CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 8 juillet 2003

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Rozakis , President ,   Mr   G. Bonello ,   Mrs   F. Tulkens ,   Mr   E. Levits ,   Mrs   S. Botoucharova ,   Mr   A. Kovler ,   Mr   K. Hajiyev, judges , and   Mr   S. Nielsen , Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 9 September 1997 and registered on 18   December 1997, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the partial decision of 13 December 2001, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The Supreme Holy Council (Висш духовен съвет) of the Muslim community headed by Mr Nedim Gendzhev was the officially recognised leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria, at least between 1995 and 1997. In reality, at all relevant times it was one of the two rival Muslim religious leaderships in Bulgaria. Mr Nedim Gendzhev, a Bulgarian citizen born in 1945 and residing in Sofia, is its leader. He was the Chief Mufti at least between 1988 and 1992 and the Chairman of the Supreme Holy Council at least between 1995 and 1997. The application was brought on behalf of the Supreme Holy Council, being allegedly the organisation of a part of the Muslim believers in Bulgaria. The applicant organisation was represented before the Court by Mrs   S.   Margaritova ‑ Vutchkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The respondent Government were represented by Mrs M. Dimova, co-agent, of the Ministry of Justice. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 1.     Changes of leadership of the Muslim community between 1992 and 1997 (a)     The removal of Mr Gendzhev in 1992 At the end of 1989 a process of democratisation commenced in Bulgaria. Soon thereafter some Muslim believers and activists of the Muslim religion in the country sought to replace the leadership of their religious organisation. They considered that Mr Gendzhev, who was the Chief Mufti at that time, and the members of the Supreme Holy Council had collaborated with the communist regime. The old leadership, with Mr Gendzhev as Chief Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims, also had supporters. This situation caused divisions and internal conflict within the Muslim community in Bulgaria. On 10 February 1992 the Directorate of Religious Denominations (Дирекция по вероизповеданията) (“the Directorate”), a governmental agency attached to the Council of Ministers, declared the election of Mr   Gendzhev in 1988 as Chief Mufti of the Muslims in Bulgaria null and void and proclaimed his removal from that position. This decision was based on findings, inter alia , that Mr Gendzhev’s election in 1988 had been politically motivated. The Directorate appointed a three-member Interim Holy Council as a temporary governing body of the Muslims’ religious organisation, considering that that was “the only possible means of preventing the organisational disintegration of the Muslim denomination”. A national conference of Muslims, organised by the interim leadership, took place on 19 September 1992. It elected Mr Hasan as Chief Mufti and also approved a new Statute which was registered in accordance with sections 6 and 16 of the Religious Denominations Act. After September 1992 the supporters of Mr Hasan obtained full control over the property and activities of the Muslim community Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the Chief Mufti, challenged the decision of 10 February 1992 before the Supreme Court. The proceedings ended by final judgment of 7 April 1993. The Supreme Court, while considering that the impugned decision was not amenable to judicial review, nevertheless commented that the Directorate’s decision to declare Mr   Gendzhev’s election null and void had been within its competence. Insofar as the impugned decision had also proclaimed “the removal” of Mr   Gendzhev from his position of Chief Mufti, this had been ultra vires . However, it was unnecessary to annul this part of the Directorate’s decision as in any event it had no legal consequences. (b)     The reinstatement of Mr Gendzhev in 1995 The leadership dispute between Mr Gendzhev and Mr Hasan continued throughout 1993 and 1994. The official position of the Directorate of Religious Denominations remained that Mr Hasan was the legitimate Chief Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims. At the same time the Directorate apparently sought to “resolve” the dispute by a “unification” of the two factions under a common leadership. On 2 November 1994 the supporters of Mr Gendzhev held a national conference which proclaimed itself the legitimate representative of Muslim believers. The conference elected a leadership and adopted a statute. Mr   Gendzhev was elected President of the Supreme Holy Council. After the conference the newly elected leaders applied to the Directorate for registration as the legitimate leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria. At the end of 1994 parliamentary elections took place in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Socialist Party obtained a majority in Parliament and formed a new government, which took office in January 1995. On 22 February 1995 the Deputy Prime Minister issued a decree approving the statute of the Muslim denomination as adopted by the supporters of Mr Gendzhev on 2 November 1994. On 23 February 1995 the Directorate registered the leadership elected at that conference and effectively removed Mr Hasan and his supporters. In the following months the faction led by Mr Gendzhev assumed full control over the property and activities of the Muslim community in Bulgaria. Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Directorate registering Mr Gendzhev’s leadership. Mr Hasan submitted, inter alia , that the conference of 2 November 1994 had been organised by people outside the Muslim religious organisation presided over by him. Accordingly, they could register their own religious organisation but could not claim to replace the leadership of another. Mr Hasan asked the Supreme Court either to proclaim the February 1995 decision null and void as contrary to the law or to declare that it constituted registration of a new religious community, the existing Muslim organisation being unaffected. The State did not have the right to impose a single leadership on the Muslims. On 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court stated that under the Religious Denominations Act the Council of Ministers enjoyed full discretion in its decision as to whether or not to register the statute of a given religion. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was therefore limited to an examination of whether the impugned decision had been issued by the competent administrative organ and whether the procedural requirements had been complied with. In that respect the decision of February 1995 was lawful. As regards the request for interpretation of the February 1995 decision, it was not open to the Supreme Court, in the framework of those particular proceedings, to state its opinion as to whether it had the effect of creating a new legal person, or introducing changes, and whether after this decision there existed two parallel Muslim religious organisations. (c)     Judicial proceedings instituted by Mr Hasan in 1996 and 1997 Following the removal of Mr Hasan, in 1995 the Musilm believers who supported him held their own national conference and re-elected him Chief Mufti, while introducing changes in the organisation’s statute and leadership. Mr Hasan then applied to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for registration of the amended statute and the new leadership. Not having received any response, Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the tacit refusal. On 14 October 1996 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment. It noted that in 1992 the Chief Mufti’s Office as represented by Mr Hasan had been duly registered as a religious denomination under section 6 of the Religious Denominations Act and had thus obtained legal personality of which it had not been subsequently deprived. Therefore the Council of Ministers was under an obligation, pursuant to sections 6 and 16 of the Act, to examine a request for registration of a new statute or of changes in the leadership in the existing religious denomination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the tacit refusal of the Council of Ministers had been unlawful and remitted the file to the Council of Ministers, which was required to examine it. On 19 November 1996 the Deputy Prime Minister refused to register the 1995 statute and leadership of the Chief Mufti’s Office as represented by Mr   Hasan. He sent him a letter stating inter alia that the Council of Ministers had already registered a leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria, which was that elected by the November 1994 conference with Mr Gendzhev as President of the Supreme Holy Council. The Deputy Prime Minister concluded that the first applicant’s request “[could not] be granted as it [was] clearly contrary to the provisions of the Religious Denominations Act”. On 5 December 1996 Mr Hasan appealed to the Supreme Court against the refusal of 19 November 1996. On 13 March 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the refusal of the Deputy Prime Minister to register the 1995 statute and leadership headed by Mr   Hasan on the ground that it was unlawful and contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution. That refusal was moreover “an unlawful administrative intervention into the internal organisation of [a] religious community”. The Supreme Court again ordered the transmission of the file to the Council of Ministers for registration. Despite the Supreme Court judgments of 1996 and 1997 the Council of Ministers did not grant registration to the religious leadership headed by Mr   Hasan. 2.     The change of leadership in 1997 and ensuing judicial proceedings (a)     The national conference of October 1997 In February 1997 the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party stepped down and an interim cabinet was appointed. At the general elections that followed in April 1997 the Union of Democratic Forces obtained a majority in Parliament and formed a new government. The new Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate of Religious Denominations urged the two rival leaderships, of Mr Hasan and of Mr   Gendzhev, to negotiate a unification. On 12 September 1997, in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate, the religious leadership presided over by Mr Hasan demanded the removal of Mr Gendzhev. On 18 September 1997 the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr   Gendzhev, also in a letter addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Directorate, proposed the holding of a unification conference to be organised by a joint committee composed of representatives of the opposing factions. The Deputy Prime Minister was asked to serve as guarantor of the unification process and ensure full representation at the conference of all Muslim religious communities. The letter also indicated that the current official leadership presided over by Mr Gendzhev agreed to freeze any movements of staff or disposals of community property pending the conference. On 30 September 1997 the contact groups elected by the rival factions - composed of five members each - signed an agreement to convene a national conference of all Muslim believers. The agreement was also signed by the competent Deputy Prime Minister and the Director of Religious Denominations. It provided inter alia: 1.     The all-Muslim conference shall be organised on the basis of full representation of the Mulsim denomination. It shall not be based on the two existing statutes [of the rival leaderships]. [The] Deputy Prime Minister ... and the Director of Religious Denominations undertake to guarantee the implementation of this principle. 2.     ... The [rival groups] undertake not to obstruct the unification spirit of the conference, failing which the Directorate would take appropriate administrative measures against the persons suspected of [obstruction]. 3.     Pending the conference, the [leadership headed by Mr Gendzhev] undertakes to refrain from any administrative decisions, [such as] appointments ... 4.     The [leadership headed by Mr Gendzhev] consents to a freeze on all bank accounts ... and declares that pending the conference it will not enter into any transaction ... 7.     The joint committee shall elaborate rules and a procedure for the organisation of the conference...” On an unspecified date the joint committee ruled that the assembly of each local community attending a mosque should elect two representatives to the national conference. It also decided that the minutes from the assemblies’ proceedings had to be made on a form provided by the Directorate of Religious Denominations and certified by the local mayor. On 6 October 1997 the joint committee decided that the conference should be held on 23 October 1997 and also agreed on the distribution of the expenses. Local assemblies for the election of delegates were held on 17 October 1997 throughout the country. The applicant organisation has submitted copies of two complaints dated 21 October 1997, addressed by a local religious leader and by the mayor of a village to the Directorate. The letters stated that persons connected with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a political party, had used threats to take away the minutes of the elections of delegates in the respective two localities. On 21 and 22 October 1997 Mr Gendzhev and those who had signed the unification agreement on behalf of the Supreme Holy Council headed by him wrote to the Prime Minister and the Directorate of Religious Denominations stating that the conference planned for 23 October was not organised in accordance with the statute of the Muslim religious organisation and that it was therefore unlawful. Those who had signed the agreement of 30   September 1997 stated that they had been forced to do so by the Director of Religious Denominations and declared the withdrawal of their support for that agreement. The letter signed by Mr Gendzhev further described the participation of the Directorate in the preparation of the conference as an unacceptable State interference in the Muslims’ internal affairs. On 23 October 1997 more than one thousand delegates attended the conference. Only those whose election had been certified by the mayors were allowed to participate. According to the press, the verification of the delegates’ credentials was carried out by employees of the Directorate of Religious Denominations. Its Director addressed the conference stating, inter alia , that Mr Gendzhev, who did not appear, had “failed the test”. In these words the Director apparently blamed Mr Gendzhev for having withdrawn from the unification process. According to the applicant organisation, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a political party whose members are in their large majority ethnic Turks, was involved in the organisation of the conference. That party was allegedly very close to the ruling Union of Democratic Forces and was implementing the political decision to replace the leadership of the Muslim community. According to the applicant organisation, about one hundred of the delegates on 23   October 1997 were mayors elected on the Movement of Rights and Freedoms ticket. The conference adopted a new statute of the Muslim denomination in Bulgaria and unanimously elected a new leadership comprising six members of the leadership of Mr Hasan and other persons. It appears that no leader of the applicant organisation was among the newly elected leadership. The conference voted a resolution authorising the new leadership to conduct an audit and seek the prosecution of Mr   Gendzhev for alleged unlawful transactions. On 28 October 1997 the competent Deputy Prime Minister registered the newly elected leadership. (b)     Judicial appeals by the Supreme Holy Council led by Mr Gendzhev Mr Gendzhev, who claimed that he remained the President of the Supreme Holy Council, appealed on its behalf to the Supreme Administrative Court against the Government’s decision to register the new leadership. He claimed that the persons who had signed the agreement for the holding of a unification conference on behalf of the applicant organisation had never been officially authorised to do so; that the conference had been unlawful because of that fact and since those persons had in any event withdrawn; and that the authorities had interfered in an inadmissible manner in the internal affairs of the Muslim community. That was so because the Directorate of Religious Denominations had prepared the forms on which the results of the local elections for delegates had been recorded and also because those results had been certified by the mayors. Furthermore, among the elected delegates there had been a number of persons who were local mayors or active members of one political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. On 4 May 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court held a hearing. It admitted in evidence the material submitted by the applicant organisation but refused its request for a disclosure order against the Council of Ministers. That request apparently concerned documents about the preparation of the October 1997 conference and the elections of delegates. The court also refused to hear witnesses. On 16 July 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, rejected the appeal as being inadmissible. It found that the Supreme Holy Council of Mr Gendzhev had no locus standi to lodge an appeal as it had never been validly registered. The registration acts of 22 and 23 February 1995 had been based on a decision by a Deputy Prime Minister who, however, had not been duly authorised in express terms by the Council of Ministers to approve the statutes of religious denominations. As a result the Supreme Holy Council of Mr Gendzhev had never legally existed and all its acts between 1995 and 1997 were null and void. Upon the applicant’s appeal, on 9 October 1998 a five-member chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 16 July 1998 and remitted the case for examination on the merits. The chamber noted that by judgment of 27 July 1995 the Supreme Court had found that the 1995 registration of the Supreme Holy Council headed by Mr Gendzhev had been lawful. That finding was final and binding. Therefore, the applicant’s appeal could not be rejected for lack of locus standi . In the renewed proceedings the three-member bench of the Supreme Administrative Court examined the appeal on the merits and dismissed it on 23 May 1999. The presiding judge was the same person who had presided over in the previous examination of the case, which had ended by the inadmissibility decision of 16 July 1998. He was also one of the three judges who delivered judgment on 28   April 1992 in the case concerning Mr   Gendzhev’s removal in 1992. The court found that the acts of the authorities did not constitute an interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community. The decision to hold a unification conference had been taken freely by representatives of the two rival groups. The rules and procedures for the election of delegates and for the holding of the October 1997 conference, including those concerning the minutes of the local elections for delegates and their certification, had been elaborated by the joint committee. The Directorate of Religious Denominations had only contributed to the organisation of the conference upon the parties’ request. It had acted in accordance with the agreement between the two leaderships and the decisions of the joint committee. The Directorate’s task had been to contribute to and guarantee tolerance and respect in inter-religious relations as well as in the relations between different groups belonging to one and the same religion. The fact that the Supreme Holy Council presided over by Mr   Gendzhev had withdrawn in the last minute did not call into question the validity of the conference which had taken place in accordance with the negotiated rules. It was true that these rules derogated from the statute of the Muslim community as in force at the relevant time but the derogation had been decided upon freely by the two leaderships in order to resolve the conflict in the community. It followed that the impugned act, the decision of 28 October 1997 registering the newly elected leadership of the Muslim community, was in accordance with the law. The applicant organisation submitted a cassation appeal against the judgment of 23 May 1999. It alleged, inter alia , that not all relevant evidence had been collected and examined. On 15 March 2000 the appeal was dismissed by a five-member chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court which upheld the reasoning of the impugned judgment. It also found that the relevant facts had been clarified and that the additional evidence presented by the applicant organisation at the cassation proceedings had been the same as that submitted earlier. The Court also noted that the authenticity of the minutes from the election of delegates for the October 1997 conference had not been disputed. The applicant organisation was legally represented in the above proceedings. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice The relevant provisions of the 1991 Constitution read as follows: Article 13 “(1)     Religions shall be free. (2)     Religious institutions shall be separate from the State. (3)     Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria. (4)     Religious institutions and communities, and religious beliefs shall not be used for political ends.” Article 37 “(1)     The freedom of conscience, the freedom of thought and the choice of religion or of religious or atheistic views shall be inviolable. The State shall assist in the maintenance of tolerance and respect between the adherents of different denominations, and between believers and non-believers. (2)   The freedom of conscience and religion shall not be exercised to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, or of the rights and freedoms of others.” The Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 5 of 11 June 1992 provides a legally binding interpretation of the above provisions. It states inter alia that the State must not interfere with the internal organisation of religious communities and institutions, which must be regulated by their own statutes and rules. The State may interfere with the activity of a religious community or institution only in the cases contemplated in Articles 13 § 4 and 37 § 2 of the Constitution. An assessment as to whether there is such a case may also be undertaken at the time of registration of a religious community or institution. The Religious Denominations Act 1949 and was amended several times. The relevant provisions of the Act, as in force at the time of the events at issue, read as follows. Section 6 “(1)     A religious denomination shall be considered recognised and shall become a legal person upon the approval of its statute by the Council of Ministers, or by a Deputy Prime Minister authorised for this purpose. (2)     The Council of Ministers, or a Deputy Prime Minister authorised for this purpose, shall revoke the recognition, by a reasoned decision, if the activities of the religious denomination breach the law, public order or morals.” Section 9 “(1)     Every religious denomination shall have a leadership accountable to the State. (2)     The statute of the religious denomination shall establish its governing and representative bodies and the procedure for their election and appointment... “ Section 16 “(1)     The national governing bodies of the religious denominations shall register with the Directorate of Religious Denominations of the Council of Ministers, and local governing bodies with the local municipalities, and they shall submit a list of the names of all members of these governing bodies.” The Act also laid down rules regarding the activities of a religious denomination, imposes requirements as regards its clergy and gives the Directorate of Religious Denominations certain supervisory functions. In its judgment no.   5 of 11 June 1992 the Constitutional Court, while agreeing that certain provisions of the Religious Denominations Act were clearly unconstitutional, found that it was not its task to repeal legal provisions adopted prior to the entry into force of the 1991 Constitution, the ordinary courts being competent to declare them inapplicable. Under Decree No. 125 of the Council of Ministers of 6 December 1990, as amended, the competence of the Directorate of Religious Denominations includes “contacts between the State and religions denominations”, assistance to central and local administrative authorities in solving problems which involve religious matters and assistance to religious organisations as regards education and publications. At the relevant time there were no procedural provisions under Bulgarian law applicable to the examination by the Council of Ministers, or by a Deputy Prime Minister, of a petition for authorisation of a religious denomination. The Religious Denominations Act 1949 was repealed with effect as from 1 January 2003, upon the entry into force of the new Religious Denominations Act 2003. The new law provides, inter alia , that “there can be no more than one legal person being a religious denomination with the same name and registered address” (section 15 § 2). COMPLAINTS The applicant organisation complained, invoking Articles 6, 9, 13 and 14 of the Convention, of the acts of the authorities related to the national conference of 23 October 1997, the ensuing registration of a new officially recognised leadership of the Muslim community in Bulgaria and the subsequent judicial proceedings. It claimed that the Directorate of Religious Denominations had organised and manipulated the conference with the aim of favouring one of the rival leaderships and removing Mr Gendzhev, thus violating Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention. The applicant organisation also complained that the requirement of impartiality, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention, had been breached in the 1999 proceedings because the presiding judge had decided twice in the same case, before and after its remand for renewed examination, and had also participated in another case involving Mr Gendzhev in similar circumstances. Furthermore, in the 1998-99 proceedings the Supreme Administrative Court had allegedly rejected a request for a disclosure order against the Directorate of Religious Denominations in respect of all documentary material concerning the October 1997 conference, thus vitiating the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. The resulting decisions were allegedly arbitrary. The applicant organisation complained, invoking Article 13 of the Convention, that the judicial remedies it had had at its disposal had proved ineffective and that no other remedies had been available against the arbitrary acts of the authorities. THE LAW 1.     Complaints under Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention The applicant organisation complained that the authorities had organised and manipulated the October 1997 Muslim conference with the aim of favouring one of the rival leaderships and removing Mr Gendzhev. They also complained in general about the alleged State intervention in the affairs of the Muslim community. The Court considers that the above complaints fall to be examined under Article 9 of the Convention, which provides:   “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2.     Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” (a)     The parties’ submissions (i)     The Government The Government stated that the divisions within the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria since 1989 had been caused by conflicts of political and personal nature. In 1997 efforts had been made to overcome these differences and unify the community. The representatives of the rival groups had signed an agreement for the holding of a unification conference and had solicited the assistance of the Directorate of Religious Denominations. The role of the Directorate had been that of a neutral guarantor of the agreement entered into freely by the opposing factions. Mr   Gendzhev himself had solicited such participation of the Directorate, apparently considering it vital in the unification process. The joint committee had freely decided that it wished the minutes of local elections of delegates certified by the mayors. Furthermore, as established by the courts later, the election of delegates had proceeded normally. The massive participation had demonstrated the community’s will for unification. The Government also underlined that the case did not concern a process of putting two religious communities under a single leadership but a situation where one religious community had two leaderships. Contradictory decisions of the authorities during the period 1992-1997, including those criticised by the Court in its Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria judgment, had resulted in confusion as to the leadership of the Muslim community. Unlike in previous years, however, in 1997 the State had not interfered in the internal affairs of the community but had only assisted it in its efforts to achieve unification, as part of the authorities’ duty under the Constitution to help maintaining a climate of tolerance in religious life. The Government stated that the reasons given by Mr Gendzhev and the five members of the contact group nominated by the Supreme Holy Council presided over by him for their withdrawal from the national conference were vague and left the impression that they had simply been unsatisfied with the results of the primary elections for delegates. The Government considered that the withdrawal of five persons did not put into question the legitimacy of the national conference and that the authorities rightly accepted its results. (ii)     The applicant organisation The applicant organisation replied that Mr Gendzhev had been unlawfully removed in 1992 by Mr Hasan and that in 1997 Mr Hasan had sought a repeat of these events, counting on the support of the Union of Democratic Forces, the political party which had “helped” him in 1992, and which had again come to power in 1997. The applicant organisation further stated that Mr Gendzhev had actively sought the achievement of unification which he considered important for the well-being of the Muslim community but had had to withdraw because of the irregularities in the elections of delegates. The Government’s argument that the withdrawal of several persons did not affect the legitimacy of the conference was flawed since the leaders had withdrawn precisely because of the illegitimacy of the local elections for delegates. In particular, the authorities had gone far beyond what was necessary for the organisation of the conference and had mounted a concerted effort to remove Mr Gendzhev. Pressure had been brought to bear on local communities in the elections for delegates. The election results had been manipulated since contrary to relevant regulations elections had been held in many villages which were not independent municipalities. On at least three occasions the minutes had been forged. (b)     The Court’s decision on admissibility The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the above complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established. 2.     Complaints under Article 6 of the Convention The applicant organisation complained that in the proceedings on appeal against the decision of 28 October 1997 of the Deputy Prime Minister to register the leadership elected at the unification conference, the same judge had sat twice in the examination of the case and the courts had refused the applicant organisation’s request for a disclosure order. It also complained that the courts had disregarded important facts and had delivered arbitrary decisions. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...” The Government stated that the applicant organisation had not exhausted all domestic remedies as it had not requested the removal of the judge in question. In any event, under the relevant domestic law, a higher court, after quashing a lower court’s judgment, remits the case to be examined by the same lower court. That was the normal procedure. The Government also sated that the applicant organisation’s allegations that certain evidence had not been examined and their submissions about the refusal of their request for a disclosure order were unsubstantiated, it being unclear what evidence they had sought to adduce. The applicant organisation’s judicial appeals had been dealt with on the merits. The courts had carefully examined all arguments advanced by the parties. The applicant organisation replied that the judge’s withdrawal had not been requested as there had been doubts whether such a request would have been successful. The applicant organisation also stated that it was clear that the evidence they had sought to adduce in vain concerned the irregularities in the preparation of the October 1997 conference. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the above complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established. 3.     Complaint under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 Article 13 of the Convention provides: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” The Government submitted that the courts, by examining the applicant organisation’s appeals on the merits, provided an effective remedy against the alleged interference with the believers’ Article 9 rights. The applicant organisation replied that the courts had disregarded important facts and had delivered arbitrary decisions, thus denying in practice any effective remedy, and that no other remedies existed. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the remainder of the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.   Søren Nielsen   Christos Rozakis Deputy Registrar   President