CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 15 juin 2000

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s598389FD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:16pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sBA8DCCFC { width:35.45pt; display:inline-block } .s31BEBB9E { width:7.26pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sE55CAA3E { width:1.26pt; display:inline-block } .s9872C2C6 { width:15.43pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s4D28B2E2 { width:24pt; display:inline-block } .s21B97EC1 { width:25.99pt; display:inline-block } .s5A722CD { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.45pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sE0372AB5 { width:21.8pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s3985515B { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC2250E92 { width:36.56pt; display:inline-block } .s2348ECBC { width:232.5pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .sD49C56F { width:262.16pt; display:inline-block } SECOND SECTION   DECISION   AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application no. 31925/96 by Francesco CARIGNANI against Italy     The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 15 June 2000 as a Chamber composed of     Mr   C.L. Rozakis, President ,   Mr   A.B. Baka,   Mr   B. Conforti,   Mr   P. Lorenzen,   Mrs   M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,   Mr   E. Levits,   Mr   A. Kovler, judges , and   Mr   E. Fribergh, Section Registrar ,     Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 9 February 1996 and registered on 17 June 1996,     Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,     Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,     Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS     The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1938 and living in Lucca.   A.   The circumstances of the case     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.     The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which he had let to A.D.L.     In a registered letter of 28 June 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.     In a writ served on the tenant on 23 December 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.     By a decision of 22 January 1987, which was made enforceable on 3 September 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.     On 7 June 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.     On 5 July 1989, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 July 1989.     Between 26 July 1989 and 20 March 1995, the bailiff made 13 attempts to recover possession, on 26 July 1989, 19 January 1990, 24 May 1990, 27 November 1990, 22 May 1991, 21 November 1991, 22 May 1992, 24 November 1992, 11 March 1993, 21 October 1993, 17 March 1994, 25 October 1994 and 20 March 1995.     On 20 July 1995, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his children.     Between 19 October 1995 and 26 January 1999, the bailiff made 10 attempts to recover possession, on 19 October 1995, 26 January 1996, 28 March 1996, 24 September 1996, 21 January 1997, 27 May 1997, 19 November 1997, 30 March 1998, 24 September 1998 and 26 January 1999.     Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.   B.   Relevant domestic law     The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35.     COMPLAINTS   1.   The applicant complains about his prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of his apartment.   2.   The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings.     THE LAW     The applicant complains that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:   “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.   The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”     The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:   “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal ...”     The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies. They submit that he has failed to issue proceedings in the administrative courts challenging the refusal of police assistance and to raise, in the same proceedings, the constitutionality of the legislative provisions concerned.     The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the Immobiliare Saffi judgment cited above, §§   40-42). As the Government have not submitted any new argument in support of their objection, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This exception should therefore be rejected.     The Government further argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were not part of the judicial process for enforcement of orders for possession, since police intervention was an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process. That administrative phase can not be said to come within the scope of Article 6.     The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants eviction proceedings (see the Immobiliare Saffi judgment cited above, §§ 62-63). As the Government have not submitted any new argument in support of their objections, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This exception should therefore also be rejected.     On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously.     The applicant argues that the impossibility to repossess his apartment during eleven years from the issue of the order for possession amounts to a violation of his right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He further argues that the entry into force of Law no. 431/98 did not help solving the problem of the enforcement of the great number of orders for possession, since the Prefects cannot rapidly grant the assistance of the police for lack of policemen.     As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no.   431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.     The applicant argues that the delay in the enforcement of the order issued by the Florence Magistrate is contrary to the rule of law.     The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.     For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,   DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE , without prejudging the merits of the case.         Erik Fribergh   Christos Rozakis   Registrar   President