CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 15 novembre 2005

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s719459F8 { width:11.09pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FORMER SECTION IV     CASE OF J.A. PYE (OXFORD) LTD v. THE UNITED KINGDOM     (Application no. 44302/02)     JUDGMENT (merits)     STRASBOURG   15 November 2005     THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER, WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 30 August 2007     This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44 §   2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Former Section IV), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   M. Pellonpää , President ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mrs   V. Strážnická ,   Mr   R. Maruste ,   Mr   S. Pavlovschi ,   Mr   L. Garlicki ,   Mr   J. Borrego Borrego, judges , and Mr M. O’Boyle , Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 18 October 2005, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 44302/02) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd, companies incorporated in the United Kingdom (“the applicants”), on 17   December 2002. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr P. Lowe, a lawyer practising in Oxford with Darbys, Solicitors. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Willmot, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. 3.     The applicants alleged that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land with development potential to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in their case. 4.     The application was allocated to the Former Section IV of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. 5.     By a decision of 8 June 2004, following a hearing on admissibility and the merits (Rule 54 § 3), the Court declared the application admissible. 6.     The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). 7.     On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1), but this case remained with the Chamber constituted within former Section IV. 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 8 June 2004 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   E. Willmot , Foreign and Commonwealth Office,   Agent , Mr   J. Crow ,   Counsel , Mr   K. Harmes, Mr   P. Hughes, Ms   R. Ellis ,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicants Mr   D. Pannick , Q.C.,   Counsel , Mr   P. Lowe , Ms   S. Ingram ,   Advisers , Mr   G. Pye ,   Mrs   Y. Pye ,   on behalf of the applicants.   The Court heard addresses by Mr Crow and Mr Pannick. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The second applicant company is the registered owner of a plot of 23   hectares of agricultural land in Berkshire. The first applicant company was its predecessor in title. The owners of a property adjacent to the land, Mr. and Mrs. Graham (“the Grahams”) occupied the land under a grazing agreement until 31 December 1983. On 30 December 1983 a chartered surveyor acting for the applicants wrote to the Grahams noting that the grazing agreement was about to expire and requiring them to vacate the land. In January 1984 the applicants refused a request for a further grazing agreement for 1984 because they anticipated seeking planning permission for the development of all or part of the land and considered that continued grazing might damage the prospects of obtaining such permission. 10.     Notwithstanding the requirement to vacate the land at the expiry of the 1983 agreement, the Grahams remained in occupation at all times, continuing to use it for grazing. No request to vacate the land or to pay for the grazing which was taking place was made. If it had been, the evidence was that the Grahams would happily have paid. 11.     In June 1984 an agreement was reached whereby the applicants agreed to sell to the Grahams the standing crop of grass on the land for £1,100. The cut was completed by 31 August 1984. In December 1984 an inquiry was made of the applicants as to whether the Grahams could take another cut of hay or be granted a further grazing agreement. No reply to this letter or to subsequent letters sent in May 1985 was received from the applicants and thereafter the Grahams made no further attempt to contact the applicants. From September 1984 onwards until 1999 the Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without the permission of the applicants. 12.     In 1997, Mr Graham registered cautions at the Land Registry against the applicant companies’ title on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. 13.     On 30 April 1998 the applicant companies issued an originating summons in the High Court seeking cancellation of the cautions. On 20   January 1999 the applicant companies issued further proceedings seeking possession of the disputed land. 14.     The Grahams challenged the applicant companies’ claims under the Limitation Act 1980 (“the 1980 Act”) which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another. They also relied on the Land Registration Act 1925, which applied at the relevant time and which provided that, after the expiry of the 12-year period, the registered proprietor was deemed to hold the land in trust for the squatter. 15.     Judgment was given in favour of the Grahams on 4 February 2000 ([2000]Ch 676). Mr Justice Neuberger held that since the Grahams enjoyed factual possession of the land from January 1984, and adverse possession took effect from September 1984, the applicant companies’ title was extinguished pursuant to the 1980 Act, and the Grahams were entitled to be registered as proprietors of the land. At the conclusion of his 30-page judgment, Neuberger J. remarked that the result he had reached did not accord with justice and could not be justified by practical considerations: the justification advanced for the right to acquire title to land by adverse possession – namely the avoidance of uncertainty – had in his view little relevance to the use of registered land where the owner was readily identifiable by inspecting the register of the relevant title at the Land Registry. The fact that an owner who had sat on his rights for 12 years should be deprived of the land was in his view “illogical and disproportionate”: as he expressed the point, “it does seem draconian to the owner and a windfall for the squatter that, just because the owner has taken no step to evict a squatter for 12 years, the owner should lose 25 hectares of land to the squatter with no compensation whatsoever”. 16.     The applicant companies appealed and on 6 February 2001, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision on the ground that the Grahams did not have the necessary intention to possess the land, and the applicant companies were therefore not “dispossessed” of it within the meaning of the 1980 Act ([2001]EWCA Civ 117, [2001]Ch 804). Although this conclusion was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, two members of the Court of Appeal went on to address the question whether the applicants’ loss of title to the land could also have given rise to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as applied in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 17.     Lord Justice Mummery held that Article 1 did not impinge on the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1980, which did not deprive a person of his possessions or interfere with his peaceful enjoyment of them but only deprived a person of his right of access to the courts for the purpose of recovering property if he had delayed the institution of his legal proceedings for 12 years or more after being dispossessed by another. The extinction of the applicants’ title was not, in his view, a deprivation of possessions nor a confiscatory measure for which payment of compensation would be appropriate, but simply a logical and pragmatic consequence of the barring of the right to bring an action after the expiration of the limitation period. In the alternative, Mummery L.J found that any deprivation was justified in the public interest, the conditions laid down in the 1980 Act being reasonably required to avoid the risk of injustice in the adjudication of stale claims and as ensuring certainty of title: those conditions were not disproportionate, the period of 12 years being reasonable and not imposing an excessively difficult burden on the landowner. 18.     Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention. This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol. 19.     The Grahams appealed to the House of Lords, which, on 4   July   2002, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court ([2002] UKHL 30, [2002] 3 All ER 865). Lord Browne-Wilkinson, with whom Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Hutton agreed, held that the Grahams did have “possession” of the land in the ordinary sense of the word, and therefore the applicant companies had been “dispossessed” of it within the meaning of the 1980 Act. There was no inconsistency between a squatter being willing to pay the paper owner if asked and his being in possession in the meantime. Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to the European Convention on Human Rights only to note that there was no ambiguity in the 1980 Act which called for resolution. 20.     Lord Bingham of Cornhill, agreeing with Lord Browne-Wilkinson, made the following statement in the course of his judgment: “[The Grahams] sought rights to graze or cut grass on the land after the summer of 1984, and were quite prepared to pay. When Pye failed to respond they did what any other farmer in their position would have done: they continued to farm the land. They were not at fault. But the result of Pye’s inaction was that they enjoyed the full use of the land without payment for 12 years. As if that were not gain enough, they are then rewarded by obtaining title to this considerable area of valuable land without any obligation to compensate the former owner in any way at all. In the case of unregistered land, and in the days before registration became the norm, such a result could no doubt be justified as avoiding protracted uncertainty where the title to land lay. But where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which compels such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title should not be required to pay some compensation at least to the party losing it. It is reassuring to learn that the Land Registration Act 2002 has addressed the risk that a registered owner may lose his title through inadvertence. But the main provisions of that Act have not yet been brought into effect, and even if they had it would not assist Pye, whose title had been lost before the passing of the Act. While I am satisfied that the appeal must be allowed for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, this is a conclusion which I (like the judge [Neuberger J]...) ‘arrive at with no enthusiasm’.” [ JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v. Graham and another [2000] 3 All ER 865, at 867] 21.     The question whether the result was incompatible with the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was not pursued before the House of Lords, it being conceded that the Human Rights Act 1998 had no retrospective effect. However, in his judgment Lord Hope of Craighead, who also agreed with Lord Browne-Wilkinson on the reasons for dismissing the appeal, observed that the question under the Convention: “....is not an easy one, as one would have expected the law - in the context of a statutory regime where compensation is not available - to lean in favour of the protection of a registered proprietor against the actions of persons who cannot show a competing title on the register. Fortunately.......a much more rigorous regime has now been enacted in Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act. Its effect will be to make it much harder for a squatter who is in possession of registered land to obtain title against the wishes of the proprietor. The unfairness in the old regime which this case has demonstrated lies not in the absence of compensation, although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor.” II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 22.     Section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980, a consolidating Act, provides: “(1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person... (6) Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act contains provisions for determining the date of accrual of rights of action to recover land in the cases there mentioned.” 23.     Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 provides: “Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession of the land, and has while entitled to the land been dispossessed or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.” 24.     In the case of unregistered land, section 17 of the 1980 Act provides that, on the expiration of the limitation period regulating the recovery of land, the title of the paper owner is extinguished. In the case of registered land, section 75(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 provides that, on the expiry of the limitation period the title is not extinguished but the registered proprietor is deemed to hold the land thereafter in trust for the squatter. 25.     The Law Reform Committee considered the law on limitation periods in its report of 1977 (Cmnd 6923). It commented negatively on the courts’ practice of granting an implied licence to the would-be adverse possessor, which had the effect of stopping time running against the owner, and proposed no change to the existing limitation periods, and agreed that the expiration of the limitation period should serve to extinguish the claimant’s title. 26.     A Law Commission Consultation Paper on Limitation of Actions in 1988 (Law Com 151) gave a number of general policy aims of the law on limitations. The Consultation Paper noted that defendants have a legitimate interest in having cases brought to court reasonably promptly as evidence may not be available indefinitely, and because defendants should be able to rely on their assumed entitlement to enjoy an unchallenged right. The State, too, has an interest in ensuring that claims are made and determined within a reasonable time in order to deliver a fair trial, and as guarantor of legal certainty. Finally, limitation periods were seen to have a salutary effect on plaintiffs in encouraging them to bring claims reasonably promptly. 27.     A separate Law Commission Consultative Document on land registration in 1998 (prepared with the Land Registry; Law Com 254) noted that although the original intention of the system of land registration was to apply the principles of unregistered land to a registered format, there were certain areas where this was not wholly true. One example given was the position of the rights of adverse possessors (section 75(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 was referred to). The Consultative Document set out and commented on four particularly cogent reasons often given for the law on adverse possession: (i) Because it is part of the law on limitation of actions. It noted: “... because adverse possession is an aspect of the law of limitation, it is of course customary to account for it, at least in part, in terms of the policy of limitation statutes generally, namely to prevent defendants from stale claims and to encourage defendants not to sleep on their rights. However, adverse possession does not merely bar claims. Its effect is positive: ‘a squatter does in the end get title by his possession and the indirect operation of the Limitation Act ..’. This can only be justified by factors over and above those which explain the law on limitation ... this particular justification has much greater force in relation to unregistered land than it does for land with registered title. Unregistered title ultimately depends on possession. It therefore behoves a landowner to be vigilant to protect that possession and not to sleep on his or her rights. ... where title is registered (...) the basis of title is primarily the fact of registration rather than possession. Registration confers title because the registration of a person as proprietor of land of itself vests in him or her the relevant legal estate ...”   (ii) Because if land and its ownership are out of kilter, the land may become unmarketable. Where the registered owner has disappeared, and cannot be traced, and a squatter takes possession, the doctrine of adverse possession “does at least ensure that in such cases land remains in commerce and is not rendered sterile”. Where there have been dealings “off the register”, such as where a farmer agrees to a land swap with a neighbour under a “gentleman’s agreement” but does not register the change, “adverse possession fulfils a useful function”. (iii) Because in case of mistake the innocent but mistaken squatter of land may have incurred expenditure. In such circumstances adverse possession can be justified on grounds of hardship, and there are parallels with the principles of proprietary estoppel. (iv) Because it facilitates and cheapens investigation of title to land. The Law Commission accepted this last reason as being very strong for unregistered land, but considered that for registered land, where title depends on the contents of the register rather than possession, it was not applicable. 28.     The Law Commission proposed, provisionally, that the system of adverse possession as it applied to registered land should be recast to reflect the principles of title registration, and that it should be limited to very few, exceptional cases. 29.     Two Reports, on Limitation of Actions (Law Com 270) and on registered land (Law Com 271), followed the Consultation Papers, and were published in July 2001. 30.     The Law Commission Report on Limitation of Actions recommended that the general limitation period for actions in respect of land should be ten years. It added that if the proposals made on registered land in Law Com 254 were accepted, the proposal would relate only to interests in unregistered land (and unregistrable interests in registered land [1] ). 31.     The Report on registered land (Law Com 271) proposed that a squatter should be able to apply to be registered as proprietor after 10 years’ adverse possession, and that the registered proprietor should be notified of that application. If the proprietor objected to the registration, the application by the adverse possessor for registration would be rejected. The registered proprietor would then be required to regularise the position (for example by evicting the squatter) within two years, failing which the squatter would be entitled to be registered as proprietor. 32.     The Land Registration Act 2002, which does not have retroactive effect, implemented the proposals in Law Com 271. 33.     On 23 March 2005, Deputy Judge Strauss in the Chancery Division gave judgment in the case of Beaulane Properties Ltd v. Palmer ( Times Law Reports , 13 April 2005). The case concerned a licensee who had remained in possession of registered land for over 12 years after the expiry of his licence. Applying the judgment of the House of Lords in the present case, the judge found that under English law as it stood up to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the registered owner of the land lost all claim to it. However, on analysing the facts on a Convention basis, he found that there was no real public or general interest in the law on adverse possession in the case of registered land, and that the adverse consequences for the landowner were disproportionate. By re-interpreting the relevant legislation in accordance with Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, the judge found that the claim by the former licensee to have acquired the disputed land failed. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 34.     The applicants submitted that they had been deprived of their land by the operation of the domestic rules on adverse possession in a manner incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. That provision reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A.     Submissions of the parties 35.     The Government noted that the applicant companies bought the land in question between 1975 and 1977, when there was no doubt as to the content of the law of adverse possession. The applicant companies thus acquired their interest in the land subject to the pre-existing legal regime, which included the risk of losing it after 12 years’ adverse possession by another. The application of that law in the present case was no more than the due operation of the pre-existing national legal regime, and not such as to engage Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It was contended that the applicant companies’ interest in the land was equivalent to a defeasible interest: from the moment they acquired the property, their property right was subject to restrictions, qualifications or limitations imposed by the pre-existing legal requirements of the Limitation Act and their rights ceased to exist once those restrictions, qualifications or limitations took effect, after 12 years of adverse possession by another. The case represented nothing more than the due operation of a pre-existing legal regime under which the applicant companies’ interest in the land was ultimately defeated pursuant to its own inherent defeasibility and was not such as to engage Article 1 of the Protocol. It would be an unwarranted extension of the scope of Article 1 to permit a person in the applicants’ position to argue that their rights were engaged since this would involve an attempt to convert a defeasible property right into an indefeasible one: this would offend against the clear principle that Article 1 protected existing rights and did not entitle a person to acquire new property rights. 36.     The Government continued that, even if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was engaged, it had not been violated. They first underlined that the interference with the applicant companies’ peaceful enjoyment of the land was not encouraged or discouraged by the State – it resulted from the Grahams’ action and the applicant companies’ inaction. The applicant companies’ attempt to end the interference was met with a defence based on the 1980 Act, and the operation of the Act was a limitation of the applicant companies’ rights of access to court, not an interference with their property rights. The present case should therefore be considered in the context of Article 6 of the Convention, rather than Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 37.     In any event, the Government further submitted that as the interference with the applicant companies’ peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was the result of the Grahams’ actions, and not the State’s, there could be no question of a breach of primary, negative obligations by the State. At most, the State’s positive obligations were at issue. However, the State was not required to protect a professional property developer from the entirely avoidable consequences of his failing to enter into contractual arrangements (in this case, for example, a discontinuous series of grazing agreements with the Grahams). 38.     Assuming Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be engaged, the Government submitted that broadly the same test should be applied for the compatibility with the Convention of limitation periods under that provision as under Article 6. In the application of such a test, the Government contended that the limitations pursued a legitimate objective, namely, the public interest in preventing stale claims being brought before the courts, and in ensuring that the reality of unopposed occupation of land and its legal ownership coincided. The Government further claimed that a wide margin of appreciation was allowed to the State in determining the proportionality of a measure, and in that context they noted that: at twelve years, the limitation period was long; the applicant companies could have brought an action against the Grahams at any time during that period; the limitation period would have been stopped if the applicant companies had obtained a written acknowledgement of their ownership from the Grahams; the applicant companies had failed to respond to correspondence from the Grahams and had failed to take any steps whatever to assert their ownership for well over 12 years, and the applicant companies must have been aware of the general effect of section   15 of the 1980 Act. The Government also noted that a substantial amount of time and study had been devoted to achieving the right balance in matters of limitation periods, and the mere fact that the 2002 Act modified the position did not render the previous legislation incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As to the relevance of compensation, the Government repeated that they had not benefited from the operation of the law on limitation periods in the present case, adding that even where an interference involved the complete loss of a person’s economic interest in an asset for the benefit of the State, an absence of compensation might still be compatible with Article 1 ( Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands , 23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B, §§ 66-74). 39.     Finally, the Government noted that title could be obtained by adverse possession in a number of other jurisdictions, and that in no case was compensation paid to the displaced former owner. They referred specifically to the Northern Irish, Scottish, Irish, Hungarian, Polish, Swedish, Dutch, Spanish, German and French jurisdictions. 40.     The applicant companies contended that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 clearly applied to the present case. They underlined that the cumulative effect of the Limitation Act 1980 and the Land Registration Act 1925 was to extinguish the title of the owner of the land in favour of the person who had established adverse possession: the legislation did not merely limit the right of access to court. As to the Government’s contention that the applicant companies held the land subject to the operation of the Limitation Acts, the applicant companies did not accept that a State should be able to apply a law which provided for the taking of property and handing it over to another, free from the fair balance test of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, simply because the law was in existence when the property was acquired. 41.     The applicant companies did not accept that their inaction was responsible for the taking of the land: the land was taken by operation of the 1980 Act and the 1925 Act. The courts’ decisions applying those Acts constituted the State’s interference with the applicant companies’ enjoyment of their possessions, and that interference was in breach of the negative obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They referred to comments made by judges in the case and comments of the Law Commission and the Land Registry to the effect that the law should be changed. In addition, the applicant companies considered that the objectives regularly given for the limitation legislation were not satisfactory. They argued that where land was registered, there was no uncertainty of ownership and no justification for depriving somebody of his title simply because he had not objected to a third person using his land. They saw no public benefit in transferring land to persons in adverse possession in circumstances such as the present. B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     General principles 42.     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, for example, Bruncrona v. Finland , no. 41673/98, § 65, 16 November 2004) and must comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised (see, for example, Beyeler v.   Italy [GC], no.   33202/96, §§ 108-14, ECHR 2000-I). 43.     The notion of “public interest” in the second sentence of the first paragraph is necessarily extensive. In particular the decision to enact property laws will commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues. The taking of property in pursuance of legitimate social, economic or other policies may be in the public interest even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property. 44.     The national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in “the public interest”. The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is in the public interest unless that judgment is manifestly without foundation. 45.     The possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified. Provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislature’s discretion should have been exercised in another way ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, § 51). 46.     An interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must nevertheless strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the public or general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a whole, which is to be read in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first sentence. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions or controlling their use. Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment of whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance, and notably, whether it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant (see Former King of Greece and Others , [GC], no. 25701/94, §   89, ECHR 2000-XII). 47.     In this connection, the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference that cannot be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This provision does not, however, guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of “public interest” may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value (see, among other authorities, Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 48, ECHR 1999-II). A deprivation of property without compensation can, in certain circumstances, be compatible with Article 1 ( Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, ECHR 2005 ‑ ..., §   117). Where agricultural property is bought subject to the conditions of the general law, and the purchaser is subsequently obliged to re-sell the property at a substantially lower price, the Court will consider the lawfulness and purpose of the deprivation, bearing in mind the State’s margin of appreciation ( Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden , judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171 ‑ A, §§ 44-55). 48.     Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the proceedings at issue must also afford the individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by this provision. In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see, among other authorities, Jokela v.   Finland , no. 28856/95, § 45, ECHR 2002-IV). 2. The applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case 49.     The Court notes that the applicant companies were owners of the freehold of the land in question and were registered in the Land Register with absolute title until, by operation of the 1925 and 1980 Acts, they lost that title in consequence of the adverse possession of the land by the Grahams. In contending that the loss of title did not engage the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol, the Government argue that when the applicants acquired the land they did so subject to the then existing law, according to which their rights were defeasible in the event of 12 years’ adverse possession by a trespasser. While accepting that where, as in the case of James and Others , a Contracting State introduces legislation which compulsorily transfers property from one individual to another, such legislation is capable of giving rise to an interference with the former owner’s property rights under Article 1, the Government argue that the position is different where, as in the present case, the relevant law exists at the time the property is acquired and where the operation of the law is to be seen as an incident of the property right at the time of its acquisition. 50.     The Court cannot accept the Government’s argument. As registered freeholders, the applicants’ title to the land was absolute and not subject to any restriction, qualification or limitation. Their property rights were in this respect quite different from those of the holders of a lease, licence or other defeasible or limited property interest which was liable to expire by the effluxion of time and to cease to exist as such. It was the operation of the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts which brought to an end of the applicants’ title and not any inherent defect or limitation in that title. 51.     The Court does not share the Government’s view that the operation of the legislation is to be regarded as an incident of, or limitation on, the applicants’ property right at the time of its acquisition, such that Article 1 ceased to be engaged when the relevant provisions took effect and the property right was lost after 12 years of adverse possession. It is true that the relevant provisions of the legislation existed at the time the property was acquired by the applicants and that the consequences for the applicants’ title to the land of 12 years adverse possession were known. However, Article 1 does not cease to be engaged merely because a person acquires property subject to the provisions of the general law, the effect of which is in certain specified events to bring the property right to an end, and because those events have in fact occurred. Whether it does so will depend on whether the law in question is properly to be seen as qualifying or limiting the property right at the moment of acquisition or, whether it is rather to be seen as depriving the owner of an existing right at the point when the events occur and the law takes effect. It is only in the former case that Article 1 may be held to have no application. 52.     The Court finds that, in the present case, the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts cannot be regarded as limiting or qualifying the freehold property right of the applicants at the moment of their acquisition. In this respect, the provisions were significantly different from those with which the Commission was concerned in the decisions relied on by the Government ( J.S. and Others v. the Netherlands , no. 14561/89, Commission decision of 7 September 1995; Gudmundsson v. Iceland , no. 23285/94, Commission decision of 17 January 1996, Zacher v. Germany , nos.   27026/95 and 30032/96, Commission decisions of 4 September 1996), each of which related to the grant of licences which were from the outset subject to conditions imposed by law which were either never fulfilled or which ceased to be complied with. The provisions are also different from those examined by the House of Lords in Wilson v. The First County Trust Ltd. [2003] UKHL 40 – also invoked by the Government - in which the majority held that the relevant legislation regulating the enforceability of loan agreements “bit” at the moment the transaction was concluded and that the lender accordingly had no right to enforce repayment of the loan of which he could be deprived under Article   1. By contrast, the 1925 and 1980 Acts are in the view of the Court to be seen as “biting” on the applicants’ property rights only at the point at which the Grahams had completed 12   years’ adverse possession of the applicants’ land and not as delimiting the right at the moment of its acquisition. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that, on this ground, Article 1 was not engaged in the present case. Since the applicants’ rights cannot therefore be regarded as defeasible rights at the moment of acquisition, the Court cannot accept the Government’s further submission that, to hold Article 1 to be applicable would offend against the clear principle that the Article protects existing rights only and does not entitle a person to acquire new property rights. 3. The alleged interference with the applicants’ Article 1 rights 53.     The Government further contend that, even if Article 1 was in principle applicable, there was no interference with the applicants’ property rights or none for which the State can be held responsible. It is argued that the operation of the 1980 Act is to be seen as imposing a limitation on the applicants’ rights of access to court, rather than an interference with their property rights and that the present case should be considered in the context of Article 6 of the Convention rather than Article 1 of the Protocol. It is further argued that, as any interference with the applicant companies’ peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was the result of the Grahams’ actions and not the State’s, there could be no question of a breach of the State’s negative obligations under the Protocol. At most the State’s positive obligations were engaged and these obligations could not extend to protecting the applicants against the avoidable consequences of their failure to take steps within the 12 years to bring the Grahams’ adverse possession to an end. 54.     While it is true that the application of limitation periods to bar causes of action has traditionally been examined under Article 6 of the Convention and in the context of the parties’ right to effective access to court (see, for example, Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 22   October 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV), there is no reason why the application of limitation periods should not in an appropriate case give rise to issues under other Convention Articles and nothing in pri