CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 21 octobre 2003

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display:inline-block } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s546C9D04 { border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s40B7A780 { border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s4F2EDFF { border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; padding-right:5.03pt; padding-left:5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } FOURTH SECTION DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application nos. 47675/99 and others by Barbara McANDREW and 10 others against the United Kingdom The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21   October 2003 as a Chamber composed of   Mr   M. Pellonpää , President ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mr   S. Pavlovschi ,   Mr   L. Garlicki ,   Mr   J. Borrego Borrego, judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above applications lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on various dates from 1 April 1999 to 13 February 2001, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows:               THE FACTS The applicants are United Kingdom nationals. Alan Broadhurst (application no. 69187/01) is represented before the Court by Mr R. Price, a lawyer practising in Sheffield; the remaining applicants are represented by Dicksons HMB Solicitors, lawyers practising in Stoke-on-Trent. A.     The circumstances of the cases The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Each applicant failed to pay sums due in respect of either local taxes (community charge or council tax), or court-imposed fines. In respect of the failure to pay local taxes, the magistrates’ court had in each case determined that the applicants were liable to pay (issuing a “liability order”); in fines cases, the magistrates’ court had imposed the fine as the sentence following a criminal conviction. Each applicant fell into arrears with the payments due from them. These cases involve the enforcement proceedings in respect of their arrears in the magistrates’ court. Each applicant appeared before the court, following the issuing of an application for their committal to prison as a result of their failure to pay the sums due. At that hearing the magistrates found that the non-payment was due to the applicant’s wilful refusal or culpable neglect. As a result each applicant was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, suspended on terms that the applicant make periodic payments towards the outstanding sum. The applicant failed to comply with the terms imposed. A further hearing was thereafter held in the magistrates’ court at which the suspended term of imprisonment was activated. Each applicant spent a period of time in prison. Legal aid (free legal representation where the applicant did not have sufficient means to pay for it) was not available for these enforcement proceedings prior to 1 June 1997 and none of the applicants were legally represented at the hearings in front of the magistrates. Following their imprisonment, an application was made on behalf of each applicant, by way of either judicial review or case stated, which resulted in the High Court quashing the orders made by the magistrates. The applicants were released from prison on bail at the time of making their applications to the High Court. In three cases the orders of the magistrates were quashed in a judgment of the High Court. In the remaining cases the orders were quashed following the High Court’s approval of a consent order agreed between the applicants and the magistrates who had sentenced them. The Court has set out the relevant facts pertaining to each applicant in the table which appears at the end of this decision. That table sets out the following information in respect of each applicant: their name and application number; whether their case involved non-payment of community charge (“CC”), council tax (“CT”) or fines (“F”) and the number of days which they spent in prison; whether their proceedings in the magistrates’ court took place before or after legal aid became available on 1 June 1997; and the grounds upon which the High Court quashed the orders of the magistrates. Where the orders of the magistrates were quashed following a judgment, the Court has indicated that fact in the table. Where the orders of the magistrates were quashed by means of a consent order, the Court has set out a summary of the terms of the consent order. Throughout the text of this decision, where there is a reference to a specific applicant, the Court has set out the surname of the applicant followed by their application number in brackets. The words “justices” and “magistrates” are synonymous in domestic law. The Court sets out the facts of four applications more fully below. 1.     Julie BEET (47676/99) The applicant’s proceedings before the magistrates arose in respect of her arrears in payment of community charge and took place after 1 June 1997. She spent a total of 2 days in prison. The orders of the magistrates’ court were quashed by the High Court as a result of a consent order in which it was agreed that: “(i) The decision of the justices that the applicant had culpably neglected to pay her community charge without having conducted a proper inquiry into her circumstances as of the time that the liability became due was unlawful, see R. v. Leeds Justices ex parte Kennett [1996] RVR 53. (ii) The decision of the justices to issue a sentence of committal to prison and to make an order postponing the issue of the warrant that would have left the threat of imprisonment over her for over 4 years was unlawful having regard to the principles laid down in R. v. Oliver and Oliver [1989] 11 Cr App R(S) 10 and R. v. Ealing Justices ex parte Cloves [1991] RVR 169 and R. v. Newcastle upon Tyne Justices ex parte Devine [1998] RA 97. (iii) In view of the circumstances of the applicant and [her] detention, and the period of detention served, all parties agreed that the matter be remitted back to the magistrates and that the magistrates, upon reviewing the matter, agreed to remit the outstanding community charge arrears, see Brooke LJ in R. v. St Helens Justices ex parte Jones CO/3328/95.” In respect of costs, it was further agreed that: “... in view of the fact that the Hull Justices had acknowledged the same ground in quashing the committal in R. v. Hull Justices ex parte Shawcross (CO/265/98) costs be borne by the respondent justices see R. v. Newcastle upon Tyne Justices ex parte Devine [1998] RA 97.” 2.     Steven DALDRY (58896/00) The applicant’s application for judicial review was determined by the judgment of Mr Justice Keene in R. v. Gloucestershire Justices ex parte Daldry [2001] RVR 242. The facts as set out in that judgment were that the applicant had a major heart attack in the summer of 1997 leaving him disabled. In the spring of 1998 he appeared before the magistrates as a result of failing to pay arrears of community charge. Three liability orders had been made in respect of amounts due for each of the three years from 1990-1993. The magistrates found the applicant to have wilfully refused or culpably neglected to have paid his community charge for some part of those three years. The justices fixed a term of imprisonment and ordered the applicant to pay £5 per week from his income support, the term being suspended so long as he made those payments. The applicant failed to keep up with the payments that were due. He was therefore required to attend before the magistrates on 23 July 1998. Some days before that hearing he was given an appointment to see the consultant cardiologist who was going to undertake open-heart surgery on him. Approximately two weeks before the hearing date, the applicant’s wife telephoned the authority responsible for collecting the community charge and told its recovery officer that the applicant had a hospital appointment on 23 July 1998. There was a dispute about what happened during that telephone conversation. According to the applicant, he was told that the matter would be adjourned. However, a letter from the authority’s recovery officer stated that the applicant was told that he must attend court and would be dealt with first in the list. The applicant did not attend court on 23   July   1998. The justices issued a warrant for his committal to prison in his absence. The applicant was imprisoned on 4 December 1998. An application for leave to seek judicial review was made, heard and granted the same day, at which time the applicant was also granted bail. Mr Justice Keene quashed the spring 1998 decision of the magistrates for the following reasons. First, by reference to regulation 41(3) of the Community Charges (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1989 (see below) Mr Justice Keene found that the magistrates had failed to give separate consideration to, and make separate findings in respect of, whether there had been culpable neglect or wilful refusal in respect of each of the three liability orders that had been made against the applicant during the years 1990-1993. In coming to that conclusion, Mr Justice Keene stated that he agreed with the judgment of Mr Justice Owen in the case of R. v. Leeds Justices ex parte Kennett (see below). Secondly, in the circumstances of this case, the judge held that deducting the arrears due from the applicant’s income support was a proper alternative which should have been considered by the magistrates before making any suspended order for imprisonment. Thirdly, given the applicant’s circumstances, the magistrates should have exercised their discretion to remit the amount of his community charge arrears. Their failure to do so was perverse. In relation to the hearing on 23 July 1998, Mr Justice Keene stated as follows: “... it appears that the justices must have been aware of the applicant’s medical condition and of the reason which he gave for not attending. It may well be that they did not regard that as a sufficient reason for his non-attendance. Nonetheless it does not seem that that could have been regarded as a spurious reason, or a mere excuse, or that the applicant was acting in bad faith in any way. As a matter of law, justices can issue a warrant of committal in the absence of a defendant, but where there is evidence of serious ill health and the defendant is not present in court, justices should be slow to commit a person for civil debt in the absence of conducting any further investigations. The matter was well put by Rose LJ, in a case arising out of very different circumstances but nonetheless of relevance for present purposes, namely R. v. Doncaster Justices ex parte Hannan [1998] RVR 254. His Lordship said this: ‘This case illustrates how unwise it may be for justices to make an order committing someone to prison when they do not know, because that person is not before them and because that person does not know of the date of the hearing, what the up-to-date circumstances are’. Of course the present case is different in that the person in question did know of the date of the hearing but had put forward a particular problem which he faced in attending on that day. Whether he was justified in not appearing is not the point. The point is that the committal of someone to prison is a very draconian step and before taking it justices should take steps to satisfy themselves that they are fully aware of all the circumstances which relate to the individual who does not appear before them, particularly when they do know that he has a serious health problem. In my judgment, to issue a warrant for the imprisonment of this applicant forthwith, in those circumstances, was Wednesbury unreasonable.” 3.     Alan BROADHURST (69187/01) This applicant’s application for judicial review was determined by the judgment of Mr Justice Gage in R. v. Sheffield Justices ex parte Broadhurst [2001] RVR 245. The applicant was summoned to appear before the magistrates on 4 March 1997 as a result of his failure to meet his liabilities for community charge and council tax. The magistrates found that his failure to pay was as a result of culpable neglect. They made an order committing the applicant to prison for 45 days, but suspended the term upon payment of £8 a week of the arrears. Mr Justice Gage quashed that order for the following reasons. First, the magistrate had been faced with five liabilities in relation to community charge and council tax on 4 March 1997. Mr Justice Gage referred to the following words of Mr Justice Owen in R. v. Leeds Justices ex parte Kennett : “It is apparent from the wording of the regulations that each liability order is to be considered separately and in respect of each liability order there has to be, as I see it, a decision as to whether there was wilful refusal or culpable neglect shown.” Mr Justice Gage continued by quoting the words of Mr Justice Turner in R. v. Warrington Borough Council ex parte Barrett [2000] RVR 208, inter alia , that: “... Before the justices were entitled to come to a finding of culpable neglect or wilful refusal they had to give separate consideration to each period.” Mr Justice Gage then considered the actions of the magistrates on 4   March 1997. He concluded as follows: “... what the court did on that occasion was to look at the whole matter in the round together, and did not look at each of the liabilities separately and make separate findings in respect of each. In the circumstances it seems to me clear from the regulations and the interpretation put upon them by Turner J and Owen J, with which I respectfully agree, that the magistrates erred in their failure to make separate findings in respect of each of the liabilities.” Mr Justice Gage further held that the decision of the magistrates to order the applicant to make payments of £8 a week was one which no reasonable bench of magistrates could have made; that the magistrates should have considered their power to remit part or all of the sum due before they went on to consider imprisonment; and that the imposition of terms of payment which would have taken a period of five years to discharge was far too long. The applicant appeared again before the magistrates on 20 March 2000. On that occasion he was ordered to be committed to prison for non-payment of community charge and council tax. Mr Justice Gage quashed that order for the following reasons. The hearing concerned four additional liabilities for council tax. Mr   Justice Gage held, first, that the magistrates had failed to consider their power to remit the amounts due. Second, that they did not make separate inquiries in respect of each of the four liabilities. Third, that on the evidence before the justices, they should not have made a finding of wilful refusal to pay. Fourth, that the period that it would have taken for the applicant to discharge his arrears on the making of repayments had by that time been extended to eight years. That period was far too long. 4.     Ingrid DANN (3859/02) This applicant’s application for judicial review was determined by the judgment of the Divisional Court on 23 March 2000. In February 1995, following a means inquiry, the magistrates found that the applicant had been guilty of culpable neglect in failing to pay two court-imposed fines. They imposed a term of seven days’ imprisonment, postponed upon payment of £10 per fortnight. On 13 June 1995 the applicant was committed to prison by the magistrates in respect of her failure to pay those fines. She was detained in prison for one day. The Divisional Court allowed the applicant’s application for judicial review and quashed the decision of the magistrates on the basis that they had been wrong in law not to have considered the imposition of a supervision order as an alternative to sending the applicant to prison, as they were required to do by section 82(4A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. In coming to its conclusion, the Divisional Court set out the requirements of sections 77(2), 82(3), 82(4) and 82(4A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (see under “Relevant domestic law” below). Lord Justice Otton stated that, in fine enforcement cases, it was therefore the obligation of the magistrates to act as follows: first, to conduct an inquiry into the applicant’s means; secondly, to determine whether the default was due to wilful refusal or culpable neglect; and thirdly, to consider or try all the alternative means of enforcing payment other than imprisonment. His Lordship affirmed that the language of section 82, in particular section 82(4), was unambiguous. He referred to the following passage in the commentary in Stones’ Justices Manual 1999: “The words are thus peremptory. There is no discretion in the court. It must either consider or try all the other methods of enforcing payment.” Lord Justice Otton referred further to the statutory requirement to consider a supervision order under section 88 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 prior to imposing a sentence of imprisonment and to the passage of the judgment of Mr Justice Farquharson in R. v. Norwich Justices ex parte Lilly (1987) 151 JP 689 in relation to enforcement proceedings (set out under “Relevant domestic law” below). During the course of his judgment, Lord Justice Otton stated that, in fines enforcement cases, the statutory provisions and principles were well established, yet it was “a blemish on our justice system” that too many debtors were sent to prison instead of resorting to the many alternative methods of disposal which were available to magistrates. B.     Relevant domestic law 1.     Appeal from a decision of a magistrates’ court by way of case stated By virtue of section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 a party to proceedings before a magistrates’ court may “question the proceeding on the ground that it is wrong in law or is in excess of jurisdiction by applying to the justices composing the court to state a case for the opinion of the High Court on the question of law or jurisdiction involved ...”. This is known as the “case stated” procedure. Under section 113 of the 1980 Act, magistrates may grant bail to a party who applies to them to state a case; but if they refuse to do so, in cases categorised as “civil” under the domestic law, the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant bail until it is seized of some substantive proceedings to which the grant of bail can be ancillary. 2.     Judicial review According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 1(1) at paragraph 59: “Judicial review is the process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are charged with the performance of public acts and duties ... Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in respect of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself ... The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern is with whether a decision making authority exceeded its powers, committed an error of law, committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached or abused its powers.” 3.     The distinction between an act of a magistrates’ court which is merely wrong in law and one which is so wrong as to be in excess of jurisdiction The principles underlying the domestic law as set out under this heading are largely as previously stated in the case-law of the Convention organs, in particular in the judgments of the Court in the cases of Benham v. the United   Kingdom (judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p.738) (“ Benham ”) and Perks and Others v. the United Kingdom nos. 25277/94 and others, 12 October 1999 (“ Perks ”). The Government submitted that this was an accurate statement of the position under domestic law. The applicants disagreed and the extent to which they did so can be seen by reference to the applicants’ arguments as set out under the below heading “Preliminary submission that Benham and Perks were wrongly decided”. In English law, orders of a magistrates’ court which are in excess of jurisdiction are void from the outset, whereas orders made within jurisdiction remain valid until set aside by a superior court. It is only in respect of the former type of error that a court can be held civilly liable in damages (under section 108 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, which replaced section 45 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979 – see below). The appropriate test for whether an order of a magistrates’ court is void for lack of jurisdiction is that set out by the House of Lords in McC. v.   Mullan [1984] 3 All England Reports 908. In that case magistrates had made an order sending a 14-year-old boy to a training school after a hearing at which he was not legally represented, had not applied for legal aid and had not been informed of his right so to do. The order was quashed on judicial review on the ground that, by virtue of Article 15(1) of the Treatment of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, magistrates were not permitted to pass a custodial sentence for the first time on a juvenile who was not legally represented, unless he had applied for legal aid and had been refused on grounds of means or had been informed of his right to apply for it but had refused or neglected to do so. The boy then applied for damages for false imprisonment against the magistrates. Since the case was decided prior to the enactment of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and at a time when magistrates were liable in damages for false imprisonment if they acted in excess of jurisdiction, the House of Lords was required to decide the jurisdictional question. Indeed, Lord Templeman in his judgment stated as follows: “The question to be determined on this appeal is whether the magistrates acted within their jurisdiction or without jurisdiction.” In addressing that question, Lord Bridge specifically referred to the case of Anisminic Ltd. v. the Foreign Compensation Commisison [1969] 2 Appeal Cases 147 (HL) (“ Anisminic ”) and stated as follows: “I do not believe that the novel test of excess of jurisdiction which emerges from the Anisminic case, ... however valuable it may be in ensuring that the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts over inferior tribunals is effective to secure compliance with the law and is not lightly to be ousted by statute, has any application whatever to the construction of s[ection]   15 of the 1964 Northern Ireland Act or s[ection] 45 of the 1979 [Justices of the Peace] Act.” In the judgment of the House of Lords, a magistrates’ court acted in excess of jurisdiction in three circumstances only: (1) if it acted without having jurisdiction over the cause, (2) if, although it had jurisdiction, it were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure, or (3) if it made an order that had no proper foundation in law because of a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent. The instant case fell within the third limb of the rule: the magistrates were liable in damages because they had not observed the requirements of Article 15(1) of the 1976 Order. As such, they had failed to fulfil the statutory condition precedent to the imposition of the sentence of detention. During the course of his judgment, Lord Bridge commented on the jurisdiction of magistrates in conducting a criminal trial: “... once justices have duly entered upon a summary trial of a matter within their jurisdiction, only something quite exceptional occurring in the course of their proceeding to a determination can oust their jurisdiction ... [A]n error (whether of law or fact) in deciding a collateral issue on which jurisdiction depends will not do so. Nor will the absence of any evidence to support a conviction ...” Lord Bridge also said the following in relation to the second situation set out above in which a magistrates’ court acted in excess of jurisdiction: “Justices would, of course, be acting ‘without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction’ within the meaning of s[ection] 15 if, in the course of hearing a case within their jurisdiction, they were guilty of some gross and obvious irregularity of procedure, as for example if one justice absented himself for part of the hearing and relied on another to tell him what had happened during his absence, or of the rules of natural justice, as for example if the justices refused to allow the defendant to give evidence. But I would leave for determination if and when they arise other more subtle cases one might imagine in which it could successfully be contended in judicial review proceedings that a conviction was vitiated on some narrow technical ground involving a procedural irregularity or even a breach of the rules of natural justice. Such convictions, if followed by a potential trespass to person or goods, would not, in my opinion, necessarily expose the justices to liability in damages.” The final limb of the rule formulated by the House of Lords in McC. v. Mullan (that is, that magistrates exceed their jurisdiction when they make an order which has no foundation in law because of a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent) was applied by the Court of Appeal in R.   v.   Manchester City Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Davies [1989] 1 All England Reports 90, a case concerning rates (a local tax which was the predecessor to the community charge). In the course of his judgment in that case, Lord Justice O’Connor stated: “I return to the issue under s[ection] 45 of the 19[7]9 Act. This section was considered by the House of Lords in McC. v. Mullan ... That was a case from Northern Ireland but the relevant statutory provisions are the same.” Again, the issue was whether magistrates had acted in excess of jurisdiction and were therefore liable in damages for false imprisonment. In considering that question Lord Justice Neill stated as follows: “It is to be noted that in Anisminic Ltd. v. the Foreign Compensation Commission ... Lord Reid expressed the opinion that it is better not to use the term [jurisdiction] ‘except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the inquiry in question’. It is plain, however, that in s[ection] 45(1) ‘jurisdiction’ has a wider meaning than this original meaning.” The plaintiff had been unable to pay all of the rates for which he became liable in December 1984, and in January 1986 he failed to follow his accountant’s advice to close his business and elect bankruptcy. Applying legislation similar to regulation 41 of the Community Charge Regulations (for which, see below), the magistrates found that his failure to follow the accountant’s advice constituted culpable neglect and they committed him to prison. The Court of Appeal held that no causal connection had been established between the failure to follow the advice in 1986 and the failure to pay the rates in 1984; and that the magistrates had not properly entered into the inquiry as to whether the failure to pay was due to culpable neglect, which was required by the legislation as a statutory condition precedent to the exercise by the justices of their power to issue a warrant of commitment. They were therefore acting in excess of jurisdiction and were liable in damages. The three Appeal Court judges expressed their findings in slightly different terms. Lord Justice O’Connor observed that “they never carried out the inquiry required [by the law]”. Lord Justice Neill found that “some inquiry about the applicant’s finances was made”, but that “a clear and crucial distinction can be drawn between the inquiry required by the statute and the inquiry which was in fact carried out. The justices never examined the question whether failure to pay was due to culpable neglect ... In my judgment, the statutory inquiry was not held in the present case”; and Sir   Roger Ormrod (who dissented from the majority decision) said: “... it is quite clear that the justices carried out an inquiry into means carefully and in detail ... It is equally plain that they misdirected themselves completely ... They ... failed to realise that the question they had to decide was whether the applicant’s failure to pay his rates was ‘ due either to his wilful refusal or to his culpable neglect’ ”. 4.     Statutory provisions (a)     Provisions concerning enforcement of payment of the community charge and council tax The relevant subordinate legislation is the Community Charge (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1989 (Statutory Instrument 1989/438) (“the 1989 Regulations”). The relevant provisions of regulation 29 (“application for a liability order”) are as follows: “(1)     If an amount which has fallen due ... is wholly or partly unpaid the charging authority may ... apply to a magistrates’ court for an order against the person by whom it is payable. ... (5)     The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.” Regulation 39(1) provides for the seizure and sale of a debtor’s property (“levying of distress”): “Where a liability order has been made the authority which applied for the order may levy the appropriate amount by distress and sale of goods of the debtor against whom the order was made.” Regulation 41 is concerned with the committal to prison of a debtor, and provides, so far as is relevant: “(1)     Where a charging authority has sought to levy an amount by distress under regulation 39, the debtor is an individual, and it appears to the authority that no (or insufficient) goods of the debtor can be found on which to levy the amount, the authority may apply to a magistrates’ court for the issue of a warrant committing the debtor to prison. (2)     On such application being made the court shall (in the debtor’s presence) inquire as to his means and inquire whether the failure to pay which led to the liability order concerned being made against him was due to his wilful refusal or culpable neglect. (3)     If (and only if) the court is of the opinion that his failure was due to his wilful refusal or culpable neglect it may if it thinks fit - (a)     issue a warrant of commitment against the debtor, or (b)     fix a term of imprisonment and postpone the issue of the warrant until such time and on such conditions (if any) as the court thinks just. ... (7)     The order in the warrant shall be that the debtor be imprisoned for a time specified in the warrant which shall not exceed 3 months, unless the amount stated in the warrant is sooner paid ... .” Regulation 42 makes further provision in respect of committal to prison. It provides, in relevant part, as follows: “(2)     Where an application under regulation 41 has been made, and after the making of the inquiries mentioned in paragraph (2) of that regulation no warrant is issued or term of imprisonment fixed, the court may remit all or part of the appropriate amount mentioned in regulation 39(2) with respect to which the application related. (3)     Where an application under regulation 41 has been made but no warrant is issued or term of imprisonment fixed, the application may be renewed (except so far as regards any sum remitted under paragraph (2)) on the ground that the circumstances of the debtor have changed.” Regulations 47 and 48 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (Statutory Instrument 1992/613), which concern the commitment to prison of a person for failure to pay council tax, are in similar terms to regulations 41 and 42 of the 1989 Regulations. (b)     Provisions concerning enforcement of payment of fines Sections 77(2) and 82 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 read, in relevant part, as follows: “77.     Postponement of issue of warrant. (2)     Where a magistrates’ court has power to issue a warrant of commitment under this Part of this Act, it may, if it thinks it expedient to do so, fix a term of imprisonment ... and postpone the issue of the warrant until such time and on such conditions, if any, as the court thinks just.” “82.     Restriction on power to impose imprisonment for default (3)     Where on the occasion of the offender’s conviction a magistrates’ court does not issue a warrant of commitment for a default in paying any ... sum [adjudged to be paid following conviction] ... or fix a term of imprisonment under ... section 77(2) which is to be served by him in the event of any such default, it shall not thereafter issue a warrant of commitment for any such default or for want of sufficient distress to satisfy such a sum unless - (...) (b)     The court has since the conviction inquired into his means in his presence on at least one occasion. (4)     Where a magistrates’ court is required by subsection (3) above to inquire into a person’s means, the court may not on the occasion of the inquiry or at any time thereafter issue a warrant of commitment for a default in paying any such sum unless - (...) (b)     The court (i)     is satisfied that the default is due to the offender’s wilful refusal or culpable neglect; and (ii)     has considered or tried all other methods of enforcing payment of the sum and it appears to the court that they are inappropriate or unsuccessful.” Section 82(4A) lists the methods of enforcing payment that are mentioned in the above-cited subsection 82(4)(b)(ii). One such method that is listed in section 82(4A) is the imposition of a ‘fines supervision order’ under section 88 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. Section 82 continues: “(5)     After the occasion of an offender’s conviction by a magistrates’ court, the court shall not, unless - (a)     the court has previously fixed a term of imprisonment under section 77(2) above which is to be served by the offender in the event of a default in paying a sum adjudged to be paid by the conviction; (...) issue a warrant of commitment for a default in paying the sum or fix such a term except at a hearing at which the offender is present. (5A)     A magistrates’ court may not issue a warrant of commitment under subsection   (5) above at a hearing at which the offender is not present unless the clerk of the court has first served on the offender a notice in writing stating that the court intends to hold a hearing to consider whether to issue such a warrant and giving the reason why the court so intends. (...) (5F)     A notice under subsection (5A) above to be served on any person shall be deemed to be served on that person if it is sent by registered post or the recorded delivery service addressed to him at his last known address, notwithstanding that the notice is returned as undelivered or is for any other reason not received by that person. (6)     Where a magistrates’ court issues a warrant of commitment on the ground that one of the conditions mentioned in subsection (1) or (4) above is satisfied, it shall state that fact, specifying the ground, in the warrant.” (c)     Restrictions on imposing custodial sentences on persons under the age of 21 Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 sets out provisions in relation to the custody and detention of persons under 21 years of age. Section 1 reads, in relevant part, as follows: “1.     General restriction on custodial sentences (5)     No court shall commit a person under 21 years of age to be detained under section 9 below [Detention of persons aged 18-20 for default or contempt] unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate; (...) (5A)     Where a magistrates’ court commits a person under 21 years of age to be detained under section 9 below, it shall - (a)     state in open court the reason for its opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate; and (b)     cause that reason to be specified in the warrant of commitment and to be entered in the register.” Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 reads, in relevant part, as follows: “3.     Restriction on imposing custodial sentences on persons under 21 not legally represented. - (1)     A magistrates’ court on summary conviction or the Crown Court on committal for sentence or on conviction on indictment shall not - (a)     pass a sentence of detention in a young offender institution (...) in respect of or on a person who is not legally represented in that court, unless either   - (i)     he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear his means were such that he required assistance; or (ii)     having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply.” Regulation 42(7) of the 1989 Regulations states that the above sections of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 apply to proceedings under regulation 41 of the 1989 Regulations.     5.     Case-law Among the further case-law referred to in the judgments and consent orders of the High Court, and/or referred to by the parties in their submissions, was the following: (a)     The inquiry into the debtor’s means and circumstances (i)     General In R. v. Hyndburn Justices ex parte Derrick Long (18 October 1993), Mr Justice Schiemann stated as follows in a case concerning the non-payment of the community charge: “ ... It is important when dealing with the liberty of citizens only to set in train the process of imprisonment when all the requirements imposed by law have been carefully considered. It is important to note that, in this field as in the case of suspended sentences of imprisonment imposed pursuant to the criminal law, the same degree of care must be exercised in the case of a suspended penalty as in the case of an immediate penalty.” (ii)     Failure to hold a proper means inquiry In R. v. Woking Justices ex parte Johnstone [1942] 2 King’s Bench 248, the Divisional Court, in examining legislation in similar terms to the 1989 Regulations, emphasised that, in order to commit to prison, the justices, following their inquiry, had to be of the opinion that the failure to pay was due either to wilful refusal or culpable neglect. In R. v. Stafford Justices ex parte Shaun Thomas Johnson (16   March   1995) Mr Justice Laws stated as follows: “ ... The means inquiry required by regulation 41(2) is of great importance because without it the Justices plainly cannot properly arrive at a conclusion as to whether the failure to pay had been due to the debtor’s wilful refusal or culpable neglect. A means inquiry, thus, is at the centre of the enforcement procedure which is laid down by these Regulations. These Justices did not, in truth, embark upon a proper means inquiry at all. It follows that their order committing the applicant to prison is entirely vitiated.” In Meara v. DPP (25 November 1998), a case involving the non-payment of fines, Lord Justice Rose stated that: “... an essential prerequisite to a finding of culpable neglect must be the holding of a full means inquiry”. (iii)     Failure to examine each liability order separately In R. v. Leeds Justices ex parte Kennett [1996] Rating and Valuation Reporter (“RVR”) 53, an order committing the applicant to prison for non-payment of community charge following the issue of thre