CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 20 juin 2002

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5BA5B7C7 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s662121A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .sB8987CE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s61ED8A2B { width:14.36pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s84D0D60A { width:8.36pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sBB5E682E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s71220220 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sDEA336FF { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s9922FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s9C230781 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt } .s451A1BF5 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s377C1984 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s4B773175 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s48D61AB0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sEC533701 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7A3B44D7 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sA845BF37 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-15.05pt } .s99668499 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; font-size:10pt } .sE8EB5753 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s6BBACBD8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s160BBE39 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s9671CAED { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sAF0B4C7 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; font-size:10pt } .s31CA8E2D { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:42pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .s292CCFD { margin-top:42pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:14pt } .s731EBF6B { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:24pt; font-size:14pt } .s7BB60D65 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt } .s527A9694 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s8AD34D0 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:20.15pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:8.8pt; font-size:10pt } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s588BDBF1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sBED5F98F { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:36pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s988562EE { width:30.55pt; display:inline-block } .s6B64E62F { width:203.14pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .s60570E66 { width:233.81pt; display:inline-block } FIRST SECTION FINAL DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 35519/97 by Mihail Simeonov MIHOV against Bulgaria The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 20 June 2002 as a Chamber composed of   Mr   C.L. Rozakis , President ,   Mrs   F. Tulkens ,   Mr   G. Bonello ,   Mr   E. Levits ,   Mrs   S. Botoucharova ,   Mr   A. Kovler ,   Mr   V. Zagrebelsky , judges , and   Mr   E. Fribergh , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 8 December 1996, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the partial decision of 19 September 2000, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant, Mr Mihail Simeonov Mihov, is a Bulgarian national, who was born in 1966. He was represented before the Court by Mr Y. Grozev, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The respondent Government were represented by Mrs V. Djidjeva, of the Ministry of Justice. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 1.     The criminal proceedings On 11 September 1993, the applicant, who worked as a custom officer, was questioned in relation to a preliminary investigation opened on 10   September 1993 by the Plovdiv Regional Public Prosecutor against persons suspected of having obtained unlawfully excise tax refunds through forged documents. On 19 November 1993 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand on suspicion of having aided and abetted those persons and having forged documents in contravention of Article 212 §§ 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code, which provided for a sentence of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment. Four persons, including the applicant, were eventually prosecuted and convicted in one trial. All of them later submitted applications to the European Commission of Human Rights raising complaints under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (see, Ilijkov v. Bulgaria , no. 33977/96, 26 July 2001, unreported, and the pending cases of Hristov v. Bulgaria , no.   35436/97 and Al Akidi v. Bulgaria , no. 35825/97). The accusations against the applicant concerned the alleged false certification, made by him on 9 May 1993, of a fictitious export of consignments of cigarettes which in reality had never left the country. That false certification had enabled Mr Ilijkov to obtain unlawfully 6,249,600   Bulgarian levs (the equivalent of 200,417 US dollars at the relevant time). The applicant’s defence was apparently based on his assertion that on the relevant day he had been working in his office on the basis of documents only and that his colleagues had been checking the actual traffic of lorries. On 5 April 1994, having completed the preliminary investigation, the prosecution authorities submitted an indictment to the Plovdiv Regional Court. The indictment relied on 33 witnesses and voluminous documentary material. The Plovdiv Regional Court sat as a chamber of three judges: a president who was a professional judge and two lay judges. The first hearing took place on 12 and 13 May 1994 when the Regional Court heard the four co-accused and several witnesses. Some of the witnesses did not appear. The prosecutor and the defence lawyers requested leave to submit further evidence. The court adjourned the hearing. On 16   May 1994 the court, sitting in private, appointed a graphology expert. Several times during the proceedings the Regional Court had to wait for the case file to be returned by the Supreme Court in Sofia, where it had been sent for the examination of the appeals submitted by the applicant and his co-accused against the Regional Court’s refusals to release them on bail. In practice, whenever such an appeal was submitted, the Plovdiv Regional Court transmitted the case file together with the appeal and a prosecutor’s opinion. The case file was sent to the Supreme Court on 28 May 1994 for one of the co-accused’s appeal against detention to be examined and was returned on 30 June 1994. The Regional Court did not deal with the case until 13 September 1994, when the presiding judge ordered the production of a piece of evidence. The trial resumed on 6 October 1994. The court heard several witnesses and adjourned the hearing as the prosecutor insisted on the examination of other witnesses who had not appeared and in order to enable the accused persons to submit further evidence. Some of the witnesses who had not appeared were ordered to pay fines. The next trial hearing took place on 29 and 30 November 1994. The financial expert appointed by the court stated that he had been denied access to certain documents and therefore had not finalised his report. The court ordered a bank and the customs office to provide access to the documents in question. Two additional financial experts were also appointed. Both the prosecution and the defence sought to adduce additional evidence. The hearing was adjourned. Between 20 January and 21 February 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court for the examination of appeals against detention. The hearing listed for 19 April 1995 was adjourned as the presiding judge was ill. The next hearing, scheduled for 9 June 1995, was adjourned as one of the lay judges had been taken ill. On 12 July 1995 the court sitting in private ordered an expert report. The hearing listed for 21 September 1995 was adjourned owing to the illness of the lawyer of one of the co-accused. The court also observed that several witnesses had not been summoned properly and that others, albeit summoned, had not appeared. The applicant and the other accused persons further requested a substitution of the judges examining the case on the ground that they were not impartial, having on several occasions dismissed their applications for release. Between 3 October and 6 November 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court, which was examining appeals against detention. The next hearing, listed for 12 January 1996, had to be adjourned as both lay judges were ill. After learning that the lay judges were prevented by illness from further participation in the proceedings, on 19 February 1996 the Plovdiv Regional Court recommenced the examination of the case with two new lay judges. On that date the court appointed two additional experts. The new chamber of the court held a hearing on 26 and 27 March 1996. It heard several witnesses and experts. The hearing was adjourned as some of the witnesses had not been summoned due to an omission on the part of the court’s clerk and because the parties sought to adduce further evidence. The court fixed the date for the next hearing to 7 and 8 May 1996. On 7 and 8 May 1996 the court heard several witnesses and an expert. The hearing was adjourned as further evidence had to be obtained. Between 9 and 28 May 1996 the case file was at the Supreme Court in Sofia in connection with appeals against detention. The hearing scheduled for 16 and 17 September 1996 was adjourned to 29 and 30 October 1996 as a lay judge had broken his leg and was unable to attend. The hearing of 30 October 1996 was further adjourned, because the medical experts considered that one of the co-accused was not in a condition to participate in the hearing as he was on a hunger strike. Between 19 November and 4 December 1996 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court in connection with appeals against detention. In its cover letter to the Supreme Court, the Regional Court drew attention to the fact that a hearing had been listed for 19 December 1996 and called for the return of the case file before that date. The hearing resumed on 19 December 1996. One witness and the experts were heard. As other witnesses had not appeared, the court accepted the requests of the defence lawyers and the prosecutor for a further adjournment. The Regional Court throughout the proceedings sought police assistance to establish the addresses of witnesses and bring them before the court. One of the witnesses was suspected of seeking to evade service of the summonses. The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took place on 28 ‑ 31   January 1997. The court heard witnesses and the submissions of the parties to the criminal case and examined other evidence. On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty of having made a false certification on 9 May 1993 thus enabling Mr Ilijkov to obtain unlawfully excise tax refund. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. His accomplices were also convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between eleven and thirteen years. The court reserved the reasoning of its judgment. It was prepared on an unspecified date at least three months following the delivery of the judgment. On 10 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation against his conviction and sentence. The case was listed for a hearing on 26 September 1997. On that date the prosecutor appointed to act before the Supreme Court of Cassation declared that he had known one of the convicted persons and that he wished to withdraw. The examination of the case could not proceed and the hearing was adjourned. The hearing was held on 23 January 1998. By judgment of 16 March 1998 the court confirmed the applicant’s conviction and sentence. On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a petition for review (cassation). On 10 June 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing in the review (cassation) proceedings. As one of the co-accused joined the proceedings at that moment, the court adjourned the hearing to enable him to make the necessary submissions, which he did on 22 June 1998. The hearing resumed on 9 December 1998. On 22 March 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the petitions for review of the applicant and the other accused persons. At all stages of the proceedings the applicant was legally represented. 2.     The applicant’s pre-trial detention On 19 November 1993 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. On 1 March 1994 the applicant’s application for release was dismissed by the Plovdiv Regional Court, sitting in private, on the grounds that he was charged with a serious offence with intent and that there was a prima facie danger of his absconding, committing further offences or obstructing the course of justice. The court held that the state of health of the applicant’s wife and child was not a ground for ordering his release under the relevant law. On 14 March 1994 the applicant complained of his detention to the Chief Public Prosecutor on the ground that he had not committed the offence in question. He did not receive an answer. In March 1994 five persons who had been heard as witnesses in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his accomplices were charged with perjury. Separate proceedings were brought against them. At the hearing on 13 May 1994 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application for release made on the same day. On 18 May 1994 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. On 30 June 1994 the appeal was dismissed at a sitting in private in the presence of the prosecutor. The Supreme Court held that the applicant’s detention was imperative as he had been charged with a serious offence with intent. On 6 October 1994 the Regional Court dismissed the applications for release filed by all co-accused stating that the charges carried a penalty of ten or more years imprisonment and that there were “no grounds to consider it established that the defendants would not abscond or commit a crime”. The family situation and health condition of the accused persons did not require their release. At the trial hearing of 29 and 30 November 1994, the applicant applied for release on bail on the grounds that there was no danger that he would abscond and that he had a permanent address. The court dismissed the application holding that there were no new facts to justify his being released. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He stated that he had been detained for more than one year, that most evidence had been collected, that he had a family and two small children one of whom was seriously ill and that therefore there was no danger of absconding or committing an offence. On 4 December 1994, the Regional Court, before transmitting the appeal to the Supreme Court, sitting in private, examined the matter again and refused to reverse its decision of 30 November 1994. The court held, inter alia , that according to the domestic law and the Supreme Court’s practice detention pending trial was prima facie necessary when a person had been accused of having committed a serious wilful offence. To substitute this judicial measure by a more lenient one would only be possible if there had been “not even a hypothetical danger that the accused might abscond or commit further offences”, in particular, ”if he is ill or elderly”. On 21 February 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the applicant’s detention. The Supreme Court explained its practice in matters of detention on remand stating that under Article 152 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure detention on remand was mandatory for everyone accused of a crime punishable by ten or more years’ imprisonment, the only exception being where it was clear beyond doubt that there was no danger of the accused absconding or re-offending. In the Supreme Court’s view such would only be the case where, for example, the accused was seriously ill, elderly or in any other condition which excluded the danger of his or her absconding or re-offending. Since the applicant was charged with a crime punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment and as no special circumstances excluding the danger of his absconding or re-offending had been established, there were no grounds for ordering his release on bail. The Supreme Court referred to its practice on the matter. The Supreme Court further refused to consider the applicant’s contention that the evidence against him was weak. It found that it had no jurisdiction to do so in connection with a bail application. Its only task was to examine whether the conditions for detention on remand under Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been met. At the hearing on 21 September 1995 the applicant again appealed against his detention on the ground that there was no danger of his absconding. In particular, he pointed out that he had continued to work at the customs office although he had been aware of the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, no steps had been taken by the authorities for almost a whole year. The prosecutor objected, stating, inter alia , that under the relevant law, and regard being had to the increase in the crime rate in the country, the court was not entitled to release the applicant or the other co-accused. On 21 September 1995 the Regional Court dismissed the application for bail, holding that there were no new circumstances and that pre-trial detention was required as a matter of law in all cases where the charges concerned a serious offence with intent. On 28 September 1995 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. On 6 November 1995 the Supreme Court sitting in private, upon receipt of the prosecutor’s observations which had not been communicated to the applicant, dismissed the appeal stating that the applicant could only be released if there existed unequivocal evidence establishing beyond all doubt that there was no danger of his absconding, re-offending or obstructing the investigation. However, no such evidence was available in the applicant’s case. On 19 February 1996 the applicant again submitted an application for release to the Plovdiv Regional Court. It was dismissed on the same day as there had been no new facts and on the ground that the applicant was charged with a serious wilful crime which automatically required the imposition of pre-trial detention in accordance with Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At the hearing of 27 March 1996 the applicant renewed his application for release on bail which was refused on the same day by the Regional Court as there had been no new circumstances. On 24 September 1996 the applicant submitted a request for release. The Regional Court dealt with it at the hearing on 29 October 1996 and dismissed it on grounds similar to those previously stated. On 1   November   1996 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. He stated, inter alia , that his detention had been continuing for three years only because the Regional Court had failed to conduct the trial promptly. In particular, it had not replaced the lay judge who had been ill. On 11 November 1996, the Regional Court, sitting in camera, re-examined the matter ex officio and refused to reconsider its decision. On 19   November 1996 the appeal was transmitted to the Supreme Court. On 25 November 1996 a prosecutor of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office submitted written observations to the Supreme Court, inviting it to dismiss the appeal. The comments were not communicated to the applicant. On 4 December 1996 the Supreme Court sitting in private dismissed the appeal. It stated that the danger of absconding, re-offending and perverting the course of justice was presumed in view of the gravity of the crime with which the applicant was charged. On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     Penal Code Article 212 § 4 lays down that it is an offence to misappropriate very large quantities of possessions by using forged documents. This offence is punishable by ten to twenty years’ imprisonment. 2.     Code of Criminal Procedure (a)     Legal criteria and practice regarding the requirements and justification for detention on remand The Supreme Court has stated that it is not open to the courts, when examining an appeal against detention on remand, to inquire whether there exists sufficient evidence to support the charges against the detainee. The courts must only examine the lawfulness of the detention order (Decision no.   24 of 23 May 1995 in case no. 268/95, I Chamber, Bulletin 1995, p.   149). Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 152, as in force at the material time (and until 4 June 1995), provided as follows: “(1)     Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the charges concern] crimes punishable by ten or more years’ imprisonment or capital punishment. (2)     In the cases under the preceding paragraph [detention on remand] shall not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading justice or committing further offences.” These provisions, as worded from 4 June 1995 until August 1997, provided as follows: “(1)     Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the charges concern] a serious wilful crime. (2)     In the cases falling under paragraph 1 [detention on remand] may possibly not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused evading justice, obstructing the investigation, or committing further offences.” According to Article 93 § 7 of the Penal Code a “serious” crime is one punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment. With effect from 1 January 2000 Article 152 and other provisions concerning the grounds for detention on remand were amended. According to the Supreme Court’s practice at the relevant time (it has now become at least partly obsolete as a result of the amendments in force since 1 January 2000) Article 152 § 1 required that a person charged with a serious wilful crime (or with a crime punishable by ten or more years’ imprisonment, according to this provision as in force before June 1995) had to be detained on remand. An exception was only possible, in accordance with Article 152 § 2, where it was clear beyond doubt that any danger of absconding or re-offending was objectively excluded as, for example, in the case of an accused who was seriously ill, elderly, or already detained on other grounds, such as serving a sentence (Decision no. 1 of 4 May 1992 in case no. 1/92, II Chamber, Bulletin 1992/93, p. 172; Decision no. 4 of 21   February 1995 in case no. 76/95, II Chamber; Decision no. 78 of 6   November 1995 in case no. 768/95, II Chamber; Decision no. 24 in case no.   268/95, I Chamber, Bulletin 1995, p. 149). (b)     Appeals against detention during the trial According to Article 304 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the detainee’s applications for release at the trial stage of criminal proceedings are examined by the trial court. It follows from Article 304 §§ 1 and 2 that such requests may be examined in private or at an oral hearing. The law does not require the trial court to decide within a particular time-limit. The trial court’s decision as regards a request for release is subject to appeal to the higher court (Article 344 § 3). The appeal must be lodged within seven days (Article 345) with the trial court (Article 348 § 4 in conjunction with Article 318 § 2). According to Article 347, after receiving the appeal, the trial court, sitting in private, shall decide whether there exist grounds to annul or vary its decision. If it does not find a reason to do so the trial court transmits the appeal to the higher court. Before doing so, the trial court must communicate the appeal to the other party and receive its written observations (Article 348 § 4 in conjunction with Articles 320 and 321). The law does not provide for the prosecutor’s observations to be communicated to the appellant. Article 348 provides that the appeals court may examine the appeal in private or, if it considers it necessary, at an oral hearing. The law does not require the appeal court to decide within a particular time-limit. (c)     Lay judges Article 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is entitled “Substitute judges and lay judges”. Paragraph 1 provides: “Where the examination of the case will be lengthy, a substitute judge or lay judge may be appointed.” COMPLAINTS The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his detention pending trial had not been justified and had been unreasonably long. The applicant raised three complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. In the initial application he stated that the proceedings before the Supreme Court in the examination of his appeals against detention had been unfair as they had been conducted in private, without a hearing or the participation of the applicant or his lawyer. In his written observations of 7   June 2001 in reply to the Government’s observations the applicant also complained that the scope of review of lawfulness had been too narrow and that the courts had not ruled on his petitions for release speedily. THE LAW 1.     Complaint of the alleged lack of justification for and excessive length of the applicant’s detention (Article 5 § 3 of the Convention) Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides: “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph   1   (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.” a)     The Government’s objections as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged abuse The Government submitted that the domestic remedies had not been exhausted as the applicant had allegedly never appealed to the prosecution authorities. Furthermore, he could have brought an action for damages. As he had not done so his application was abusive. The applicant pointed to the fact that on 14 March 1994 he had appealed to the Chief Public Prosecutor to no avail and that after the beginning of the trial in April 1994 only the courts, not the prosecution authorities, had been competent to rule on his applications for release. He further referred to the Court’s case-law according to which in circumstances such as those in the present case a civil action for damages was not an effective remedy and objected against the allegation of abuse. The Court considers that the applicant undoubtedly made normal use of the remedies available under Bulgarian law in respect of the justification and the length of his detention on remand by filing a number of appeals to the competent courts. Further, the allegation of abuse is groundless. The Government’s objections must therefore be dismissed. b)     The parties’ submissions The Government submitted that the charges against the applicant concerned serious crimes. In such cases Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure required that the accused be detained on remand. Release on bail was only possible in exceptional circumstances, where there did not exist even a theoretical possibility of absconding, re-offending or perverting the course of justice. In the absence of concrete evidence of such exceptional circumstances a presumption arose that there was a danger that the accused would abscond or commit an offence. It was incumbent on the detainee to produce sufficient evidence that there existed exceptional circumstances warranting release on bail. The applicant had failed to submit persuasive evidence in this respect. The reasons for the applicant’s detention were thus relevant and sufficient. The Government were of the opinion that, furthermore, the authorities had handled the case with due diligence and had worked on it very actively. The preliminary investigation had lasted only six months. Among the reasons for the delays in the judicial stage of the proceedings there had been “objective” factors. In particular, the case had been very complex: it concerned four accused persons having committed customs offences and forged documents, the case-file had been in six volumes and the prosecution had relied on 33 witnesses. The national courts had been under an obligation to take every necessary step to elucidate the facts. Many adjournments had been inevitable as witnesses had not appeared despite the efforts of the Regional Court to ensure their attendance including through police assistance. Other adjournments had been caused by judges having been taken ill. Furthermore, one adjournment had been necessary owing to illness of one of the defence lawyers. The Government also submitted that the applicant had on many occasions contributed to the length of the proceedings by making requests for the collection of additional evidence up until the end of the proceedings. The applicant replied that the domestic law and practice at the relevant time, as applied in his case and referred to by the Government, had been in direct violation of the Convention which required that long periods of detention should be justified by the authorities on the basis of existing dangers of absconding or committing an offence. However, the applicant had not sought to abscond or obstruct the proceedings after 11 September 1993, when he had been interrogated as a witness. He had a family and children. Further, the applicant considered that the authorities had been responsible for excessive delays as on many occasions they had not ensured the attendance of witnesses, had allowed long intervals for the judges’ summer holidays and had failed to appoint reserve lay judges. The applicant objected against the Government’s position that he had been responsible for delays resulting from his applications for release and appeals. c)     The Court’s decision on admissibility The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. The complaint is therefore admissible. 2.     Complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention a)     Complaints raised for the first time on 7 June 2001 The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints that the courts did not review all aspects of the lawfulness of his detention and did not rule on his petitions for release speedily concerned proceedings between 1994 and the end of 1996 but were submitted to the Court only on 7 June 2001. These complaints were therefore submitted after the expiry of the six months period under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. b)     Complaints raised in the initial application The applicant complained that the proceedings before the Supreme Court in the examination of his appeals against detention had been unfair as they had been conducted in private, without a hearing or the participation of the applicant or his lawyer. As the Court in its partial decision of 19   September 2000 declared inadmissible as being out of time the complaints concerning all but one of the applicant’s appeals, the remaining complaint concerns the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 December 1996. Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” The Government submitted that the Supreme Court had acted on appeal from a decision of the Regional Court which had examined the matter in an open hearing. Holding a hearing before the second level jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in the particular case, would be burdensome and would slow down the procedure. The applicant reiterated his complaint. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. The complaint is therefore admissible. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaints concerning the justification and the length of his detention on remand (Article 5 § 3) and the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in the examination of his appeal against detention by the Supreme Court on 4 December 1996 (Article 5 § 4). Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.   Erik Fribergh   Christos Rozakis   Registrar   President