CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 28 octobre 1999

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display:inline-block } .sE159D65A { width:141.75pt; display:inline-block } .sD75245C2 { width:66.04pt; display:inline-block } .sE0E3AF24 { width:59.7pt; display:inline-block } .sC4CF4A9C { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.4pt; text-align:justify } .s8E4EE0F1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s6E2FCA00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCDABDDB1 { margin-top:24pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }           CASE OF BRUMĂRESCU v. ROMANIA   (Application no. 28342/95)                 JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG     28 October 1999     In the case of Brumărescu v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article   27 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), as amended by Protocol   No.   11 [1] , and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court 2 , as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:   Mr   L. Wildhaber , President ,   Mrs   E. Palm ,   Mr   C.L. Rozakis ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mr   L. Ferrari Bravo ,   Mr   L. Caflisch ,   Mr   L. Loucaides ,   Mr   J.-P. C osta,   Mr   W. Fuhrmann ,   Mr   K. Jungwiert,   Mr   B. Zupančič ,   Mrs   N. Vajić ,   Mr   J. Hedigan ,   Mrs   M. T satsa-Nikolovska,   Mr   T. Pan ŢÎ ru ,   Mr   E. Levits ,   Mr   L. Mihai , ad hoc judge , and also of Mrs M . de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 17 June and 30 September 1999, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case was referred to the Court by a Romanian national, Mr   Dan   Brumărescu (“the applicant”), and by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 3 and 6 November 1998 respectively, within the three-month period laid down by former Articles 32 § 1 and 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 28342/95) against Romania lodged by Mr Brumărescu with the Commission under former Article   25 on 9 May 1995. The Commission’s request referred to former Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby Romania recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (former Article 46). The applicant’s application to the Court referred to former Articles 44 and 48 as amended by Protocol No. 9 [2] , which Romania had ratified. The object of the request and of the application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 2.     In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 § 4 of Protocol No. 11 taken together with Rules 100 § 1 and 24 § 6, a panel of the Grand Chamber decided on 14 January 1999 that the case would be examined by the Grand Chamber of the Court. The Grand Chamber included ex officio Mr C. Bîrsan, the judge elected in respect of Romania (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24 § 4 of the Rules of Court), Mr L. Wildhaber, the President of the Court, Mrs   E.   Palm and Mr C.L. Rozakis, the Vice-Presidents of the Court, Sir   Nicolas Bratza, President of Section, and Mr G. Ress, Vice-President of Section (Article 27 § 3 of the Convention and Rules 24 §§ 3 and 5 (a)). The other members appointed to complete the Grand Chamber were Mr   L.   Ferrari Bravo, Mr L. Caflisch, Mr L. Loucaides, Mr W. Fuhrmann, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr B. Zupančič, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs   M.   Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Mr T. Panţîru and Mr E. Levits (Rule 24 § 3). Subsequently Mr Bîrsan, who had taken part in the Commission’s examination of the case, withdrew from sitting in the Grand Chamber (Rule   28). The Romanian Government (“the Government”) accordingly appointed Mr L. Mihai to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1). 3.     The President of the Court, acting under Rule 59 § 3, invited the parties to submit memorials on the issues raised in the case. 4.     The applicant designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule   36 §§ 3 and 4). 5.     The Registrar received the applicant’s memorial on 3 May 1999 and the Government’s memorial on 10 May 1999 after an extension of time. 6.     On 1 June 1999 the applicant filed observations supplementing his memorial of 3 May 1999. The Government replied to these on 14 June 1999. Although both documents had been lodged after the time ‑ limit for submitting memorials, the President decided on 17 June 1999, in accordance with Rule 38 § 1, that they could be included in the case file. 7.     In accordance with the decision of the President, who had also given the applicant’s representative leave to address the Court in Romanian (Rule   34 § 3), a hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 17 June 1999.   There appeared before the Court: (a)   for the Government Mr   C.-L. Popescu , Adviser, Ministry of Justice,   Agent , Mrs   R. R izoiu , Ministry of Justice, Mr   T. C orlaţean , Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Advisers ; (b)   for the applicant Mr   C. Dinu , of the Bucharest Bar,   Counsel.   The Court heard addresses by Mr Dinu, Mr Popescu and Mrs Rizoiu and also their replies to questions put by one of its members. 8.     On 30 June 1999, in accordance with Rule 61 § 3, the President granted Mr Mircea Dan Mirescu leave to submit written comments on certain aspects of the case. They were received on 28 June 1999. 9.     In accordance with Rule 61 § 5, written observations in reply to those comments were filed by the applicant on 29 July 1999 and by the Government on 30 July 1999. 10.     On 30 September 1999 Mr Ress, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case, was replaced by Mr J.-P. Costa, substitute judge (Rule 24 § 5 (b)). THE FACTS I.     the circumstances of the case 11.     In 1930 the applicant’s parents had a house built in Bucharest. From 1939 onwards they let the ground floor to the Mirescu brothers, the uncles of the third party intervening in the case, Mr Mircea Dan Mirescu. 12.     In 1950 the State took possession of the applicant’s parents’ house in Bucharest, allegedly under Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation. The applicant’s parents were never informed of the grounds or legal basis for that deprivation of property. They were, however, allowed to continue to live in one of the flats in the house as tenants of the State. 13.     In 1973, pursuant to Law no. 4/1973, the State sold the Mirescu brothers the flat which they had hitherto occupied as tenants. The intervener, Mr Mircea Dan Mirescu, and his sister, A.M.M., inherited the flat in 1988. After his sister’s death in 1997 the intervener was left as the sole successor in title to the flat. A.     Action for recovery of possession 14.     In 1993 the applicant, as the beneficiary of his parents’ estate, brought an action in the Bucharest Court of First Instance (“the Court of First Instance”) seeking a declaration that the nationalisation was null and void on the ground that Decree no. 92/1950 provided that the property of employees could not be nationalised and his parents had been employed at the time of the nationalisation of their house. It is not clear from the documents before the Court whether the applicant informed the Court of First Instance of the sale by the State to the Mirescu brothers in 1973. 15.     In a judgment of 9 December 1993 the Court of First Instance held that the nationalisation of the applicant’s parents’ house under Decree   no.   92/1950 had been a mistake, as his parents had belonged to a category of persons whose property the decree exempted from nationalisation. The court went on to hold that the State had obtained possession by duress and so could not rely on prescription to establish title. It also ruled that the State could not have acquired title to the house under Decree no.   218/1960 or Decree no. 712/1966 since those instruments had been contrary to the Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 respectively. The court therefore ordered the administrative authorities – namely the mayor of Bucharest and a State-owned company, C., which managed State-owned housing – to return the house to the applicant. 16.     No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final and irreversible since it could no longer be challenged by way of an ordinary appeal. 17.     On 31 March 1994 the mayor of Bucharest ordered the house to be returned to the applicant and on 27 May 1994 the C. company complied. 18.     As of that date the applicant ceased to pay rent on the flat he was occupying in the house. 19.     The applicant began paying land tax on the house on 14 April 1994 and continued doing so until a date in 1996 (see paragraph 25 below). 20.     On an unknown date the Procurator-General of Romania, acting at the instance of Mr Mircea Dan Mirescu, lodged an application ( recurs în anulare ) with the Supreme Court of Justice to have the judgment of 9   December 1993 quashed on the grounds that the Court of First Instance had exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the lawfulness of the application of Decree no. 92/1950. 21.     The hearing before the Supreme Court of Justice was set down for 22   February 1995. Mr Mircea Dan Mirescu was not invited to take part in the proceedings. On the day of the hearing, the applicant requested an adjournment as his lawyer was absent through illness. 22.     The Supreme Court of Justice refused that request and proceeded to hear oral argument, after which it reserved judgment until 1 March 1995, the applicant being ordered to file written submissions before that date. 23.     In those submissions, the applicant requested the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the Procurator-General’s application. He argued, first, that Decree no.   92/1950 had been incompatible with the 1948 Constitution, both in that it had been published only in part and in that it had breached the principle that no expropriation should be effected save in the public interest and after payment of fair compensation. Secondly, he submitted that, since his parents had been employees at the time of the nationalisation, the decision to nationalise their house had contravened the terms of the decree, which provided that dwellings belonging to employees could not be nationalised. Lastly, the applicant relied on Article 21 of the Romanian Constitution of 1991, which guarantees unrestricted access to the courts. 24.     On 1 March 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 9 December 1993 and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that property could be acquired by way of legislation, noted that the State had taken the house on the very day on which Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation had come into force and reiterated that the manner in which that decree had been applied could not be reviewed by the courts. Accordingly, the Bucharest Court of First Instance could not have found that the applicant was the rightful owner of the house without distorting the provisions of the decree, thus exceeding its powers and encroaching on those of the legislature. The Supreme Court of Justice confirmed that former owners were entitled to bring actions for recovery of possession but held that the applicant in the case before it had not established his title, whereas the State had demonstrated title under the nationalisation decree. In any event, provision as to redress for any wrongful seizure of property by the State would have to be made in new legislation. 25.     Thereupon, the tax authorities informed the applicant that the house would be reclassified as State property with effect from 2 April 1996. B.     Developments after the adoption of the Commission’s report: proceedings for restitution 26.     On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application for restitution with the administrative board established to deal with applications lodged in Bucharest pursuant to Law no. 112/1995 (“the Administrative Board”). He submitted that he had been dispossessed of his house in 1950 in breach of Decree no. 92/1950 on nationalisation; that the Bucharest Court of First Instance had held that that deprivation of property had been unlawful in a final judgment of 9 December 1993; and that he was therefore entitled to be reinstated as the owner of the whole house. 27.     In a report drawn up in November 1997 the valuation board established under Law no. 112/1995 valued the applicant’s house at 274,621,286 Romanian lei (ROL), of which the flat occupied by the applicant accounted for ROL 98,221,701. 28.     On 24 March 1998 the Administrative Board vested ownership of the flat rented by the applicant in him and awarded him financial compensation for the rest of the house. Having regard to section 12 of Law   no.   112/1995, which put a ceiling on compensation, and to the ceiling applicable in November 1997 – ROL 225,718,800 – the Board awarded him ROL   147,497,099. 29.     On 14 May 1998 the applicant challenged that decision in the Bucharest Court of First Instance, attacking the Board’s refusal to return the whole house to him and pointing out that no grounds for that refusal had been given. He argued that in his case, where there had been an unlawful deprivation of property, Law no. 112/1995 – which concerned lawful expropriations – did not apply. Accordingly, his only means of protecting his right of property was an action for recovery of possession. However, since he had already brought such an action, and since the Court of First Instance, in a final judgment of 9 December 1993, had held him to be the owner of the house, he believed himself to be debarred from bringing a fresh action for recovery of possession. Consequently, he sought a declaration that he was the owner of the whole house and stated that he was not seeking compensation under Law no. 112/1995. 30.     That application was dismissed on 21 April 1999. The applicant appealed and the proceedings are currently pending in the Bucharest County Court. II.     relevant domestic law and practice A.     The Constitution 31.       Article 21 of the Romanian Constitution provides: “Everyone shall be entitled to apply to the courts for protection of his rights, freedoms or legitimate interests. The exercise of this right shall not be restricted by any statute. ...” B.     Law no. 59/1993 amending the Code of Civil Procedure 32.     The relevant provisions of this Act read: Article 330 “The Procurator-General may, of his own motion or on an application by the Minister of Justice, apply to the Supreme Court of Justice for any final judicial decision to be quashed on any of the following grounds: 1.     that the court in question has exceeded its jurisdiction; 2.     ...” Article 330 1 “An application for a judicial decision to be quashed may be made at any time.” C.     Law no. 17 of 17 February 1997 amending Article 330 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 33.     Article 330 1 was amended as follows: “Article 330 2 : An application under Article 330 § 1 for a judicial decision to be quashed may be made within six months of the date on which the judicial decision in question becomes final ...” D.     Decree no. 92/1950 on the nationalisation of certain immovable property 34.     The relevant provisions of this decree read: Article I “... in order to ensure the proper management of dwellings which wealthy capitalists and exploiters who possess a large number of properties have allowed to fall into dilapidation as a means of sabotage; [and] In order to deprive exploiters of an important means of exploitation; The immovable property appearing in the schedules ... annexed to and forming part of this decree shall be nationalised. The listed property comprises: 1.     immovable property belonging to former industrialists, owners of large estates, bankers, owners of large trading enterprises and other representatives of the wealthy capitalist class; 2.     immovable property belonging to real-estate exploiters ...” Article II “The immovable property of workers, civil servants, small artisans, persons working in intellectual professions and retired persons shall be excluded from the scope of this decree and shall not be nationalised.” E.     Decree no. 524 of 24 November 1955 amending Decree no. 92/1950 35.     The relevant provisions of this decree read: Article XI “Subject to its obligation to apply the criteria laid down ... in Article II [of Decree no.   92/1950], the Cabinet may amend the annexes [containing the schedule of immovable property to be nationalised] to [that] decree. The Cabinet may also decide not to apply the nationalisation provisions to any flat or [other] immovable property.” F.     Position of the Supreme Court of Justice 1.     Case-law up to 2 February 1995 36.     In a number of cases the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Justice upheld judgments of lower courts asserting their jurisdiction to deal with claims concerning immovable property that had been nationalised, including property nationalised under Decree no. 92/1950. In a judgment of 9   March 1993 (no. 518), for instance, it held, on the issue whether the courts had power to deal with cases concerning the application of Decree   no.   92/1950: “... in ruling on the applicant’s claim for recovery of possession, and in allowing it, the courts, which have general jurisdiction under the law to determine civil disputes, merely applied the terms of the decree. To be more precise, they applied those of its provisions that forbid the nationalisation of certain immovable property and those which require such property to be returned in the event of an erroneous or improper application of the decree.” 2.     The departure from precedent of 2 February 1995 37.     On 2 February 1995 the full Supreme Court of Justice decided by a majority of twenty-five to twenty to depart from the Civil Division’s previous decisions, holding: “[T]he courts do not have jurisdiction to impugn Decree no. 92/1950 or to order that property nationalised under its provisions be returned ...; legislation alone can bring the nationalisations carried out under Decree no. 92/1950 into accord with the provisions of the present Constitution concerning the right of property ...” 3.     The departure from precedent of 28 September 1998 38.     On 28 September 1998 the full Supreme Court of Justice unanimously decided to depart from its ruling of 2 February 1995 that the courts did not have jurisdiction in matters concerning infringements of the right of property committed between 1944 and 1989. It held: “[T]he courts have jurisdiction to entertain any action concerning an alleged infringement of the right of property or other rights in rem where such an infringement occurred between 1944 and 1989.” G.     Position of the Constitutional Court 39.     On 19 July 1995 the Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of a bill to regulate the legal status of residential property which had passed into State ownership. As to whether the owners of immovable property which the State had vested in itself improperly or without legal authority could sue for return of their property or obtain compensation, it held: “... The situation is different in relation to dwellings which became State property through an unlawful administrative act or simply de facto – that is to say without any legal authority, the State’s ownership having no basis in law. In such cases the individual’s legal right to the property has never been extinguished, with the result that, since the State is not the owner, such property cannot be covered by a statute whose object is to regulate the legal status of dwellings which have passed into State ownership. In other words, ... the measures which the bill before us seeks to introduce are not applicable to dwellings not legally vested in the State. If the bill were to treat the State as owning immovable property which it had taken without legal authority, it would be conferring ownership on the State retrospectively, or else introducing a mechanism not envisaged by the 1991 Constitution for transforming individual ownership into State ownership, and that cannot be accepted. It follows that this Court must allow the objection that this part of the bill, in so far as it deals with immovable property taken without legal authority by the State or other artificial persons, is incompatible with the Constitution ... It is for Parliament to decide, when amending the bill, whether to make provision for persons who have been deprived of their dwellings by the State without legal authority, or for the successors in title of such persons, to be able to benefit from the Act if they choose not to embark on the slow, uncertain and costly course of bringing an action for recovery of possession ...” H.     Law no. 112 of 23 November 1995 regulating the legal status of certain residential property (commenced 29 January 1996) 40.     The relevant provisions of this Act read: Section 1 “Individuals who formerly owned residential property which passed lawfully into the ownership of the State or of another artificial person after 6 March 1945 and which was still in the possession of the State or another artificial person on 22 December 1989 shall be entitled to benefit, by way of reparation, from the measures in this Act. The provisions of this Act shall apply equally to the successors in title of such former owners, subject to existing statutory provisions.” Section 2 “The persons referred to in section 1 shall be entitled to restitution in the form of the restoration to them of the ownership of flats in which they currently live as tenants or which are vacant. In respect of other flats, those persons shall receive compensation as provided in section 12 ...” Section 13 “The amount of compensation to be awarded to former owners or their successors in title in respect of flats which have not been returned to them, or the sale price of such flats, as the case may be, shall be determined in accordance with Decree no. 93/1977, legislative Decree no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992. The value of the appurtenant land shall be determined according to the criteria (Document 2665 of 28 February 1992) for identifying and valuing land held by State-owned commercial companies ... The values so determined shall be converted to present-day levels by means of multipliers which may not be lower than the rate of increase in the national average salary over the relevant period. Neither the total value of a flat which is returned nor the total amount of compensation due for a flat which is not returned and for the appurtenant land may exceed the cumulative total of the national average salary for each year over the period of twenty years expiring on the date on which the compensation is assessed. Where a flat whose value, calculated according to the rules laid down in the first paragraph of this section, exceeds the total referred to in the second paragraph is returned, pursuant to section 2, to its former owner, his heirs or living relatives to the second degree of consanguinity, those persons cannot be obliged to pay the difference. The amount of compensation due at present-day levels under the above provisions shall be calculated on the day of payment, on the basis of the national average salary for the last month of the previous quarter. For the purpose of implementing this Act, an extrabudgetary fund shall be established, on which the Ministry of Finance may draw and into which shall be paid: (a)     the proceeds of the sale of non-returned flats, including payments in full, deposits, monthly instalments and interest (less commission of 1% of the value of each flat); and (b)     the proceeds of government bonds issued for the purpose of financing the fund, as provided in Law no. 91/1993 on public borrowing. The above fund may be drawn on for the following purposes, in order of priority: (a)     to pay the compensation due under the provisions of this Act to owners or their successors in title; (b)     to redeem the bonds issued and cover the expenses entailed by their issue; and (c)     to build housing to be allocated in the first instance to tenants in the situation referred to in section 5(3).” I.     Position of the executive with regard to Law no. 112/1995 41.     On 23 January 1996 the government adopted decision no. 20/1996 implementing Law no. 112/1995. The decision provided that immovable property which had passed into State ownership under a legislative provision was to be regarded as property legally vested in the State. It also specified that Law no. 112/1995 did not apply to immovable property held by the State where its title was not based on any legislative provision. 42.     On 18 February 1997 the government adopted decision no. 11/1997 to supplement decision no. 20/1996. Section 1(3) of decision no. 11/1997 provided that, in order for property to be defined as having been acquired by the State under Decree no. 92/1950, it had to have been acquired in accordance with Articles I §§ 1-5 and II of the decree and the person referred to in the lists drawn up under the decree as the owner of the property had to have been the true owner at the date of the nationalisation. J.     The lower courts’ position on the application of the res judicata principle 43.     Following government decision no. 11 of 18 February 1997, former owners who had succeeded in obtaining final court judgments ordering their property to be returned, only to see those judgments quashed by the Supreme Court of Justice on an extraordinary application by the Procurator ‑ General, brought fresh actions for recovery of possession. The plea of res judicata raised in those new actions was not treated in the same way by all courts, as appears from the following. 1.     Judgment no. 5626 of 16 May 1997 of the Bucharest (2nd District) Court of First Instance (final and enforceable) “... the property sought to be recovered has already been the subject matter of proceedings between the same parties, resulting in judgment no. 212 of 12 January 1994 (now final and enforceable), in which this Court found for I.P. and declared him to be the owner of the property ... The Procurator-General applied for that judgment to be quashed and on 28   September 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice did quash it and substituted its own judgment dismissing I.P.’s claim ... ... in accordance with Article 1201 of the Civil Code, which provides that ‘the principle of res judicata applies where a fresh action concerning the same subject matter, based on the same cause of action, is commenced between the same parties acting in the same capacities’, this Court finds that there have already been proceedings between these same parties in respect of the same property and that those proceedings have been determined by the Supreme Court of Justice ... … that being so, this Court accepts the plea of res judicata and holds that it cannot entertain the plaintiff’s claim.” 2.     Judgment no. 3276 of 10 December 1998 of Făgăraş Court of First Instance (appeal still possible) “... this Court finds that Decree no. 92/1950 was unlawfully applied to the building owned by the plaintiff ..., orders that it be returned to her and dismisses the plea of res judicata ...” K.     Law no. 213 of 24 November 1998 on public property and the rules governing it 44.     The relevant provisions of this Act read: Section 6 “1.     Property acquired by the State between 6 March 1945 and 22 December 1989, provided that it passed into State ownership lawfully, that is to say in a manner not contrary to the Constitution, to international treaties to which Romania was a party or to any legislation in force at the time at which it passed into State ownership, shall likewise form part of the public or private property of the State or other public authorities. 2.     Save where it is governed by special reparation laws, property held by the State without valid legal authority, including property acquired by way of a transaction voidable for lack of true consent, may be claimed by former owners or their successors in title. 3.     The courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not the legal authority is valid.” PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 45.     Mr Brumărescu applied to the Commission on 9 May 1995. He alleged that the Supreme Court of Justice had deprived him of access to a court with the power to enable him to recover possession of his house, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 46.     The Commission declared the application (no. 28342/95) admissible on 22   May 1997. In its report of 15 April 1998 (former Article 31 of the Convention), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. The full text of the Commission’s opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [3] . FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 47.     The Government invited the Court to hold that, owing to events which had occurred since the Commission had adopted its report, the applicant had ceased to be a “victim” of a violation of the Convention and that, in any event, he had not exhausted domestic remedies. As to the merits, they asked the Court to dismiss the complaints. The applicant requested the Court to dismiss the Government’s preliminary objections, to hold that there had been a violation of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to award him just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention. THE LAW I.     The government’s preliminary objections A.     Whether the applicant is a “victim” 48.     According to the Government, the new developments which had occurred after the admissibility decision of 22 May 1997 meant that the applicant was no longer a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the claim filed by the applicant under Law no. 112/1995 had resulted in the decision of 24 March 1998 ordering part of the house at issue to be returned to the applicant and awarding him compensation for the part not returned. That compensation was sufficient to debar the applicant from continuing to claim to be the victim of a violation (if any) of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. Although the proceedings were still pending as the applicant had appealed to the courts against the refusal to make full restitution, the Government submitted that it was not open to the courts to determine the case in a manner less favourable to the applicant than the decision of 24 March 1998. 49.     The applicant asked the Court to proceed with its examination of the case. He submitted that he had been deprived of his property and that it had still not been returned to him. He also emphasised that it had never been his wish to give up the property in question in return for compensation and that in any event the amount of the proposed compensation was derisory in view of the value of the house. The fact that he had been awarded such compensation could not, therefore, deprive him of his status as a victim, a status which he had had and still possessed. 50.     It is the settled case-law of the Court that the word “victim” in the context of Article 34 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of Article 41. Consequently, a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, the Lüdi v. Switzerland judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 18, § 34). With regard to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant is currently in the same situation as he was on 1 March 1995, since there has been no final decision acknowledging, at least in substance, and redressing any violation of the Convention caused by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice. As to the complaint concerning the applicant’s right of property, the application for restitution made after the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment has not yet been finally determined. Although the decisions already delivered in the course of those proceedings – which are not in themselves the subject of complaint before the Court – tend somewhat to ameliorate the applicant’s position by returning part of the house in question to him and compensating him for the part not returned, and although it is not impossible that the applicant’s claim to have the whole house returned to him may eventually succeed, the fact remains that the basis of those proceedings was precisely the situation created by the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment, namely the acceptance that the house had become State property again. As a result, those proceedings cannot in any event entirely efface the consequences of the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment for the applicant’s enjoyment of his right of property, since if the house is returned to him this will be done under different legal provisions from those underlying the complaint now before the Court. The Court observes, moreover, that the applicant’s complaints do not only concern the Supreme Court of Justice’s interference with his right of property but also relate to an alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention caused by the same judgment. The applicant may unquestionably claim to be a victim owing to the quashing of a judicial decision which was in his favour – a decision which had become final – and to the ruling that the courts had no jurisdiction to entertain actions for recovery of possession such as the one he had brought. It remained impossible to bring actions for recovery of possession before the courts for several years. Even if, as a result of new rules and the Supreme Court of Justice’s change of position, that legal avenue is now available in such circumstances, the Court considers that it would be onerous to require the applicant to bring the same action for a second time, particularly as, in view of the contradictory decisions emanating from the Romanian courts, the outcome of a new action for recovery of possession remains uncertain, regard being had to the principle of res judicata . In these circumstances, it is undeniable that the applicant is, as he asserted, still affected by the impugned judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice and continues to be the victim of the violations of the Convention which he asserts flow from that judgment. The objection must therefore be dismissed. B.     Whether domestic remedies have been exhausted 51.     The Government also submitted that the application was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. While acknowledging that there was no effective means in Romanian law of challenging the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment of 1 March 1995, the Government argued that it was open to the applicant to bring a new action for recovery of possession. Although that remedy had existed before the Commission declared the application admissible, it had become effective only after the entry into force of Law no. 112/1995 (as interpreted by government decision no. 11/1997) and Law no. 213/1998 on public property and after the Supreme Court of Justice had departed from its own previous decisions on 28 September 1998. 52.     The Court notes that the Government first raised this objection before the Commission on 7 April 1998, after the decision on the admissibility of the application of 22 May 1997 and after submitting their observations on the merits to the Commission on 11 July 1997. 53.     The Court reiterates that objections of this kind should in principle be raised before the admissibility of the application is examined (see, among other authorities, the Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28   June 1984, Series A no. 80, p. 31, § 57, and the Artico v. Italy judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 13-14, § 27). However, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether in the present case there are particular circumstances permitting the Government to raise the objection after the admissibility stage, since it considers that the objection is in any event ill-founded. 54.     The Court notes that before lodging his application with the Commission, the applicant used the remedy referred to by the Government, namely an action for recovery of possession. Then as now, that remedy existed and was effective, and the Government did not dispute that. 55.     The Court considers that the Government, who are responsible for the quashing of a final judgment determining an action for recovery of possession, cannot now argue that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies because he has not brought a fresh action for recovery of possession (see also paragraph 50 above in fine ). Accordingly, this preliminary objection must be dismissed. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 56.     According to the applicant, the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgment of 1   March 1995 infringed Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by [a] … tribunal …” 57.     In his memorial the applicant submitted that the Supreme Court of Justice’s finding that the courts had no jurisdiction to determine an action for recovery of possession was contrary to the right of access to a court enshrined in Article 21 of the Romanian Constitution and to Article 3 of the Romanian Civil Code, which deals with denial of justice. He also argued that the Supreme Court of Justice’s dictum that he was not the owner of the property at issue was in contradiction with the ground on which it had allowed the application to quash the earlier decisions, namely that the courts had no jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case. 58.     The Government admitted that the applicant had been refused access to the courts but submitted that that refusal had been temporary and in any event justified by the need to ensure compliance with procedural rules and to preserve the principle of the separation of powers. 59.     In the Commission’s opinion, the right of access to a court meant that there must be a judicial avenue for claims concerning civil rights. Hence, the quashing of the judgment of 9 December 1993 on the ground that the courts could not entertain such an action had impaired the very substance of the right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1. 60.     The Court must therefore examine whether the judgment of 1 March 1995 infringed Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 61.     The right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article   6 § 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares, among other things, the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia , that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question. 62.     In the present case the Court notes that at the material time the Procurator-General of Romania – who was not a party to the proceedings – had a power under Article 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure to apply for a final judgment to be quashed. The Court notes that the exercise of that power by the Procurator-General was not subject to any time-limit, so that judgments were liable to challenge indefinitely. The Court observes that, by allowing the application lodged under that power, the Supreme Court of Justice set at naught an entire judicial process which had ended in – to use the Supreme Court of Justice’s words – a