suffer any detriment in their career on account of their membership of an organisation or their party affiliation.” “A rendőr bármely törvényesen megalakult, illetve bíróság által nyilvántartásba vett társadalmi szervezetnek – beleértve a politikai pártot is – tagja lehet. Szervezeti hovatartozása, pártállása miatt szolgálati viszonya keretében semmiféle előnyben vagy hátrányban nem részesíthető.” Regulation 434 “Party badges and symbols shall not be displayed on police premises. While on duty, police officers shall refrain from wearing badges showing their political preference.” “A rendőrség hivatali helyiségeiben, körleteiben pártok jelvényei, jelképei nem helyezhetők el. A rendőr szolgálatban politikai hovatartozására utaló jelvényt nem viselhet.” Regulation 435 “Police officers shall not engage in activities as experts or advisers in relation to questions of police service upon request from political parties unless authorised to do so by the Minister of the Interior.” “A rendőr pártok részére a rendőri szolgálattal összefüggő kérdésekben szakértői, szaktanácsadó feladatokat csak a belügyminiszter engedélyével végezhet.” Regulation 437 “On police premises the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly is subject to the approval of the common superior of all the organisers [of any assembly].” “A rendőrség objektumaiban a gyülekezési jog csak a szervezők közös elöljáróinak engedélyével gyakorolható.” Regulation 438 “Police officers shall have the right to participate in lawfully organised … gatherings (such as peaceful assemblies, processions and demonstrations) in their leisure time. On such occasions they shall refrain from wearing uniform unless the aim of the gathering is the representation or protection of interests related to [police] service. They shall refrain from carrying their service gun or other firearms lawfully in their possession. Where the gathering is ordered to be dissolved, they shall immediately leave.” “A rendőr szabad idejében részt vehet a … jogszerűen tartott rendezvényen (békés összejövetelen, felvonuláson, tüntetésen). Ilyen esetben egyenruhát csak akkor viselhet, ha a rendezvény célja a szolgálati viszonnyal összefüggő érdekek képviselete, védelme. Szolgálati vagy más jogszerűen tartott lőfegyverét nem tarthatja magánál. Ha a rendezvény feloszlatására kerül sor, köteles a helyszínt azonnal önként elhagyni.” Regulation 470 “Police officers shall … be entitled to make statements upon request from the press or radio or television stations on questions related to road safety, public safety or certain offences provided that, [in so doing,] they maintain the confidentiality of service secrets, observe the principle of the presumption of innocence, respect personality rights [ személyiséghez fűződő jogok ] and do not prejudice the examination and investigation of cases …” “A rendőr, a sajtó, a rádió és a televízió megkeresése alapján a közlekedés-, a közbiztonság kérdéseiről, egyes bűncselekményekről, a szolgálati titok megőrzésével, az ügyek vizsgálatának és felderítésének veszélyeztetése nélkül, valamint az ártatlanság vélelmének figyelembe vételével és a személyiséghez fűződő jogok tiszteletben tartásával … nyilatkozhat …” Regulation 472 “… [Police officers] shall be entitled to give lectures on – or to participate in radio or television programmes concerning – politics, science, literature or sport without prior authorisation but on condition that no reference is made to their police service.” “… [A rendőr] politikai, tudományos, szépirodalmi és sport témájú előadásokat, szereplést (a rádióban és a televízióban is) engedély nélkül vállalhat rendőri állására való utalás nélkül.” Regulation 473 “Police officers shall have the right to make statements and publish articles in Ministry of the Interior publications without permission, while observing the rules on service and official secrets.” “A Belügyminisztérium lapjaiban a szolgálati- és az államtitokra vonatkozó szabályok betartásával a rendőr engedély nélkül nyilatkozhat és publikálhat.” Regulation 474 “Police officers shall not be entitled to publish textbooks and documentary literature related to police activities save with prior authorisation …” “A rendőri vonatkozású kérdéseket tárgyaló szak- és tényirodalmi művet a rendőr csak előzetes engedéllyel jelentetheti meg …” Regulation 477 “Police officers shall be entitled to publish works of fiction … and works on science, politics or sport … that are unrelated to police activities without permission but on condition that no reference is made to their police service.” “A rendőr – a rendőri állásra való utalás nélkül – szabadon közölheti, illetve kiadhatja a nem rendőri vonatkozású szépirodalmi …, tudományos, politikai kérdéseket tárgyaló, sporttal foglalkozó műveit …”   20.       Decree no. 3/1995 of 1 March 1995 of the Minister of the Interior (“the 1995 Regulations”), which was adopted under the 1994 Police Act in order to implement its provisions and which laid down service regulations for the police, entered into force on 31 March 1995. It provides: Section 106(5) “Police officers, in their capacity as representatives of the police or experts, shall not give statements to the press or participate in radio or television programmes or in films, unless permitted to do so by the Head of the National Police or one of his deputies. No permission is needed for giving scientific or cultural lectures or for other public appearances of a similar nature (including participation in radio or television programmes) if no reference is made to police service.” “A rendőr a rendőrség képviselőjeként, szakértőjeként a sajtóban, a rádió és televízió műsoraiban, filmekben csak az országos rendőrfőkapitány, illetve helyettesei előzetes hozzájárulásával szerepelhet. A rendőri állásra utalás nélkül tartott tudományos, kulturális előadások megtartásához, ilyen irányú egyéb közszerepléshez beleértve a rádióban és televízióban történő szereplést is) engedély nem kell.” Section 106(6) “Police officers shall have the right to make statements and publish articles in police publications without permission, while observing the rules on service and official secrets.” “A rendőrség lapjaiban a szolgálati és az államtitokra vonatkozó szabályok betartásával a rendőr engedély nélkül nyilatkozhat és publikálhat.” Section 106(9) “Members of the police force, in their capacity as police officers, shall not make public appearances unless authorised to do so by the head of the police department. On such occasions police officers shall refrain from making political statements and shall evince a neutral attitude towards any social organisation [ társadalmi szervezetek ].” “Nyilvános szerepléshez (ha az rendőrként történik) engedélyt kell kérni a rendőrfőkapitánytól. A rendőr ilyen közéleti szereplése során tartózkodjék a politikai nyilatkozatoktól, magatartása a társadalmi szervezeteket illetően semleges legyen.” Section 106(10) “Police officers shall have the right to participate in lawfully organised … gatherings in their leisure time. On such occasions they shall refrain from wearing uniform and carrying their service gun or other firearms lawfully in their possession. Where the gathering is ordered to be dissolved, they shall immediately leave .” “A rendőr szabad idejében részt vehet a … jogszerűen tartott rendezvényen. Ilyen esetben egyenruhát nem viselhet. Szolgálati vagy más jogszerűen tartott lőfegyverét nem tarthatja magánál. Ha a rendezvény feloszlatására kerül sor, köteles a helyszínt azonnal önként elhagyni.” PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 21.     Mr László Rekvényi applied to the Commission on 20 April 1994. He alleged that the prohibitions contained in Article 40/B § 4 of the Hungarian Constitution infringed his rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention taken either alone or together with Article 14 . 22.     The Commission declared the application (no. 25390/94) admissible on 11 April 1997. In its report of 9 July 1998 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 10 (twenty-one votes to nine); that there had been no violation of Article 11 (twenty-one votes to nine); that it was not necessary to examine the applicant’s complaint under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article   10 (twenty-five votes to five) and that there had been no violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 11 (twenty-two votes to eight). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the four partly dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [6] . FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 23.     The applicant requested the Court in his memorial to find the respondent State in breach of its obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention taken either alone or together with Article 14 and to award him just satisfaction under Article 41. The Government, for their part, invited the Court to reject the applicant’s complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention both taken alone and together with Article 14. THE LAW I.     alleged violation of article 10 of the convention 24.     The applicant maintained that the prohibition on engaging in “political activities” contained in Article 40/B § 4 of the Hungarian Constitution amounted to an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression, in violation of Article 10 of the Convention, which provides: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 25.     The Commission arrived at the same conclusion, finding that the impugned prohibition was vague and sweeping, and could not, therefore, be regarded as being “prescribed by law” as required by paragraph 2 of Article   10. The Government did not dispute that the applicant could rely on the guarantees contained in Article 10; nor did they deny that the prohibition interfered with the exercise of his rights under that Article. They contended, however, that the interference was justified under the second paragraph of Article   10. A.     As to the applicability of Article 10 and the existence of an interference 26.     The Court takes it for granted that the pursuit of activities of a political nature comes within the ambit of Article 10 in so far as freedom of political debate constitutes a particular aspect of freedom of expression. Indeed, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society (see the Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, § 42). Furthermore, the guarantees contained in Article   10 of the Convention extend to military personnel and civil servants (see the Engel and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 41-42, § 100; and the Vogt v. Germany judgment of 26   September 1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 22-23, § 43). The Court sees no reason to come to a different conclusion in respect of police officers and this has not been disputed by those appearing before the Court. Nor has it been contested that the prohibition, by curtailing the applicant’s involvement in political activities, interfered with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The Court for its part also finds that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. B.     As to whether the interference was justified 27.     Such an interference gives rise to a breach of Article 10 unless it can be shown that it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aim or aims as defined in paragraph 2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” to attain them. 1.     “Prescribed by law” (a)     Submissions of those appearing before the Court (i)     The applicant 28.     The applicant submitted that the prohibition at issue was of an unacceptably general character and was open to arbitrary interpretations. A general constitutional ban on political activities contradicted any legislation of a lower level permitting certain activities of a political nature. Since the notion of “political activities” was not defined in any Hungarian law, it was not foreseeable whether or not a certain activity fell under the prohibition. This legal situation had prevailed without interruption since 1 January 1994 and had not been rectified by any subsequent legislation, including the 1994 Police Act.   (ii)     The Government 29.     In the proceedings before the Commission, the Government argued that the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations had provided a legal framework detailed enough to define the restrictions on political activities by police officers in a manner compatible with Article 10 § 2. 30.     In their pleadings before the Court, the Government relied on Article   78 of the Hungarian Constitution (see paragraph 13 above) as regards the alleged contradiction between the constitutional restriction and the permissive legislation of a lower level and explained that the two were not in conflict but complemented each other. They maintained that in the Hungarian legal system it was the practice that certain provisions of the Constitution could properly be interpreted only if read together with legislation of a lower level completing and explaining their precise content. Contemporary legislative techniques often left it to laws lower in the hierarchy to define general notions used in higher laws – a law-making method not uncommon at least in continental legal systems and never in principle disapproved by the Convention organs. In any event, the Constitutional Court had the competence to rule on any potential contradiction between the Constitution and other legislation. 31.     Furthermore, the legislation in force both prior and subsequent to the adoption of the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations met the requirements of foreseeability, the latter two instruments having merely recodified provisions already in force. Therefore, the constitutional restriction in question was “prescribed by law” at all times subsequent to its entry into force. Prior to 1 October 1994, the conditions governing various activities of a political nature, whereby police officers have always been permitted to exercise certain rights relating to freedom of expression, were laid down, inter alia , in Law no. 34 of 1989 on parliamentary elections, Law no. 55 of 1990 on the legal status of members of Parliament, Law   no.   64 of 1990 on the election of members of local authorities and mayors, and Law no. 17 of 1989 on referenda (the right to collect “nomination coupons”, expound election programmes, promote candidates, organise election campaign meetings, nominate candidates, vote in and stand for elections to Parliament, local authorities and the office of mayor and to participate in referenda) and also in the 1990 Regulations (the right to join trade unions, associations and other organisations representing and protecting police officers’ interests, to participate in peaceful assemblies, make statements to the press, participate in radio or television programmes or publish works on politics, etc.) (see paragraphs 14 to 17 and 19 above). (iii)     The Commission 32.     In its report the Commission, after examining the relevant domestic law as presented by the Government in the proceedings before it, observed that the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations had entered into force only in October 1994 and March 1995 respectively. The Commission, therefore, came to the conclusion that in the relevant period the impugned restriction had been based solely on Article 40/B § 4 of the Constitution. Moreover, it considered that the notion of “political activities” was vague and sweeping and that the Government had not adduced any case-law interpreting this term. The constitutional restriction itself was not, therefore, precise enough to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct in the matter. The Commission concluded that, the requirement of foreseeability thus not having been met, the interference was not “prescribed by law”. 33.     In her submissions to the Court, the Commission’s Delegate explained that the various laws referred to by the Government in their memorial and, in particular, the 1990 Regulations, had been adopted prior to the impugned amendment to the Constitution. The only legal provisions which could be regarded as having further defined the constitutional restriction on political activities by police officers were to be found in the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations. Consequently, it was not until the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations came into force that the legal situation had met the requirement of foreseeability. (b)     The Court’s assessment 34.     According to the Court’s well-established case-law, one of the requirements flowing from the expression “prescribed by law” is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, § 49, and the Kokkinakis v. Greece judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, p. 19, § 40). The role of adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain (see, mutatis mutandis , the Cantoni v.   France judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, p. 1628, § 32). The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see the previously cited Vogt judgment, p. 24, § 48). Because of the general nature of constitutional provisions, the level of precision required of them may be lower than for other legislation. 35.     The Court notes the Government’s submission that Article 40/B § 4 of the Constitution, which contains the generic term “political activities”, is subject to interpretation and is to be read in conjunction with complementary provisions contained in the various laws cited and the 1990 Regulations (see paragraphs 14 to 17, 19 and 31 above). As has been recalled many times in the Court’s case-law, it is primarily for the national authorities to interpret and apply domestic law (see, for example, the Chorherr v. Austria judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-B, pp.   35-36, § 25). In the absence of any domestic precedents to the opposite effect adduced by the applicant, the Court considers that the detailed provisions invoked by the Government cannot be held to be in contradiction with the general wording of the Constitution. Further, the adoption of the constitutional amendment in question did not result in the annulment of the 1990 Regulations, which were therefore in force when the impugned circular letters were issued. As a consequence, there appears to have existed at the relevant time a framework of provisions partly permitting – occasionally subject to authorisation – and partly restricting the participation of police officers in certain kinds of political activity. 36.     As to the wording of these provisions, it is inevitable, in the Court’s opinion, that conduct which may entail involvement in political activities cannot be defined with absolute precision. It seems, therefore, acceptable for the 1990 Regulations (see paragraph 19 above) – as for the 1994 Police Act and the 1995 Regulations (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above) – to lay down the conditions for undertaking types of conduct and activities with potential political aspects, such as participation in peaceful assemblies, making statements to the press, participating in radio or television programmes, publications or joining trade unions, associations or other organisations representing and protecting police officers’ interests. 37.     The Court is satisfied that in the circumstances these provisions were clear enough to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct accordingly. Even accepting that it might not be possible on occasions for police officers to determine with certainty whether a given action would or would not –against the background of the 1990 Regulations – fall foul of Article 40/B §   4 of the Constitution, it was nevertheless open to them to seek advice beforehand from their superior or clarification of the law by means of a court judgment. 38.     Having regard to these considerations, the Court finds that the interference was “prescribed by law” for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 10. 2.     Legitimate aim 39.     The Government submitted that the constitutional provision in question was aimed at depoliticising the police, and this during a period when Hungary was being transformed from a totalitarian regime to a pluralistic democracy. In view of the police’s past commitment to the ruling political party, the restriction served the purpose of protecting national security and public safety as well as preventing disorder. 40.     Neither the applicant nor the Commission expressed an opinion on this point. 41.     In the present case the obligation imposed on certain categories of public officials including police officers to refrain from political activities is intended to depoliticise the services concerned and thereby to contribute to the consolidation and maintenance of pluralistic democracy in the country. The Court notes that Hungary is not alone, in that a number of Contracting States restrict certain political activities on the part of their police. Police officers are invested with coercive powers to regulate the conduct of citizens, in some countries being authorised to carry arms in the discharge of their duties. Ultimately the police force is at the service of the State. Members of the public are therefore entitled to expect that in their dealings with the police they are confronted with politically neutral officers who are detached from the political fray, to paraphrase the language of the recent judgment in the case of Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2376-77, § 53, which judgment concerned the compatibility with Article 10 of restrictions on the involvement of senior local government officers in certain types of political activity). In the Court’s view, the desire to ensure that the crucial role of the police in society is not compromised through the corrosion