CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 31 août 2004

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Pellonpää ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mr   S. Pavlovschi ,   Mr   L. Garlicki ,   Mr   J. Borrego Borrego, judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 June 1999, Having regard to the partial decision of 1 April 2003, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant, Mrs   Zora Macková born Schavernoch, is a   Slovakian national, who was born in 1921 and lives in Liptovský Mikuláš. She is represented before the Court by Mr   Olaf Alexander Macko, her son, who lives in Toronto (Canada). The respondent Government were represented by Mr P.   Kresák, their Agent. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The father of the applicant was a   businessman. The assets of his enterprise included inter alia a   real estate complex serving partially as housing for his family and partially as commercial premises for his business activities. At some point in the late 1940s or early 1950s, the enterprise of the applicant’s father was expropriated and attached, as an   independent subsidiary, to a   State company. The applicant’s father, who never received any compensation for his expropriated assets, died in 1959. Under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act ( Zákon o   mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách - “the Restitution Act”), the applicant requested the State company on 23   January 1991 to   surrender to her “all assets expropriated from her father”. In its reply of 4   June 1991 the State company informed the applicant that it had taken notice of her request. It interpreted the request as a   claim for restitution of assets expropriated “in accordance with the legal rules adopted in the period from 1945 to 1948 without providing for any compensation” within the meaning of Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act. The State company further informed the applicant that her claim would be   dealt with in the context of its privatisation, which was being prepared under the Act 92/1991 on the Transfer of State Property to Private Persons ( Zákon o prevode majetku štátu na iné osoby – “the Privatisation Act”). On 7   September 1991 the applicant repeated her request to   the State company. She requested it to   surrender the assets concerned and to   conclude with her a   restitution agreement on the transfer of ownership of these assets under Section   5   (3) of the Restitution Act. In this request, the applicant referred to assets “that have been expropriated without any compensation” as defined in Section   2 (3) of the   Restitution Act. At the same time, the applicant hand ‑ delivered a   letter to the Ministry of Administration and Privatisation of National Property ( Ministerstvo pre správu a privatizáciu národného majetku - “the Ministry”), the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the National Property Fund ( Fond národného majetku – “the Fund”), in which she requested that the expropriated assets be   restored to her. On 25   March 1992, in accordance with Section   5 (4) of the Restitution Act, the applicant filed a   claim for the restitution of the   residential house and the commercial premises with the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court ( Okresný súd ). This request resulted in two separate sets of proceedings, one concerning the residential house and one concerning the commercial premises. The claim for restitution of the residential house On 26   October 1992 the District Court requested the applicant to   clarify and supplement her previous submissions. The applicant replied on 4   November 1992. She identified the State company as the defendant of her action and argued that the State had taken over and was using the house in question without any legal justification. She relied on Sections 1 (1), 2   (1)   (c), (2), (3) – first sentence, 3 (2) (c), 5 (1), (3), (4), 6 (1) (c) (2) of the Restitution Act. On 13   July 1993 the District Court requested the competent Land Registry Administration to submit to it the Land Registry files concerning the real estate at issue. On 26   July 1993 the District Court sent a   copy of the applicant’s action to the defendant and requested its observations in reply. The defendant replied on 25   August 1993. On 9   September 1993 the applicant submitted a   further specification of the subject ‑ matter of her action. On 14   September 1993 the District Court held a   hearing. The applicant confirmed that she was seeking restitution of the house on the ground that it had been taken away from her family and used by the State without any legal basis. By a   submission of 23   September 1993 the applicant restated the scope of the subject ‑ matter of her action. On 7   October 1993, following a   hearing, the District Court gave its first judgment in the case. It took it as established that the house at issue had been taken by the State without any legal basis and had to   be   restored to the applicant pursuant to Sections   2 (1) (c) and 6 (2) of the Restitution Act. It ordered the State company to   conclude with the applicant an   agreement within the meaning of Section   5 (3) of the Restitution Act on restitution of the house and to   surrender the house to   her within 15 days from the date on which the judgment became final. On 3   November 1993 the judgment was sent by registered mail to both parties. On 4   November 1993 it was received by the applicant. The State company confirmed receipt of the judgment by signing a   postal delivery card ( doručenka ) indicating 22   November 1993 as the   date of service. On 6   December 1993 the State company filed an   appeal to the Banská Bystrica Regional Court ( Krajský súd ). It claimed that the District Court’s judgment had been served on it on 22   November 1993. The State company argued that the State had taken the house in accordance with the then ‑ applicable legal rules. In such a   case, the restitution of the house should be dealt with within the State company’s privatisation on the basis of Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act in conjunction with Section   47 (1) of the Privatisation Act. On 23   December 1993 the applicant filed her observations in reply to the appeal. She considered the reasons given by the District Court in its judgment to be correct and proposed that the judgment be upheld. On 11   January 1994 the District Court transmitted the case ‑ file to the Regional Court for a   determination of the appeal. On 14   March 1994 the Regional Court returned the case ‑ file to the District Court as the latter had failed to   collect the court fee from the appellant State company. On 28   March 1994 the District Court requested the State company to pay the court fee. On 12   May 1994 the applicant filed further observations in reply to the appeal. On 8   July 1994 the District Court reiterated its request to the State company to   pay the court fee for the appeal and, on 25   August 1994, it re ‑ submitted the case ‑ file to the Regional Court for a   decision on the appeal. On 17   November 1994 the Regional Court held a   hearing on the appeal. On the same day, having found procedural as well as material flaws, the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for re ‑ examination. On 11   January 1995 the District Court requested the parties to   submit further evidence. In particular, it requested them to   obtain and submit the Decree of 8   July 1950 on nationalisation of the enterprise of the applicant’s father (the “Nationalisation Decree of 1950”). The applicant and the State company replied, respectively, on 25 and 26   January 1995. On 19   February 1995 the applicant submitted further evidence and informed the District Court that she was still searching for the Nationalisation Decree of 1950 and that she would submit it as soon as found. On 9   March 1995 the applicant informed the District Court that, pursuant to reports of 16   February and 2   March 1995 from the Slovakian National Archive and the Liptovský Mikuláš District Library, respectively, the Nationalisation Decree of 1950 could not be found there. On 14   September 1995 the applicant appointed a   lawyer to   represent her in the proceedings. On 11   October 1995 the Ministry decided under the Privatisation Act to   privatise the subsidiary of the State company whose assets comprised the real estate which was the subject of the litigation. The State company was transformed into a   private joint stock company (“the Privatised company”). Its assets were transferred to the Fund and later invested in the Privatised company. The Fund subsequently sold 51% of the shares of the Privatised company to a   third private party. On 8   March 1996 the Privatised company informed the District Court that, in the course of its privatisation, the ownership of the State company had been transferred to the Fund. The hearing scheduled for 14   March 1996 had to be adjourned as none of the parties appeared. The applicant duly apologised for her absence. On 22   April 1996 the National Archive informed the applicant again that it was unable to   find the Nationalisation Decree of 1950. On 4   June 1996 the applicant requested that the District Court investigate when its judgment of 7   October 1993 had been served on the State company. On 3   July 1996 the District Court made an   inquiry with the Liptovský Mikuláš Post Office about the delivery of the judgment of 7   October 1993 to the State company. In a   letter of 8   July 1996 the Head of the Post Office informed the District Court that, according to the postal records on delivery of registered mail, the District Court’s registered letter of 3   November 1993 had been delivered to   the   State company on 4   November 1993. On 2   September 1996 the applicant informed the District Court that she had withdrawn the power of attorney from her previous legal representatives and that she had appointed her son to represent her. The applicant’s son had his permanent residence in Toronto (Canada) but, at that time, was staying and had an   address in Slovakia as well. The applicant identified the Privatised company, being the State company’s legal successor, as the new defendant to her action and made a   new submission concerning the merits of her case. Among other things, she pointed out that the District Court’s judgment of 7   October 1993 had in fact been received by the State company already on 4   November 1993. She maintained that in order to   satisfy the fifteen days’ time ‑ limit for its appeal of 6   December 1993, the State company had forged the date stated in the postal delivery card to   indicate 22   November 1993 as the judgment service date. She requested that that appeal be   declared inadmissible as having been lodged out of time and that her action be   granted. On 18   September 1996 the applicant supplemented her claim for compensation in respect of the costs incurred by her in the proceedings. On 19   September 1996 the District Court held a   hearing. The applicant made further submissions on 20   September and 10   October   1996 and on 22   January 1997. The Privatised company made further submissions on 11   November 1996 and 22   January 1997. On 23   January 1997 the District Court held a   hearing at which the applicant made a   written submission and reiterated her arguments as to the belatedness of the State company’s appeal of 6   December 1993. The hearing was adjourned until 7   February 1997 in order that the District Court could examine the recent submissions of the parties. On 6   February 1997 the applicant as well as the Privatised company made further written submissions. The latter also apologised for not being able to attend the hearing scheduled for the following day. On 7   February 1997 the District Court held a   hearing. It was adjourned sine die in order to obtain further evidence. On 10   February 1997 the applicant requested that the District Court grant an   interim measure prohibiting the defendant from carrying out any dispositions in respect of the real estate in issue. On 19   February 1997 the applicant informed the District Court which witnesses she wished the latter to hear in support of her action. On 28   February 1997 the District Court requested information from the Fund concerning the settlement of the applicant’s restitution claims in the process of privatisation of the State company. The Fund replied on 6   March   1997. The applicant made further written submissions on 21   March, 24   March and 9   April 1997. On 10   April 1997 the District Court held a   hearing. Following it, the District Court gave a   new judgment in the case. It established that the commercial assets of the applicant’s late father had as such been expropriated in the manner referred to in Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act. The house at issue had not in fact formed a   part of the commercial assets of the applicant’s father. It therefore had been expropriated unlawfully, i.e. in a   situation foreseen in Section   6 (2) of the Restitution Act. The applicant met all the requirements for having the house restored to her. The District Court consequently ordered the Privatised company to   restore it to   her. Having found in the applicant’s favour, the District Court further decided that the applicant was entitled to compensation in respect of her legal costs. As to the amount of this compensation, the District Court accepted only a   minor part of the applicant’s claim and issued a   corresponding order for costs against the Privatised company. It rejected the remainder of the applicant’s claim for costs as being unsubstantiated. On 14   April 1997 the applicant submitted a   further specification of her claim for compensation in respect of the costs incurred by her in the proceedings. On 27   May 1997 the Privatised company lodged an   appeal against the District Court’s judgment of 10   April 1997 with the Žilina Regional Court. It argued inter alia that the applicant’s restitution claim had already been determined and satisfied by the decision of the Ministry of 4   March 1997 (see below). It further argued that there was a   legal obstacle recognised by Section   8 (1) of the Restitution Act to the restitution of the house in natura in that the house had became an   integral part of the Privatised company’s plant and its restitution would result in disruption of its operations. On 13   June 1997 the applicant filed her observations in reply to the Privatised company’s appeal. She demanded that the challenged judgment be upheld as being factually and legally correct. She submitted that appeal proceedings were in any event unlawful given the fact that the initial appeal filed by the State company on 6   December 1993 was inadmissible as having been lodged out of time. The Regional Court called a   hearing for 10   February 1998 but it had to   be adjourned as neither the applicant nor her representative who was at that time in Canada appeared. On 26   February 1998 the applicant requested that the Regional Court fix the next hearing for 18   March 1998 as on that day her representative would be able to attend. On 17   March 1998 the Regional Court held a   hearing. The applicant reiterated her objections as to the belatedness of the State company’s appeal of 6   December 1993. Consequently, she considered any further proceedings to be illegal and an abuse of legal process. The hearing had to   be   adjourned as the legal representative of the Privatised company could not attend due to health problems. On 21   April 1998 the Regional Court held another hearing. Following it, on the same day, the Regional Court gave a   judgment in which it upheld the District Court’s judgment as regards the merits of the case. As to the applicant’s argument concerning the admissibility of the State company’s appeal of 6   December 1993, the Regional Court found it established that the judgment of 7   October 1993 had in fact been served on the State company on 4   November 1993 and not on 22   November 1993. It however held that it was not competent to   re ‑ examine the admissibility of the appeal of 6   December 1993 as this appeal had already been determined by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court in its decision of 17   November 1994. Finally, the Regional Court found the District Court’s findings in respect of the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of her costs to be   “absolutely incomprehensible”. The Regional Court consequently quashed the relevant part of the District Court’s judgment and returned the case ‑ file to the latter for a   new decision on this issue. No   further appeal lay against the Regional Court’s judgment of 21   April 1998 as regards the merits of the case. It became final and binding on 20   August 1998. On 24   August 1998 the Liptovský Mikuláš County Police Department ( Obvodné oddelenie Policajného zboru ) requested the case ‑ file to examine further the applicant’s criminal complaint of forgery in connection with the State company’s appeal of 6   December 1993. The District Court transmitted the file to the Police on 2   September 1998 and they returned it on 24   November 1998. The Police decided not to take criminal proceedings on the applicant’s criminal complaint for lack of evidence. On 1   December 1998 the Regional Court corrected a clerical error in its judgment of 21   April 1998 in that it rectified the incorrectly written file number of that judgment. On 1   March 1999 a   Judicial Enforcement Officer ( súdny exekútor ), commissioned by the applicant to   enforce the District Court’s judgment of 10   April 1997, as upheld by the Regional Court on 21   April 1998, notified the Privatised company that enforcement proceedings had been instituted. The Privatised company filed objections against this enforcement with the District Court. On 19 May 1999 the District Court dismissed the company’s objections and the enforcement was successfully completed. On 6   April and 13   October and 14   October 1999 the applicant made further submissions concerning the costs of the trial. She claimed reimbursement of “all costs and expenses incurred by her in connection with the basic proceedings on the merits, the appeal proceedings as well as the enforcement proceedings”. She claimed in particular reimbursement of the additional legal costs and expenses incurred as a   result of the Regional Court’s failure to   declare the appeal of 6   December 1993 inadmissible. She also claimed compensation for the earnings lost during and as a   consequence of the lengthy proceedings on her restitution claim. On 20   March 2000 the District Court informed the applicant that her claims for reimbursement of the costs and expenses did not meet the formal procedural requirements and instructed her on the correct manner of filing such claims. On 2   May 2001 the applicant submitted a   detailed specification of her claim. In its decision of 21   May 2001 the District Court awarded the applicant a   part of her claim for costs and expenses. It rejected the remainder of her claim as unsubstantiated and ill-founded. Although it was open to her, the applicant did not file an   appeal against the District Court’s decision of 21   May 2001 and it become final and binding on 13   June 2001. The claim for restitution of the commercial premises Further to her restitution claim under Section   5   (4) of the Restitution Act filed on 25   March 1992, the applicant reapplied, on 29   June 1994, to the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court for restitution of the commercial premises. She qualified her claim as a   claim for restitution of possessions of which her late father had been deprived “in violation of the then ‑ applicable legislation and without any   compensation”. She claimed that these premises be   restored to her in natura . The State company subsequently went through the process of privatisation (see above). Details of the privatisation operation were set out in a   “privatisation project” which was attached to the decision of the Ministry of 11   October 1995 on the State company’s privatisation. It appears that Part “B.2.2” of the privatisation project made provision for the manner in which the applicant’s restitution claims were to   be   dealt with and satisfied. The decision of 11   October 1995 stated that no appeal could be   filed against it. Neither this decision nor the relevant privatisation project has been officially served on the applicant. On 27   September 1996 the applicant restated her restitution claim filed with the District Court. She submitted that, despite all her efforts, she had been unable to find the Nationalisation Decree of 1950 on which the expropriation of her father’s assets should have been based. She considered that, in these circumstances, the expropriation should be   regarded as having taken place in violation of the then ‑ applicable regulations, i.e. the condition defined in Section   6 (1)   (k) of the Restitution Act. She asserted that the District Court was thus competent to   determine her claim and demanded restitution of the commercial premises in natura . In its decision of 4   March 1997, and apparently on the basis of the procedure set out in the privatisation project appended to the decision of 11   October 1995, the Ministry determined the applicant’s restitution claim. It noted that the applicant had raised the claim with the Ministry and with the State company in 1991. It considered it to   be   established that the commercial premises at issue had been expropriated by the Nationalisation Decree of 1950 and thus “in accordance with the legislation adopted in the period from 1945 to 1948 and without any compensation” as referred to in Section   2   (3) of the Restitution Act. On the basis of this provision the Ministry found that it had jurisdiction to determine the matter in accordance with Section   47 of the Privatisation Act. The Ministry observed that the applicants’ father had 3 children out of whom only the applicant qualified for restitution. She was accordingly entitled to 1/3 of the property at issue. The Ministry noted that, after the expropriation, new buildings had been constructed on the premises concerned and that, in the meantime, the ownership rights to these premises had been transferred to the Privatised company. The Ministry concluded that in these circumstances it would not be   appropriate to   restore these premises in natura to the applicant. The Ministry therefore decided pursuant to Section   47 (1) of the Privatisation Act to   satisfy the applicant’s claim in an alternative way. It decided to deliver her shares in a   Governmental restitution fund ( Reštitučný investičný fond ). The Ministry determined the value of the property at issue on the basis of a   report obtained from an   expert and awarded the applicant shares with the aggregate nominal value corresponding to 1/3 of that value. According to the applicant, the real value of these shares was substantially lower than their nominal value. The Ministry notified the applicant of its decision of 4   March 1997 by a   letter of 6   March 1997. It also advised the applicant that “if she disagreed with the evaluation of her claim, she could assert her claim” before the civil court within fifteen days from the date on which the notification was served on her. By a   letter of 19   March 1997 the applicant informed the District Court and the Ministry that she disagreed with the manner in which her restitution claim was to   be   satisfied as well as with its evaluation. She expressly stated that it was an “appeal” against the above notification. However, in a   letter of 24 March 1997 the applicant’s representative informed the District Court that the letter of 19   March 1997 was only intended to   make clear that the applicant disapproved of the decision taken and that it should by no   means be   considered as a   formal appeal. On 10   April 1997 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action for restitution in natura of the commercial premises. It noted that, before the State company and the Ministry as well as before the District Court, the applicant had originally claimed restitution on the ground that her father’s property was “expropriated in accordance with the legal rules adopted in the period from 1945 to 1948 without providing any compensation” within the meaning of Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act. It also noted that on 11   September 1995, i.e.   within the time ‑ limit set forth by Section   47 (4) of the Privatisation Act (as amended by the Act No.   60/1994 Coll.), the Ministry had decided to   privatise the State company. The District Court concluded that the Ministry was thus competent to   determine the applicants’ restitution claim. It noted that the Ministry had in fact already done so by its decision of 4   March 1997. The District Court observed that the Ministry had notified the applicant of its decision of 4   March 1997 and that it had advised her of the available remedy by a   letter of 6   March 1997. Pursuant to Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act, if the applicant disagreed with the evaluation of her claim by the Ministry, she could assert her restitution claim in court. By her submission of 19 March 1997 the applicant informed the District Court in explicit terms that she did not wish to   make use of this remedy. The District Court noted that, in any event, such a   remedy would be determined in a   separate set of proceedings and that it was not the subject ‑ matter of the proceedings before it. The District Court finally noted that, in the course of the proceedings, the applicant had sought to   change the legal qualification of her restitution claim. She now alleged that the State had taken away the property from her father by “nationalisation which had taken place in violation of the then ‑ applicable legal rules” within the meaning of Section   6 (1)   (k) of the Restitution Act. The applicant argued that, in this case, it was the District Court which had jurisdiction to determine her claim. The District Court concluded that such a   re ‑ qualification was not possible as the applicant’s restitution claim, as originally qualified, had already been satisfied by the Ministry. The applicant appealed to the Žilina Regional Court. On 25   March 1998 the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s judgment of 10   April 1997. It concurred with the District Court’s view that, insofar as the applicant’s claim originally based on Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act had already been determined and satisfied by the Ministry, pursuant to Article   135 §   2 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, the courts were not called upon to determine the same claim to the same property, although in the meantime re ‑ qualified under Section   6 (1) (k) of that Act. The applicant’s disagreement with the decision of the Ministry could be   examined by courts in a   separate set of proceedings taken under Article   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act within 15 days from the service of the respective notification. It was however not at issue in the present proceedings. The Regional Court nevertheless found that the District Court had insufficiently established the scope of the subject ‑ matter of the applicant’s claim. Insofar as the action, as restated and supplemented by the applicant in the course of the proceedings, was directed at recovery of property other than that already decided upon by the Ministry in its decision of 4   March 1997, it was to be determined under the Restitution Act. The Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court and ordered it to re ‑ establish the scope of the subject ‑ matter of the action and to re ‑ examine it in the light of the above conclusion. No appeal lay against the Regional Court’s decision. On 8   March 1999 the District Court requested the applicant to   restate the subject ‑ matter of her action so as to express it clearly, unequivocally and in line with the applicable procedural rules. The applicant replied on 25   March 1999. She defined the immovable items the restitution of which she was claiming and stated that she was seeking their restitution on the ground that the State had taken them from her late father in violation of the then ‑ applicable regulations within the meaning of Section   6 (1)   (k) of the Restitution Act. At the same time she raised a   claim for “financial compensation for all loss, material and moral damage, lost profit, lost opportunities and unjust enrichment and gain caused by erroneous administrative conduct and inactivity together with interest for late payment”. On 27   April 1999 the District Court informed the applicant that her submission did not comply with the applicable formal requirements and requested her to   define clearly, unambiguously and comprehensibly which plots of land and which constructions she sought to   have restored and which costs she requested to   have compensated. In her submission of 10   May 1999 the applicant re ‑ defined the subject ‑ matter of her action and stated that she would reformulate her claim for reimbursement of her costs at a   later stage. On 21   October 2003 the District Court again dismissed the applicant’s action for restitution of the commercial premises. It found that the action related partially to the immovables that had already been covered by the decision of the Ministry of 4   March 1997 and partially to other immovable items. As for the first part, the applicant’s restitution claim had already been satisfied by the Ministry. As to the second part, the applicant had failed to   establish that her parents had in fact owned these items and that she was entitled to   have them restored. The District Court further ordered the applicant to   pay the defendant’s legal costs. By   another separate decision of 21   October 2003 the District Court declared the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of her costs inadmissible as, despite its previous instruction and warning, she had failed to   raise it in accordance with the applicable procedural rules. The applicant appealed against both decisions of the District Court of 21   October 2003 and her appeals are currently pending. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice The Restitution Act (no. 87/1991 Coll.) On 21   February 1991 the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic enacted the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. It entered into force on 1   April 1991 and has been amended several times since. It is still in force in Slovakia. The purpose of the Restitution Act, as set out in Section   1 (1), is to   endeavour to mitigate the consequences of certain injustices and property losses which arose between 25   February 1948 and 1   January 1990 by acts falling within the sphere of civil law, labour law, and by administrative acts incompatible with the principles of a   democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to Section   2 (1) of the Act, infringements of property rights which took place during this period shall be redressed either by the restitution of property or by financial compensation. Section   2 (3) provides that, when an   ownership title was taken away in accordance with the nationalisation laws adopted between 1945 and 1948 without appropriate compensation having been paid, the person entitled to   restitution shall have a   claim to redress under the Privatisation Act (see below). Section   3 provides which persons are entitled to restitution. Under its subsection (2) (c), children and the spouse of the person whose property was taken by the State are entitled to restitution each in equal shares. The State or other entities in possession of the expropriated or confiscated property on the day of entry into force of the Act (Section   4 (1)) are obliged to   surrender and restore such property to the person entitled to restitution upon a   written request to this effect made by the person entitled to restitution (Section   5 (1)). If no such request has been filed within six months after the date of the entry into force of the Act, the claim to restitution is forfeited (Section   5 (2)). Pursuant to Section 5 (3), the State or other entity obliged to   make restitution shall conclude an   agreement with the person entitled to restitution for surrender of the property and to   restore the property to the entitled person within thirty days from the expiry of the time ‑ limit referred to in Section   5 (2). Where the State or other entity obliged to   make restitution refuses to   surrender the property, the entitled person may, within one year after the date of entry into force of the Act, assert his or her restitution claim in civil court (Section 5 (4)). Section Article 6 (1) (k) provides that the obligation to restore property also applies where the deprivation of property took place during the relevant period in violation of the then ‑ applicable legal rules. Under Section   6 (2), in conjunction with Section   2 (1) (c), the obligation to restore property applies also to cases where property was taken by the State without any legal basis and on grounds of political persecution (Section 2 (2)) or actions infringing generally accepted human rights and liberties. Pursuant to Section   8 (1), constructions which have been substantially modified and have thus lost their original constructional and technical character are not to be restored. The Privatisation Act (no. 92/1991 Coll.) On 26   February 1991 the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic enacted the Privatisation Act. It entered into force on 1   April 1991. It has been amended several times and it is still in force in Slovakia. It stipulates the conditions and procedure for the transfer to private hands of State property which is held by State companies, State financial institutions and other State organisations and State property used by organisations founded by municipalities or administered by the Land Fund ( Pozemkový fond ). Pursuant to Section   3 (2) property in respect of which claims have been raised under special legislation (including the Restitution Act) falls within the scope of the Privatisation Act. The acquirer of such property becomes liable to make restitution under the special legislation. In accordance with Section   10 (10) decision ‑ making on privatisation is not governed by the general rules on administrative proceedings. A decision on privatisation cannot be reviewed by a   court. Section   47 (1) provides that, where a   property has been taken away in the circumstances referred to in Section   2 (3) of the Restitution Act, the person entitled to restitution under the Restitution Act shall have a   claim to redress under the Privatisation Act. The manner in which the redress is to   be   afforded shall be   determined in the decision on privatisation concerning that property. The Ministry is to notify the person who raised the   claim to redress in writing about the approved manner in which and extent to which the redress is to be afforded without undue delay after the decision on privatisation is given. Pursuant to Section   47 (2) a   written request for redress is to be filed with the Ministry within six months from the date of the entry into force of the Privatisation Act, otherwise the claim is forfeited. The Fund is obliged to   settle a claim for redress which is made under subsection (1) in accordance with schedule of the approved privatisation project, but in no case later than one year after the privatisation project was approved. Under Section   47 (3), if the entitled person disagrees with the evaluation of his or her claim, this person can assert the claim before a   court within 15 days from the day when he or she is notified of the decision on the claim. In accordance with Section   47 (4) (as in force until 23   March 1994) if the claim of an   entitled person cannot be satisfied under subsections (1), (2) and (3) because the decision on privatisation was not given by 31   December   1994, the claim shall be settled under the Restitution Act. This deadline was extended until 31   December 1995 by an   amendment No.   60/1994 Coll. which entered into force on 24   March 1994. Pursuant to Section   47 (5) if a   claim can be   settled by restitution in   natura , the settlement of the claim is governed by the Restitution Act and the provisions of Section 47 (4) of the Privatisation Act do not apply. The Code of the Civil Procedure In accordance with Article   135 (2) ordinary courts normally have the power to   determine issues which otherwise fall within the scope of competence of other authorities. However, if an   issue has already been determined by the competent authority, the ordinary courts would rely on its decision. Part   5 governs the administrative judiciary. Under Article   244 (1) administrative tribunals review the lawfulness of decisions taken by public authorities on the basis of administrative law actions under Chapter   2 of that Part and administrative law appeals under Chapter   3 of that Part. Pursuant to Article   246 (2) (a), as applicable at the relevant time, the reviewing of decisions given by central bodies of State administration (including ministries) falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In accordance with Article   250l, the provisions of Chapter   3 of Part   5 on administrative law appeals apply in cases where the law bestows on courts the power to   determine legal remedies against administrative decisions which have not yet become final and binding. COMPLAINTS 1.     The applicant complained that she did not receive a   fair hearing within the meaning of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention in determination of her claim for restitution of the commercial premises in that her claim had been determined arbitrarily by the Ministry which – being a   part of the executive – cannot be regarded as an   impartial and independent tribunal, whereas the civil courts decided that they were not competent to   determine her claim insofar as it had already been decided upon by the Ministry. 2.     The applicant also complained under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings on her claim for restitution of the residential house had exceeded a   reasonable time. 3.     The applicant further complained under Article   1 of Protocol No.   1 that, although her entitlement to   restitution of the commercial premises had been accepted, she was not given these premises in natura but merely awarded her financial compensation of a   substantially lower real value. 4.     The applicant finally complained under Article   13 of the Convention that she had no effective remedy in respect of her complaint under Article   6 §   1 of the Convention of the length of the proceedings on her claim for restitution of the residential house. THE LAW 1.     The applicant complained that her claim for restitution of the commercial premises had been determined arbitrarily by the Ministry which had not been impartial and independent and that the ordinary courts had refused to examine her claim in respect of these premises as it had already been decided upon by the Ministry. She further complained that the proceedings on her claim for restitution of the residential house had lasted unreasonably long. She relied on Article   6 §   1 of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a   fair ... hearing within a   reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal ...” a)     As to the complaint concerning the proceedings leading to the decision of the Ministry, the decision itself and the lack of access to a   court in this respect, the Government maintained that the applicant had in fact raised her claim to   restitution of the commercial premises in two ways. She firstly filed her claim with the Ministry and, secondly, with the ordinary courts. On 4   March 1997 the Ministry acknowledged her claim. The only point at dispute was the manner in which the claim was to   be   satisfied. The Ministry decided that it would satisfy the claim by means of an alternative form of compensation and not by restitution in   natura . The Government asserted that if the applicant had any objections to the way in which her claim had been determined and to the settlement offered by the Ministry, she could have raised them in an   administrative law appeal under Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act within 15 days from when the notification of the settlement was served on her. The appeal would then have been   dealt with by the Supreme Court. The Government further claimed that in none of their respective decisions had the domestic courts found that they lacked jurisdiction to   review the decision of the Ministry on the basis of the administrative law appeal referred to above. In its decision of 25   March 1998 the Žilina Regional Court merely took it as established that the applicant’s claim for restitution of the commercial premises was well ‑ founded. The Regional Court did so on the basis of the finding of the Ministry in its decision of 4   March 1997 which it considered it to be unnecessary to   review. The Government invited the Court to declare the relevant part of the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. The applicant reiterated that the proceedings leading to the decision of the Ministry of 4   March 1997 lacked the guarantees of a   fair trial before an   independent and impartial tribunal and that this decision was wrongful. She maintained that she had no effective possibility of having this process and the ensuing decision reviewed by a   tribunal compatible with the requirements of Article   6 of the Convention. Insofar as the Government referred to the administrative law appeal under Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act, the applicant maintained that she could not make proper use of this remedy as she had been denied access to the information and documents she needed for it. She further pointed out that, due to its numerous amendments, the Privatisation Act was not adequately comprehensible to an   ordinary citizen and that it appeared to   be in conflict with the Restitution Act. She also objected that there had been no effective judicial control available in respect of the whole process of the privatisation of the State company and in respect of its outcome. Finally, the applicant maintained that, even assuming that she had a   remedy before the Supreme Court, even that court could not satisfactorily meet the requirements of Article   6 of the Convention. The Court notes that the applicant asserted her restitution claim concerning the commercial premises at the same time both in administrative proceedings before the Ministry and in judicial proceedings before the ordinary courts. Her claim was first determined by the Ministry which decided on the legal qualification of the claim, the extent to which it was accepted and the manner in which it was to be satisfied. The Ministry evaluated the accepted part of the claim and offered the applicant corresponding compensation. The Court observes that Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act envisages a   possibility for a   person who claims restitution and who disagrees with the evaluation of his or her claim to assert the claim before a   court. The applicant was advised of this possibility by the Ministry in their letter of 6   March 1997. The provision of Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act providing for this judicial remedy is a   lex specialis in relation to the provision of Section   10 (10) of that Act. The assertion of the applicant’s rights under Section   47 (3) of the Privatisation Act would be in a   separate set of proceedings under Part   5, Chapter   3 of the Code