CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 22 mai 2001

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Costa , President ,   Mr   W. Fuhrmann ,   Mr   L. Loucaides ,   Mr   P. Kūris ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mrs   H.S. Greve ,   Mr   M. Ugrekhelidze , judges , And   Mrs   S.   Dollé , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 24 April 1995 and registered on 18   September 1995, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicants, Susan Clark, Fred Clark, Claudine Clark, Yvonne Clark, Irene Clark and Clara Cartwright, are United Kingdom nationals, living in Braintree, Essex. They are represented by Mr T. Christie, President of the National Romani Rights Association. The respondent Government are represented by Mr H. Llewellyn of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A.     The circumstances of the case Until July 1993 the six applicants and their families were living in caravans on a privately owned site at Cressing. On an unspecified date the Braintree District Council informed the owner that there were too many caravans on the site. As a result the applicants had to move. On an unspecified date the applicants, or some of them, purchased a small plot of land, a few miles away from the site at Cressing, and stationed their caravans there. The applicants then sought retrospectively planning permission for the site’s change of use to a residential caravan site for seven families. This was refused by the Braintree District Council on 12 April 1994. On 28 June 1994 the applicants were served with two enforcement notices which required them inter alia to demolish all unauthorised structures such as fences, sheds and street-lighting appliances and to cease using the site for the siting of their caravans. The applicants appealed to the Secretary of State for the Environment. An Inspector appointed by him held a public inquiry on 7 December 1994 and visited the site. On 10 January 1995 the Inspector dismissed the appeal. The Inspector considered that the principal issues were: (i) the resulting impact on the appearance and character of the local countryside; (ii) the resulting impact on road safety; and iii) the degree of need for the accommodation. The Inspector noted that one of the applicable policies was to protect the countryside from developments unless related to agriculture, mineral extraction, forestry or outdoor recreational uses or other uses compatible with the rural areas. Another policy, contained mainly in Circular 1/94 and earlier relevant circulars intended to ensure that the planning system recognised the need for accommodation consistent with gypsies’ nomadic lifestyle, but also reflected the importance of a plan-led system in relation to site provision. The Inspector further found that the area where the applicants’ caravans were located was not covered by any specific protective planning designation. However, the landscape was predominantly arable and the development sought would detract from the area’s open rural character. To reach this finding the Inspector took into account that the site was exposed to wide public view; that the development included fences, telephone poles and lighting columns which together with the caravans inherently looked out of place; that   permission was sought for a permanent and not temporary development and for seven pitches, whereas the normal policy was to limit them to three. The Inspector further concluded that “the impact on road safety [was] one of the principal issues” in the appeal. The site was accessible through an unmade green lane, branching off a primary route with heavy traffic where the speed limit was 60 miles per hour and was often exceeded. The road had seen serious and fatal accidents. The use of the access to the site by the occupants of seven dwellings would appreciably increase the likelihood of accidents. The Inspector also considered the applicants’ need for a caravan site. He noted that the available bi-annual counts showed that there had been a continuing, albeit decreasing, unmet need for authorised accommodation within the District of Braintree. He accepted that the applicants were in need of accommodation when they lost their pitches at the site at Cressing. He considered that these facts were powerful considerations in support of the development sought, but that on balance the benefits were outweighed by the indefinite harmful effects resulting from the choice of the particular site. On 3 July 1995, the applicants again applied to the Braintree District Council for a planning permission for the site. The application was dismissed on 29 August 1995. The applicants’ appeal was dealt with by written representations and the Inspector dismissed it by letter dated 14 May 1996. In his decision, he considered whether certain changes proposed to the site would overcome the objections. He found however that the fence remained a prominent intrusive feature in the open rural area, with the tops of the caravans rising above it and that screening could only be achieved by planting after some considerable period during which the site would continue to damage the rural landscape. He also noted that the road was heavily used by fast-moving traffic and considered that movement of vehicles in and out of the site would add to the dangers of the type already a feature of this section of the road. He concluded, having carefully considered the applicants’ representations about their links with the area and their children’s schooling that this relatively large scheme twice the size of those normally considered appropriate in the local plan was still harmful to the character and appearance of the area and prejudicial to highway safety. On 28 March 1996, six of the applicants were convicted by the Braintree Magistrates’ Court for, inter alia , failure to comply with the enforcement notices and were ordered to pay fines between 100 and 200 pounds sterling (GBP), plus costs. The Chairman noted that a wilful refusal to comply with an enforcement notice was a serious offence. Taking into account however the applicants’ previous good character and expressing sympathy for the applicants’ situation, he hoped that the planning authorities would find a way round their difficulties but stated that for a satisfactory outcome of the planning problem the applicants’ cooperation was necessary. The representative of the applicants and the Braintree District Council   exchanged correspondence and had meetings for the purpose of exploring the possibilities for the applicants’ moving to other sites. The applicants were urged to identify two other sites, each for three pitches, and to apply for planning permission. Also, since finding sites was difficult, the applicants were urged to be prepared to apply and accept whatever vacancies for caravan pitches would arise. The applicants objected stating that buying a plot and applying for planning permission without a guarantee that such permission would be granted would involve serious costs. They suggested that compliance with the enforcement notice should not be required or should be delayed. By letter of 13 September 1996 the Council indicated that ownership of a site was not a pre-requisite for applying for planning permission. Also, in the Council’s view the applicants had made no serious effort to find other suitable sites. The letter also addressed the applicants’ argument that the caravan policies were discriminatory. It stated that insofar as there were provisions applicable specifically to gypsy caravans, these discriminated in their favour, by providing for exceptions to the normal restrictive planning policies. On 24 March 1997, the applicants were fined GBP 100 and GBP 75 costs for failure to comply with the enforcement notices. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     General planning law The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991) (“the 1990 Act”) consolidated pre-existing planning law. It provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land (section 57 of the 1990 Act). A change in the use of land for the stationing of caravans can constitute a development ( Restormel Borough Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Rabey [1982] Journal of Planning Law 785; John Davies v. Secretary of State for the Environment and South Hertfordshire District Council [1989] Journal of Planning Law 601). An application for planning permission must be made to the local planning authority, which has to determine the application in accordance with the local development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise (section 54A of the 1990 Act). The 1990 Act provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of a refusal of permission (section 78). With immaterial exceptions, the Secretary of State must, if either the appellant or the authority so desire, give each of them the opportunity of making representations to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. It is established practice that each inspector must exercise independent judgment and must not be subject to any improper influence (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 11, § 21). There is a further appeal to the High Court on the ground that the Secretary of State’s decision was not within the powers conferred by the 1990 Act, or that the relevant requirements of the 1990 Act were not complied with (section 288). If a development is carried out without the grant of the required planning permission, the local authority may issue an “enforcement notice” if it considers it expedient to do so having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations (section 172 (1) of the 1990 Act). There is a right of appeal against an enforcement notice to the Secretary of State on the grounds, inter alia , that planning permission ought to be granted for the development in question (section 174). As with the appeal against refusal of permission, the Secretary of State must give each of the parties the opportunity of making representations to an inspector. Again there is a further right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court against a decision of the Secretary of State under section 174 (section 289). Such an appeal may be brought on grounds identical to an application for judicial review. It therefore includes a review as to whether a decision or inference based on a finding of fact is perverse or irrational ( R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] Appeal Cases 696, 764 H-765 D). The High Court will also grant a remedy if the inspector’s decision was such that there was no evidence to support a particular finding of fact; or the decision was made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or made for an improper purpose, in a procedurally unfair manner or in a manner which breached any governing legislation or statutory instrument. However, the court of review cannot substitute its own decision on the merits of the case for that of the decision-making authority. Where any steps required by an enforcement notice to be taken are not taken within the period for compliance with the notice, the local authority may enter the land and take the steps and recover from the person who is then the owner of the land any expenses reasonably incurred by them in doing so (section 178 of the 1990 Act). Circular 1/94 New guidance on gypsy sites and planning, in the light of the 1994 Act, was issued to local authorities by the Government in Circular 1/94 (5   January 1994). Councils were told that: “In order to encourage private site provision, local planning authorities should offer advice and practical help with planning procedures to gypsies who wish to acquire their own land for development. ... The aim should be as far as possible to help gypsies to help themselves, to allow them to secure the kind of sites they require and thus help avoid breaches of planning control.” (paragraph 20) However: “As with other planning applications, proposals for gypsy sites should continue to be determined solely in relation to land-use factors. Whilst gypsy sites might be acceptable in some rural locations, the granting of permission must be consistent with agricultural, archaeological, countryside, environmental, and Green Belt policies. ...” (paragraph 22). It was indicated that as a rule it would not be appropriate to make provision for gypsy sites in areas of open land where development was severely restricted, for example Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Sites of Special Scientific Interest. Nor were gypsy sites regarded as being among those uses of land normally appropriate in a Green Belt (paragraph 13). Circular 18/94 Further guidance issued by the Secretary of State dated 23   November 1994 concerned the unauthorised camping by gypsies and the power to give a direction to leave the land (CJPOA above). Paragraphs 6-9 required local authorities to adopt “a policy of toleration towards unauthorised gypsy encampments: “6.     ... Where gypsies are camped unlawfully on council land and are not causing a level of nuisance which cannot be effectively controlled, an immediate forced eviction might result in unauthorised camping on a site elsewhere in the area which could give rise to greater nuisance. Accordingly, authorities should consider tolerating gypsies’ presence on the land for short periods and could examine the ways of minimising the level of nuisance on such tolerated sites, for example by providing basic services for gypsies e.g. toilets, a skip for refuse and a supply of drinking water. ... 8.     Where gypsies are unlawfully camped on Government-owned land, it is for the local authority, with the agreement of the land-owning Department, to take any necessary steps to ensure that the encampment does not constitute a hazard to public health. It will continue to be the policy of the Secretaries of State that Government Departments should act in conformity with the advice that gypsies should not be moved unnecessarily from unauthorised encampments when they are causing no nuisance. 9.     The Secretaries of State continue to consider that local authorities should not use their powers to evict gypsies needlessly. They should use their powers in a humane and compassionate fashion and primarily to reduce nuisance and to afford a higher level of protection to private owners of land.” Paragraphs 10-13 further require local authorities to consider their obligations under other legislation before taking any decisions under the 1994 Act. These obligations include their duties concerning pregnant women and newly-born children, the welfare and education of children and the housing of homeless persons. In a judgment of 22 September 1995 ( R.   v.   Lincolnshire County Council, ex parte Atkinson , R. v. Wealden District Council, ex parte Wales and R. v. Wealden District Council, ex parte Stratford , unreported), the High Court held that it would be an error of law for any local authority to ignore those duties which must be considered from the earliest stages. COMPLAINTS The applicants complain under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and under Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of the authorities’ refusal to grant them planning permission to station their caravans and of the ensuing enforcement measures against them. The applicants contend that as a result they are denied their right to respect for their home and for their property. Their right to education is also threatened as their children would not be able to attend school if the families have to move. The applicants submit that the legislation concerning planning permission for caravans is discriminatory as it creates harsh requirements for a small minority of people, the gypsies, while not affecting any other section of society. THE LAW 1. The applicants complain that the refusal of planning permission to station and live in caravans on their land and the enforcement measures implemented in respect of their occupation of their land disclose a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which provides: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The submissions of the parties The Government submitted with reference to the Buckley case (judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, pp.   1291-92, §§ 74-75) that in the context of town and country planning, which involved the exercise of discretionary judgment in implementing policies in the interests of the community, national authorities were in a better position to evaluate local needs and conditions than an international court. It was not for the Court to substitute its view of what would be the best planning policy or the most appropriate measure in a particular case. While the applicants were entitled to have their interests carefully considered by the national authorities and weighed in the balance as against the needs of planning control, an examination of the applicable system, and the facts of this case, showed that the procedural safeguards contained in national law as to the way in which planning judgments were made (an assessment by a qualified independent expert, an Inspector, followed by judicial review in the High Court) were such as to give due respect to their interests. The Government pointed out that local planning authorities were encouraged to adopt a sympathetic approach to any question of enforcement action under Circular 18/94 (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice above). However, gypsies could not claim the right to live wherever they liked in defiance of planning control, particularly when they were now seeking to live a settled existence indefinitely on their own land. The Government further submitted that it had always been open to the applicants to apply for pitches on local authority sites but so far as was known no such application had been made. The applicants could also make an application for Council accommodation. They have in any event been given considerable time to find an alternative site elsewhere. They pointed out that the applicants took up residence on the land in a rural area without obtaining, or even applying for the prior planning permission necessary to render that occupation lawful. The applicants submitted that the planning authorities had failed to make any practically effective provision for the gypsy population and in practice did not give any weight to their special needs. Their way of life had been made progressively more difficult due to the legislation and policies that had been adopted since 1948. They argued that they had had only one other alternative to taking up accommodation on their land which was parking on the side of the road where they would have been at risk of enforcement measures to move them on and which would have not facilitated their children’s welfare and education. Though there were local authority sites for gypsies, these were all full to capacity and there were far more gypsies in the county than could be catered for by these sites. The applicants have approached 50 local landowners in an attempt to find an alternative site but no-one had been willing to sell any land to them. They dispute that, as gypsies, they should be required to go into settled housing which is against their wishes and contrary to their culture. The applicants further pointed out that their land was not in a Green Belt or other area of special landscape value and that they had taken steps to keep the site tidy and to improve the screening. Nor were there any genuine highway safety objections to the site since a farm shop had been allowed in the same road which increased the number of cars stopping and slowing. The planning procedures discounted their representations on these matters and arbitrarily followed local plans, which required, for example, that no more than three caravans could be situated on a development, which restriction did not apply to non-gypsies. This also fails to acknowledge the gypsy way of life in living together with a group of closely linked families. There was no serious prospect of taking any appeals to the High Court in these cases. The Court’s assessment The Court recalls that it has already examined complaints about the planning and enforcement measures imposed on a gypsy family who occupied their own land without planning permission in the case of Buckley v. the United Kingdom (cited above, p. 1271). While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see, amongst other authorities, the Cossey v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1990, Series   A no. 184, p. 14, § 35). In the more recent cases decided before the Grand Chamber, the Court was not persuaded that any emerging consensus concerning the special needs of minority groups was sufficiently concrete for it to derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable in any particular situation. This reinforced the Court’s view that the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved in policies balancing the interests of the general population, in particular with regard to environmental protection and the interests of a minority with possibly conflicting requirements, rendered the Court’s role a strictly supervisory one (see, for example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.   27238/95, 18 January 2001, ECHR 2001, §§ 93-94). Turning to the present application, the Court considers that the applicants’ occupation of their caravans is an integral part of their ethnic identity as gypsies, reflecting the long tradition of that minority of following a travelling lifestyle. Measures which affect the applicants’ stationing of their caravans have therefore a wider impact than on the right to respect for home. They also affect their ability to maintain their identity as gypsies and to lead their private and family life in accordance with that tradition. The applicants’ right to respect for their private life, family life and home are therefore in issue in the present case (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom , cited above, §§ 73-74). Having regard to the facts of this case, it finds that the decisions of the planning authorities refusing to allow the applicants to remain on their land in their caravans and the measures of enforcement taken in respect of their continued occupation constituted an interference with their right to respect for their private life, family life and home within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It therefore examines below whether this interference was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being “in accordance with the law”, pursuing a legitimate aim or aims and as being “necessary in a democratic society” in pursuit of that aim or aims. It was not contested by the applicants that the measures to which they were subjected were “in accordance with the law”. It is also apparent that the reasons given for the interferences in the planning procedures in this case were expressed in terms of environmental policy and highway safety. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the measures pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others” through preservation of the environment and of protecting health. As regards the necessity of the measures, an interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. While it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of necessity, the final evaluation as to whether the reasons cited for the interference are relevant and sufficient remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention (see, amongst other authorities, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom , [Section 3], nos. 33985/97 and 33986/97, 27 September 1999, ECHR 1999-VI, § 88). In this regard, a margin of appreciation must, inevitably, be left to the national authorities, who by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. This margin will vary according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions (see the Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom judgment 22 October 1982, Series A no. 45, p. 21, § 52 and the Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55). Hence, as the Court observed in its above-mentioned Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment (p. 1292, § 75 in fine), “in so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation”, although it remains open to the Court to conclude that there has been a manifest error of appreciation by the national authorities. In these circumstances, the procedural safeguards available to the individual applicant will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, it must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 (see the Buckley judgment, loc. cit., pp. 1292-93, §§ 76-77). Furthermore, although the fact of being a member of a minority with a traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a society does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the environment, it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented. As intimated in the Buckley judgment, the vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at the decisions in particular cases ( loc. cit. , pp. 1292-95, §§ 76, 80, 84). Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the seriousness of what is at stake for the applicants, who have taken up residence on their own land by way of finding a long-term and secure place to station their caravans and live together with their families. Planning permission has however been refused for this and they have been required to leave. It would appear that the applicants do not in fact wish to pursue an itinerant lifestyle. They have been resident on the site from about 1994 to date. While it is not disputed that the applicants are gypsies therefore, the present case is not concerned as such with traditional itinerant gypsy life styles. The Court observes that the applicants moved onto their land in their caravans without obtaining the prior planning permission which they knew was necessary to render that occupation lawful. In accordance with the applicable procedures, the applicants’ appeals against refusal of planning permission and enforcement notices were conducted by Planning Inspectors, who were qualified independent experts and, on the first occasion, in a public inquiry. The applicants were provided with an opportunity to put before the Inspectors any material which they regarded as relevant to their arguments and in particular their personal, financial and other circumstances, their views as to the suitability of alternative sites and the length of time needed to find a suitable alternative site. The Inspectors in the appeals saw the site themselves and considered the applicants’ representations. While the first Inspector had regard to the applicants’ needs as gypsies for a site for their caravans as being a powerful consideration, he found that their site was in an open position of arable farmland and that the development detracted from the open rural character. He took into account in that context the nature of the development, which included seven pitches as well as fences, telephone poles and lighting columns which looked inherently out of place. He also had regard to the risk to highway safety as access to and from the site was onto a busy road which had seen serious and fatal accidents. He concluded that this long-term harmful impact of the development outweighed the applicants’ interests. The second Inspector reached a similar conclusion after examining the applicants’ proposed improvements to the site. The Inspectors’ reports thus showed that there were strong, environmental and safety reasons for the refusal of planning permission and that the applicants’ personal circumstances had been taken into account in the decision-making process. The Court also notes that appeal to the High Court was available in so far as the applicants felt that the Inspectors, or Secretary of State, had not taken into account a relevant consideration or had based the contested decision on irrelevant considerations. Though it was acknowledged in the planning proceedings that it might not be easy for the applicants to find alternative accommodation, sites did exist and the Court is therefore not persuaded that there were no alternatives available to the applicants besides remaining in occupation on land without planning permission in a rural area. As stated in the Buckley case, Article 8 does not necessarily go so far as to allow individuals’ preferences as to their place of residence to override the general interest (judgment cited above, p.   1294, § 81). In the circumstances, the Court considers that proper regard was had to the applicants’ predicament both under the terms of the regulatory framework, which contained adequate procedural safeguards protecting their interests under Article 8, and by the responsible planning authorities when exercising their discretion in relation to the particular circumstances of their case. The decisions were reached by those authorities after weighing in the balance the various competing interests. It is not for this Court to sit in appeal on the merits of those decisions, which were based on reasons which were relevant and sufficient, for the purposes of Article 8, to justify the interferences with the exercise of the applicants’ rights. The humanitarian considerations which might have supported another outcome at national level cannot be used as the basis of a finding by the Court which would be tantamount to exempting the applicants from the implementation of the national planning laws and obliging governments to ensure that every gypsy family has available for its use accommodation appropriate to its needs (see the Chapman v. the United Kingdom case cited above, § 115). Furthermore, the effect of these decisions cannot on the facts of this case be regarded as disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. The Court accordingly finds that the measures may be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting the rights of others. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 2.     The applicants claim that they have been denied the right to live on their land and have therefore suffered a breach of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which provides: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Having regard to the reasoning given above under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court finds that any interference with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their property was proportionate and struck a fair balance, in compliance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Their complaint is therefore to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 3.     The applicants complain that the measures taken against them violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which provides as relevant: “No person shall be denied the right to education. ...” The applicants submitted that the refusal to allow them to remain on their own land resulted in the fifteen children in their families being denied access to satisfactory education. If they were forced back onto the road, their children’s attendance at school would become hazardous and their education would risk serious disruption. Integration into the school system could hardly be achievable in such circumstances. The Government argued that there was no right under the above provision for children to be educated at any particular school and that in any case there was no evidence that the enforcement measures had had the effect of preventing the applicants’ children from going to school. Grants had been made in the area to provide special teaching resources for the children of peripatetic families and the policy was to encourage and integrate such children into schools. The Court finds that applicants have failed to substantiate their complaints that their children have been effectively denied the right to education as a result of the planning measures complained of. There has, accordingly, been no appearance of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention and this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 4.     The applicants claim that they have been discriminated against as gypsies due to the operation of planning laws and procedures, invoking Article 14 of the Convention which provides: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim that others in a similar situation had been treated more preferentially than themselves. The aim of the planning system was designed inter alia to protect the environment and this applied to anyone, gypsy or non-gypsy, who wished to settle in the country. To the extent that there was any difference in treatment, they argued that there would be a reasonable and objective justification, namely, the preservation of the countryside. The applicants claimed that the laws and policies discriminated against them as gypsies. The arbitrary grounds of objection taken against gypsy occupation of land were not applied to non-gypsy developments while house owners benefited from preferential allocation of resources and were taken into account liberally in local plans. Farming intensification and diversification were also encouraged, and farm caravans were permitted. In their own case however, the local plan had applied a three-caravan rule which did not apply to non-gypsy developments. Having regard to its findings above under Article 8 of the Convention that any interference with the applicants’ rights was proportionate to the legitimate aim of preservation of the environment and protection of highway safety, the Court concludes that there has been no discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. While discrimination may arise where States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different ( Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, ECHR 2000-IV, § 44), the Court does not find, in the circumstances of this case, any lack of objective and reasonable justification for the measures taken against the present applicants. This part of the application must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the application inadmissible.   S. Dollé   J.-P. Costa   Registrar   President