CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 22 mars 2001

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s20FDDAE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCA1147F8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB8987CE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s61ED8A2B { width:14.36pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s84D0D60A { width:8.36pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sBB5E682E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s147369FC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s24C63AC { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:31.75pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-20.15pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s4B773175 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s145CCEB3 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s9019FD2F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s6BBACBD8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s160BBE39 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s9671CAED { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s8AD34D0 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s451A1BF5 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s377C1984 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .sBED5F98F { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:36pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s988562EE { width:30.55pt; display:inline-block } .s6B64E62F { width:203.14pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .s60570E66 { width:233.81pt; display:inline-block } SECOND SECTION FINAL DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 31927/96 by Serafino SERLENGA against Italy The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22   March 2001 as a Chamber composed of   Mr   C.L. Rozakis , President ,   Mr   A.B. Baka ,   Mr   G. Bonello ,   Mr   P. Lorenzen ,   Mrs   M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska ,   Mr   E. Levits ,   Mr   A. Kovler , judges , and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 7 March 1996 and registered on 17 June 1996, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the partial decision of 27 April 2000, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant is an Italian national living in Turin. He is represented before the Court by Mr P. Garetto, a lawyer practising in Turin. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Turin, which he had let to G.G. In a registered letter of 19 March 1990, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 October 1990 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. In a writ served on the tenant on 1 March 1991, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Turin Magistrate. By a decision of 25 March 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Turin Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 25 March 1992. On 17 September 1992, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son. On 23   September 1992, he served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises, and, on 21 October 1992, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 December 1992. Between 11 December 1992 and 23 October 1998, the bailiff made 18   attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. At the beginning of January 1999, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises. B.     Relevant domestic law The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35, ECHR-V. COMPLAINTS 1.     The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about his prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of his apartment. 2.     The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings. THE LAW The applicant complains that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” The applicant further complains about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” The Government argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were not part of the judicial process for enforcement of orders for possession, since police intervention was an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process. That administrative phase can not be said to come within the scope of Article 6. The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants eviction proceedings (see the Immobiliare Saffi judgment cited above, §§ 62-63). As the Government have not submitted any new argument in support of their objection, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This exception should therefore also be rejected. On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate. As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court. The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the remainder of the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.   Erik Fribergh   Christos Rozakis   Registrar   President