CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 8 décembre 1999

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text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s711D7040 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }           CASE OF PELLEGRIN v. FRANCE   (Application no. 28541/95)                 JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG     8 December 1999       In the case of Pellegrin v. France, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article   27 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), as amended by Protocol   No.   11 [1] , and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court 2 , as a Grand Chamber composed of the following judges:   Mrs   E. Palm , President ,   Mr   A. Pastor Ridruejo,   Mr   L. Ferrari Bravo ,   Mr   L. C aflisch ,   Mr   J.-P. Costa ,   Mrs   F. Tulkens,   Mr   W. Fuhrmann ,   Mr   K. Jungwiert ,   Mr   M. Fischbach ,   Mr   V. Butkevych ,   Mr   J. Casadevall ,   Mr   B. Zupančič ,   Mrs   N. Vajić ,   Mr   J. Hedigan ,   Mrs   W. Thomassen ,   Mr   T. Panţîru,   Mr   K. Traja , and also of Mrs M. de Boer-Buquicchio , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 10 June and 17 November 1999, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 9 December 1998, within the three-month period laid down by former Articles 32 § 1 and 47 of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 28541/95) against the French Republic lodged with the Commission under former Article 25 by a French national, Mr Gilles Pellegrin, on 8 July 1995. The Commission’s request referred to former Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby France recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (former Article 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2.     On 6 January 1999 the applicant designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 36 § 3). 3.     In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 § 4 of Protocol No. 11 taken together with Rules 100 § 1 and 24 § 6, a panel of the Grand Chamber decided on 14 January 1999 that the case would be examined by the Grand Chamber of the Court. The Grand Chamber included ex officio Mr   J. ‑ P.   Costa, the judge elected in respect of France (Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 24 § 4), Mr L. Wildhaber, the President of the Court, Mrs E. Palm, Vice-President of the Court, and Mr M. Fischbach, Vice-President of Section (Article 27 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 §§ 3 and 5 (a)). The other members appointed to complete the Grand Chamber were Mr L. Ferrari Bravo, Mr L. Caflisch, Mr W. Fuhrmann, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr J. Casadevall, Mr B. Zupančič, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs   W.   Thomassen, Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Mr T. Panţîru, Mr   E.   Levits and Mr K. Traja (Rule 24 § 3). 4.     At the Court’s invitation (Rule 99), the Commission delegated one of its members, Mr J.-C. Geus, to take part in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. 5.     The Registrar received the memorial of the applicant on 7 April 1999 and the memorial of the French Government (“the Government”) on 16   April. 6.     In accordance with the President’s decision, a hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 June 1999.   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   J.-F. Dobelle , Deputy Director of Legal Affairs,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Mr   P. Boussaroque, Human Rights Section ,     Legal Affairs Department,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Counsel ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   C. Pettiti , of the Paris Bar,   Counsel ; (c)     for the Commission Mr   J.-C. Geus ,   Delegate , Ms   M.-T. Schoepfer ,   Secretary to the Commission.   The Court heard addresses by Mr Geus, Mr Pettiti and Mr Dobelle. 7.     Mr Wildhaber, who was unable to attend the hearing, was replaced as President of the Grand Chamber by Mrs Palm (Rule 10), his place as a member of the Grand Chamber being taken by Mrs F. Tulkens, substitute judge (Rule 24 § 5 (b)). Mr Levits, who was likewise unable to attend the hearing, was replaced by Mr V. Butkevych, substitute judge (above-mentioned Rule 24 § 5 (b)). Mrs Tsatsa-Nikolovska, who was unable to attend the deliberations on 17 November 1999, was replaced by Mr   A.   Pastor Ridruejo, substitute judge (above-mentioned Rule 24 § 5 (b)). THE FACTS I.     The circumstances of the case A.     The relevant facts 8.     Until 1989 the applicant was employed in the private sector, working mainly as a management and accountancy consultant. On the basis of the professional experience he had thus acquired, he applied for a job working for the French State under the overseas cooperation programme. 9.     The French Ministry of Cooperation and Development recruited him – under a contract signed on 13 March 1989 – as a technical adviser to the Minister for the Economy, Planning and Trade of Equatorial Guinea. As head of project, he was to be responsible for drawing up the budget of State investment for 1990 and was to participate in the preparation of the three-year plan and the three-year programme of public investment, in liaison with Guinean civil servants and international organisations. 10.     The contract stipulated that the applicant was to be placed at the disposal of the government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea for two ten-month spells separated by a period of home leave calculated on the basis of five days for each month worked. The contract also laid down the conditions of his remuneration and in respect of all other matters referred to the regulations issued pursuant to the Law of 13 July 1972 (see paragraph   36 below). 11.     On 9 January 1990, following a number of local disagreements, the Guinean authorities placed the applicant once more at the disposal of the French authorities. This caused the termination of his contract on expiry of his period of home leave (see paragraph 31 below). 12.     The Ministry intended to give the applicant a new contract when he had completed his home leave, assigning him to duties in Gabon. To be eligible, he had to satisfy two prior conditions, as required of all other applicants for cooperation posts: firstly, candidates had to obtain the approval of the authorities of the country where they were to serve; secondly, they had to be certified medically fit to serve overseas. 13.     As the approval of the Gabonese authorities was slow in coming, the Ministry of Cooperation and Development notified the applicant – by a letter of 2 February 1990 – that his contract was to be terminated and informed him that he would subsequently be removed from the Ministry’s establishment with effect from 15 March 1990. 14.     The Gabonese authorities’ approval was later given for a post of financial analyst at the Ministry of Public Sector Reform. By a letter of 7   February 1990 the Ministry of Cooperation and Development noted this approval and accordingly declared the striking-off decision announced on 2   February null and void. The applicant was then summoned to attend the compulsory medical examination to assess his fitness to serve. 15.     On 22 February 1990 the doctor responsible for the interministerial medical service, a specialist in tropical medicine, examined the applicant and ordered an additional psychiatric report. In the light of the results of the additional diagnosis, the doctor declared on 15 March 1990 that the applicant was permanently unfit to serve overseas. 16.     On 23 March 1990 the Ministry of Cooperation and Development noted that opinion and accordingly informed the applicant that his name was to be removed from the list of the Ministry’s establishment with effect from 15 March 1990. B.     The proceedings in issue 17.     On 16 May 1990 the applicant lodged an application with the Paris Administrative Court to set aside the decision of 23 March 1990 as being unlawful. 18.     On 9 November 1990 the Minister for Cooperation and Development filed his defence. 19.     By an interlocutory judgment of 16 April 1992 the Paris Administrative Court ordered a medical report in order to ascertain whether, on account of his state of health, the applicant had been unfit in March 1990 to serve as a technical adviser under the overseas cooperation programme. 20.     On 21 November 1992 the medical expert filed his report, having interviewed the applicant and given him a medical, psychological and neuropsychiatric examination on 3 September 1992. He gave it as his opinion that the Ministry of Cooperation and Development’s administrative reaction had been excessive and that the applicant’s state of health had not made him unfit to resume his duties after three months’ sick-leave, after which he could have gone before a medical board. 21.     On 22 December 1992 the applicant filed a compensation claim, seeking an order requiring the State to pay him two different sums. Firstly, he claimed 550,000 French francs (FRF), which he considered to be the amount of remuneration he would have received if he had remained in post; secondly, he claimed FRF 500,000 in compensation for the personal, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he considered he had sustained on account of being struck off. 22.     By a decision of 4 January 1993 the Paris Administrative Court fixed the amount payable in costs for the medical report. By a decision of 1   March 1993 it corrected a clerical error in the operative provisions of the first decision. 23.     On 8 March 1993 the Minister for Cooperation and Development submitted his observations on the medical report. 24.     On 14 April 1993 the applicant filed a reply. 25.     On 3 May 1993 the Minister for Cooperation and Development submitted his defence to the applicant’s compensation claim of 22   December 1992, arguing that it was unfounded. 26.     On 14 September and 4 October 1994 the Minister for Cooperation and Development filed a rejoinder and a number of documents. 27.     On 13 December 1994 the applicant filed a reply. 28.     The case was set down for hearing on 19 January 1995. On 9   January 1995 the applicant was informed that the case had been put off to a date to be determined later. 29.     On 11 and 18 January 1995 the Minister for Cooperation and Development submitted additional observations and a number of documents. 30.     On 16 February 1995 the applicant submitted a reply. 31.     By a judgment of 23 October 1997, following a hearing on 25   September 1997, the Paris Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s application, as regards both the request to have the striking-off decision set aside and the compensation claim. It held in particular: “ ...     As to the application to set aside the Minister for Cooperation’s decision of [23]   March 1990 Firstly, the documents in the file show that Mr Pellegrin’s contract with the State to work in Equatorial Guinea as a participant in the cooperation programme was terminated when the Guinean authorities placed him once more at the disposal of the French State. Although, by a letter of 7 February 1990, the Minister declared null and void the decision of 2 February 1990 announcing that Mr Pellegrin’s name would be removed from the list of the Ministry’s establishment with effect from 15 March 1990, which he did with a view to the signing of a new contract, he did not intend to reactivate the contract under which Mr Pellegrin had been assigned to duties in Equatorial Guinea, since that contract had been automatically terminated when the foreign State placed him once more at the disposal of the French State. Consequently, Mr Pellegrin may not validly argue that the decision of [23] March 1990 unlawfully rescinded the decision of 7 [February] 1990. Secondly, in deciding to remove the applicant’s name from the list of the Ministry’s establishment with effect from 15 March 1990, the Minister was merely drawing the consequences of the fact that the contract assigning Mr Pellegrin to duties in Equatorial Guinea expired on that date and of the fact that no new contract had been signed. Consequently, his decision was not invalidated by any unlawful retrospectiveness; ... Thirdly, the medical report of 21 November 1992 shows that on [23] March 1990 Mr Pellegrin did not satisfy the physical fitness conditions for service overseas. Consequently, he may not validly maintain that the decision of [23] March 1990, which cited the … opinion that he was unfit as ground for refusing him a new contract for the cooperation service in Gabon, was vitiated by an error of judgment; ... As to the compensation claim It follows from the rejection of Mr Pellegrin’s arguments in support of his application to set aside the decision of [23] March 1990 that he may not rely on any culpable unlawfulness making the State liable. Consequently, his claim for compensation from the State for prejudice caused by the decision of [23] March 1990 must be dismissed ...” 32.     On 16 January 1998 the applicant gave notice of appeal against the above judgment, which had been served on him on 13 January, and filed his statement of the grounds of appeal. 33.     On 10 June 1998 the Minister for Cooperation and Development filed a pleading. 34.     On 30 June 1998 the applicant filed a further pleading. 35.     The case is pending in the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal. II.     relevant domestic law Law no. 72-659 of 13 July 1972 on the position of civilian cultural, scientific and technical cooperation staff in post in foreign States 36.     The relevant provisions of the law governing the position of civilian cultural, scientific and technical cooperation staff in post in foreign States (in respect of which two implementing decrees were promulgated on 25   April 1978) provide: Section 1 “The civilian staff on whom the State calls to perform cultural, scientific or technical cooperation duties outside French territory at the service of foreign States, particularly by virtue of agreements between France and those States, shall be governed by the provisions of the present Law ...” Section 3 “Without prejudice to the rules governing the exercise of judicial functions, the staff contemplated by the present Law shall serve, while performing their duties, under the authority of the Government of the foreign State or the body at whose service they have been placed, under conditions laid down by agreement between the French Government and the foreign authorities concerned. They shall be required to maintain the propriety and discretion befitting persons performing their duties in the territory of a foreign State and inherent in the public ‑ service nature of the tasks they carry out ... They shall be forbidden to engage in any act or participate in any event which might be damaging to the French State, local public policy or the relations the French State maintains with foreign States. In the event of failure to respect the obligations contemplated in the previous two paragraphs, their turn of duty may be terminated immediately, without prior formalities, and without prejudice to any administrative proceedings that may be brought against them on their return to France.” III.     COMPARATIVE LAW: PUBLIC SERVANTS IN EEC LAW “Freedom of movement of workers and access to employment in the public service of the Member States – Commission action in respect of the application of Article 48(4) of the EEC Treaty” (Communication from the Commission of the European Communities published in OJEC   no. C 72 of 18 March 1988) 37.     Article 48(4) [2] of the Treaty of 25 March 1957 instituting the European Economic Community (“the EEC Treaty”) provides for a derogation from the principle of freedom of movement for workers within the Community in respect of “employment in the public service”. 38.     The Court of Justice of the European Communities has developed a restrictive interpretation of this derogation. In its judgment of 17 December 1980 in the case of Commission v. Belgium (C-149/79, ECR 3881) it decided that the derogation concerned only posts which involved direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities, and which thus presumed on the part of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which formed the foundation of the bond of nationality. 39.     The European Commission, to which the EEC Treaty assigned responsibility for ensuring the correct application of Community rules, noted that a large number of posts likely to be caught by the derogation had in reality no bearing on the exercise of powers conferred by public law or protection of the general interests of the State. 40.     In a communication of 18 March 1988 it set itself the task of listing separately those activities which are covered by the derogation and those which are not. It thus established two distinct categories of activities according to whether or not they involved “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State”. These categories were defined as follows: “ Exclusion of specific activities in the national public service [from freedom of movement for workers] On the basis of current Court of Justice rulings, and bearing in mind the present conditions for establishing the single market, the Commission considers that the derogation in Article 48(4) covers specific functions of the State and similar bodies such as the armed forces, the police and other forces for the maintenance of order, the judiciary, the tax authorities and the diplomatic corps. This derogation is also seen as covering posts in State Ministries, regional government authorities, local authorities and other similar bodies, central banks and other public bodies, where the duties of the post involve the exercise of State authority, such as the preparation of legal acts, the implementation of such acts, monitoring of their application and supervision of subordinate bodies ... Activities concerned by action in the public service sector The Commission considers that the functions involved in certain forms of public employment are for the most part sufficiently remote from the specific activities of the public service as defined by the Court of Justice that they would only in very rare cases be covered by the exception in Article 48(4) of the Treaty. The Commission proposes therefore to implement its action in the following areas by order of priority: – bodies responsible for administering commercial services (e.g. public transport, electricity and gas supply, airline and shipping companies, posts and telecommunications, radio and television companies), – public health care services, – teaching in State educational establishments, – research for non-military purposes in public establishments. Each of these activities also exists in the private sector, to which Article 48(4) does not apply, or may be exercised in the public sector without the imposition of nationality requirements ...” Where the second category is concerned, the Commission has left it open to EEC member States to try to show that the duties of a given post involve the specific activities of the public service; this would, exceptionally, justify application of the derogation. Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 41.     The Court of Justice has applied and developed these principles in a number of judgments. In its judgment of 2 July 1996 in the case of European Commission v. the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (C-473/93, ECR   I-3248), it held: “§ 27     ... in order to determine whether posts fall within the scope of Article 48(4) of the Treaty, it is necessary to consider whether or not the posts in question typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as it exercises powers conferred by public law and has responsibility for safeguarding the general interests of the State or of other public bodies. For that reason, the criterion for determining whether Article   48(4) of the Treaty is applicable must be functional and must take account of the nature of the tasks and responsibilities inherent in the post, in order to ensure that the effectiveness and scope of the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement of workers and equal treatment of nationals of all Member States is not restricted by interpretations of the concept of public service which are based on domestic law alone and which would obstruct application of Community rules (judgment in Case 307/84 Commission v. France [1986] ECR 1725, paragraph 12). … § 31     ... the generality of posts in the areas of research, health, inland transport, posts and telecommunications and in the water, gas and electricity supply services are remote from the specific activities of the public service because they do not involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law or duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities (see, in particular, as regards the area of health, the judgment in Case 307/84 Commission v. France, and, as regards research for civil purposes, the judgment in Case 225/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR 2625). … § 33     ... the Court has already stated that the very strict conditions which posts must satisfy in order to come within the exception laid down in Article 48(4) of the Treaty are not fulfilled in the case of trainee teachers (judgment in Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 28), in the case of foreign-language assistants (judgment in Case 33/88 Allué and Coonan [1989] ECR 1591, paragraph 9) or in the case of secondary school teachers (judgment in Case C-4/91 Bleis [1991] ECR I-5627, paragraph 7). § 34     For the same reasons, the same applies to primary school teachers ...” PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 42.     Mr Pellegrin applied to the Commission on 8 July 1995. He complained that his case had not been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He also relied on Articles 3 and   13. 43.     On 21 May 1997 the Commission declared the application (no.   28541/95) partly admissible. In its report of 17 September 1998 (former Article   31 of the Convention), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (eighteen votes to fourteen). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the three separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [3] . FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 44.     In their memorial the Government asked the Court, as their principal submission, to dismiss the application lodged by Mr Pellegrin as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In the alternative, they left the question as to the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings to the Court’s discretion. 45.     The applicant asked the Court to find a violation of Article 6 § 1 and to award him just satisfaction. THE LAW Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 46.     The applicant complained of the length of the proceedings which are pending in the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” 47.     The Court must determine whether that Article is applicable to the present case. The applicant and the Commission argued that it was applicable; the Government submitted that it was not. A.     Arguments of the parties 1.     The applicant 48.     The applicant submitted that his status as a non-established civil service employee under contract more closely resembled that of an employee under private law than that of a civil servant. The fact that in the event of a dispute the administrative courts had jurisdiction (as for civil servants) did not in itself confer on him a status which could be assimilated with civil servant status. The Court’s case-law on civil servants was therefore not applicable in his case. 49.     Were the Court nevertheless to assimilate him with a civil servant and apply its case-law on the question, he argued that the dispute in issue did not concern his recruitment, his career or the termination of his employment in the civil service. He asserted that the object of the dispute was not to obtain his reinstatement as a member of the establishment from which he had been struck off, but to obtain a ruling that the striking-off decision was unlawful with the sole aim of obtaining compensation for the damage caused by that decision. 50.     In the applicant’s submission, the dispute therefore had a “purely economic” purpose, namely to obtain the payment of compensation, firstly for the remuneration he would have received if he had remained in post, and secondly for the personal, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that he considered he had sustained on account of being struck off. Referring to the Le   Calvez v. France judgment of 29 July 1998 ( Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, pp. 1900-01, § 58), he argued that his “means of subsistence” had been affected, since the decision to strike him off had deprived him of the monthly salary which formed his only income. 51.     The applicant further submitted that the duties he had performed in Equatorial Guinea had not involved the exercise of powers conferred by public law, as it had been possible for them to be performed by a private consultant. The purpose of recruiting a participant in the cooperation programme remunerated by the French administrative authorities was to provide financial assistance to the host State by placing a qualified person at its disposal without obligation. 2.     The Government 52.     The Government submitted that the applicant’s status as a civil service employee under contract could be assimilated with civil servant status. Firstly, the contract did not play a significant role in the relationship between the employee concerned and the administrative authority which employed him; its signing was not the result of negotiation between the parties about the employee’s conditions of service but a mere manifestation of agreement on both sides which entailed application of pre-existing statutory and regulatory conditions of service (laid down in the present case by the Law of 13 July 1972 and its two implementing decrees). Secondly, the conditions for the performance of the duties of employees under contract, termination of their service and their remuneration were very similar to those applicable to civil servants since, just like those conditions, they were determined by the constraints of public service. Lastly, in the event of a dispute, the administrative courts had jurisdiction and applied rules which – derogating from those applied to other administrative contracts – were similar to those governing civil servants. 53.     The Government argued on that basis that the Court’s case-law on civil servants should be applied. Referring to the Fusco v. Italy judgment of 2 September 1997 ( Reports 1997-V, p. 1732, § 20), they submitted that the dispute manifestly concerned termination of the applicant’s employment in the civil service. He had initially confined himself to lodging an application to set aside the striking-off decision. It was only two and a half years later that he had added a compensation claim to that application. 54.     Moreover, in the Government’s submission, payment of that compensation depended on a prior finding of the unlawfulness of the striking-off decision. As the Court had ruled in its Neigel v. France judgment of 17 March 1997 ( Reports 1997-II, p. 411, § 44), in such a case what was at stake in the dispute was not “purely or essentially economic”. 55.     The Government further submitted that the impugned decision was taken under conditions derogating from the position in ordinary law (see, to the converse effect, the Francesco Lombardo v. Italy judgment of 26   November 1992, Series A no. 249-B, pp. 26-27, § 17). The State to which the applicant had been assigned had availed itself of its right, at any time and for reasons of expediency, to place the applicant once more at the disposal of the French authorities, who had no alternative but to take note of that decision. This automatically caused the unilateral termination of the contract. 56.     In the Government’s submission, this situation fell outside the scope of ordinary law on account of the specific nature of the diplomatic responsibilities entrusted to the applicant, which required him to participate, in both the States concerned, in the exercise of functions which were a matter of national sovereignty and could accordingly not be delegated by the administrative authorities. As an employee of the Ministry of Cooperation and Development engaged in the cooperation programme, the applicant had taken part in a public-service assignment for the French State; as a technical adviser at the Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Trade of Equatorial Guinea, he had taken part in the exercise of that State’s sovereignty. 3.     The Commission 57.     The Delegate of the Commission considered that the object of the dispute was mainly economic. Firstly, the striking-off decision had deprived the applicant of his “means of subsistence” (see the previously cited Le   Calvez judgment, pp. 1900-01, § 58). Secondly, the dispute concerned the lawfulness of the decision to strike him off. In the event of a ruling that it was not lawful, he would be entitled to compensation. Accordingly, what was at issue in the proceedings was the existence of a debt in the applicant’s favour, which was a “civil” right according to the Court’s case-law (see the Cazenave de la Roche v. France judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998 ‑ III, p. 1327, § 43). B.     The Court’s assessment 58.     The facts of the present case raise the problem of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to disputes raised by servants of the State over their conditions of service. 1.     Existing case-law 59.     As the Court has noted in previous cases, in the law of many member States of the Council of Europe there is a basic distinction between civil servants and employees governed by private law. This has led the Court to hold that “disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service of civil servants are as a general rule outside the scope of Article 6 § 1” (see, for example, the Massa v. Italy judgment of 24   August 1993, Series A no. 265-B, p. 20, § 26). This general principle of exclusion has however been limited and clarified in a number of judgments. Thus, in the Massa case (ibid.) the applicant applied for a reversionary pension following the death of his wife, who had been a headmistress. In the Francesco Lombardo case (judgment cited above) a carabiniere who had been invalided out of the service because of disability and who maintained that the disability was “due to his service” applied for an “enhanced ordinary pension”. The Court considered that the applicants’ complaints related neither to the “recruitment” nor to the “careers” of civil servants and only indirectly to “termination of service” as they consisted in claims for purely pecuniary rights arising in law after termination of service. In those circumstances and in view of the fact that the Italian State was not using “discretionary powers” in performing its obligation to pay the pensions in issue and could be compared to an employer who was a party to a contract of employment governed by private law, the Court held that the applicants’ claims were civil ones within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. In the Neigel case, on the other hand, the decision contested by the applicant, namely the refusal to reinstate her to a permanent post in the civil service, was held by the Court to concern “her ‘recruitment’, her ‘career’ and the ‘termination of [her] service’”. The Court went on to say that the applicant’s claim for payment of the salary she would have received if she had been reinstated did not make Article 6 § 1 applicable because an award of such compensation by the administrative court was “directly dependent on a prior finding that the refusal to reinstate [had been] unlawful” (previously cited Neigel judgment, p. 411, § 44). The Court accordingly decided that the dispute did not concern a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. It should be noted that the administrative authorities’ refusal to reinstate did not constitute exercise of any discretionary power on their part since, according to the applicable domestic law, either the post was vacant, in which case the applicant would have been entitled to reinstatement, or there was no vacancy and the authorities could not reinstate her. According to other judgments, Article 6 § 1 applies where the claim in issue relates to a “purely economic” right – such as payment of salary (see the De Santa v. Italy, Lapalorcia v. Italy and Abenavoli v. Italy judgments of 2   September 1997, Reports 1997-V, p. 1663, § 18, p. 1677, § 21, and p.   1690, § 16, respectively) – or an “essentially economic” one (see the Nicodemo v. Italy judgment of 2 September 1997, Reports 1997-V, p. 1703, §   18) and does not mainly call in question “the authorities’ discretionary powers” (see the following judgments: Benkessiouer v. France, 24 August 1998, Reports 1998-V, pp. 2287-88, §§ 29-30; Couez v. France, 24 August 1998, Reports 1998-V, p. 2265, § 25; Le Calvez, cited above, pp. 1900-01, § 58; and Cazenave de la Roche, cited above, p. 1327, § 43). 2.     The limits of the present case-law and its consequences 60.     The Court considers that, as it stands, the above case-law contains a margin of uncertainty for Contracting States as to the scope of their obligations under Article 6 § 1 in disputes raised by employees in the public sector over their conditions of service. In the Neigel case, for example, the criterion of the absence of discretionary power was not taken to be decisive for the applicability of Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 59 above). The criterion relating to the economic nature of a dispute, for its part, leaves scope for a degree of arbitrariness, since a decision concerning the “recruitment”, “career” or “termination of service” of a civil servant nearly always has pecuniary consequences. This being so, it is difficult to draw a distinction between proceedings of “purely” or “essentially” economic interest and other kinds of proceedings. In the Neigel case, for example, the view could have been taken that the applicant, who had sought payment of the remuneration she would have received if she had been reinstated to a post in the administrative service she had previously worked for, was submitting an essentially economic claim. In another case the Court held that Article 6 § 1 was applicable on account of the fact that the issue “at the heart of the proceedings” concerned the applicant’s “means of subsistence” (see the previously cited Le Calvez judgment, pp. 1900-01, § 58). Yet most proceedings brought by public servants against the administrative authorities which employ them have a bearing on their “means of subsistence”, so that, from that point of view too, the “economic” criterion gives rise to doubt. The Court can thus only confirm what it stated in its Pierre-Bloch v. France judgment in relation to electoral disputes, when it held: “proceedings do not become ‘civil’ merely because they also raise an economic issue” (judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI, p. 2223, § 51). 61.     The Court therefore wishes to put an end to the uncertainty which surrounds application of the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 to disputes between States and their servants. 62.     The parties in the present case derived argument from the distinction which exists in France, as in some other Contracting States, between two categories of staff at the service of the State, namely officials under contract and established civil servants (see paragraphs 48 and 52 above). It is true that in some States officials under contract are governed by private law, unlike established civil servants, who are governed by public law. The Court notes, however, that in the current practice of the Contracting States established civil servants and officials under contract frequently perform equivalent or similar duties. Whether the applicable legal provisions form part of domestic public or private law cannot, according to the Court’s established case-law, be decisive in itself, and it would in any event lead to inequality of treatment from one State to another and between persons in State service performing equivalent duties. 63.     The Court accordingly considers that it is important, with a view to applying Article 6 § 1, to establish an autonomous interpretation of the term “civil service” which would make it possible to afford equal treatment to public servants performing equivalent or similar duties in the States Parties to the Convention, irrespective of the domestic system of employment and, in particular, whatever the nature of the legal relation between the official and the administrative authority (whether stipulated in a contract or governed by statutory and regulatory conditions of service). In addition, this interpretation must take into account the disadvantages engendered by the Court’s existing case-law (see paragraph 60 above). 3.     New criterion to be applied 64.     To that end, in order to determine the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to public servants, whether established or employed under contract, the Court considers that it should adopt a functional criterion based on the nature of the employee’s duties and responsibilities. In so doing, it must adopt a restrictive interpretation, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention, of the exceptions to the safeguards afforded by Article 6 § 1. 65.     The Court notes that in each country’s public-service sector certain posts involve responsibilities in the general interest or participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law. The holders of such posts thus wield a portion of the State’s sovereign power. The State therefore has a legitimate interest in requiring of these servants a special bond of trust and loyalty. On the other hand, in respect of other posts which do not have this “public administration” aspect, there is no such interest. 66.     The Court therefore rules that the only disputes excluded from the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention are those which are raised by public servants whose duties typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting as the depositary of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State or other public authorities. A manifest example of such activities is provided by the armed forces and the police. In practice, the Court will ascertain, in each case, whether the applicant’s post entails – in the light of the nature of the duties and responsibilities appertaining to it – direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities. In so doing, the Court will have regard, for guidance, to the categories of activities and posts listed by the European Commission in its communication of 18 March 1988 and by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (see paragraphs 37 to 41 above). 67.     Accordingly, no disputes between administrative authorities and employees who occupy posts involving participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law attract the application of Article 6 § 1 since the Court intends to establish a functional criterion (see paragraph 64 above). Disputes concerning pensions all come within the ambit of Article 6 § 1 because on retirement employees break the special bond between themselves and the authorities; they, and a fortiori those entitled through them, then find themselves in a situation exactly comparable to that of employees under private law in that the special relationship of trust and loyalty binding them to the State has ceased to exist and the employee can no longer wield a portion of the State’s sovereign power (see paragraph 65 above). 4.     Application of the above criterion in the instant case 68.     The Court notes that at the material time the applicant was employed by the Ministry of Cooperation and Development. As one of the civilian cooperation staff in post in foreign States he was under specific obligations “