CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 31 août 2000

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s598389FD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:16pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sBA8DCCFC { width:35.45pt; display:inline-block } .s31BEBB9E { width:7.26pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sE55CAA3E { width:1.26pt; display:inline-block } .s9872C2C6 { width:15.43pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s4D28B2E2 { width:24pt; display:inline-block } .s944BDE53 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36pt } .s3985515B { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sC2250E92 { width:36.56pt; display:inline-block } .s70FEFFC2 { width:243.15pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .sD49C56F { width:262.16pt; display:inline-block } SECOND SECTION   DECISION   AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application no. 46407/99 by Nikolas STOIDIS against Greece     The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 31 August 2000 as a Chamber composed of     Mr   A.B. Baka, President ,   Mr   C.L. Rozakis,   Mr   G. Bonello,   Mrs   V. Strážnická,   Mr   P. Lorenzen,   Mr   M. Fischbach,   Mr   A. Kovler, judges , and   Mr   E. Fribergh, Section Registrar ,     Having regard to the above application introduced on 8 February 1999 and registered on 25 February 1999,     Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,     Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS     The applicant is a Greek national, born in 1948 and living in Edessa (Greece).     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.   The circumstances of the case     Until 31 December 1992, when he was fired, the applicant used to work for the State Electricity Company ( Dimosia Epihirisi Ilektrismu , hereinafter DEI ).     On 23 March 1993 he instituted civil proceedings before the single-member first instance civil court ( monomeles protodikio ) of Athens to challenge his dismissal and ask for non-pecuniary damages. In asking for non-pecuniary damages the applicant claimed that DEI had invaded his privacy by sending a doctor to his house, while he was on sick leave, to check the state of his health. He also claimed that DEI wished to defame him because of his “anti-Greek” and “pro-Skopje” activities. The introductory writ ran in 163 pages and contained 20 different claims.   A hearing was fixed for 6 October 1993 but was cancelled because of the elections. On 10 October 1993 the applicant asked the court to fix a new hearing date. The court decided to resume the examination of the case on 9 February 1994 when it ordered an adjournment until 1 June 1994. On 1 June 1994 the defendant was not present in court. The court decided to adjourn the examination of the case until 9 January 1995. On 9 January 1995 none of the parties was present in court and the hearing was cancelled. On 10 January 1995 the applicant asked the court to fix a new hearing date. The court decided to resume the examination of the case on 18 May 1995 when the applicant’s action was finally heard. Judgment was delivered on 6 October 1995. The text was finalised in December 1995. The court ordered DEI to rehire the applicant and to pay him salary arrears. However, the court refused to grant the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage.     On 21 December 1995 DEI appealed. The applicant, who obtained a copy of the finalised text of the judgment on 22 December 1995, also appealed on 29 December 1995. He invoked 27 grounds and submitted 234 documents. The Court of Appeal ( efetio ) of Athens decided to join the two appeals and hear them on 5 March 1996. On 25   June 1996 the court allowed DEI ’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s. The applicant claims that he received a copy of the decision in August 1997.     On 30 September 1997 the applicant appealed in cassation, invoking 65 grounds. The Court of Cassation heard the appeal on 27 October 1998. On 11 May 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal. The text of the decision was finalised on 23 June 1999 and was filed on 12   July 1999.   B.   Relevant domestic law     According to section 32 of Law no. 1545/1985, in labour disputes the hearing must be scheduled to take place at the latest fifteen days after the institution of the proceedings and the decision must be issued within one month from the hearing.   COMPLAINT     The applicant complains, under Article   6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of the proceedings.     THE LAW     The applicant complains, under Article   6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of the proceedings.     Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides as follows:   “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … , everyone is entitled to a …   hearing within a reasonable time …”.     The Government submit that the applicant’s case was complex. The deadlines set by domestic law in respect of labour disputes are indicative. The first instance court had planned to hear the applicant’s action within six months from its lodging, which was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The authorities were not responsible for the delays caused by the various cancellations and adjournment of the first instance hearing. The first cancellation was caused by the elections. The Government submit that it was the parties that requested the adjournment of 9   February 1994. The adjournment of 1   June 1994 must have been requested by the applicant himself, the defendant being absent from the court that day. The hearing of 9   January 1995 was cancelled because of the absence of both parties. The court took care to fix the next hearing date shortly after each adjournment or cancellation. Moreover, its decision was issued within a reasonable time after the hearing. There were no delays before the court of appeal. It took the applicant thirteen months to appeal in cassation against the court of appeal’s judgment. The Court of Cassation heard the case and issued its judgment within a reasonable time in the particular circumstances. The applicant could have taken steps to expedite the finalisation of the text of the judgment of the Court of Cassation. In the light of all the above, the Government submit that there was no breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.     The applicant submits that the domestic courts repeatedly acted in breach of national law by not respecting the strict deadlines it sets in respect of labour disputes. The applicant holds the Government responsible for the delays caused by the cancellation due to the elections. According to the applicant, it was the defendant who requested the adjournment of 9   February 1994. On 1   June 1994 the court decided to adjourn the examination of the case proprio motu . The applicant does not accept that the first instance and appeal courts’ decisions were issued within a time that was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. He also claims that he received a copy of the appeal court’s decision only in August 1997. The applicant points out that the Court of Cassation decided to hear his appeal almost one year after it had been lodged. Moreover, it took the Court of Cassation eight and a half months to finalise the text of the decision, which the applicant did not receive before December 1999. The applicant considers that, given what was at stake in the proceedings, it was unacceptable that it should have taken the domestic courts six and a half years to issue a final judgment in his case.     In the light of the parties’ observations, the Court considers that the application raises serious questions of fact and law, which are of such a complexity that their determination should depend on an examination on the merits. It cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.     For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,   DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE , without prejudging the merits of the case.           Erik Fribergh   András Baka   Registrar   President