CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 février 2002

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:left; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s6BE22B1D { width:252.02pt; display:inline-block } .sFDE7661F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s662121A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .sA4585C32 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s8206B7BF { margin-top:3pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-indent:-14.2pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .sEE1EDB13 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:normal; font-style:italic } .s4B9306D5 { margin-top:3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sC202EACC { clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break }     FORMER THIRD SECTION     CASE OF FRETTÉ v. FRANCE     (Application no. 36515/97)     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG     26 February 2002       FINAL     26/05/2002       This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44 §   2 of the Convention. In the case of Fretté v. France, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   W. Fuhrmann , President ,   Mr   J.-P. Costa ,   Mr   P. Kūris ,   Mrs   F. Tulkens ,   Mr   K. Jungwiert ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mr   K. Traja , judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 2 October 2001 and 30 January 2002, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 36515/97) against the French Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Mr Philippe Fretté (“the applicant”), on 1 April 1997. 2.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the decision to dismiss his application for authorisation to adopt amounted to an arbitrary interference with his private and family life, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, and that it was based exclusively on an unfavourable prejudice about his sexual orientation. He also complained that he had not been notified of the hearing held by the Conseil d'Etat and that he had not been given access to the Government Commissioner's submissions prior to the hearing, in breach of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. 3.     The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11). 4.     The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. 5.     By a decision of 12 June 2001 the Court declared the application partly admissible [The Court's decision is obtainable from the Registry]. 6.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 2 October 2001 (Rule 59 § 2).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the French Government (“the Government”) Mr   R. Abraham , Director of Legal Affairs,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Mrs   L. Delahaye , magistrat , on secondment to the Human     Rights Section of the Legal Affairs Department,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mrs   H. Davo , magistrat , on secondment to the Human     Rights Office, European and International     Affairs Department, Ministry of Justice, Mrs   A. Oui , Principal Administrative Assistant,     Social Services Department,     Ministry of Employment and Solidarity,   Counsel ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   R. Wintemute , Reader in Law, King's College,     University of London,   Approved Representative , Mr   T. Formond , doctoral student in private law,     University of Paris X (Nanterre), Mr   S. Garneri , doctoral student in public law,     University of Aix ‑ en ‑ Provence,   Advisers .   7.     The Court heard addresses by Mr Wintemute and Mr Abraham. 8.     On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1), but this case remained with the Chamber constituted within the former Third Section. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     In October 1991 the applicant made an application for prior authorisation to adopt a child. A social inquiry was opened by the Paris Social Services, Child Welfare and Health Department. On 18 December 1991 the applicant had a first interview with a psychologist from the Department, during which he revealed that he was a homosexual. He submits that during the interview he was strongly urged not to continue with the adoption process. 10.     In a decision of 3 May 1993 the Paris Social Services Department rejected the applicant's application for authorisation to adopt. The reasons given for the decision were that the applicant had “no stable maternal role model” to offer and had “difficulties in envisaging the practical consequences of the upheaval occasioned by the arrival of a child”. The decision was taken on the basis of various inquiries leading, among other things, to a social services report of 2 March 1993, which included the following statements: “... Mr Fretté seems to us to be a sensitive, thoughtful man who shows consideration for others. He discusses his emotional life and his homosexuality with a great deal of honesty and simplicity. He spoke to us of a number of relationships which have had a major impact on his life, particularly one with a male friend who has now died. It should be added that he is now the auxiliary guardian of this friend's child. ... His humanistic, altruistic cast of mind prompts him to take an interest in the problems of the Third World. He sponsors two Tibetan children, one of whom is a baby. He is able to talk sensibly and intelligently about the boy over whom he has guardianship. He is not personally responsible for the boy, who is in the care of his grandmother, but he plays a highly active part in his upbringing. His ideas about bringing up children are well thought out and imbued with a spirit of tolerance. Mr Fretté has been thinking about adopting since 1985. He is aware that his homosexuality may be an obstacle to being granted authorisation to adopt because of the prevailing views of society. In his opinion, his choice of emotional and sexual lifestyle has no bearing on his desire to bring up a child. His application is a personal undertaking not a militant gesture. Since 1985 he has met many homosexual men with children. He even once considered having a child with a female friend but the plan came to nothing because of a lack of maturity on both sides. This friend is nonetheless still very interested in Mr Fretté's plan to adopt and has even promised to act as a female role model for the child. Mr Fretté's application to adopt a child is motivated by a desire to provide a child with affection and a proper upbringing. In his view the essential thing is to love and care for a child, adoption, for him, being no more than a social and legal procedure. Mr Fretté has the support of the friends around him. It seems, however, that his family either do not know of his plans or have misgivings about them. His desire for a child is genuine but he has difficulties in envisaging the practical consequences of the upheaval occasioned by the arrival of a child. For example, it was only when we visited his home that he realised how unsuitable his flat is for a child to live in. As a result he began considering the possibility of moving. When questioned as to how he regarded his role in society as a single father he said he did not have an answer. He considers himself capable of managing the day-to-day life of a child and thinks that he will in due course find the answers to the questions about his homosexuality and the absence of an adoptive mother that will occur to the child as he or she grows up. Mr Fretté is perfectly aware of the importance of telling the child about his parentage. He shows understanding towards women who are impelled to abandon their children. He refuses to have any fixed ideas about the characteristics of the child he would like to adopt. Nonetheless, he has been thinking that he would prefer as young a baby as possible and that he may begin searching in Korea or Vietnam. Mr Fretté has undoubted personal qualities and an aptitude for bringing up children. A child would probably be happy with him. The question is whether his particular circumstances as a single homosexual man allow him to be entrusted with a child.” 11.     On 21 May 1993 the applicant asked the authorities to reconsider their decision but his application was dismissed by a decision of 15 October 1993 indicating, among other things, that the applicant's “choice of lifestyle” did not appear to be such as to provide sufficient guarantees that he would offer a child a suitable home from a family, child-rearing and psychological perspective. 12.     On the same day the applicant lodged an application for judicial review of that decision with the administrative court, seeking to have the decisions dismissing his application for authorisation quashed. 13.     In a judgment of 25 January 1995 the Paris Administrative Court set aside the decisions refusing the applicant authorisation, citing the following grounds, inter alia : “In dismissing Mr Fretté's application for authorisation to adopt a child, the main reasons given by the authorities were that Mr Fretté had 'no stable maternal role model' to offer and found it difficult 'to envisage the practical consequences of the upheaval occasioned by the arrival of a child'. The first reason is a circumlocution, by which the authorities could only have meant to refer to Mr Fretté's unmarried status, which could be lawfully relied on in support of the impugned decision but, under the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 2, of the decree of 23 August 1985, could not lawfully constitute the sole reason for the decision. Neither is there any evidence in the case file to substantiate the second reason given, which seems in fact to be erroneous in view of the information provided in the reports drawn up by the social services. The reason given for the decision of 15 October 1993, by which the Director of Social Services, Child Welfare and Health dismissed Mr Fretté's appeal and confirmed the initial decision examined above, was Mr Fretté's 'choice of lifestyle'. Through this euphemistically worded reason the authorities were alluding to Mr   Fretté's homosexuality. As the authorities themselves acknowledge in their defence pleadings, this aspect of Mr Fretté's personality could only have constituted a reason to refuse authorisation if it had been combined with conduct that was prejudicial to the child's upbringing. The social services report prepared by Mrs S. and Mrs D. credits Mr Fretté with 'undoubted personal qualities and an aptitude for bringing up children', finds that 'a child would probably be happy with him' and only raises a question as to the compatibility of Mr Fretté's adoption plans with the 'particular circumstances' of his being 'a single homosexual man'. The social inquiry conducted by the French Vice-Consul's deputy in London noted Mr Fretté's educational skills, which he shows as much in his private life as in his professional activities. The psychiatrist, Dr D., detected 'no psychological impediment' to Mr Fretté's plan and although the psychologist, Mrs O., recommended that authorisation be refused, she gave no reason for her opinion and drew attention elsewhere in her report to 'Mr Fretté's affective qualities and aptitude for bringing up children and his deep understanding of adoption-related issues'. Whereas the social services reports produced included information, particularly with regard to Mr Fretté's family, which, since they could have no valid bearing on the authorities' decision, infringed his right to respect for his private life, none of the documents included in the case file made it possible to establish or even suggest that Mr Fretté's lifestyle reflected a lack of moral rigour or emotional stability, or a risk that he would abuse the adoption process, or any other conduct indicating that his plan to adopt presented a risk to any child he might adopt. Thus, those who took the contested decisions in the instant case wrongly interpreted the provisions cited above. Mr Fretté's application to have the aforementioned decisions of 3   May and 15 October 1993 set aside is well-founded.” 14.     The Paris Social Services appealed against that judgment to the Conseil d'Etat . 15.     The Government Commissioner, Mrs C. Maugüe, made her submissions at the hearing of 16 September 1996. She submitted that the Paris Social Services' application to have the contested judgment set aside was well-founded, addressing the court as follows: “The case raises the following question: In spite of Mr F.'s undoubted personal and intellectual qualities, did the authorities have good reason to consider that he did not provide sufficient guarantees to offer a child a home because of his choice of lifestyle? In the light of the information in the case file, this question is elevated to a matter of principle. This case does not turn on its own facts because the documents in the case file leave me in no doubt that in many respects Mr F. has a genuine aptitude for bringing up children. The only thing that prompted the authorities to refuse authorisation was the fact that Mr F. was a homosexual and therefore that he did not provide sufficient guarantees that he would offer a child a suitable home from a psychological, child-rearing and family point of view. However, nothing in the case file suggests in any way that Mr F. leads a dissolute life and neither is there any reference in it to any specific circumstance that might pose a threat to the child's interests. Accepting the lawfulness of the refusal of authorisation in the instant case would implicitly but necessarily doom to failure all applications for authorisation to adopt by homosexuals ... It is certain that a number of factors would tend to indicate that the Paris Social Services made an error in assessing the evidence. The first and undoubtedly the strongest argument is that since the major reform of the laws on adoption introduced by the Act of 11 July 1966, single persons, whether men or women, have been entitled to adopt. ... Deciding ... by judicial interpretation that an unmarried homosexual man does not provide sufficient guarantees from a psychological and family perspective to adopt a child introduces discrimination between adoption candidates on grounds of their choice of private life which was not expressly intended by Parliament. The second argument in favour of the Administrative Court's ruling is that a person's right to lead the sex life of his or her choice should not, of course, be contested. This is one of the key components of the right to respect for private life guaranteed, inter alia , by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the Civil Code. There is no longer any discrimination against homosexuality at domestic level ... Thirdly, an examination of the case-law of the ordinary courts with regard to granting custody of the children of divorced couples and the exercise of parental authority shows that the ordinary courts take a broadly pragmatic approach in this area and attempt to avoid the pitfalls of an overly categorical approach. Thus, they do not hesitate, where the specific circumstances of the case so require, to accord visiting rights to homosexual parents or even to grant them custody or the right to exercise parental authority. For example, in a case in which it was established that there were upheavals in the mother's household, that there was no evidence of any physical danger to the child in the father's household, that the father lived in a stable relationship with another man and that the child was thriving in his father's home, custody was granted to the father (Pau Court of Appeal, 25 April 1991, no. 91-40734). Conversely, another court found that a father who had 'immoral homosexual relations incompatible with the exercise of parental authority' could not exercise that authority (Rennes Court of Appeal, 27 September 1989, no. 89-48660). Similarly, in a judgment in which it was found that, because of the father's homosexual practices, it would be particularly dangerous for the moral and physical well-being of his children to spend their holidays with him, it was held that there were serious grounds to justify refusing the father that right (First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation (Cass. civ. I), 13   January 1988, no. 86-17784). More recently the Court of Cassation granted a homosexual donor parental authority over a child born by artificial insemination to a mother who was herself involved in a homosexual relationship (Cass. civ. I, 9 March 1994, M me L. c. M. L. ; D 1995.197 note E. Monteiro; D 1995 summary 131, observations by D. Bourgault-Coudeyville). The courts do not therefore presume that because someone is a homosexual, he or she is disqualified from exercising parental rights. The discussion focuses mainly on the child's interests and the dangers that such circumstances may pose to the child's mental health. Lastly, authorisation is merely an administrative decision taken prior to the adoption process. ... 2.2.     Nonetheless, I consider, for a number of reasons, that the Paris Social Services did not commit any error in assessing the evidence when it held that Mr F. did not provide the necessary guarantees. A number of factors led me to this conclusion. Firstly, the right of everyone to the sex life of their choice should not be confused with a hypothetical right to have children. ... Secondly, the pertinence of the comparison with the case-law on custody of children and parental authority is clearly limited. The examples cited above relate only to a previously established family tie or one which corresponds to an actual line of descent. It is one thing to preserve a filial tie between a child and parents who are separating or who wish to confirm their links with him or her but another to allow the establishment of a family tie between a child and an adult out of nothing ... Thirdly, the question whether a child is in danger of being psychologically disturbed by his relationship with an adult who cannot offer him or her the reference point of a distinct father and mother, in other words a model of sexual difference, is a very difficult one which divides psychiatrists and psycho-analysts. Adopted children are all the more in need of a stable and fulfilling family environment because they have been deprived of their original family and have already suffered in the past. This makes it all the more important that they do not encounter any further problems within their adopted family. ... There is no agreement on the answer to that question. If there is any consensus it lies instead in the growing awareness that the rights of the child set the limits of the right to have children and that the child's interests cannot always be reconciled with current developments. This being so, I believe that when dealing with such a sensitive question, whose implications are more ethical and sociological than legal, it is up to Parliament to take a stance on what amounts to a choice for society. The courts, for their part, should not be anticipating shifts in public opinion, but responding to them. This brings me to my fourth argument, which is that the question whether one or more homosexuals should be entitled to adopt is not one which Parliament can be said to have determined. ... Fifthly, there should be no underestimating the part that authorisation plays in the adoption procedure. Admittedly, this is only one stage in the adoption process but it is a crucial one because the adoption cannot go ahead without it. ... It should be added, as a concluding remark regarding authorisation, that I am aware that what I propose has the drawback that it appears to encourage candidates for adoption to conceal the truth if they feel that their choice of lifestyle amounts to an absolute impediment to their being granted authorisation. However, there are two reasons why I think that this problem can be overcome. Firstly, the question will not arise very often because, as was mentioned above, the scarcity of children eligible for adoption compared to the demand usually prompts the social services to reject requests from single candidates. Secondly, the aim of the inquiries conducted prior to the granting of authorisation is precisely to ensure that the candidate can offer a child a suitable home and this inevitably means that the experts investigate his or her private life. Although the inquisitorial nature of these inquiries has sometimes been condemned (see for example J. Rubellin-Devichi, Revue française de droit administratif , 1992, pp. 904 et seq.), they do have the merit of ensuring that authorisation is then granted in full knowledge of the facts. My final argument is that if you have any remaining scruples about the fact that in considering the legality of a refusal of authorisation you are ruling on a matter which it is usually for the ordinary courts to decide in their capacity as the judges of matters of personal status, your scruples may be partly allayed by the fact that the position you will be taking will not entirely prevent the ordinary courts from authorising the adoption of a child by a homosexual in certain cases if they consider it compatible with the child's interests. When the new law on adoption was introduced recently, a new Article 353-1 was added to the Civil Code, the second paragraph of which provides that if authorisation is refused or not granted within the statutory time, the courts may approve the adoption if they consider that the applicants are capable of providing the child with a suitable home and that this is compatible with the child's interests. ... It follows from the foregoing that the Paris Social Services are justified in maintaining that the Paris Administrative Court was wrong to rule in the judgment appealed against that the two impugned decisions should be set aside.” 16.     In a judgment of 9 October 1996 the Conseil d'Etat set aside the Administrative Court's judgment and, ruling on the merits, rejected the applicant's application for authorisation to adopt. It decided, inter alia , as follows: “In a decision of 3 May 1993, upheld by a further decision of 15 October 1993 in response to an application for reconsideration, the chairman of the Paris Council ... rejected Mr Fretté's application for authorisation to adopt a child on the ground that although the applicant's choice of lifestyle was to be respected, the type of home that he was likely to offer a child could pose substantial risks to the child's development. From the information in the case file, particularly the evidence gathered when Mr   Fretté's application was being considered, it emerges that Mr Fretté, regard being had to his lifestyle and despite his undoubted personal qualities and aptitude for bringing up children, did not provide the requisite safeguards – from a child-rearing, psychological and family perspective – for adopting a child. The Paris Administrative Court was thus wrong, when setting aside the contested decisions, to rely on the argument that, in refusing the authorisation sought by Mr Fretté on the aforementioned ground, the chairman of the Paris Council had applied these provisions incorrectly. However, since the appeal procedure has had the effect of transferring all the issues of fact and law to the Conseil d'Etat , it is for the latter to examine the other submissions made by Mr Fretté before the Paris Administrative Court. ... The grounds given for the contested decisions satisfy the requirements of the law. ...” II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Regulations and information relating to the adoption procedure 17.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Code provide as follows: Article 343 “Adoption may be applied for by a married couple who have not been judicially separated and have been married for more than two years or are both over twenty ‑ eight years of age.” Article 343-1 “Adoption may also be applied for by any person over twenty-eight years of age.” (the age-limit was thirty at the material time, namely prior to the adoption of Law   no.   96-604 of 5 July 1996) 18.     The Family and Social Welfare Code lays down the rules on the taking of children into State care and the conditions for their adoption. It describes the authorisation procedure as follows: Article 63 “ ... Children in State care may be adopted by persons given custody of them by the social services wherever the emotional ties that have been established between them warrant such a measure or by persons granted authorisation to adopt by the head of the children's welfare service under the conditions laid down by decree ...” Article 100-3 “Persons wishing to provide a home for a foreign child with a view to his or her adoption shall apply for the authorisation contemplated in Article 63 of this Code.” 19.     Decree no. 85-938 of 23 August 1985 established the arrangements for appraising applications for authorisation to adopt a child in State care as follows: Article 1 “Any person wishing to obtain the authorisation contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Family and Social Welfare Code must submit an application to that end to the head of the children's welfare service of the département in which he or she resides.” Article 4 “In order to assess the application, the head of the children's welfare service shall conduct all the investigations required to ascertain what kind of home the applicant is likely to offer the children from a psychological, child-rearing and family perspective   ...” Article 9 “Decisions to refuse authorisation must be supported by reasons as laid down in section 3 of the Law of 11 July 1979 cited above. The applicant's age or matrimonial status or the presence of children in his or her household may not constitute the sole reason for a refusal.” Article 11 “The decision by the head of the children's welfare service shall apply for three years. A further application for authorisation may be made when that period has expired. Further applications shall be assessed under the same procedure. ...” 20.     According to data collected by the French authorities, some 11,500 applications for authorisation were made in 1999. About 8,000 applications were examined that year and the usual average of some 10% were rejected. At the time there were around 2,000 children in State care awaiting adoption. In 1999 the authorities issued some 4,000 visas to foreign children following their adoption by persons residing in France. B.     Notification of hearings before the Conseil d'Etat 21.     At the material time, Article 55 of the Decree of 30 July 1963 on the organisation and functioning of the Conseil d'Etat required lawyers to be advised at least four days before the sitting if any cases in which they were due to appear were on the list of cases to be heard and to be notified of the issues raised in reports to the Conseil d'Etat. The obligation to notify therefore applied only in respect of lawyers. 22.     As regards private individuals, a decision of the Conseil d'Etat of 16   March 1966 (Paisnel, Reports, p. 216) pointed out: “There is no rule stating that appellants must receive [notice of the date on which their case is to be heard]. If they have not appointed a legal representative, it is for them to ask to be notified of the date on which their case is to be heard or to consult the notice boards installed for this purpose at the registry of the Judicial Division. This rule, which provides that the parties are summoned to the hearing only if they have appointed a lawyer, should be seen in the light of the rule laid down in section 67 of the Ordinance of 31 July 1945, under which only members of the Court of Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat Bar (the avocats aux conseils ) may plead during hearings before these courts.” 23.     Since 1 January 2001 all parties to proceedings before the Conseil d'Etat have been automatically informed of the date of the hearing. As in the past, the lists of cases for hearing are displayed at the Judicial Division secretariat and so are accessible to the public. 24.     At the hearing the Government Commissioner speaks after counsel for the opposing parties have addressed the court and so the parties to the case cannot speak after him (see Kress v. France [GC], no. 39594/98, § 48, ECHR 2001-VI). Even if they are not represented by a lawyer, they do, however, have the possibility, hallowed by usage, of sending the trial bench a “memorandum for the deliberations” to supplement the observations they have made orally or to reply to the Government Commissioner's submissions. This memorandum for the deliberations is read out by the reporting judge before he reads out the draft judgment and before the discussion begins. 25.     By section 45 of the Ordinance of 1945, cases for which it is not compulsory to be represented by a lawyer include applications for judicial review of the decisions of the various administrative authorities. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION 26.     The applicant alleged that the rejection of his application for authorisation to adopt had implicitly been based on his sexual orientation alone. He argued that that decision, taken in a legal system which authorised the adoption of a child by a single, unmarried adoptive parent, effectively ruled out any possibility of adoption for a category of persons defined according to their sexual orientation, namely homosexuals and bisexuals, without taking any account of their individual personal qualities or aptitude for bringing up children. Referring to the procedure adopted by the Court in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (no. 33290/96, ECHR 1999 ‑ IX), the applicant considered it appropriate to place the issue in the context of Article 14 of the Convention. He alleged that he was the victim of discrimination on the ground of his sexual orientation, in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. In view of the inevitability of the conclusion on that point, he did not deem it necessary for the Court to determine whether there had been a breach of Article 8 taken alone. The relevant parts of the Articles in question provide: Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex ...” Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, ... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A.     Applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 27.     As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the provisions of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Petrovic v.   Austria , judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, p. 585, § 22, and Van Raalte v. the Netherlands , judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 184, § 33). 28.     While he accepted that the right to respect for private and family life did not include the right of any unmarried person to adopt a child, the applicant submitted that the refusal of authorisation to adopt had infringed his right to respect for his private life without discrimination on the ground of his sexual orientation. He considered that an examination of the French authorities' decisions revealed that the decision to refuse authorisation had been based on his sexual orientation alone. The only way of avoiding that conclusion would be to show that the decision had been based on another ground which would have been applied in the same way to an unmarried single person, whether a heterosexual or a homosexual who had kept his homosexuality secret, with the same personal qualities and aptitude for bringing up children as had been recognised in himself. The fact was that there was no such ground. While the decision of 3   May 1993 had mentioned his difficulties in “envisaging the practical consequences of the upheaval occasioned by the arrival of a child” and the lack of a “stable maternal role model”, it had to be said that those grounds had not been taken up again subsequently. Moreover, the Administrative Court had found that none of the evidence in the case file substantiated the first ground and had interpreted the second as “a circumlocution ... which ... could not legally constitute the sole reason for the decision”. As for the ground of the child's interests on which the Government relied, it had to be said that no specific child had been identified during the authorisation procedure and therefore that it applied to all the children in the world who might be in need of an adoptive parent or parents. To exclude all unmarried homosexuals from adoption on the ground that that was in the interest of any child who might be in need of adoptive parents showed that the difference in treatment was based on sexual orientation. Pointing out that sexual orientation is “a most intimate part of an individual's private life” (see Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom , nos.   33985/96 and 33986/96, ECHR 1999-VI), the applicant maintained that practically any difference in treatment based on sexual orientation amounted to interference in a homosexual's private life because it required him to choose between denying his sexual orientation or being penalised, unlike anybody else. The fact that the decisions taken by the French authorities with respect to the applicant's application for authorisation meant that anyone who revealed their homosexuality relinquished all possibility of adoption was particularly serious. An individual's private life was hardly respected if he was obliged to forgo a possibility available to any unmarried heterosexual in France, namely that of becoming a parent, if he wished to remain true to his sexual orientation. All the circumstances of which the applicant complained therefore fell within the ambit of Article 8 (see, mutatis mutandis , Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV). The applicant added, in the alternative, that adoption was a prospective family life which could fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention for the purposes of Article 14. 29.     The Government maintained, on the contrary, that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the Convention. Article 8 of the Convention did not safeguard aspirations, yet to be fulfilled, to found a family. Refusing to grant a person prior administrative approval for a possible adoption was not a decision that interfered with a person's private life and so it did not fall within the scope of Article 8. While respect for private life should also comprise “to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings” (see Niemietz v. Germany , judgment of 16   December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, p. 33-34, § 29), the right to adopt was not included as such among the rights guaranteed by the Convention (see Di Lazzaro v. Italy , no. 31924/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997, Decisions and Reports (DR) 90-B, p. 134). In the Government's opinion, the applicant was fostering confusion between the reasons for the refusal of authorisation, which he believed to have been based on his sexual orientation, and the actual object of the decision to dismiss his request which did not in itself amount to an interference in his private life. With regard to the latter point, the Government noted that the case did not concern a dispute over an existing situation, as had been true in the cases cited by the applicant, but a request relating to his future life, so that he could not allege that any right had been infringed. What the applicant sought was not recognition – and protection – of a right within the sphere of his private life but recognition of the mere potential or possibility for him to become an adoptive father. As to the reasons for refusing authorisation, the Government noted that neither the decision of 3 May 1993, which referred only to the absence of a stable maternal role model and the applicant's difficulties in assessing the day-to-day consequences of an adoption, nor that of 15 October 1993, which alluded only to his “choice of lifestyle”, contained the slightest indication that they were taken solely on the basis of his sexual orientation. The same was true of the Administrative Court's judgment and the Conseil d'Etat' s ruling, even though they differed in terms of the solution adopted. While there was no doubt that the expression “choice of lifestyle” did include sexual orientation, it did not refer to that aspect alone but also covered other factors that tended to indicate that the applicant was not equipped to offer a child a suitable home from a psychological, child-rearing and family perspective. The Government argued on that basis that Article 8 was not applicable in the instant case. Consequently, there had been no violation of Article 14, which had no independent existence. 30.     In the case before it, the Court must therefore determine whether the facts of the case fall within the scope of Article 8 and hence of Article 14 of the Convention. 31.     The Court has repeatedly held that Article 14 of the Convention is pertinent if “the subject-matter of the disadvantage ... constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed ...” (see National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium , judgment of 27 October 1975, Series A no. 19, p. 20, § 45), or the contested measures are “linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed ...” (see Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden , judgment of 6   February 1976, Series A no. 21, p. 17, § 39). For Article 14 to be applicable, it is enough for the facts of the case to fall within the ambit of one or more of the provisions of the Convention (see Thlimmenos , cited above, and Inze v. Austria , judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, § 36). 32.     The Court notes that the Convention does not guarantee the right to adopt as such (see Di Lazzaro , cited above, and X v. Belgium and the Netherlands , no. 6482/74, Commission decision of 10 July 1975, DR 7, p.   75). Moreover, the right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a family and does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family (see Marckx v. Belgium , judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, pp. 14-15, § 31, and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 32, § 62). In the instant case, the decision to dismiss the applicant's application for authorisation could not be considered to infringe his right to the free expression and development of his personality or the manner in which he led his life, in particular his sexual life. However, French domestic law (Article 343-1 of the Civil Code) authorises all single persons – whether men or women – to apply for adoption provided that they are granted the prior authorisation required to adopt children in State care or foreign children, and the applicant maintained that the French authorities' decision to reject his application had implicitly been based on his sexual orientation alone. If this is true, the inescapable conclusion is that there was a difference in treatment based on the applicant's sexual orientation, a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention (see Salgueiro da Silva Mouta , cited above, § 28). The Court also reiterates, in this connection, that the list set out in this provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words “any ground such as” (in French “ notamment ”) (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 30-31, § 72). It is for the Court to determine therefore whether, as the applicant maintained, his avowed homosexuality had a decisive influence. The Court concedes that the reason given by the French administrative and judicial authorities for their decision was the applicant's “choice of lifestyle”, and that they never made any express reference to his homosexuality. As the case file shows, however, that criterion implicitly yet undeniably made the applicant's homosexuality the decisive factor. That conclusion is borne out by the views expressed by the Paris Administrative Court in its judgment of 25 January 1995 and the Government Commissioner in her submissions to the Conseil d'Etat . The applicant's right under Article 343-1 of the Civil Code, which falls within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, was consequently infringed on the decisive ground of his sexual orientation. 33.     Accordingly, Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is applicable. B.     Compliance with Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 34.     According to the Court's case-law, a difference in treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14 if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see, among other authorities, Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany , judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 291 ‑ B, pp. 32-33, § 24, and Van Raalte , cited above, p. 186, § 39). In that connection, the Court observes that the Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions (see, among other authorities, Johnston and Others v. Ireland , judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, pp. 24-25, § 53). 35.     According to the applicant, the difference in treatment in the present case could not be based on an objective and reasonable justification. Pointing out that where sexual orientation was at issue, there was a need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons (see Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom , nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, 27 September 1999, and Smith and Grady and Salgueiro da Silva Mouta , cited above), he submitted that nothing could reasonably justify his being totally barred from adopting. Although the Government referred to the child's interests, what was at stake in the instant case was not a specific child's interests but those of all the children in the world who might be in need of adoptive parents. The irrebuttable presumption that no homosexual provided sufficient guarantees to offer a suitable home to an adopted child which was the logical corollary of the reference to such an interest reflected a soci