CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 7 mai 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s20FDDAE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCA1147F8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB8987CE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s84D0D60A { width:8.36pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s61ED8A2B { width:14.36pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sBB5E682E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s377C1984 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .sBED5F98F { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:36pt } .sB06CCEC3 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-align:left } .s988562EE { width:30.55pt; display:inline-block } .s4993656A { width:200.47pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .s60570E66 { width:233.81pt; display:inline-block } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } FIRST SECTION DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 42414/98 by G.G. against Italy The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 7   May 2002 as a Chamber composed of   Mrs   F. Tulkens , President ,   Mr   P. Lorenzen ,   Mrs   N. Vajić ,   Mr   E. Levits ,   Mrs   S. Botoucharova ,   Mr   A. Kovler ,   Mr   V. Zagrebelsky , judges , and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 10 February 1998, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1935 and living in Rome. She is represented before the Court by Mr E. Baldi, a lawyer practising in Naples. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Naples, which she had let to E.F and then to his widow L.D’A. In a writ of 7 November 1981, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 3 May 1982. She asked the tenant to vacate the premises by that date and summoned him to appear before the Naples Magistrate. By a decision of 13 October 1983, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 3   May 1984. On 25 November 1983, E.F. opposed alleging the expiry of the lease on another date. By a decision of 23 November 1984, the Naples District Court rejected the appeal of E.F. and served him notice that the order for possession would be enforced on 17 May 1990. On 22 February 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 May 1990. Between 17 May 1990 and 15 December 1998, the bailiff made twenty-six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. According to law no.   431/98, the Naples Magistrate suspended the eviction proceedings until 15 May 1999. On 1 June 1999, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 June 1999. Between 15 June 1999 and 16 November 1999, the bailiff made six attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. On an unspecified date of 2001, the tenant died and the applicant recovered possession of the apartment. THE LAW The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property. The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.   The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that she failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts. The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected. The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. The applicant argues that the refusal of the administration to enforce the order issued by the magistrate has interfered with the power of the judiciary. The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues, which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.   Erik Fribergh   Françoise Tulkens   Registrar   President