CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 8 juillet 2004

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt }                   CASE OF VO v. FRANCE   (Application no. 53924/00)                     JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   8 July 2004       In the case of Vo v. France, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Mr   L. Wildhaber , President ,   Mr   C.L. Rozakis ,   Mr   J.-P. Costa ,   Mr   G. Ress ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mr   L. Caflisch ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická,   Mr   P. Lorenzen   Mr   K. Jungwiert,   Mr   M. Fischbach,   Mr   J. Hedigan,   Mrs   W. Thomassen ,   Mr   A.B. Baka,   Mr   K. Traja,   Mr   M. Ugrekhelidze,   Mrs   A. Mularoni ,   Mr   K. Hajiyev , judges , and Mr P.J. Mahoney , Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 10 December 2003 and 2 June 2004, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 53924/00) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo (“the applicant”), on 20 December 1999. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr B. Le Griel, of the Paris Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R. Abraham, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on the ground that the conduct of a doctor who was responsible for the death of her child in utero was not classified as unintentional homicide. 4.     The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber to which the case had been assigned decided on 22 May 2003 to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber with immediate effect, none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 5.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24. 6.     The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. In addition, observations were also received from the Center for Reproductive Rights and the Family Planning Association, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2). 7.     A hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 December 2003 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   F. Alabrune , Deputy Director of Legal Affairs,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Mr   G. Dutertre , Drafting Secretary,     Human Rights Section,     Legal Affairs Department,     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mrs   J. Vailhe , Drafting Secretary,     European and International Affairs Department,     Ministry of Justice, Mr   P. Prache, Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons,     Ministry of Justice, Mr   H. Blondet , judge of the Court of Cassation, Mrs   V. Sagant, European and International Affairs Department,     Ministry of Justice,   Counsel ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   B. Le Griel , of the Paris Bar,   Counsel .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Le Griel and Mr Alabrune. 8.     In accordance with the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 54A § 3, the Court decided to examine the issue of admissibility of the application with the merits. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Bourg-en-Bresse. 10.     On 27 November 1991 the applicant, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo, who is of Vietnamese origin, attended Lyons General Hospital for a medical examination scheduled during the sixth month of pregnancy. 11.     On the same day another woman, Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, was due to have a contraceptive coil removed at the same hospital. When Dr G., who was to remove the coil, called out the name “Mrs Vo” in the waiting-room, it was the applicant who answered. After a brief interview, the doctor noted that the applicant had difficulty in understanding French. Having consulted the medical file, he sought to remove the coil without examining her beforehand. In so doing, he pierced the amniotic sac causing the loss of a substantial amount of amniotic fluid. After finding on clinical examination that the uterus was enlarged, the doctor ordered a scan. He then discovered that one had just been performed and realised that there had been a case of mistaken identity. The applicant was immediately admitted to hospital. Dr G. then attempted to remove the coil from Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, but was unsuccessful and so prescribed an operation under general anaesthetic for the following morning. A further error was then made when the applicant was taken to the operating theatre instead of Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo, and only escaped the surgery intended for her namesake after she protested and was recognised by an anaesthetist. 12.     The applicant left the hospital on 29 November 1991. She returned on 4 December 1991 for further tests. The doctors found that the amniotic fluid had not been replaced and that the pregnancy could not continue further. The pregnancy was terminated on health grounds on 5 December 1991. 13.     On 11 December 1991 the applicant and her partner lodged a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, alleging unintentional injury to the applicant entailing total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months and unintentional homicide of her child. Three expert reports were subsequently filed. 14.     The first, which was filed on 16 January 1992, concluded that the foetus, a baby girl, was between 20 and 21 weeks old, weighed 375 grams, was 28 centimetres long, had a cranial perimeter of 17 centimetres and had not breathed after delivery. The expert also concluded that there was no indication that the foetus had been subjected to violence or was malformed and no evidence that the death was attributable to a morphological cause or to damage to an organ. Further, the autopsy performed after the abortion and an anatomico-pathological examination of the body indicated that the foetal lung was 20 to 24 weeks old. 15.     On 3 August 1992 a second report was filed concerning the applicant’s injuries: “(a)     There is a period of temporary total unfitness for work from 27 November 1991 to 13 December 1991, when the patient was admitted to the Tonkin Clinic with an entirely unconnected pathology (appendectomy) (b)     the date of stabilisation can be put at 13 December 1991 (c)     there is no loss of amenity (d)     there is no aesthetic damage (e)     there is no occupational damage (f)     there is no partial permanent unfitness for work Damage in terms of pain and suffering resulting from this incident still has to be assessed. The assessment should be carried out with a doctor of Vietnamese extraction specialising in psychiatry or psychology.” 16.     The third report, which was issued on 29 September 1992, referred to the malfunctioning of the hospital department concerned and to negligence on the part of the doctor: “1.     The manner in which appointments in the departments run by Professors [T.] and [R.] at Lyons General Hospital are organised is not beyond reproach, in particular in that namesakes are common among patients of foreign origin and create a risk of confusion, a risk that is undoubtedly increased by the patients’ unfamiliarity with or limited understanding of our language. 2.     The fact that patients were not given precise directions and the consulting rooms and names of the doctors holding surgeries in them were not marked sufficiently clearly increased the likelihood of confusion between patients with similar surnames and explains why, after Dr [G.] had acquainted himself with Mrs Thi Thanh Van Vo’s medical file, it was [the applicant] who came forward in response to his call. 3.     The doctor acted negligently, by omission, and relied solely on the paraclinical examinations. He did not examine his patient and by an unfortunate error ruptured the amniotic sac, causing the pregnancy to terminate at five months. He is accountable for that error, although there are mitigating circumstances.” 17.     On 25 January 1993, and also following supplemental submissions by the prosecution on 26 April 1994, Dr G. was charged with causing unintentional injury at Lyons on 27 November 1991 by: (i)     through his inadvertence, negligent act or inattention, perforating the amniotic sac in which the applicant’s live and viable foetus was developing, thereby unintentionally causing the child’s death (a criminal offence under Article 319 of the former Criminal Code – which was applicable at the material time – now Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code); (ii)     through his inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty of protection or care, causing the applicant bodily injury that resulted in her total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months (a criminal offence under Article R. 40, sub-paragraph 4, of the former Criminal Code – which was applicable at the material time – now Articles R. 625-2 and R. 625-4 of the Criminal Code). 18.     By an order of 31 August 1995, Dr G. was committed to stand trial in the Lyons Criminal Court on counts of unintentional homicide and unintentionally causing injuries. 19.     By a judgment of 3 June 1996, the Criminal Court found that the accused was entitled as of right to an amnesty under the Amnesty Law of 3   August 1995 in respect of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries entailing temporary unfitness for work of less than three months. As to the offence of unintentional homicide of the foetus, it held: “The issue before the Court is whether the offence of unintentional homicide or the unintentional taking of the foetus’s life is made out when the life concerned is that of a foetus – if a 20 to 21 week-old foetus is a human person (‘another’ within the meaning of Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code). ... The expert evidence must be accepted. The foetus was between 20 and 21 weeks old. At what stage of maturity can an embryo be considered a human person? The Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act of 17 January 1975 provides: ‘The law guarantees respect of every human being from the beginning of life.’ The Law of 29 July 1994 (Article 16 of the Civil Code) provides: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life’. The laws of 29 July 1994 expressly employed the terms ‘embryo’ and ‘human embryo’ for the first time. However, the term ‘human embryo’ is not defined in any of them. When doing the preparatory work for the legislation on bioethics, a number of parliamentarians (both members of the National Assembly and senators) sought to define ‘embryo’. Charles de Courson proposed the following definition: ‘Every human being shall be respected from the start of life; the human embryo is a human being.’ Jean-François Mattéi stated: ‘The embryo is in any event merely the morphological expression of one and the same life that begins with impregnation and continues till death after passing through various stages. It is not yet known with precision when the zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo a foetus, the only indisputable fact being that the life process starts with impregnation.’ It thus appears that there is no legal rule to determine the position of the foetus in law either when it is formed or during its development. In view of this lack of a legal definition it is necessary to return to the known scientific facts. It has been established that a foetus is viable at 6 months and on no account, on present knowledge, at 20 or 21 weeks. The Court must have regard to that fact (viability at 6 months) and cannot create law on an issue which the legislators have not yet succeeded in defining. The Court thus notes that a foetus becomes viable at the age of 6 months; a 20 to 21 week-old foetus is not viable and is not a ‘human person’ or ‘another’ within the meaning of former Article 319 and Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code. The offence of unintentional homicide or of unintentionally taking the life of a 20 to 21 week-old foetus has not been made out, since the foetus was not a ‘human person’ or ‘another’... Acquits Dr G. on the charge without penalty or costs ...” 20.     On 10 June 1996 the applicant appealed against that judgment. She argued that Dr G. had been guilty of personal negligence severable from the functioning of the public service and sought 1,000,000 French francs (FRF) in damages, comprising FRF 900,000 for the death of the child and FRF   100,000 for the injury she had sustained. The public prosecutor’s office, as second appellant, submitted that the acquittal should be overturned. It observed: “By failing to carry out a clinical examination, the accused was guilty of negligence that caused the death of the foetus, which at the time of the offence was between 20 and 24 weeks old and following, normally and inexorably, the path of life on which it had embarked, there being no medical doubt over its future.” 21.     In a judgment of 13 March 1997, the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in so far as it had declared the prosecution of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries time-barred but overturned the remainder of the judgment and found the doctor guilty of unintentional homicide. It imposed a six-month suspended prison sentence and a fine of FRF 10,000, holding: “... In the instant case Dr [G.]’s negligence is characterised in particular by the fact that the patient’s knowledge of French was insufficient to enable her to explain her condition to him, to answer his questions or to give him the date of her last period, circumstances that should have further impressed upon him the need for a thorough clinical examination. The assertion that he was entitled to rely on the medical records alone shows that, though an able scientist, this young doctor was nonetheless unaware of one of the essential skills of the practice of medicine: listening to, getting to know and examining the patient. Indeed, before this Court Dr [G.] said that the accident had impressed upon him how vital it was to take precautions before operating. There is a clear causal link between this negligent act and omission and the death of the child Mrs Vo was carrying. The accused has himself acknowledged, with commendable honesty, that a clinical examination would have alerted him to the fact that the patient was pregnant and had been mistaken for another patient. As regards the classification of the offence as unintentional homicide, it is first necessary to reiterate the legal principles governing this sphere. Various provisions of international treaties, such as Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in New York on 26 January 1990, recognise a right to life protected by law for everyone, and notably children. Under domestic law, section 1 of the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act (Law   no. 75-17 of 17 January 1975) specifies: ‘The law guarantees respect of every human being from the beginning of life ... this principle may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and in accordance with the conditions set out in this statute.’ Further, Law no. 94-653 of 29 July 1994 on the respect of the human body lays down in Article 16 of the Civil Code: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life.’ These statutory provisions cannot be regarded as mere statements of intent, devoid of any legal effect, since Article 16-9 of the Civil Code indicates that the provisions of Article 16 are mandatory. For its part the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation applied these rules of international and domestic law in two judgments it delivered on 27 November 1996, specifying that the Act of 17 January 1975 only permits derogation from the rule stated in section 1 thereof that every human being is entitled to respect from the beginning of life in cases of necessity and subject to the conditions and limitations set out in it. The Court of Cassation added that, having regard to the conditions laid down by the legislature, the provisions of that statute and of the law of 31 December 1979 on the voluntary termination of pregnancy, taken as a whole, were not incompatible with the aforementioned treaty provisions. In a different case, moreover, the Court of Cassation pointed out that on signing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in New York on 26 January 1990, France made a declaration concerning interpretation in which it stated that the convention could not be interpreted as constituting any obstacle to the implementation of the provisions of French legislation on the voluntary termination of pregnancy. That reservation shows, by converse implication, that that convention could concern a foetus aged less than 10   weeks, the statutory maximum foetal age in France for a voluntary termination of pregnancy. It follows that, subject to the provisions on the voluntary termination of pregnancies and therapeutic abortions, the right to respect for every human being from the beginning of life is guaranteed by law, without any requirement that the child be born as a viable human being, provided it was alive when the injury occurred. Indeed, viability is a scientifically indefinite and uncertain concept, as the accused, who is currently studying in the United States, himself acknowledged, informing the Court that foetuses born between 23 and 24 weeks after conception could now be kept alive, a situation that was inconceivable a few years ago. In the opinion prepared by Professor [T.] and adduced in evidence by Dr [G.], reference is made to a report by Professor Mattéi in which it is indicated that the embryo is merely the morphological expression of one and the same life that begins with impregnation and continues till death after passing through various stages. It is not yet known with precision when the zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo a foetus, the only indisputable fact being that the life process starts with impregnation. ... Thus the issue of viability at birth, a notion that is uncertain scientifically, is in addition devoid of all legal effect, as the law makes no distinction on that basis. In the instant case it has been established that when the scan was performed on 27   November 1991 – before the amniotic fluid was lost later that day – the [applicant’s] pregnancy had been proceeding normally and the child she was carrying was alive. When the therapeutic abortion was performed on 5 December 1991, it was noted that a comparison of the child’s measurements with published tables suggested that the foetus was between 20 and 21 weeks old and possibly older, as it is not certain that the tables take into account the specific morphology of children of Vietnamese origin. Dr [G.], when questioned on this point at the hearing, was unable to provide any further information. The conclusion from the anatomo-pathological examination was that the foetal lung indicated an age of between 20 and 24 weeks, its measurements suggesting that an age at the lower end of that range was the most likely. In any event, as Dr [G.] said in evidence, the age of the foetus was very close to that of certain foetuses that have managed to survive in the United States. The photographs at page D 32 of the trial bundle show a perfectly formed child whose life was cut short by the accused’s negligence. As the Douai Court of Appeal observed in its judgment of 2 June 1987, had the assault on the child concerned inflicted a non-fatal wound, it would have been classified without any hesitation as an offence of unintentionally causing injuries. A fortiori , an assault leading to the child’s death must be classified as unintentional homicide. Thus, the strict application of the legal principles, established scientific fact and elementary common sense all dictate that a negligent act or omission causing the death of a 20 to 24 week-old foetus in perfect health should be classified as unintentional homicide. Consequently, the impugned judgment must be overturned ... While [the applicant’s] civil action is admissible, if only to corroborate the prosecution case, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim for reparation. This is because despite the serious nature of the negligent act and omission of Dr [G.], a doctor in a public hospital, they do not constitute personal misconduct of such exceptional gravity entailing a total disregard for the most elementary principles and duties inherent in his function as to make them severable from public service. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to order Dr [G.] to pay to this civil party compensation in the sum of 5,000 francs under Article 475-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on account of costs which she has incurred, but which have not been paid by the State. ...” 22.     On 30 June 1999, on an appeal on points of law by the doctor, the Court of Cassation reversed the judgment of the Lyons Court of Appeal and ruled that there was no reason to remit the case for retrial: “Having regard to Article 111-4 of the Criminal Code: Criminal-law provisions must be strictly construed. ... In convicting [the doctor] of unintentional homicide, the appellate court noted that Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognise the existence for all persons of a right to life protected by law. The appellate court stated that the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Act of 17   January 1975 establishes the rule that the life of every human being must be respected from the beginning of life. That rule is now restated in Article 16 of the Civil Code as worded following the amendment made by the Law of 29 July 1994. The appellate court went on to state that, by operating without performing a prior clinical examination, the doctor was guilty of a negligent act or omission that had a definite causal link with the death of the child the patient was carrying. However, by so holding, when the matters of which the defendant was accused did not come within the definition of the offences set out in former Article 319 and Article   221-6 of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal misinterpreted the aforementioned provisions. ...” II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Criminal Code 23.     The provision dealing with the unintentional taking of life at the material time and until 1 March 1994 was Article 319 of the Criminal Code, which read as follows: “Anyone who through his or her inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of regulation unintentionally commits homicide or unintentionally causes death, shall be liable to imprisonment of between three months and two years and a fine of between 1,000 and 30,000 francs.” 24.     Since 1 March 1994, the relevant provision has been Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code (as amended by Law no. 2000-647 of 10 July 2000 and Order no. 2000-916 of 19 September 2000), which is to be found in Section   II (“Unintentional taking of life”) of Chapter I (“Offences against the life of the person”) of Part II (“Offences against the human person”) of Book II (“Serious crimes ( crimes ) and other major offences ( délits ) against the person”). Article 221-6 provides:   “It shall be an offence of unintentional homicide punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros to cause the death of another in the conditions and in accordance with the distinctions set out in Article 121-3 by inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty of safety or care. In the event of a manifestly deliberate breach of a special statutory or regulatory duty of safety or care, the maximum sentences shall be increased to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros.” 25.     Article 223-10 of the Criminal Code, which concerns the voluntary termination of pregnancy by a third party without the mother’s consent, is to be found in Section V under the heading “Unlawful termination of pregnancy” of Chapter III, entitled “Endangering the person”, in Part II of Book II. It reads as follows:   “It shall be an offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000   euros to terminate a pregnancy without the mother’s consent.” 26.     Section III entitled “Protection of the human embryo” of Chapter I (“Offences against biomedical ethics”) of Part I (“Public-health offences”) of Book V (“Other serious crimes ( crimes ) and other major offences ( délits )”) prohibits various types of conduct on grounds of medical ethics (Articles 511-15 to 511-25), including the conception of human embryos in vitro for research or experimental purposes (Article 511-18). B.     The Public Health Code 27.     At the material time the limitation period for an action in damages in the administrative courts was four years, while the period in which a pregnancy could be voluntarily terminated lawfully was ten weeks following conception. 28.     The provisions of the Public Health Code as worded since the Patients’ Rights and Quality of the Health Service Act (Law no. 2002-303 of 4 March 2002) came into force read as follows: Article L. 1142-1 “Save where they incur liability as a result of a defect in a health product, the medical practitioners mentioned in Part IV of this Code and all hospitals, clinics, departments and organisations in which preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment is performed on individuals shall only be liable for damage caused by preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment if they have been at fault. ...” Article L. 1142-2 “Private medical practitioners, the hospitals, clinics, health services and organisations mentioned in Article L. 1142-1 and any other legal entity other than the State that is engaged in preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment and the producers and suppliers of and dealers in health products in the form of finished goods mentioned in Article L. 5311-1 with the exception of sub-paragraph 5 thereof, subject to the provisions of Article L. 1222-9, and sub-paragraphs 11, 14 and 15, that are used in connection with such activities shall be under a duty to take out insurance in respect of any third-party or administrative liability they may incur for damage sustained by third parties as a result of an assault against the person in the course of that activity taken as a whole. ...” Article L. 1142-28 “The limitation period for actions against medical practitioners and public or private hospitals or clinics in respect of preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment shall be ten years from the date the condition stabilises.” Article L. 2211-1 “As stated in Article 16 of the Civil Code as hereafter reproduced: ‘ ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life.’   ” Article L. 2211-2 “The principle referred to in Article L. 2211-1 may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and in accordance with the conditions set out in this Part. It shall be the nation’s duty to educate society on this principle and its consequences, [to provide] information on life’s problems and on national and international demography, to inculcate a sense of responsibility, to receive children into society and to uphold family life. The State, aided by the local and regional authorities, shall perform these obligations and support initiatives that assist it to do so.” Article L. 2212-1 “A pregnant woman whose condition causes her distress may ask a doctor to terminate her pregnancy. The pregnancy may only be terminated within the first twelve weeks.” Article L. 2213-1 “A pregnancy may be voluntarily terminated at any time if two doctors from a pluridisciplinary team certify, after the team has issued a consultative opinion, that either the woman’s continued pregnancy puts her health at serious risk or that it is highly likely that the unborn child is suffering from a particularly serious affection which is recognised as incurable at the time of diagnosis. ...” C.     The position taken by the Court of Cassation 29.     The Court of Cassation has followed its decision in the instant case (see paragraph 22 above) on two occasions (in its judgments of 29 June 2001 (full court), Bulletin no. 165, and of 25 June 2002 (Criminal Division), Bulletin no. 144), despite submissions from the advocates-general concerned to the contrary. 1.     Judgment of the full court of 29 June 2001 “As regards the two grounds of appeal of the public prosecutor at the Metz Court of Appeal and of Mrs X which have been joined together ... : On 29 July 1995 a vehicle being driven by Mr Z collided with a vehicle being driven by Mrs X, who was six months pregnant. She was injured and as a result of the impact lost the foetus she was carrying. In the impugned judgment (Metz Court of Appeal, 3 September 1998), Mr Z was convicted of unintentionally injuring Mrs X, aggravated by the fact that he was under the influence of drink. However, he was acquitted of the unintentional killing of the unborn child. The grounds of appeal against that decision are, firstly, that Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code, which makes it an offence to cause the death of another, does not exclude from its scope a viable unborn child and that, by holding that this provision applied only to a child whose heart was beating at birth and who was breathing, the Court of Appeal had added a condition that was not contained in the statute, and, secondly, unintentionally causing the death of an unborn child constituted the offence of unintentional homicide if the unborn child was viable at the material time, irrespective of whether or not it breathed when it was separated from the mother, with the result that there had been a violation of Articles 111-3, 111-4 and 221-6 of the Criminal Code and Article 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The rule that offences and punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal statutes be construed strictly, pleads against extending the scope of Article   221-6 of the Criminal Code, which makes unintentional homicide an offence, to cover unborn children whose status in law is governed by special provisions concerning embryos and foetuses. ...” 2.     Judgment of the Criminal Division of 25 June 2002 “... Having regard to former Article 319, Article 221-6 and Article 111-4 of the Criminal Code: The rule that offences and punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal statutes be construed strictly, pleads against a charge of unintentional homicide lying in the case of a child that is not born alive. The impugned judgment established that Z, whose pregnancy under the supervision of X came to term on 10 November 1991, attended the clinic in order to give birth on 17 November. She was placed under observation at about 8.30 p.m. and drew the attention of the midwife, Y, to an anomaly in the child’s cardiac rhythm. Y refused to call the doctor. A further test carried out at 7 a.m. the following morning showed a like anomaly and subsequently that the heart had stopped beating altogether. At about 8 a.m., X pronounced the baby dead. In the evening he proceeded to extract the stillborn child by caesarean section. According to the autopsy report, the child did not present any malformation but had suffered from anoxia. In finding Y guilty of unintentional homicide and X, who was acquitted by the Criminal Court, liable for the civil consequences of that offence, the Court of Appeal held that the child’s death was a result of the negligent acts and omissions of both the doctor in failing to place the patient, who was beyond term, under closer observation and of the midwife in failing to notify an unequivocal anomaly noted when the child’s cardiac rhythm was recorded. After noting that the stillborn child did not present any organic lesion capable of explaining its death, the Court of Appeal stated: ‘This child had reached term several days previously and, but for the fault that has been found, would have been capable of independent survival, with a human existence separate from its mother’s.’ However, by so holding, the Court of Appeal misapplied the provisions referred to above and the aforementioned principles. It follows that this appeal on points of law is allowed. The case will not be remitted, as the facts are not capable of coming within the definition of any criminal offence. ...” 30.     The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation has held that a court of appeal gave valid reasons for finding a defendant guilty of the unintentional homicide of a child who died an hour after its birth on the day of a road traffic accident in which its mother, who was eight months’ pregnant, was seriously injured, when it held that, by failing to control his vehicle, the driver had caused the child’s death an hour after birth as a result of irreversible lesions to vital organs sustained at the moment of impact (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 2 December 2003). 31.     An article entitled “Unintentional violence on pregnant women and the offence of unintentional homicide” ( Recueil Dalloz 2004, p. 449) notes that in twenty-eight out of a total of thirty-four articles commenting on the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 2 December 2003 (see paragraph 30 above) the authors are critical of the Court of Cassation’s case-law (see paragraph 29 above). The criticism includes: the laconic reasoning of the Court of Cassation’s judgments and incoherence of the protection afforded, as a person causing unintentional injury is liable to criminal prosecution while a person who unintentionally causes the death of the foetus goes unpunished; the fact that a child who has lived for a few minutes is recognised as having standing as a victim, whereas a child that dies in utero is ignored by the law; and the fact that freedom to procreate is less well protected than freedom to have an abortion. D.     The Garraud amendment 32.     On 27 November 2003 the National Assembly adopted on its second reading a bill to adapt the criminal justice system to changes in criminality. The bill included the Garraud amendment, so named after the member of parliament who introduced it, which created an offence of involuntary termination of pregnancy (ITP). 33.     The adoption of this amendment gave rise to fierce controversy and, after a week of consultations, the Minister of Justice, Mr Perben, declared on 5 December 2003 that the member’s proposal “caused more problems than it solved” and that he was in favour of abandoning it. On 23 January 2004 the Senate unanimously deleted the amendment. This was the second time the senators had rejected such a proposal, as they had already opposed it in April 2003 when examining the Reinforcement of Protection against Road Violence Act, passed on 12 June 2003. E.     The laws on bioethics 34.     On 11 December 2003 the National Assembly adopted on its second reading a bill on bioethics with a view to reforming the 1994 laws on the donation and use of parts and products of the human body, medically assisted procreation and prenatal diagnosis, as envisaged by the legislature at the time, in order to take into account subsequent scientific and medical progress and new issues with which society was confronted. In view of the speed with which technological advances are made, the bill reinforces the guarantees on the provision of information and on seeking and obtaining consent, prohibits certain practices that are technically feasible (reproductive cloning) and provides a framework for those with a proven medical interest (research on embryos in vitro ). It establishes a regulatory and supervisory body (the Procreation, Embryology and Human Genetics Agency) whose functions also include acting as a watchdog and providing support and expert guidance in these spheres (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/bioethique.asp). III.     EUROPEAN LAW A.     The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 35.     The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, also known as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which was opened for signature on 4 April 1997 in Oviedo, came into force on 1   December 1999. In this convention, the member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories to it, “... Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine, ... agreed as follows: Chapter I – General provisions Article 1 – Purpose and object Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine. Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention. Article 2 – Primacy of the human being The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science. ... Chapter V – Scientific research ... Article 18 – Research on embryos in vitro 1.     Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro , it shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo. 2.     The creation of human embryos for research purposes is prohibited. ... Chapter XI – Interpretation and follow-up of the Convention Article 29 – Interpretation of the Convention The European Court of Human Rights may give, without direct reference to any specific proceedings pending in a court, advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the present Convention at the request of: –     the Government of a Party, after having informed the other Parties; –     the Committee set up by Article 32, with membership restricted to the Representatives of the Parties to this Convention, by a decision adopted by a two-thirds majority of votes cast. ...” 36.     The commentary on Article 1 (see paragraphs 16 to 19 of the explanatory report on the convention) states: Article 1 – Purpose and object “16.     This Article defines the Convention’s scope and purpose. 17.     The aim of the Convention is to guarantee everyone’s rights and fundamental freedoms and, in particular, their integrity and to secure the dignity and identity of human beings in this sphere. 18.     The Convention does not define the term ‘everyone’ (in French ‘ toute personne ’). These two terms are equivalent and found in the English and French versions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which however does not define them. In the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition of these terms among member States of the Council of Europe, it was decided to allow domestic law to define them for the purposes of the application of the present Convention. 19.     The Convention also uses the expression ‘human being’ to state the necessity to protect the dignity and identity of all human beings. It was acknowledged that it was a generally accepted principle that human dignity and the identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life began. ...” B.     Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (12   January 1998) 37.     Article 1 of the Protocol provides: “1.     Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited. 2.     For the purpose of this Article, the term human being ‘genetically identical’ to another human being means a human being sharing with another the same nuclear gene set.” C.     Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research 38.     The draft Protocol was approved by the Steering Committee on Bioethics on 20 June 2003. It was submitted for approval to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which sought a consultative opinion from the Parliamentary Assembly. On 30 April 2004 the Assembly issued an opinion (no. 252 (2004)) in which it declared itself in favour of the draft Protocol. On 30 June 2004 the Committee of Ministers adopted the text. Article 1 – Object and purpose “Parties to this Protocol shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to any resear