CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 18 mars 2003

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Pellonpää , President ,   Mrs   E. Palm ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   M. Fischbach ,   Mr   J. Casadevall ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mr   L. Garlicki, judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 June 1999, Having regard to the partial decision of 27 September 2001, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant, Mr Tibor Jurík, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1966 and lives in Bánov. The respondent Government were represented by Mr P. Vršanský, their Agent. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. On 25   August 1999 the Nitra Regional Court convicted the applicant of extortion. The applicant appealed. The Supreme Court scheduled a hearing for 25   November 1999. On the latter date the case was adjourned due to the absence of the applicant’s lawyer. After the decision to adjourn the case had been announced, the presiding judge imposed a procedural fine of 10,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) on the applicant pursuant to Article   66   (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision with reasons was served on the applicant at a later date. It stated that, despite previous warnings, he had unduly interrupted the presiding judge, had disrespected the latter’s instructions and that he had disturbed the conduct of the hearing. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice The Code of Criminal Procedure Under Article 66 (1), a person who, despite previous warnings, disturbs proceedings or behaves in an offensive manner in relation to a court, a public prosecutor, an investigator or a police authority or, without sufficient excuse, does not obey an order or does not comply with an instruction addressed to him or her under the Code of Criminal Procedure, can be punished with a procedural fine amounting up to SKK 50,000. Pursuant to Article 66 (4), the decision on such a procedural fine may be challenged by a complaint which has suspensive effect. The Criminal Code Under Article 169b, a person who seriously and repeatedly disturbs a court hearing or who repeatedly behaves in an offensive manner or disparages the court shall be punished by a prison sentence of up to two years or by a fine. Article 53 (1) provides that a court may impose a fine between SKK 5,000 and 5,000,000 in cases when the perpetrator obtained material benefit from a premeditated offence. Pursuant to Article 53 (2) (a) courts may otherwise impose a fine when such a punishment is foreseen in the special provisions of the Criminal Code. COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Articles 6 § 1, 7 and 13 of the Convention about the procedural fine imposed on him by the presiding judge of the Supreme Court. He alleges, in particular, that the proceedings leading to the imposition of the fine were not fair in that he was fined after the case had been adjourned, and that he had no legal remedies at his disposal in this respect. THE LAW 1.     The applicant complains that his right to a fair hearing was violated in the proceedings in which a procedural fine was imposed on him. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the relevant part of which provides: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...” The Government maintained that, unlike in the case of contempt of court within the meaning of Article 169b of the Criminal Code, the fine imposed on the applicant was of a procedural nature. In their view, neither its classification under Slovakian law nor its nature permit to conclude that it was imposed in the context of a criminal offence within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Finally, the Government submitted that the imposition of the fine in question was within the discretionary power of the court, that the maximum amount of the fine which could be imposed in this context was not excessive, and that it was neither entered in the criminal record of the person concerned, nor could it be converted into a prison term. They concluded that the proceedings leading to the imposition of the fine on the applicant fell outside the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant argued that the above provision was violated in the context of the imposition of a fine on him. The Court recalls that the question whether the criminal head of Article 6 applies in similar cases has to be assessed in the light of three alternative criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, namely the classification of the offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the nature and severity of the penalty (see T. v. Austria [GC], no. 27783/95, § 61, 14   November 2000 and Ravnsborg v. Sweden , judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A no. 283-B, p.   28, § 30, with further references). The Court notes that, unlike the contempt of court under Article 169b of the Criminal Code, the behaviour for which a procedural fine was imposed on the applicant pursuant to Article 66 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not formally classified as a criminal offence in Slovakian law. As to the nature of the offence in question, the Court recalls that rules enabling a court to sanction disorderly conduct in proceedings before it are a common feature of legal systems of the Contracting States. Such rules and sanctions derive from the indispensable power of a court to ensure the proper and orderly functioning of its own proceedings. Measures ordered by courts under such rules are more akin to the exercise of disciplinary powers than to the imposition of a punishment for commission of a criminal offence (see the Ravnsborg v.   Sweden judgment referred to above, § 34). The Court finds no reason for assessing the procedural fine imposed on the applicant in a different manner. It notes, in particular, that under Article 66 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is for the court sitting in the particular proceedings in which the misconduct has occurred to examine, of its own accord, whether the misconduct calls for a fine under that provision. It is true that under Slovakian law more serious examples of disorderly conduct fall within the sphere of criminal law, but that has not been shown to be the case in the applicant’s case. Finally, the applicant was fined SKK 10,000 and the maximum penalty which he risked incurring under Article 66 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure amounts to SKK 50,000. The latter sum is substantially lower than the maximum fine which may be imposed as penalty for a criminal offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, Slovakian law does not provide for the possibility of converting a fine under Article 66 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure into a prison term. In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that what was at stake for the applicant does not warrant classifying the offence as criminal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Accordingly, the guarantees of this provision do not extend to the proceedings leading to the imposition of the above fine on the applicant. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35   §   3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35   §   4. 2. The applicant complains that, as a result of the imposition of the fine, he was held guilty of an offence contrary to Article 7 of the Convention the relevant part of which provides as follows: “1.     No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.” Considering its above conclusion that the proceedings leading to the imposition of a procedural fine on the applicant did not involve the determination of a “criminal charge”, the Court finds that the facts of the case disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 7 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 and   4 of the Convention. 3. Finally, the applicant complains that he had no effective remedy at his disposal as regards the alleged violations of Articles 6 § 1 and 7 of the Convention. He relies on Article 13 of the Convention which provides as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” According to the Court’s case-law, Article 13 applies only where an individual has an “arguable claim” to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see the Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, § 52). The Court has above found that the applicant’s complaints under Articles   6 § 1 and 7 are inadmissible either as falling outside its competence ratione materiae or as being manifestly ill-founded. For similar reasons, the applicant does not have an “arguable claim” and Article 13 is therefore inapplicable to his case. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.   Michael O’Boyle   Matti Pellonpää   Registrar   President