CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 12 janvier 2006

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display:inline-block } .sFE658DBA { width:226.71pt; display:inline-block } .s86439055 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt }   THIRD SECTION DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Applications no. 38282/97 and no. 68891/01 by Werner PETERSEN against Germany The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 12   January 2006 as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   B.M. Zupančič , President ,   Mr   J. Hedigan ,   Mr   C. Bîrsan ,   Mrs   M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska ,   Mr   V. Zagrebelsky ,   Mrs   A. Gyulumyan ,   Mrs   R. Jaeger, judges , and Mr V. Berger , Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application no.   38282/97 introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 25   August 1997, Having regard to Article   5 §   2 of Protocol No.   11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the application no.   68891/01 lodged with the Court on 19   April 2001, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant is a German national, born in 1947 and living in Neustadt. He is represented before the Court by Mr G.   Rixe, a lawyer practising in Bielefeld. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr   K.   Stoltenberg, Ministerialdirigent, and, subsequently, Mrs   A.   Wittling ‑ Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin , of the Federal Ministry of   Justice. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 1.     Factual background The applicant is the father of the child Sinja Johannes (S.), born out of wedlock in Helmstedt on 3   May 1985. The applicant had been living with Ms   B., the child’s mother, since May 1980. They agreed that the child should bear his mother’s surname, i.e. B. After their separation in November 1985, S. lived with his mother. The applicant continued to pay maintenance and had regular contacts with S. until autumn 1993. In August 1993 Ms   B. married Mr   K., who was the father of her daughter, born out of wedlock in 1990 and bearing the surname K. They   chose the husband’s surname as their family name and she availed herself of the right to put her surname in front of that name. On   3   January   1994 S.’s   surname was changed in the record of his birth from B. to K. on the motion of Ms   B.-K. and her husband Mr   K. The applicant’s objections were to no avail. On 6   December 2001 the Court declared inadmissible his application (no.   31178/96) concerning the change of S.’s surname and compensation for financial losses because of an undue refusal of access. On 30   April 2004 the Human Rights Committee, established under article   28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, decided that the applicant’s communication (no.   1115/2002) concerning the same subject-matter was inadmissible. 2.     The applicant’s first request for access to his son and other family matters a.     The applicant’s first request for access to his son i.     Proceedings before the Bremen District Court On 27   January 1994, following problems in having access to his son, the applicant applied to the Bremen District Court, having jurisdiction in guardianship matters, for a decision granting him a right to visit ( Umgangsregelung ) his son every second weekend, during the holidays and on important public holidays. On 17   February 1994 he lodged a motion to be granted an interim injunction obliging Ms   B.-K. to give him information about his son’s development. At a hearing on 6   April 1994 the Bremen District Court, with judge   F. sitting alone, heard the applicant, Ms   B.-K. and a representative of the Youth Office. It then decided by way of an interim injunction that provisionally S. should be entitled to visit the applicant every four weeks on Sunday. On 22   June 1994 the Bremen District Court judge Ms   H. heard S. at his home. S. did not express any wishes concerning the present frequency of contacts with his father, but stated that he did not wish to see him more often for the time being. Visits took place in accordance with the decision of 6   April 1994 until July 1994. Subsequently, Ms   B.-K. no longer fully complied with the decision and, following a clash with the applicant in the presence of S., prohibited visits as from October 1994. At a court hearing on 1   November 1994 held by judge   H. in the presence of the applicant, Ms   B.-K., their respective spouses and a social worker, the applicant repeated his request to see his son every second week-end. Ms   B. ‑ K. explained that initially she had granted the applicant access to S. as a sort of “pledge” to be able to end the relationship with him. S. appeared relieved since she had prevented the visits. The court informed the parties that it did not intend to impose coercive measures to enforce the decision of 6   April   1994 as it did not appear possible, given the conflict between the parents, to enforce such visits for the time being. By decision of 30   December 1994 the Bremen District Court set aside its decision of 6   April 1994 on a provisional determination of the question of access and dismissed the applicant’s repeated requests to impose a coercive penalty on Ms   B.-K. to enforce access. It further ordered that pending the preparation of an expert opinion, Ms   B.-K. should inform the applicant about his son’s development monthly. The court noted that there had been persistent conflicts between the parents concerning the implementation of the visiting arrangement of 6   April 1994. An altercation between the parents had taken place in their son’s presence in September   1994. The   implementation of access had put such a strain on S. that he had to undergo psychotherapy. Pending the outcome of an expert report on the question whether access was in S.’s best interest at the present stage, it was therefore impossible to change Ms   B.-K.’s determination of the applicant’s contacts with S. In a separate decision of the same day, the District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for an interim injunction ordering Ms   B.-K. to refrain from any activities concerning her intended temporary emigration to Kyrgyzstan with her family in order to work there as a German teacher. It   further rejected his request to withdraw Ms   B.-K.’s right to determine S.’s place of residence and to transfer it to the Youth Office or himself. In its reasoning, the court observed that a stay in a foreign country did not constitute a risk for S.’s well-being. For the child the integration in a family was essential. The applicant’s fears as to a suspension of access to S. on account of Ms   B.-K.’s temporary stay abroad could not justify withdrawing the mother’s rights regarding custody or the determination of the child’s place of residence. The District Court further ordered that a psychological expert opinion should be prepared by the expert   K. on the question of future visits between the applicant and his son, about the consequences of suspending access and the consequences of S.’s stay in a foreign country. On 21   March 1995 the Bremen District Court informed Ms   B.-K. that she would be ordered to pay a coercive penalty of 500   Deutschmarks (DEM) if she did not comply with her duty to inform the applicant about S.’s development within four weeks. Ms   B.-K. subsequently appealed against this decision, while the applicant requested the imposition of this penalty on her. In a hearing before the Bremen Regional Court on 30   May 1995 which was attended by the applicant, Ms   B.-K. and a representative of the Youth Office, the applicant withdrew his appeal against the setting aside of the interim injunction of 6   April 1994 on access and against the refusal of interim measures. On 4   July 1995 Ms   B.-K. informed the District Court that she was no longer willing to participate in the psychological examination ordered by the court. She notably argued that she feared that the applicant would not treat the contents of the report confidentially. On 2   August 1995 the District Court judge   H. visited S.’s family at home. When heard by the judge S. indicated that he did not wish to visit his father because his parents were constantly fighting. He and his sister had been talking in detail about the envisaged stay in Kyrgyzstan. They had obviously been involved in the planning. Moreover, Ms   B.-K. stated that she had decided to work abroad as a teacher three years ago, initially in Canada; later she had taken an interest in Kyrgyzstan. Subsequently, Ms   B.-K. and her family, including S., moved to Rotfront in Kyrgyzstan for three years. On 5   September 1995 the applicant requested the court to render a decision without obtaining a psychological expert opinion on the question of access, given that Ms   B.-K. and S. had moved abroad. On 25   September 1995 the Bremen District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for access and, upon the request of Ms   B.-K., ordered a three-year suspension of the applicant’s access to his son. The applicant’s repeated requests for coercive measures to enforce access were dismissed. The District Court found that contacts between the applicant and his son were not only not beneficial for the child, but in the given circumstances detrimental. There was no reason to replace Ms   B.-K.’s determination of the applicant’s access to S. by a court order. The child’s well-being would require a stable and unchallenged position in his family and a free and easy contact with the applicant, his natural father. However, the parents were both unable to secure such a situation. If the applicant reproached Ms   B.-K. for failing to exercise a positive influence on the child with a view to access, he overlooked his own obligation to refrain from any activities complicating his son’s life with the parent having custody and other persons in his company. Having regard to Ms   B.-K.’s submissions concerning the applicant’s conduct and the course of the various court proceedings, the District Court considered that Ms   B.-K. had restricted or prohibited access with good reason, in order to preserve her son from suffering strain. The   applicant obviously misunderstood his obligations towards his child when he repeatedly interfered with Ms   B.-K.’s exercise of custody and challenged her decisions in court. In this respect, the court had regard to the proceedings concerning the change of the child’s surname, concerning an intention to register S. at a private school or the planned stay abroad. There was no indication of a possible solution to this conflict. The applicant failed to see his child’s situation in life and Ms   B.-K.’s concern about the child and his development. In these circumstances, Ms   B.-K. was no longer obliged to exercise a positive influence as regards access to his father on the child, who did no longer wish to have contacts with him. The District Court further criticised the applicant for having disclosed his son’s letters to third persons. The District Court found that in these circumstances of an insurmountable conflict between the parents and given the necessity for S. to undergo psychotherapy, visits were contrary to the child’s well-being. Access therefore had to be suspended, irrespective of S.’s stay abroad, even where contacts might have been implemented during the child’s visits to Germany. The question of access should be reconsidered when S. had settled in his new family. The District Court rendered its decision without having had recourse to a psychological expert report, which would have remained incomplete without hearing Ms   B.-K., who refused to undergo a psychological examination. She could not be forced to accept such examination, and her refusal was in any event justified having regard to the applicant’s past indiscretions. Finally, according to the District Court, Ms   B.-K. had not acted irresponsibly when refusing to keep the applicant informed about the child’s development, as she had to fear that he would disclose such information and infringe her and her child’s right to privacy. ii.     Proceedings before the Bremen Regional Court On 10   October 1995 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Bremen Regional Court against the District Court’s decision dated 25   September   1995. On 8 and 13   March 1996 he challenged District Court judge   H. for bias, arguing that he had found out that both judge   H. and Ms   B.-K.’s counsel were members of the same feminist organisation and that judge   H. was one of the editors of “ Streit ”, a so-called “feminist legal journal”. On 22   August 1996 the Regional Court heard the applicant, a   representative of the Youth Office and, given Ms   B.-K.’s and S.’s stay in Kyrgyzstan, Ms   B.-K.’s counsel. On 30   September 1996 the Bremen Regional Court amended the District Court’s decision of 25   September 1995 to the effect that Ms   B.-K.’s motion for suspension of the applicant’s access to S. for a fixed period of time was dismissed. Apart from that, it upheld the District Court’s decision, notably the refusal to grant access. As regards the applicant’s request for access, the Regional Court considered that, contrary to the District Court’s view, it could not be established without taking expert evidence whether granting the applicant access was detrimental to S.’s well-being. However, on account of the factual developments, namely the child’s and his mother’s stay abroad, there were de facto obstacles to a court determination of the father’s access to the child. The applicant had to tolerate Ms   B.-K.’s decision, which she was entitled to take pursuant to section   1711 of the Civil Code, to work abroad temporarily and to take her family with her. The child was not suffering any disadvantages as he was living in a stable family relationship. Furthermore, there was nothing to suggest any long-term prejudice to the applicant’s relation with his child. The Regional Court did not approve of the District Court’s reasoning concerning coercive measures. Ms   B.-K. had no discretion whether or not she wished to comply with the court order of December 1994 concerning her duty to inform the applicant on S.’s development. In case of difficulties, she would rather have had to apply for a review of the said court order. However, the wording of the court order had limited her obligation to provide information about S. “pending the preparation of the expert opinion”. Consequently, she could assume that, being in a position to terminate the examination by refusing to cooperate, she had also not been obliged to submit the information in question to the applicant. As far as the three-year suspension of access was concerned, the Regional Court found that there was no legal basis for such a decision, the natural father having no general right of access. Pursuant to section   1711 §   1 of the Civil Code, the child’s mother determined the question of access; the   court could order access if this was in the child’s best interest. The court had to decide upon repeated requests of a natural father even if this was burdensome. In any event, a decision suspending access with far ‑ reaching consequences for the future could not be taken without psychological expert advice, including an exploration of the child and his mother. If the mother refused to undergo such an examination, the court could not arrive at a finding that the natural father’s access would in future be detrimental to the child’s well-being. The applicant’s conduct, at least given his written submissions, might have appeared difficult. Nevertheless, the Regional Court, having heard the applicant, had got the impression that he had begun to reconsider his previous position and conduct. On 15   October 1996 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s objections against its decision of 30   September 1996 and his motion for rectification of the minutes of the hearing. b.     The applicant’s request to withdraw Ms   B.-K.’s right of custody On 9   May 1995 the applicant, his requests for interim measures having remained unsuccessful (see above the second of the two District Court decisions of 30   December 1994), lodged requests to withdraw Ms   B.-K.’s right of custody of S. or alternatively, to withdraw her right to determine the child’s place of residence. On 13   September 1995 the Bremen District Court, with judge   H. sitting alone, dismissed these requests. It found that there were no indications that there were risks for the child’s well-being which could justify an interference with Ms   B.-K.’s right of custody. The mere fact that she wished to live abroad temporarily with her family was no reason to doubt her capacity to educate her son. Moreover, a stay abroad could not be regarded as detrimental to the child’s well-being, but could rather be profitable. In   this respect, the court had regard to the statements made by the child when questioned by the District Court judge. The court also noted that it was not intended to emigrate definitively, but to stay temporarily in Kyrgyzstan with the financial security of a German employment contract. Having regard to expert information, there were no indications of health risks, in particular due to radioactivity. The court further considered the consequences of granting the applicant’s requests. If S. stayed in Germany alone, he would be separated from his family for a period of two to three years, contrary to the principles of continuity and stability. Should, in such circumstances, the family decide to stay in Germany the child would suffer from the frustration of being deprived of the intended stay abroad. Consequently, even if the standards for fathers of children born in wedlock as laid down in section   1634 of the Civil Code were applied, the applicant’s right of access did not outweigh S.’s, Ms   B.-K.’s and their family’s right to respect for their family life. The District Court rendered its decision without having had recourse to expert evidence, as the expert report ordered in December 1994 would have remained incomplete without questioning Ms   B.-K. The latter had, however, refused to undergo psychological examination and could not be forced to do so. On 10   June 1996 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and his motion to challenge the District Court judge, Ms   H., for bias. It confirmed that a serious interference such as withdrawing a parent’s right of custody could only be justified in case of a serious risk for the child’s well-being, which was not identical to the applicant’s interest in having access. Having regard to S.’s hearing on 2   August 1995 by the District Court, the Regional Court considered that the child had been involved in the decision ‑ making process concerning the stay abroad and that he identified with this plan. The Regional Court dispensed with hearing S. and his mother who were staying abroad. Awaiting their return would have unduly delayed the proceedings. Hearing the applicant in court would not have disclosed any new relevant information or arguments. As regards the applicant’s motion for bias, the Regional Court noted that the judge concerned was no longer working at the District Court so that the motion was futile. On 3   September 1996 the Bremen Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s further appeal. As regards the applicant’s complaint about the failure to obtain a psychological expert opinion, the Court of Appeal observed that a party could not be forced to participate in a psychological exploration. It further found that the District Court judge had heard the child in the absence of his parents and their representatives, as required under the principles established in German case-law. The Regional Court could therefore take the contents of this hearing into consideration. Hearing the child’s mother had not been necessary, as she was living abroad. The   applicant had failed to inform the Regional Court that she had been passing her summer holidays in Germany. Hearing the applicant again in person had not been necessary, as he had extensively set out his statements in writing. As the applicant had only brought his motion for bias against the District Court judge   H. after she had rendered the decision, the Regional Court did not have to quash the District Court’s decision, even if the motion for bias against H. had been well-founded. Finally, the Regional Court had taken its decision on a reasonable factual basis. It had carefully examined S.’s interests and correctly concluded that a stay abroad of several years to which he looked forward did not amount to a danger for his well-being. The   child’s interest in living with his family outweighed the applicant’s interest in having access to him. c.     The applicant’s constitutional complaints On 1   October 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint (no.   1   BvR   2025/96) with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decisions of the Bremen courts refusing to withdraw Ms   B.-K.’s right of custody of S. On 31   October 1996 the applicant, without being represented by counsel, lodged a further complaint (no.   1   BvR   2210/96), comprising written submissions of 44   pages, with the Federal Constitutional Court against the Bremen courts’ decisions refusing to grant him access to S. On 5   March 1997 the Federal Constitutional Court, referring to the relevant provisions of the Federal Constitutional Court Act ( Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaints without giving any reasons. The decision was served on 12   March 1997. The applicant’s objection to this decision was to no avail. 3.     The applicant’s renewed request for access a.     Proceedings before the Bremen District Court On 15   November 1996 the applicant lodged a fresh motion to be granted access to his son. He requested that during his son’s stay in Kyrgyzstan, he   should have access to him for two to three days every two months and during part of his son’s summer holidays. On his son’s return to Germany, he should have access every second weekend, during part of all school holidays and on his son’s and his own birthday. Pending determination of his access, he should be kept informed about the child’s development. He   subsequently repeated these requests. Following a query of the District Court dated 6   March 1997 Ms   B.-K.’s counsel informed the court that the latter would stay in Germany in July   1997 and would be available for a hearing. On 3   July 1997 the Bremen District Court, with judge   Ho. sitting alone, heard S., Ms   B.-K., the applicant and a representative of the Youth Office. On 10   July 1997 the applicant requested, inter alia , the rectification of the minutes of the hearing, the ordering of an expert report on the question of access and the examination of twelve witnesses. On 27   August 1997 the President of the Bremen District Court, following the applicant’s request, informed him that the judges sitting or having sat in his cases to date had had jurisdiction pursuant to the assignment of functions in the District Court. On 1   September 1997 the applicant again requested to verify whether the judge dealing with his case in the Bremen District Court had jurisdiction and urged the court to render a decision soon. On 9   October 1997 he lodged a further motion for the minutes of the hearing to be rectified. On   23   October 1997 he asked the court to postpone its decision for two weeks and complained in a letter dated 27   October 1997 that certain documents had not been communicated to him. Following the court’s query dated 31   October 1997 the Youth Office submitted its report on the question of the applicant’s access to his son on 19   November 1997. On 20   November 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal to the Bremen Regional Court requesting to be granted access to S. and to transfer Ms   B. ‑ K.’s right to determine S.’s place of residence to the Youth Office. On 15   December 1997 the Bremen District Court dismissed the applicant’s motion to be granted access to S. It noted that S. was still living in Kyrgyzstan where his mother was working as a German teacher until summer 1998. The reasons underlying the Bremen Regional Court’s decision of 30   September 1996, namely factual obstacles to granting the applicant’s request, were therefore still valid. In principle, contacts with the natural father were important for a child’s well-being. However, having regard to S.’s living conditions and the applicant’s submissions, access as requested by him would not further the child’s well-being but rather be detrimental. The applicant refused to accept his son’s family situation. Moreover, his conduct, e.g. his unannounced visit to his son’s school in Kyrgyzstan or his attempt to have his son and Ms   B.-K. removed from the German records of residence, showed the applicant’s lack of respect for his son’s interests. The applicant further disregarded the fact that, as was shown in the hearing on 3   July 1997, his twelve-year-old son was scared by his conduct and did not wish to see him. This wish could not be regarded as irrelevant, as suggested by the applicant. Even though it was not excluded as a matter of principle to grant a father access to his child against the child’s will, this was only possible in cases in which their relationship would otherwise be permanently prejudiced. Such risk did not, however, exist in the present case. S. indeed profited from his stay in Kyrgyzstan and had gained in stability. Against this background, the applicant’s subsidiary request to transfer the mother’s right to determine the child’s place of residence to the Youth Office also showed the extent to which he gave priority to his parental rights over his son’s interests. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for information on his son’s development for the same reasons as his request to be granted access. The District Court also rejected the applicant’s requests to take further evidence. Taking expert evidence had to be refused as Ms   B.-K. did not agree and an expertise could not be prepared against her will. The persons named as witnesses could not make any statements with respect to the current situation. b.     Proceedings before the Bremen Regional Court On 7   January 1998 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal of 20   November 1997, arguing that due to the District Court’s decision dated 15   December 1997 the appeal was futile. On 21   April 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s decision of 15   December 1997 and complained about the length of the proceedings. Moreover, he challenged the single judge at the District Court, Mr   Ho., for bias and argued that he had not had jurisdiction to deal with his case. He subsequently submitted approximately fifteen further written statements on his appeal and his motions. On 29   April 1998 the Bremen District Court refused to modify its decision ( Nichtabhilfeentscheidung ) of 15   December 1997 and forwarded the applicant’s appeal to the Bremen Regional Court. In June   1998 Ms   B.-K., her husband, their daughter and S. returned to Germany. By a letter dated 2   July 1998 the presiding judge of the Regional Court gave the applicant an overview concerning his motions lodged and the applicable law. The judge suggested to the applicant to withdraw part of his motions in order to enable the court to reach a decision in due time. On 13   August 1998 the Bremen Regional Court, sitting in camera , conducted a hearing in the presence of the applicant and Ms   B.-K.’s representative. The latter refused to indicate her client’s address. Several procedural issues were discussed, inter alia , the question of bias of the District Court judge and of the alphabetical distribution of cases at the District Court. On the Regional Court’s inquiry, the Bremen District Court, following an administrative session, indicated that pursuant to the relevant internal court rules the distribution of the applicant’s case to judge   Ho. was based on his child’s surname as registered after its change recorded in the birth register. On 25   August 1998 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s repeated requests to rectify the minutes of the hearing. On 7   October 1998 the Bremen Regional Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, partly amended a decision taken by the District Court in respect of legal expenses. On 13   October 1998 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision of 29   April 1998 concerning the jurisdiction of judge   Ho. It found that pursuant to the relevant internal court rules the judge rendering the decision had had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s case. The applicant’s two further appeals against this decision to the Bremen Court of Appeal were to no avail, as no appeal lay against the Regional Court’s decision. On 29   October 1998 the Bremen Regional Court ordered a psychological expert report on the question of access and appointed K. as expert. On 28   December 1998 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias of 21   April 1998. Having regard to the official statements made by judge   Ho. at the District Court in reply to the applicant’s allegations, it found that there were no indications of bias on his part. The applicant’s two appeals to the Bremen Court of Appeal were to no avail. On 13 and 20   January 1999 the Bremen Court of Appeal also rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s repeated complaints concerning several procedural directions issued by the presiding judge at the Bremen Regional Court. It found that no appeal lay against these decisions. On 5   February 1999 the Regional Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and two advisers, Ms   B.-K. and her lawyer, expert   K. and a representative of the Youth Office. It dismissed the applicant’s request to adjourn the hearing on account of the absence of a representative of the Youth Office at the child’s new address, finding that at that stage of the proceedings, his or her presence was not necessary. The applicant appealed and challenged the three Regional Court judges for bias. On 4   June 1999 another bench of the Regional Court, after having heard the judges concerned, dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias, for which he had given additional reasons in at least five further written submissions to the court. On 15   July 1999 the Bremen Court of Appeal declared the applicant’s complaints about the conduct of the proceedings by the Regional Court inadmissible and dismissed his appeals against the decisions of 5   February and of 4   June 1999, respectively. The applicant’s objections were to no avail. On 18   August 1999 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s repeated request to transfer the case to the court at the child’s place of residence. It found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the appeal against the decision rendered by the Bremen District Court, irrespective of the parties’ present place of residence. The Bremen Court of Appeal subsequently dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 7   September 1999 the Bremen Regional Court granted the applicant’s motion to suspend the proceedings until termination of the mediation procedure in the custody proceeding he instituted in the Kirchhain District Court on 2   July 1999 (see below 6.). On 24   February 2000 the Bremen Regional Court, upon the applicant’s request to appoint S. a guardian ad litem , appointed Ms   R., a lawyer practising in Marburg. On 27   March 2000 the Bremen Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the appointment of a counsel as guardian as inadmissible, as no appeal lay against this decision. The   guardian subsequently met S. twice and also heard the applicant. On 14   September 2000 the President of the Bremen Regional Court informed the applicant about the results of the guardian ad litem ’s hearing of S. The latter had stated that he could imagine meeting with his father again under certain circumstances. Therefore, it appeared preferable to try to establish contacts between the applicant and his son before hearing S. again in court in the presence of an expert. The court would then be in a better position to reach its decision on the question of access. With regard to his numerous other procedural requests, the President considered that it might be useful for him to clarify in an oral hearing which of these requests he still intended to pursue. On 26   October 2000 Ms   B.-K.’s counsel informed the court that S. did not presently wish to have contacts with his father and wanted to decide for himself when to contact him. On 21   December 2000 the Bremen Court of Appeal declared inadmissible the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings before the Bremen Regional Court. It considered that the present case gave no reason to depart from the still prevailing legal opinion that no action lay for an order requiring a lower court to process an action. The applicant’s conduct, in particular his numerous requests and appeals, had contributed significantly to the length of the proceeding. In any event, the Regional Court now planned to further the proceedings as it intended to fix a date for questioning S. in court. On 11   January 2001 the Bremen Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s objections against this decision. On 13   February 2001 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no.   1   BvR   186/01) about the Court of Appeal’s decisions of 21   December 2000 and 11   January 2001 and about the length of the proceedings before the Bremen District Court, the Bremen Regional Court and the Bremen Court of Appeal. It did not give reasons for its decision. Already on 9   February 2001 the Bremen Regional Court heard the applicant, Ms   B.-K., the guardian ad litem and the expert. As S. failed to appear in court, he was questioned in a further hearing in court on 30   March   2001. S., then aged fifteen, stated that he preferred the suspension of access to his father to prevail for the time being. Even though he had started to develop some interest in his father again, he was also scared because of his father’s unpredictability. He had been scared when his father had suddenly appeared at his school or in Kyrgyzstan. He wished to have contacts with his father in writing first, and without any arrangements by the court. When he had sent a letter to his father in October   2000, the latter had, however, sent the letter to the court. On 29   May 2001 expert   K. submitted her report. She recommended that contacts between the applicant and his son in accordance with the latter’s wishes be resumed soon. S. wanted to write to his father to lay down his views on contacts. If they agreed, personal contacts between them would be possible in the near future. On 13   June and 15   August 2001 the applicant objected to the expert on grounds of bias. In her comments on this motion, the guardian ad litem informed the court of the applicant’s statements on the progress of the proceedings. The applicant had argued that he was unable to withdraw the numerous motions he had lodged in addition to the motion to be granted access to S., because he wished to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights in order to be paid damages by the Federal Republic of Germany. The applicant contested having made such statements. On 20   August 2001 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias against expert   K. It found that objectively, there was no reason to doubt the expert’s impartiality. On 21   December 2001 the applicant’s motion for bias against the judges of the Bremen Court of Appeal having jurisdiction to deal with his case was dismissed by a different chamber of that court. On 10   January 2002 the Bremen Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the Regional Court’s decision of 20   August 2001 as ill-founded. It further dismissed his complaint against the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court as inadmissible, but argued alternatively that the complaint was also ill-founded, as the delays had mainly been caused by the applicant himself. On 30   January 2002 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Bremen Court of Appeal of 21   December 2000 and 11   January 2001. It found that the appeal was inadmissible, as no further appeal lay against the said decisions of the Court of Appeal. On 13   February 2002 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s objections against the said decision. On 22   April 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving further reasons, refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no.   1   BvR   278/02), comprising written submission of more than 120   pages, concerning the court decisions on his motion for bias against the expert   K. and the length of the proceedings. It imposed a fine of 500   euros (EUR) for abuse of petition on the applicant. The applicant’s objections against this decision were to no avail. On 13   August 2002 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s renewed motion for bias against the expert   K. as inadmissible, as it just repeated his earlier motions which had been rejected. It further dismissed the applicant’s motions to appoint a different guardian ad litem , to appoint two more experts and to make a verbatim record of the hearing and granted him access to the case-file. On 4   September 2002 the Regional Court, having changed its composition, ordered a hearing of the applicant, Ms   B.-K., S. and the expert   K. On 12   November 2002 the Bremen Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias against the judges sitting in his case as ill ‑ founded. It found in particular that from 1   January 2002 onwards three different judges had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s case. As the file already comprised some 1,840   pages until then, the judges, who needed some time to read those files, could not be considered to be biased for having delayed the proceedings. On 3   May 2003 S. attained the age of majority. At that time, the proceedings in the Bremen Regional Court had not yet been terminated. 4.     The applicant’s constitutional complaint against the amended Law on Family Matters On 12   October 1998 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the amended Law on Family Matters ( Reform zum Kindschaftsrecht ) of 16   December 1997, which had come into force on 1   July 1998. Without setting out in detail which provisions of that Law he considered to contravene the Basic Law, he complained in general terms that the said Law discriminated against fathers of children, when compared to mothers of children. On 19   January 1999 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no.   1   BvR   1963/98). The decision was served on him on 26   January 1999. 5.     The applicant’s request for joint custody On 2   July 1999 the applicant filed a request, certified by a notary, with the District Court claiming joint custody of S. On 4   April 2000 the Kirchhain District Court, which had jurisdiction following S.’s and his mother’s change of residence, dismissed the applicant’s request after having heard the applicant, Ms   B.-K., S. and a representative of the Youth Office in February   2000. It found that the conditions laid down in section   1626a of the Civil Code for joint custody were not met, as S.’s mother was not willing to exercise custody jointly. The court observed that the preference given to the mother of a child born out of wedlock with respect to custody matters could only be questioned from a constitutional point of view if her refusal of joint custody appeared arbitrary and contrary to the child’s well ‑ being. In the present case, the parents did not live together, had no common views on essential questions, as evidenced by the numerous court proceedings, and joint custody of S. would not be in the latter’s best interest. S. had stated that the applicant was alien to him and that on account of past events when the applicant had suddenly appeared on several occasions, he was even afraid of him. Furthermore, the applicant’s request was not justified under section   1666 of the Civil Code, as there were no indications that Ms   B.-K.’s refusal of joint custody would entail a risk to S.’s well ‑ being. In any event, Ms   B.-K.’s refusal of access alone would not be sufficient to question her sole custody. In these clear circumstances there had been no need to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child or to order a psychological expert opinion. On 16   June 2000 the Frankfurt (Main) Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. On   8   August   2000 the Frankfurt (Main) Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s objections against its June decision. On 6   February 2001 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving further reasons, refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaints (nos.   1   BvR   1293/00 and 1   BvR   1640/00) lodged against the decision of the District Court and the two decisions of the Court of Appeal. 6.     Further related matters In 1994 Mr K., Ms   B.-K.’s husband, filed an application with the Bremen District Court for the adoption of S. The proceedings were suspended in 1995. On 13   August   1999 Mr K. withdrew his application. The District Court informed the applicant accordingly. The applicant subsequently instituted further proceedings in the Kirchhain District Court requesting mediation in the matter of access to his son and information about his son’s private and schooling matters. On   5   July 2000 the Frankfurt (Main) Court of Appeal, upon the applicant’s appeal, decided that the applicant was entitled to information on the type of school which his son attended, his class and his results, his interests in sports and music an