CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 13 janvier 2004

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Pellonpää ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   J. Casadevall ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mr   S. Pavlovschi ,   Mr   J. Borrego Borrego, judges , and   Mrs   F. Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 5 October 2000, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows:             THE FACTS The applicant, Vilho Junnila, is a Finnish national, born in 1948 and living in Kaarina. He is a lorry driver by profession. He is represented before the Court by Mr J.   Pelkonen, a lawyer practising in Kaarina. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr A. Kosonen, Director in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The applicant has worked as a lorry driver since 1989. When he attained 50 years of age in 1998, his eyesight was checked by virtue of the Road Traffic Act ( tieliikennelaki , vägtrafiklagen 267/1981). In the medical check-up it was found that he is suffering from innate disability and that his visual capacity did not meet the requirements laid down in the Driving Licences Decree ( ajokorttiasetus, körkortsförordningen 845/1990) as amended on 1   July   1996 when the Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences ( ajokorttidirektiivi, körkortsdirektivet ) was implemented. On 16   March   1998 the applicant filed an application with the Vehicle Administration ( ajoneuvohallintokeskus , fordonsförvaltningscentralen ) for permission to maintain his driving licence despite failing to meet the said medical standards. His application was rejected on 15   April   1999 due to the fact that there were no special reasons to issue permission. The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court of Uusimaa ( lääninoikeus, länsrätten ) requesting an oral hearing. He requested that he be heard in person and that an eye specialist and three persons who had given written statements on his health and on his capacity to work as a lorry driver also be heard as witnesses. The applicant emphasised that the Social Insurance Institution ( kansaneläkelaitos ,   folkpensionsanstalten ) had, on the basis of a test, found him capable of working as a lorry driver and that he had also been offered a job. Furthermore, the eye specialist and the local police chief had, in their written statements, favoured the granting of the application. The applicant has five children and the driving licence was crucial for his ability to support his family. In its observations of 7   June   1999 the Vehicle Administration submitted that in principle it was possible to grant permission under section 82 (d) of the Road Traffic Act, but the possibility to do so was limited by the Council Directive on driving licences. It noted that the Council Directive did not offer a special possibility to derogate from the medical standards set out in it. The Vehicle Administration submitted that the assessment whether derogation from the Council Directive could be done had to be made in casu . The medical standard concerning the professional driving licence was absolute. In the present case, the applicant’s eyesight was clearly weaker than the medical standard laid down by the provisions in the Council Directive and the Driving Licences Decree. Therefore, he could not be granted permission to maintain his driving licence. In his reply of 12   July   1999 the applicant requested that the Administrative Court obtain a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice on the Council Directive on driving licences. The applicant argued that the interpretation of the Council Directive was necessary because of inconsistency between it and the Road Traffic Act. The applicant alleged that if he had been aware of his disability and had requested permission before the entry into force of the Council Directive, he would have been granted such a permission. On 23 November 1999 the Helsinki Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen ), successor of the former County Administrative Court of Uusimaa, rejected the appeal, finding that an oral hearing was unnecessary, as it could not bring any relevant further clarification in the matter. The Administrative Court also held that no preliminary ruling was needed, since the Council Directive was not open to various interpretations. The Administrative Court reasoned its decision to reject the appeal by finding that the applicant’s eyesight was clearly weaker than the requirements laid down in section 9 (2) of the Driving Licences Decree. It noted that the Vehicle Administration may for special reasons grant permission for a driving licence although the holder does not meet the requirements. The Administrative Court noted that the applicant had worked as a lorry driver for ten years and that he had passed a twenty day long test during which he had driven a lorry under supervision of the Social Insurance Institution. However, the Administrative Court noted that the eyesight requirements laid down in the Council Directive were absolute, if the member state had not by virtue of Article 7 (3) obtained the Commission’s permission to derogate from them. Taking into consideration the Vehicle Administration’s competence under section   82 (d) of the Road Traffic Act to issue permission for special reasons, the requirements laid down in the Driving Licences Decree, the member states’ obligations to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty Establishing the European Community and the information on the applicant’s eyesight included in the file, the Administrative Court found that the Vehicle Administration was permitted to reject the application for traffic safety reasons. Therefore, there was no reason to change its decision. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), repeating his requests for an oral hearing and for obtaining a preliminary ruling. On 25 September 2000 the court upheld the Administrative Court’s decision as a whole. However, the decision was not unanimous as one of the judges held that there were special reasons for granting the applicant permission to maintain his professional driving licence by virtue of section 82   (d) of the Road Traffic Act. B.     Relevant domestic law 1     Driving Licences According to section 70 (4) of the Road Traffic Act a driving licence must be withdrawn if its holder no longer meets the conditions, i.e. inter alia certain medical standards, for the issuing of the licence. The applicable medical standards are found in section 9 of the Driving Licences Decree. According to section 82 (d) of the Road Traffic Act, the Vehicle Administration may for special reasons issue permission to derogate from the age requirements and medical standards relating to driving licences. The section does not contain further provisions concerning the grounds on which the permission for derogation may be issued nor on other factors to be taken into account. According to the Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29   July   1991 on driving licences, the standards set by member states for the issue or any subsequent renewal of driving licences may be stricter than those set out in the Annex of the Directive. According to the Council Directive, the eyesight requirements are absolute, if the member state has not by virtue of Article   7   (3) obtained the Commission’s permission to derogate from them. The applicable medical standards in section 9 of the Driving Licences Decree are in accordance with the Council Directive provisions. 2.     Procedure Under section   38 of the Act on Administrative Court Procedure ( hallintolainkäyttölaki, förvaltningsprocesslagen 586/1996), the applicant was in principle entitled to a hearing once he had requested one, but this request could be refused if a hearing would have been manifestly unnecessary in light of the subject-matter or for any other reason.   COMPLAINTS 1. The applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, that he did not receive a fair trial since his request for an oral hearing was rejected both by the Administrative Court and by the Supreme Administrative Court. 2. The applicant further complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the decision not to obtain a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice violated his right to a fair trial, since the interpretation of the directive was necessary. THE LAW 1. The applicant complains that he was denied an oral hearing before the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. He alleges a violation of Article 6 of the Convention which reads, in relevant part: “In the determination of his civil rights ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” The Government admit that the driving licence was crucial for the applicant in order for him to be able to continue his work as a driver. The dispute was thus connected with the applicant’s exercise of a commercial activity and arguably Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings at issue. The Government submit that the applicant had no possibility of having his driving licence renewed due to the fact that his eyesight did not meet the requirements laid down in the afore-mentioned Council Directive. Accordingly, national legislation did not give the applicant a right to maintain his licence and thus, the authorities did not have any discretionary power in the matter. The Government point out that the applicant requested an oral hearing in order to provide the courts with oral evidence relating to derogation from the Council Directive. Both the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court found that an oral hearing would not have provided any new evidence relevant to the decisions on the merits. They found that no derogation from the medical standards laid down in the Council Directive was allowed. Thus, an oral hearing was manifestly unnecessary. It was neither necessary to hold an oral hearing in order to establish the facts of the case. The decisions were based on the applicant’s eyesight which was reliably established by the medical records attached to the case file. The applicant argues that the proceedings concerned his right to continue to exercise his profession and thus that Article 6 applied. The applicant points out that he requested an oral hearing and proposed oral evidence in order to have it established that he could be granted permission to maintain his driving licence without endangering traffic safety. He also wanted to be heard in person and give evidence as the matter was crucial for his family’s livelihood. The Court observes that the proceedings at issue concerned the applicant’s professional driving licence, i.e. it was a pre-condition for exercising his profession. The Court concludes that the proceedings concerned the determination of the applicant’s civil rights and, thus, that Article 6 is applicable to the proceedings. The Court recalls that the entitlement to a “public hearing” in Article 6 § 1 implies a right to an “oral hearing” at least before one court instance. However, the obligation under Article 6 § 1 to hold a public hearing is not an absolute one. Thus, a hearing may be dispensed with if a party unequivocally waives his or her right thereto and there are no questions of public interest making a hearing necessary. A waiver can be done explicitly or tacitly, in the latter case for example by refraining from submitting or maintaining a request for a hearing (see, among other authorities, Håkansson and Sturesson v.   Sweden , judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171-A, p.   20, §   66; and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland , judgment of 24 June 1993, Series   A no.   263, pp. 19-20, §   58). Furthermore, a hearing may not be necessary due to exceptional circumstances of the case, for example when it raises no questions of fact or law which cannot be adequately resolved on the basis of the case-file and the parties’ written observations (see, mutatis mutandis , Fredin v   Sweden (no.   2), judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 283-A, pp.   10 ‑ 11, §§   21-22; and Fischer v. Austria , judgment of 26 April 1995, Series   A no.   312, pp. 20-21, § 44). In the present case no waiver was made. The applicant requested that an oral hearing be held before the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, but his requests were rejected. The purpose of the applicant’s requests for an oral hearing was to adduce evidence on his health and, through that evidence, on his capacity to work as a lorry driver. The Court recognises that the outcome of disputes concerning whether a person fulfils certain medical requirements usually depends on the written opinions given by medical doctors. Many such disputes may accordingly be better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. Moreover, it is understandable that the national authorities should have regard to the demands of efficiency and economy. In the applicant’s case, the Court observes that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court was not limited to matters of law but also extended to factual issues. The issue was whether the applicant’s eyesight was good enough to ensure traffic safety. The Court observes, however, that the courts’ assessments were entirely based on the medical evidence in the case, presented in the form of a written opinion issued by a physician. The fact that the applicant’s eyesight did not meet the requirements set out in section 9 of the Driving Licences Decree was not in dispute. What was in dispute, however, was whether the applicant in spite of this could maintain his professional driving licence. In the present case the Administrative Court, the reasons of which were accepted by the Supreme Administrative Court, found that the applicant’s eyesight was clearly weaker than the requirements laid down in the Driving Licences Decree, by which the Council Directive on driving licences had been implemented. Taking into consideration the Vehicle Administration’s competence under section 82 (d) of the Road Traffic Act to issue permission for special reasons, the requirements laid down in the Driving Licences Decree, the member states’ obligations to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty Establishing the European Community and the information on the applicant’s eyesight included in the file, the Administrative Court found that the Vehicle Administration had been permitted to reject the application for traffic safety reasons. Therefore, there was no reason to change its decision. The court also found that the evidence which the applicant wished to present at the oral hearing would not have been relevant to this outcome of the appeal. The Court sees no reason to differ. It notes that the domestic courts found that the eyesight requirements laid down in the Council Directive were absolute, if the member state had not obtained the Commission’s permission to derogate from them. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that there were circumstances which justified dispensing with a hearing in the applicant’s case (see Pursiheimo v. Finland (dec.), no.   57795/00). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 and   4 of the Convention.   2. The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that no preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice was obtained. The Court notes that the Convention does not guarantee a right to have a case referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Although an arbitrary refusal of a domestic court to request such a ruling might raise an issue under Article 6, the Court finds that the refusals by the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court in the present case were duly reasoned (see Société Divagsa v. Spain , no. 20631/92, Commission decision of 12   May   1993, Decisions and Reports, 74, p. 279). Accordingly, there is no appearance of any violation of Article 6 of the Convention in this respect. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 and   4 of the Convention.     For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the application inadmissible. Françoise Elens-Passos   Nicolas Bratza        Deputy Registrar   President   [MGU1] 1