CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 26 novembre 2002

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Costa , President ,   Mr   A.B. Baka ,   Mr   Gaukur Jörundsson ,   Mr   K. Jungwiert ,   Mr   V. Butkevych ,   Mrs   W. Thomassen ,   Mr   M. Ugrekhelidze, judges ,   and   Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 July 2002, Having deliberated, decides as follows:     THE FACTS The applicant, Fedor Aleksandrovich Sokur, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1940 and resides in the village of Grodovka, Donetsk Region, Ukraine. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. In 2001, the applicant instituted proceedings in the Novogrodovsky City Court of Donetsk Region against the “Novogrodovskaya” Mining Company - a State-owned enterprise - to recover unpaid salary for the years 1998-2000. On 3   May   2001, the Novogrodovsky City Court found in favour of the applicant ( Решение Новогродовского городского суда Донецкой области ). The decision became effective on 14   May   2001 and was sent for execution to the Novogrodovsky City Bailiffs’ Office ( Отдел Государственной исполнительной службы Новогродовского городского управления юстиции ). However, the decision was not executed, allegedly due to the failure of the Bailiffs’ Office to act, in not selling the property of the Mining Company. The applicant instituted proceedings in the Novogrodovsky City Court of the Donetsk Region against the Novogrodovsky City Bailiffs’ Office for failure to execute the court decision in his favour. On 18   July   2001, the City Court rejected the applicant’s claim, finding no fault had been committed by the Bailiffs’ Office. The court stated that the Bailiffs’ Office had presented the decision of the Commercial Court of the Donetsk Region of 30 August 2000 to the respondent company, but was prohibited from enforcing the decision by selling the property of the mine, due to the bankruptcy proceedings which had been initiated against it. On 1   November   2001, the Appellate Court of the Donetsk Region dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 18   February   2002, the panel of three judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal. On 26 December 2001, the ban on the forced sale of assets belonging to undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital, was entrenched in the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property. B.     Relevant domestic law Under Section 12 of the Law on bankruptcy ( Закон Украни «Про відновлення платоспроможності боржника або визнання його банкрутом» ), a commercial court is entitled to order a moratorium on debt recovery from a company subject to bankruptcy proceedings. The moratorium implies a prohibition on the Bailiffs’ Office to execute judgements against such a company. The Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property ( Закон України “Про введення мораторiю на примусову реалiзацiю майна” ) aims at protecting State interests on the sale of assets belonging to undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital. A moratorium on the enforcement of judgment debts has been introduced until such time as the mechanism for the forced sale of the property of such undertakings has been improved. No time-limit has been set. Section 2 of that Law provides that the prohibition on the forced sale of property includes the execution of writs by the State Bailiffs’ Office over property belonging to such companies. The Law therefore stays the execution of all writs by the State Bailiffs’ Office against the assets of undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital. COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article   6   §   1 of the Convention about the non-enforcement of the court decision in his favour. He further complains that the existing situation infringes his right to life under Article   2 § 1 of the Convention, given his low standard of living. The applicant finally alleges having been subjected to slavery due to the fact that his work was not remunerated. He invokes Article   4   §   1 of the Convention. THE LAW 1. The applicant complains that, due to the non-execution of a judgment in his favour, his right to a fair hearing was violated. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides as relevant: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of the Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government. 2. The applicant complains that his right to life was violated, invoking Article 2 § 1 of the Convention, which provides as relevant: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” The Court reiterates that according to its case-law neither Article 2 nor any other provision of the Convention can be interpreted as conferring on an individual a right to enjoy any given standard of living ( Wasilewski v. Poland , no. 32734/96, 20.4.1999). Moreover, the applicant has not shown that he suffers such destitution as to put his life at risk. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 3. The applicant complains of slavery, invoking Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, which provides as relevant: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.” The Court notes that the applicant’s allegations under Article 4 § 1 derive from the fact that he did not receive remuneration for work he had performed. The Court further notes that the applicant performed his work voluntarily and his entitlement to payment has never been denied. The dispute thus involves civil rights and obligations, but does not disclose any element of slavery within the meaning of this provision. In these circumstances, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint concerning non-enforcement of the judgement in his favour; Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.     S. Dollé   J.-P. Costa   Registrar   President