CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 mai 2005

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text-align:justify } .s60723A49 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s8BD2CFA4 { width:35.21pt; display:inline-block } .s3C0091F9 { width:215.49pt; display:inline-block } .sDEA786DA { width:210.67pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION     CASE OF BUZESCU v. ROMANIA     (Application no. 61302/00)     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG     24 May 2005       FINAL     24/08/2005       This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44   §   2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Buzescu v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   J.-P. Costa , President ,   Mr   A.B. Baka ,   Mr   R. Türmen ,   Mr   C. B îrsan,   Mr   K. Jungwiert ,   Mr   M. Ugrekhelidze,   Mrs   A. Mularoni, judges , and   Mr   S. Naismith , Deputy Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 18 November 2003 and 26 April 2005, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 61302/00) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Petru Buzescu (“the applicant”), on 25 July 2000. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr S. Grosz, a lawyer practising in London. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents: Mrs C. Tarcea, succeeded by Mr B. Aurescu and Mrs   R.   Rizoiu. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the decision of 27 June 1996 of the Romanian Union of Lawyers ( Uniunea Avocaţilor din România – “the UAR”), annulling his registration with the Constanţa Bar, and the subsequent proceedings in which that decision had been upheld, violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the right to a fair hearing. He also complained that the aforementioned decision amounted to a control of the use of property incompatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. 5.     By a decision of 18 November 2003 the Court declared the application partly admissible. 6.     The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine ), the parties replied in writing to each other’s observations. 7.     On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed Second Section (Rule 52 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     Background of the case 8.     The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bucharest. 9.     In 1977 the applicant joined the Constanţa Bar (Romania). He practised as a lawyer until 1981, when he left for the United States. As a result, the Romanian authorities deprived him of his Romanian citizenship and required him to notify the Constanţa Bar that he had ceased his professional activities and to transfer to his colleagues the cases on which he was then working. 10.     In a decision of 30 October 1981 the Constanţa Bar acknowledged the applicant’s request to cease his professional activities and decided to cancel the applicant’s membership. According to the applicant, he did not request that his membership of the Bar be cancelled. 11.     In 1985 the applicant became a member of the New York Bar and practised there as an attorney until 1991. 12.     In August 1990 the applicant applied to the Bucharest Bar to be registered as a lawyer there. On 5 November 1990 the Chairman of the Romanian Union of Lawyers ( Uniunea Avocaţilor din România – “the UAR”) sent him the following reply: “Until a new law concerning lawyers is passed, we can only order the annulment of the Constanţa Bar’s decision to cancel your membership, so that you may resume your membership of that bar, but you will be deemed ineligible to practise until you return to this country. ... Indeed, the current law does not allow you to be a member of two bars, irrespective of the fact that one such bar is in this country and the other is abroad.” 13.     The Chairman of the UAR confirmed his position in the course of subsequent meetings with the applicant in March 1991. 14.     In March 1991, after his Romanian citizenship had been restored, the applicant returned to live in Romania. On 12 April 1991 he applied to the Constanţa Bar for the annulment of the 1981 decision, on the ground that he had never requested the cancellation of his Bar membership. He also applied for reinstatement as a lawyer and to be removed from the list of lawyers who were ineligible to practise as he had been a member of another Bar. 15.     On 8 May 1991 the Constanţa Bar annulled the 1981 decision to remove the applicant’s name from the Bar roll but ordered his re-registration on the list of lawyers ineligible to practise, as he was still a member of another bar. 16.     From 1991 onwards the applicant offered investment advice to several multinational corporate clients investing in Romania. 17.     In 1994 he founded a company, Petru Buzescu SRL, subsequently renamed Buzescu & Co SRL, of which he was the sole shareholder and whose main field of activity was business and management consultancy. 18.     On 19 May 1996 the Constanţa Bar decided to remove the applicant’s ineligible status and to register his name on the list of practising lawyers with effect from 10 May 1996. 19.     From May 1996 until October 1999, given that he had been reinstated by the Constanţa Bar, he paid monthly Bar fees and UAR fees amounting to 1,983,000 Romanian lei (approximately 225 euros [“EUR”], according to the average exchange rate for the relevant period). B.     Annulment of the applicant’s reinstatement as a lawyer 20.     On 14 May 1996, in accordance with the Legal Profession Act (Law no. 51/1995) and the Rules governing the Legal Profession, the applicant submitted an application to the Bucharest Bar for a transfer from the Constanţa Bar. He did not receive any response. 21.     On 27 June 1996 the UAR decided that, in accordance with Article   5   § 3 (j) of Legislative Decree no. 90/1990 concerning the organisation and practice of the legal profession, the applicant’s reinstatement as a lawyer fell within its own field of competence and not that of the Bar. The UAR thus found that the Constanţa Bar had acted ultra vires in taking its decision of 8   May   1991. Furthermore, it declared that the Constanţa Bar’s decision of 19 May 1996, annulling the applicant’s ineligible status, was illegal, having regard to the fact that it had been based on the unlawful decision of 1991. 22.     It appears that the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 was never notified either to the applicant or to the Constanţa Bar. The decision was not communicated to him until 10 February 1998, when he was involved in other proceedings before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 23.     On 3 September 1996, following a communication from the Embassy of the United States, G.D., head of a department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to the Chairman of the UAR pointing out that the applicant’s re-registration with the Bar in 1991 was an act of reparation, that he was the legal adviser for Romania for a number of important companies from the United States mentioned in the letter, and that the best possible ways of resolving his case should be considered in the interests of good relations between the two countries. 24.     On 27 November 1996, having received no response to his application for a transfer, the applicant submitted a renewed application to the Bucharest Bar for leave to be transferred from the Constanţa Bar. 25.     As he did not receive any response, on 18   March   1997 the applicant brought an action before the Bucharest Regional Court, in accordance with the Administrative Litigation Act (Law no. 29/1990). He asked the court to establish that he had a right to be transferred from the Constanţa Bar to the Bucharest Bar, to compel the latter to allow his application for a transfer and to issue a decision authorising him to practise as a lawyer in a private law firm. 26.     Following an application by the Bucharest Bar for a change of venue ( declinare a competentei ), the Bucharest Regional Court referred the case to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 27.     During the proceedings, and following several hearings, the Bucharest Bar invited the applicant to attend a meeting organised by the Bar Council on 15 May 1997. The applicant was informed at this meeting that the Bucharest Bar was willing to consider his application for a transfer, provided that he clarified his status with the UAR. He was then told that the UAR had annulled his reinstatement as a member of the Constanţa Bar. The applicant requested the Bucharest Bar to notify him in writing about its position in respect of his application for a transfer. On 4 June 1997 the Bucharest Bar sent the applicant a letter stating the position which it had expressed orally on 15   May 1997 and informing him of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996. C.     Applications lodged by the applicant with the UAR 28.     At the suggestion of the Dean of the Bucharest Bar, the applicant requested the UAR on 9 June 1997 “to clarify and resolve” his situation and to advise him of the manner in which his request could be met. 29.     In July 1997 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal requesting it to invite the UAR to join as a defendant the proceedings he had brought against the Bucharest Bar. He pointed out that he would be seeking to compel the UAR to disclose its decision of 27   June   1996. After several hearings, on 10 February 1998 the UAR submitted a copy of its decision of 27 June 1996 to the court. 30.     On 18 February 1998 the applicant filed an application with the UAR requesting the annulment of that decision and confirmation of his status as a lawyer and a member of the Constanţa Bar, by way of reparation for an abuse committed under the communist regime. He also referred to his letter of 9 June 1997 to the UAR, pointing out that no answer had been given to his request that the UAR take the necessary decisions in order to clarify his situation. 31.     On 14 March 1998 the UAR confirmed its decision of 27 June 1996, stating, inter   alia , that the applicant had “committed fraud as he had practised as a lawyer all this time without legal authorisation”. No information was given to the applicant as to the manner in which his status could be clarified in order to practise as a legally registered lawyer. Similar statements concerning alleged fraud on the applicant’s part were made by the UAR during the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. D.     Proceedings instituted by the applicant before the Bucharest Court of Appeal against the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 32.     On 30 March 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings against the UAR before the Bucharest Court of Appeal seeking the annulment of the decision of 27 June 1996. In his application, he submitted that: following the entry into force of the Legal Profession Act (Law   no.   51/1995), the UAR had had no power to annul the Constanţa Bar’s decision of 1991; that, under section 5 of Law no. 29/1990, its decision of 27 June 1996 was invalid since it had been delivered after the one-year period prescribed by that provision and since only the courts had had jurisdiction to annul in 1996 a decision taken in 1991; and that, as regards the merits of his application, which the court was expressly invited to examine, in the absence of specific regulations indicating where to apply to remedy an unlawful administrative decision deleting him from the Bar’s list of lawyers, he had acted in good faith, according to the principles of administrative law, when he had lodged his application with the Constanţa Bar in 1991. The applicant pointed out that his administrative application of 18 February 1998 to the UAR had not constituted a remedy. That case was joined to the proceedings against the Bucharest Bar. 33.     On 30 June 1998, during a hearing before the Court of Appeal, the applicant alleged that the decision of 30 October 1981 had been unlawful since he had not applied to have his registration as a lawyer cancelled and, consequently, the Constanţa Bar had been entitled to adopt its decision of 8   May   1991 in order to redress the abuse committed in 1981. The applicant submitted a number of questions to be answered by the UAR. The UAR replied to the question whether the fact that he had applied to the Constanţa Bar in 1991 for the annulment of the 1981 decision was unlawful: it considered that the applicant could have lodged such an application with the Bar, but that the decision to be taken fell within the UAR’s exclusive field of competence. The UAR conceded that the legal basis of its decision of 27 June 1996 was Article 5 § 3 (j) of Legislative   Decree   no.   90/1990. As regards the monthly Bar and UAR fees paid by the applicant, the UAR replied that these were insignificant and that, according to the letter of 3 September 1996 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the applicant provided legal services to many companies, but he had not established an office for that purpose, nor had he paid the 10% fees to the lawyers’ social-security fund, thus committing fraud and unlawfully practising the profession of lawyer. At the same hearing, suspecting that the decision of 27   June   1996 had been fabricated at a later date, namely during the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the applicant also requested that the UAR’s original Register of Decisions be disclosed. 34.     On 7 June 1998 the court acceded to the applicant’s request. However, on 15 September 1998 it reversed its decision of 7 June 1998 and ruled that the UAR did not have to disclose the original register. The court declared that, in the absence of a criminal complaint alleging forgery lodged by the applicant against the UAR, it was satisfied that the decision purportedly given on 27 June 1996 had indeed been given on that date. The court’s new position was due mainly to the production, by the UAR, of two photocopies, one being of an undated excerpt of the minutes of a meeting of 27   June   1996 describing the procedure leading to the impugned decision, and the other being of another page of those minutes with no link to the applicant’s case. Both these pages bore the stamp of the UAR and the signature of its secretary with the words “certified copy”. It is not clear from these documents how many pages the minutes of the meeting of 27   June   1996 amounted to in all, who signed the minutes or who voted during that meeting. 35.     The applicant formally objected to that ruling, insisting that it was not his intention to prolong the procedure by lodging a criminal complaint and that the register could easily be disclosed, given that the UAR shared the same building as the court. The applicant’s objection was dismissed. 36.     On 27 October 1998, during a hearing before the Court of Appeal, the applicant replied to questions submitted by the UAR. He contended that he had not provided legal services since he had come back to Romania, that he had not practised as a lawyer with an established office and that, consequently, he had not paid the 10% of his income required by Law no. 51/1995. 37.     On 6 April 1999 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application, holding that, pursuant to Legislative Decree no.   90/1990, the Constanţa Bar had acted ultra vires in taking its decision of 8 May 1991, and that, according to Rule 130 of the Rules governing the Legal Profession (“the Rules”) issued by the UAR in 1995, the latter had been entitled to annul the decisions of local bars on grounds of illegality. As regards the fact that in 1991 the applicant had lodged an application with the Constanţa Bar, considering himself entitled to be reinstated as a lawyer by the body that had unlawfully cancelled his membership with the Bar in 1981, the Court noted that the 1981 decision had been adopted on the basis of a request by the applicant himself. E.     Proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice concerning the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 38.     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice against the aforementioned decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, submitting that that court had not taken into account all the arguments and the evidence submitted. Accordingly, in his grounds of appeal he submitted that the court had erroneously found that he had been at fault for not lodging an application with the competent body in 1991 for re-registration as a lawyer, given that he had applied in 1991, on the basis of Law no. 29/1990, to the body that had taken the unlawful and politically motivated administrative decision of 8 May 1981, although he had not requested to be deleted from the Bar’s list of lawyers. Considering that he should not have had to request to be readmitted to the legal profession because he had been excluded from the Bar by a decision without any legal basis, the applicant had lodged the application with the issuing body, namely the Constanţa Bar, as there was no provision for specific proceedings to redress the effects of such unlawful administrative decisions. The applicant also submitted that, pursuant to the aforementioned Legal Profession Act (Law no. 51/1995), which repealed Legislative   Decree   no.   90/1990, the UAR had no longer been competent in 1996 to annul Bar decisions, and that Rule 130 of the Rules could not have supplemented that law. The applicant underlined that the UAR’s decision of 27   June 1996 had been illegal because the UAR had been time–barred in 1996, according to Law   no.   29/1990, and because the legal basis for the decision, namely Legislative   Decree   no.   90/1990, had been repealed by Law no. 51/1995. In his grounds of appeal and also in his written observations to the Supreme Court, the applicant added that, according to the documents in the file, the UAR had known since 1992 that he had been registered as a lawyer by the Constanţa Bar in 1991, and that, in accordance with Article   5   §   3   (d) of Legislative Decree no. 90/1990, the UAR had at that time not only had the power but also the duty to review and possibly annul the decision of 8   May   1991 by the Constanţa Bar. The applicant referred to the UAR’s reply to the questions of 30 June 1998 and concluded that, even supposing that the UAR should have been consulted in 1991 by the Constanţa Bar on his re-registration as a lawyer, he was not to blame for lodging the application with that Bar or for the latter’s or the UAR’s failure to follow the proper procedure. The applicant requested the court to consider whether it was normal in these circumstances that he could not practise his profession in Romania, and asked it to annul the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996 and to allow his transfer to the Bucharest Bar. 39.     In a final decision of 28 January 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that, in 1991, Legislative   Decree   no.   90/1990 had vested in the Council of the UAR the exclusive authority to determine applications relating to the admission or readmission of lawyers to the Bar, and that the provisions of section 58 (g) and (i) of Law no. 51/1995 should be interpreted as conserving these prerogatives. On the basis of Rule 130 of the Rules, the court rejected the applicant’s submission that Law   no.   51/1995 had removed the UAR’s powers under Legislative Decree no. 90/1990 to annul Bar decisions, conceding nevertheless that in the text of this law such a power was not expressly maintained. As to the time within which the UAR had been entitled to annul the applicant’s registration with the Constanţa Bar in 1991, the Supreme Court held that, given the issuing body’s lack of jurisdiction, the annulment could have been decided upon at any time. Finally, the Supreme Court pointed out that the annulment of the applicant’s registration with the Constanţa Bar on the ground of illegality did not remove his right to apply to the competent authority to decide on his application for re ‑ registration as a member of the Bar. F.     Facts subsequent to the application to the Court 40.     On 30 May 2001 the applicant applied to the Bucharest Bar for registration as a lawyer registered with a foreign Bar, but to date he has not received any reply in spite of the fact that, according to him, in the interim the Bucharest Bar has approved the registration of more than ten foreign lawyers. 41.     On 14 February 2004 the Council of the UAR examined the applicant’s request of 12 April 1991 to the Constanţa Bar, the latter’s decision of 8 May 1991 and the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, annulling the applicant’s registration with the Constanţa Bar. The Council decided to repeal its decision of 27 June 1996, to restore the applicant’s previous status as a lawyer eligible to practise and to notify this new decision to him and to the Constanţa Bar. 42.     On 23 February 2004 the Council of the Bucharest Bar granted the applicant’s transfer to the Bucharest Bar, ordered his registration on that Bar’s list of lawyers and decided to notify this decision to him and to the Constanţa Bar. 43.     In a letter of 26 May 2004 the applicant stated that on 23   April   2004 the UAR had notified him of its decision of 14 February 2004, and that to date he had not received any formal notification from the Bucharest Bar concerning its decision of 23 February 2004. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 44.     The relevant provisions of the Romanian Civil Code read as follows: Article 1171 “An official deed must be adopted in the form required by law, by a public official competent to act in the place where it was adopted.” Article 1173 “An official deed shall be authentic in respect of any person subject to its terms and clauses. The execution of an official deed ... shall be suspended where a criminal complaint is lodged against its author. Where such a complaint alleging forgery is made in the course of civil proceedings, the courts may, depending upon the circumstances, provisionally suspend the execution of the deed.” 45.     The relevant provisions of the Administrative Litigation Act (Law no. 29/1990) read as follows: Section 5 “... the application to the court (to annul an administrative act) must be lodged within a year from the date on which the act is notified.” Section 11 “... If a claim is allowed, the court shall also rule on the damages claimed.” Section 12 “Where the claimant has applied for the annulment of the administrative act without claiming damages at the same time, as the amount of the damage sustained was not known at the time of the examination of the application for annulment, the time allowed for submitting a claim for damages shall run from the date on which he becomes aware of or should have become aware of the damage sustained.” 46.     Article 5 § 3 of Legislative Decree no.   90/1990 concerning certain measures with regard to the organisation and practice of the legal profession provided: “The Council of the UAR ... shall have the following powers... (d) to review decisions taken by the standing committee of the UAR or by the Bar Council and, if it establishes that these decisions are illegal, to annul them; ...   (j) to rule on applications for admission or readmission to the Bar and for transfer and secondment of lawyers from one Bar to another; ...” 47.     On 9 June 1995 the Legal Profession Act (Law no. 51/1995) entered into force, repealing Legislative   Decree   no.   90/1990. Its relevant provisions read as follows: Section 20 “The Bar shall be required to draw up an annual roll of qualified and trainee lawyers, in alphabetical order, mentioning their first and last names, academic qualifications and date of admission to the Bar, the place where they practise, their professional capacity and the courts in which they are entitled to plead ... The Bar shall transmit the annual list and the modifications thereto to the courts, the investigating authorities, the regional administrative authorities and the Romanian Union of Lawyers.” Section 48(2) “The Bar Council shall have the following powers: ... (c) to prepare, amend and publish the annual roll of lawyers. It shall transmit this list, with any changes that are necessary, to all interested bodies; ... (h) to acknowledge applications for transfers or secondment within the Bar; (i) to monitor compliance with the conditions set out in this Act and the Rules as regards the manner of exercise of the profession, and to organise and keep details of such reviews...” Section 58 “The Council of the UAR shall meet on a quarterly basis and ... shall have the following powers: ... (b) to discuss, approve and modify the Rules governing the Legal Profession; ... (g) to approve admission to the Bar in all the cases provided for by the law; ... (i) to rule on complaints against decisions by the Bar Council concerning the refusal of transfer or secondment requests.” 48.     On 6 March 2001 Law no. 51/1995 was amended, granting the following powers to the Council of the UAR in a new section 63 (i): “The Council of the UAR shall have the following powers: ... (i) to annul decisions by the Bar on grounds of illegality.” 49.     Rule 130 of the Rules governing the Legal Profession, adopted by the UAR and published in the Official Gazette no. 237 of 17   October   1995, provides: “Decisions adopted by the General Assembly or by the Bar Council may be annulled by the Council of the UAR solely on grounds of illegality or a breach of the provisions of the Rules, provided that the Bar’s autonomy is respected. Decisions by the Dean of the Bar may be contested before the Bar Council.” 50.     On 12 March 1997, in a final judgment (no. 450), the Supreme Court of Justice held in proceedings between a private party and the UAR that the latter was an administrative authority with a structure and powers provided for by law, and that the Administrative Litigation Act (Law no. 29/1990) applied to its decisions. On 18 February 2003, in a final decision (no. 658), the Supreme Court of Justice held that the UAR was an administrative authority carrying out administrative acts, that it had a structure and powers established by law, and that it fulfilled a public service role. On 4 March 2003, in a final decision (no. 866) in proceedings against the UAR concerning the right to be admitted to the legal profession without an examination, the Supreme Court of Justice held that “it [was] undisputed that the decision [of the UAR was] an administrative act issued by a public authority” and that Law no. 29/1990 was applicable to the case. 51.     On 30 January 2003, in a final decision (no. 327), the Supreme Court of Justice set aside a decision of an appellate court on the ground that, inter alia , it had reversed without stating reasons a previous order concerning the admission of evidence. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 52.     The applicant complained that the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, annulling his registration with the Constanţa Bar, and the subsequent administrative proceedings in which that decision had been upheld, had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the right to a fair hearing. He complained that the UAR’s decision had been adopted without any hearing and had not been notified to him and that, in the subsequent proceedings, the courts had failed to determine the full subject matter of the dispute, to deal with his main arguments, or to order disclosure of the UAR’s original Register of Decisions, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” A.     Arguments of the parties 1.     The applicant 53.     The applicant submitted that the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 had been adopted without any notice being given to him at that time about such proceedings and without a hearing, contrary to the requirements of the Rules and of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Instead, the decision had not been communicated to him until February 1998. 54.     He maintained that the shortcomings of the procedure for the adoption of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 had not been remedied by the subsequent court proceedings. The applicant contended that the courts had not ruled on the substantive merits of his case, notwithstanding the fact that he had constantly set out his arguments. The applicant had asked the UAR and, subsequently, the courts to rule not only on the annulment of the UAR decision, but also on his reinstatement as a member of the Bar, since his exclusion in 1981 had been an abuse committed under the communist regime; on the UAR’s failure to notify him of the decision of 27 June 1996; and on the applicability to his case of the Administrative Litigation Act (Law   no.   29/1990). That law would allegedly have rendered the UAR’s decision time-barred and would have made the Constanţa Bar competent in 1991 to annul its own decision of 1981. He submitted that he had acted in good faith and had relied on Law   no.   29/1990 when he had applied in 1991 to the Constanţa Bar, and not to the UAR, in order to annul its 1981 decision removing him from the Bar roll, and that even the UAR had acknowledged, in its response to the applicant’s questions of 30 March 1998, that he had the right to file such an application with the Bar. 55.     As regards the refusal of the Court of Appeal to order the disclosure of the UAR’s original Register of Decisions, the applicant further contended that the court could have ordered the production of the original register in the administrative proceedings, instead of proposing the alternative of criminal proceedings for forgery, which would have delayed the determination of his administrative complaints. The applicant stressed that the court had reversed its previous discovery order after the UAR had produced a few loose-leaf photocopies of the minutes of the decision of 27   June 1996. Relying on the case of Timurtaş v. Turkey , the applicant submitted that these photocopies, carrying an illegible signature, had reinforced his doubts as to the authenticity of the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996. 2.     The Government 56.     The Government submitted that the prior intervention of professional bodies, such as the UAR, was consistent with the requirements of Article   6   §   1 of the Convention as long as the applicant subsequently had access to a court offering all the guarantees of a fair hearing. Conceding that the procedure leading to the adoption of the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996 had not complied with the requirements of Article 6 § 1, the Government contended that these deficiencies had subsequently been corrected by the courts. 57.     Concerning the allegation that the courts had failed to decide on some points in the case, the Government noted that the courts had in fact ruled on all its aspects. They further submitted that, with the exception of the annulment of the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996 and the approval of the applicant’s request for a transfer to the Bucharest Bar, the other issues raised by the applicant were mere arguments on which the courts were not obliged to rule extensively. 58.     Concerning the refusal of the Court of Appeal to order the disclosure of the UAR’s original Register of Decisions, the Government pointed to the courts’ margin of appreciation on the admissibility of evidence, and noted that the Court of Appeal had reversed its decision on disclosure after the UAR had produced the verbatim record of the minutes of the meeting of 27   June   1996. Such a record of the minutes of a UAR meeting carried the signatures of all the members attending that meeting and was to be considered an official deed within the meaning of Article 1171 of the Romanian Civil Code. This classification implied that the provisions of Articles 1173 and 1174 of that Code applied, with the consequence that such a decision enjoyed a presumption of authenticity that could be rebutted by lodging a criminal complaint alleging forgery. The Government added that the Court of Appeal had informed the applicant that he could contest the authenticity of the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996 by lodging such a criminal complaint, which he had not done. B.     The Court’s assessment 59.     The Court will proceed with an examination of each of the applicant’s complaints, before reaching its final conclusion based on their overall analysis. 1.     The UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 60.     The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 does not oblige the Contracting States to submit disputes over civil rights and obligations to a fully compliant procedure at every stage. Prior intervention of administrative or professional bodies, with or without judicial prerogatives, that do not satisfy all requirements may be justified if these bodies are subject to the subsequent control of a judicial body that has full jurisdiction guaranteeing the rights under Article 6 § 1 (see Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium , judgment of 23 June 1986, Series A no. 43, p. 23, §   51, and Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium , judgment of 10   February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, § 29). 61.     The Court first observes that no specific procedure is provided for in the Rules for the annulment by the UAR of the registration of a lawyer with a Bar. Nevertheless, it notes that the parties agreed that the procedure leading to the adoption of the UAR’s decision of 27   June   1996 had not complied with the requirements of Article 6 § 1, the Government contending that these deficiencies had subsequently been corrected by the courts. 62.     The Court further notes that in the instant case, contrary to the aforementioned Albert and Le Compte judgment, the subject matter with which the UAR dealt on 27   June 1996 was subsequently submitted to the domestic courts for a full judicial review. Those proceedings were public and offered the applicant, by means of oral and written submissions, the possibility to defend his points of view. As to the applicant’s complaint that notification of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 was delayed until February 1998, the Court observes that the applicant did not suffer any irremediable prejudice, given that in March 1998 he was still able to lodge an application with the courts against that decision, no time-limit being invoked by the UAR or by the courts. 2.     The domestic courts’ failure to determine a part of the subject matter of the case 63.     The Court reiterates that the effect of Article 6 § 1 is, inter alia , to place a “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence, without prejudice to its assessment or to whether they are relevant for its decision, given that the Court is not called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately met. Nevertheless, although Article   6   § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands , judgment of 19   April 1994, Series A no.   288, p. 20, §§ 59 and 61; Burg v. France (dec.), no.   34763/02, ECHR   2003-II). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Ruiz   Torija v. Spain and Hiro Balani v. Spain , judgments of 9 December 1994, Series A nos. 303-A and B, p. 12, § 29, and pp. 29–30, § 27, respectively). 64.     The Court observes that the applicant requested the courts to annul the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, arguing that, pursuant to Law   no.   51/1995, the UAR was no longer competent in 1996 to annul his registration with the Constanţa Bar in 1991; that, pursuant to Law   no.   29/1990, it was also time-barred from taking such a decision and it was within the courts’ jurisdiction to annul in 1996 a decision taken in 1991; and that, as regards the merits of the case, which the courts were expressly requested to examine, he had acted in good faith when he had lodged an application with the aforementioned Bar in order to annul its unlawful decision of 1981, and could not be blamed for the Bar’s failure to submit his application to the UAR or for the UAR’s failure to review the validity of the Bar’s decision. The applicant also pointed out that his administrative application of 18 February 1998 to the UAR had not constituted a remedy. 65.     The Court notes that both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court rejected his application, on the ground that in 1991 the UAR, in accordance with Legislative Decree no. 90/1990, had been the only competent body for readmission to the Bar; that the applicant could not claim to be ignorant of these provisions; that, consequently, his readmission to the Constanţa Bar in 1991 had clearly been void; and that its annulment in 1996 had not been time-barred, for it could have been decided at any moment. On the basis of the Rules, the courts rejected the applicant’s submission that Law   no.   51/1995 had removed the UAR’s powers to annul Bar decisions. 66.     The Court notes, nevertheless, that the domestic courts based their decisions, as regards the UAR’s power to annul the Constanţa Bar’s decision of 1991, on a combined reading of section 58 (g) and (i) of Law   no.   51/1995 and, especially, of Rule 130 of the Rules governing the Legal Profession, the latter having been issued by the UAR itself in 1995. However, it appears that it was not until 6   March 2001, following an amendment to Law   no. 51/1995, that such a power was again expressly provided for by section 63 (i) of Law no. 51/1995. Being aware of its limited power to review the interpretation of national law by the domestic courts, the Court finds, nevertheless, that such an amendment would have been meaningless if, between 1995 and 2001, the UAR had had the power to annul Bar decisions on grounds of illegality under the original provisions of that law. 67.     The Court observes that even if the courts addressed a part of the applicant’s arguments, they did not answer his main arguments, namely that he had acted in good faith, in accordance with the principles of administrative law and with Law no. 29/1990, when he had lodged an application with the Constanţa Bar in 1991, in order to annul the unlawful decision which it had given in 1981 in the exceptional circumstances in which he had left the country; and that in any case he could not be blamed for the Bar’s failure to submit his application to the UAR or for the UAR’s failure to review the validity of the Bar’s decision. In addition, the Court notes that even if the applicant lodged his application in order to seek the annulment of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, he expressly requested the courts to consider the merits of his case and their consequences for the issue of his application. The applicant also pointed out that his administrative application of 18 February 1998 to the UAR had not constituted a remedy for the clarification of his situation. 3.     The disclosure of the UAR’s original Register of Decisions 68.     The Court reiterates that while Article 6 § 1 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see, mutatis mutandis , Schenk v.   Switzerland , judgment of 12   July   1988, Series A no.   140, p. 29, § 46, and Garcia Ruiz v. Spain , no.   30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I). The Court nevertheless has to ascertain whether the proceedings, including the way in which the evidence was taken, were fair as required by Article 6 § 1. Fairness must be assessed with regard to the proceedings as a whole (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France , no.   25444/94, §§ 45 and 46, ECHR 1999-II). 69.     In the instant case, the Court observes that, by an order of 15   September 1998, the Court of Appeal reversed its decision of 7   June   1998 on disclosure, and ruled that the UAR did not have to disclose the original Register of Decisions. The court decided that, as the applicant had refused to file a criminal complaint against the UAR alleging forgery, such evidence was unnecessary for the case, and that the evidence already produced by the UAR was sufficient for it to conclude that the decision purportedly taken on 27   June   1996 had indeed been taken on that date. The applicant’s objection to that decision was dismissed by the court. 70.     The Court notes that the evidence produced by the UAR that made the court reverse its previous decision consisted of two photocopies, one being of an undated excerpt of the minutes of a meeting of 27   June 1996 describing the procedure leading to the impugned decision, and the other being of another page of those minutes with no link to the applicant’s case. Both these pages bore the stamp of the UAR and the signature of its secretary with the words “certified copy”. 71.     The Court agrees with the applicant, who relies on the case of Timurtaş v. Turkey (no. 23531/94, § 66, ECHR   2000 ‑ VI), th