CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 6 septembre 2007

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s61ED8A2B { width:14.36pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s84D0D60A { width:8.36pt; display:inline-block } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s394C7864 { font-family:Arial; background-color:#ffff00 } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s746337E6 { width:15.24pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sCD1FF46A { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB8084949 { width:138.49pt; display:inline-block } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .sBBB64387 { text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; font-family:Arial; list-style-position:inside } .sACBB7403 { width:6.79pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s88A92475 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sDD165512 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA5E34492 { width:18.86pt; display:inline-block } .sF7942EBF { width:178.06pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } THIRD SECTION DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 72200/01 by Marija GLIHA and Amalija JORAS against Slovenia The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 6   September 2007 as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   C. Bîrsan, President,   Mr   B.M. Zupančič,   Mrs   E. Fura-Sandström,   Mrs   A. Gyulumyan,   Mr   E. Myjer,   Mr   David Thór Björgvinsson,   Mrs   I. Berro-Lefèvre, judges, and Mr S. Quesada , Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 July 2001, Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicants, Ms Marija Gliha and Ms Amalija Joras, are Slovenian nationals who were born in 1936 and 1937 and live in Velika Loka and Ljubljana respectively. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Lucijan Bembič, State Attorney-General. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. On 30 January 1951 the applicants’ father Mr Rudolf Gliha was convicted and sentenced to 4 months’ deprivation of liberty and to forfeiture of immovable and movable property to the State (a house, several fields, forests, electric mill, etc.). On 2 July 1990, further to the applicants’ request, the Public Prosecutor filed a request for legality with the Supreme Court in order to challenge the applicants’ father’s conviction.   1. The first set of civil (non-contentious) proceedings   On 30 July 1990 the applicants sent a letter to the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit, requesting restitution of property confiscated to their late father in 1951. On 29 August 1990 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction of the applicants’ late father and the sentence of forfeiture of his property to the State. At the material time, Section 145 of the 1978 Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions as then applicable (“the 1978 Act”) regulated the restitution of, and compensation for, the property forfeited through penal proceedings (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”). The applicants then filed a request for restitution of confiscated property also with the local authorities – the Community of Trebnje. The latter forwarded the request to the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit. However, on 21 September 1990 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit, forwarded the request to the Community of Trebnje. On 4   October 1990 the latter, further to Section 145 of the 1978 Act, sent the request back to the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit.   On 29 November 1991 the Denationalisation Act (“the DA”) was adopted, forming the basis for restitution of property (or its value) that had passed into State ownership after the Second World War. Its Section 92 provided that property forfeited in criminal proceedings that had terminated before 31   December 1958 should also be returned to previous owners under the DA (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”). One individual filed a constitutional initiative ( ustavna pobuda ) with the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of Section 92. Following the adoption of the DA, on 28 February 1992 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit decided that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the claim, since the administrative authorities enjoyed jurisdiction over denationalisation matters. On 20 March 1992 the applicants filed an appeal. They also requested the issuing of an interim injunction and an exclusion of a judge. On 20 May 1992 the Higher Court granted the appeal and remitted the case to the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit. On 30 June 1992 the President of the Novo mesto Basic Court refused the request for exclusion of a judge. On 4 August 1992 the applicants lodged a new request for exclusion of a judge and for exclusion of the president of the Novo mesto Basic Court. On 11 September 1992 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected it. On 5   November 1992, the Constitutional Court rescinded Section 92 of the DA. 2. The second set of civil proceedings On 15 January 1991 the applicants started proceedings against the Community of Trebnje, the Republic of Slovenia and sixteen other defendants, among them twelve natural persons, before the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit with a view to determine ownership rights over the confiscated real estate and its delivery. At the same time, they proposed an interim injunction on the prohibition of alienation and encumbrance of the real estate. On 18 November 1991, following a hearing, the request for an interim injunction was rejected and the request for the note on the dispute in the land register was granted. The applicants’ representative was invited inter alia to produce complete extracts from the land register for all real estate in dispute. On 10 March 1992 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit again summoned the applicants’ representative to reply to its request. On 6 April 1992 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit decided to stay the proceedings and to continue them as non-contentious proceedings. At the same time, it decided to annul its decision on the note of the dispute. 3. Joint civil proceedings On 26 October 1992 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit decided to join two sets of non-contentious proceedings. On 26 November 1992 the applicants replied to the request of 10   March   1992. They also requested the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit to issue a partial decision on restitution in kind and to stay the proceedings until the Supreme Court rendered a leading decision on restitution of property belonging to natural persons. On 31 December 1992 the Community of Trebnje filed submissions. On 8 March 1993 the applicants applied for an interim injunction. On 5 April 1993 the Novo mesto Basic Court, the Trebnje Unit handed down a partial decision, returning the property that could be restituted in kind to the applicant’s late father. On 15 April 1993 five defendants, all natural persons, requested the court to issue a supplementary decision on legal costs. On 23 April 1993 the applicants lodged an appeal against the decision of 5 April 1993. On 2 June 1993 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the appeal. On 4 June 1993 the applicants filed a request for an interim injunction on prohibition of alienation or encumbrance of the remaining property. On 11 June 1993 two defendants replied. On 23 June 1993 the request was rejected. The applicants filed an appeal which the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed on 13 October 1993. On 24 January 1994 the new ownership of the real estate restituted in kind to the applicants’ late father was registered in the land register. On 8 September 1994 the applicant Ms Gliha filed a document relating to a plot of land which had been allegedly omitted from the decision of 5   April   1993. On 1 July 1997 the Trebnje Local Court (new style of the first-instance court further to the reform) received the applicant Ms Gliha’s request lodged with the Supreme Court on 18 June 1997. On 9 August 1997 the Parliament passed the Act on the Temporary Suspension of certain Provisions of the Act on Denationalisation and of the 1978 Act on the Implementation of Penal Sanctions (“the Temporary Suspension Act”). It had the effect of suspending extant claims under the 1978 Act, originally until 20 December 1997 and subsequently, under new legislation, until 31   March 1998. While those provisions were in abeyance, the Parliament passed the 1998 Act on Amendments and Supplements to the Act on Implementation of Legal Sanctions (the “1998 Act“). That Act added new Sections to the 1978 Act. Section 145A applied the provisions of the DA regarding the form and scope of restitution as well as the restrictions on restitution and the valuation of property to claims for restitution of property forfeited in criminal proceedings terminated before 31   December   1958 (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”) . In 1998 and 1999 several individuals filed a constitutional initiative challenging the 1998 Act before the Constitutional Court on the ground that its provisions were retroactive and discriminatory. On 16 July 1998 the Constitutional Court dismissed the initiative (decision no. U-I-60/98 - see “Relevant domestic law and practice”). On 11 August 1998 the applicants filed a complaint with the Supreme Court concerning the length of the proceedings. On 11 September 1998 the Trebnje Local Court informed the applicants that due to the change of legislation and stay of the proceedings, the court had been unable to proceed with the examination of their claim and that a hearing would probably be scheduled in October 1998. On 2 November 1998, on the basis of the amended Article 145B of the 1978 Act, the Trebnje Local Court requested the applicants to designate entities liable for the restitution of property. The applicants filed an appeal and lodged a request for “exclusion of all courts in the Dolenjska region and of the president of the Ljubljana Higher Court”. On 23 November 1998 the court adjourned a hearing pending the outcome of the request for exclusion. On 16 December 1998 the president of the Supreme Court rejected the request for exclusion of the president of the Ljubljana Higher Court. On 24 December 1998 the applicants were summoned to supplement their request for exclusion of all courts in the Dolenjska region. In reply, on 11 January 1999 the applicant requested the transferral of jurisdiction. On 28 January 1999 the Supreme Court rejected this request. On 14 April 1999 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the appeal against the decision of 2 November 1998. On 28 May 1999 the applicants filed a request for exclusion of the Supreme Court judges and a request for protection of legality. On 10 June 1999 the Trebnje Local Court rejected the applicants’ request for protection of legality as inadmissible. On 9 July 1999 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision of 14 April 1999. On 9 August 1999 the Attorney General rejected the applicants’ request to file a request of legality against the Higher Court’s decision. On 16 October 2000 the Constitutional Court requested the applicants to supplement their appeal. On 16 November 2000 the applicants replied and also filed a constitutional initiative challenging the 1998 Act. On 28 November 2000 the Trebnje Local Court made inquiries about the state of denationalisation proceedings initiated by the applicants with the Trebnje Administrative Unit. The latter replied on 5 December 2000. On 19 December 2000 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeal against the decisions of 2 November 1998 and 14   April 1999. It also separated the part of the applicants’ submissions pertaining to the 1998 Act and reserved it for a later decision. On 22 February 2001 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ initiative challenging Sections 145A and 145C of the amended 1978 Act. On 7 February 2002 the Trebnje Local Court again summoned the applicants to designate entities liable for the restitution of property, as requested by its decision of 2 November 1998. It also made inquiries about the confiscated real estate with the Regional Mapping and Surveying Administration of Novo mesto. A hearing was scheduled for 26   February   2002. On 26 February 2002 the applicants’ representative sent a letter to the Trebnje Local Court’s stating that its decision of 2 November 1998 had no legal ground. He also requested the court to initiate proceedings for review of constitutionality of the 1998 Act. The applicants’ representative repeated this at the hearing held on the same day and stated that the applicants would initiate such proceedings themselves if the Trebnje Local Court failed to do so. The latter postponed the hearing. On 27 February the Trebnje Local Court received the reply from the Regional Mapping and Surveying Administration of Novo mesto. On 4 March 2002 the Trebnje Local Court informed the applicants that the Constitutional Court had already reviewed the constitutionality of the 1998 Act on 16 July 1998. It again requested the applicants to act in compliance with its decision of 2 November 1998. A new hearing was scheduled for 26 March 2002 but the applicants’ representative requested the court to stay the proceedings since they had lodged a new initiative with the Constitutional Court. The Trebnje Local Court stayed the proceedings. On 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court rejected the initiative. On 30 December 2003 the Trebnje Local Court rejected the applicants’ claim since they had not properly designated the entities liable for restitution of property. On 13 February 2004 the applicants filed an appeal, stating that they had not been warned of possible consequences of poor representation. They also indicated the entity liable for restitution and the form of damages sought. On 29 September 2004 the Ljubljana Higher Court granted the appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court. On 22 April 2005 the Court again made inquiries with the Regional Mapping and Surveying Administration Unit of Novo mesto about the confiscated real estate. The latter replied on 13 May 2005. On 1 June 2005 the Trebnje District Court decided to appoint a court valuator – civil engineer. It instructed the applicants to pay his fees in advance, which they did. On 29 June 2005, further to the change of legislation, the applicants filed a request for lost profits from the date of annulment of the conviction until 5   May 2007. They also requested to be exempted from payment of costs of the proceedings and an exclusion of a judge. On 21 July 2005 the applicants’ representative requested the court to return the paid sum to them and to transfer the case to another court. On 9 September 2005 the president of the Higher Court rejected the applicants’ request for exclusion of a judge. On 22 September 2005 the Supreme Court rejected their request filed on 21 July 2005. On 6 October 2005 the Trebnje Local Court requested the applicants to substantiate their request for the exemption of costs. On 27 October 2005 they replied to the court’s inquiries. On 9 November 2005 the Trebnje Local Court rejected their request. The applicants lodged an appeal. On 4 January 2006 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the appeal. On 31 January 2006 the applicants supplemented their submissions of 29   June 2005. On 6 February and 6 March 2006 hearings were held. On 17 March 2006, a civil engineering expert was appointed. He prepared his opinion on 26 June 2006. On 25 October 2006, after a hearing, the Trebnje Local Court issued a decision on the payment of compensation for the confiscated property in bonds of the Republic of Slovenia amounting to 16,281,754.00 SIT (67,942.55 EUR). The applicants filed an appeal. On 17 November 2006 the Trebnje Local Court issued a supplementary decision on the payment of expert fees. On 21 December 2006 the applicants filed an appeal and an application for exemption from payment of the court fees as well as a request for transferral of jurisdiction. The proceedings are currently pending before the Ljubljana Higher Court. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice   1. The 1978 Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions, as amended and the 2000 Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions   The 1978 Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions, as amended ( Zakon o izvrševanju kazenskih sankcij, Official Journal nos. 17/78, 8/90) originally excluded from restitution all those sentenced before 31   December   1958.   Section 145, as amended in 1990   “If the sanction of forfeiture of property is quashed, the forfeited property shall be restored to the person sentenced or his heirs. If the restitution of property in whole or in part is physically or legally impossible, the actual value of that property at the time of the decision on its restitution, and according to the state of the property at the time of forfeiture, shall be paid by the socio-political unit to which the property was allocated. (...)”   The 2000 Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions (Official Journal no.   22/2000) replaced the 1978 Act. 2. The 1991 Denationalisation Act The Denationalisation Act ( Zakon o denacionalizaciji, Official Journal no. 27/91) formed the basis for restitution of property (or its value) that had passed into State ownership through previous legislation (agrarian reform, nationalisation, confiscation, etc.). Section 3 provides that all natural persons whose property had passed into State ownership on the basis of the listed legislation adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War are entitled to denationalisation. Section 4 further specifies that all other natural persons whose property was nationalised before 1963 are entitled to denationalisation. Sections 2 and 42 to 44 provide that, where property cannot be returned in its original form, compensation is payable (not in cash but in State bonds payable in instalments over 15 years). Section 92 of the 1991 Act extended its provisions to property forfeited in criminal proceedings that had terminated by 31 December 1958. That provision was rescinded by the Constitutional Court on 5   November   1992, partly on the ground that it was retroactive and therefore violated Article 155 of the Slovenian Constitution (decision no. U-I-10/92).   3. The 1997 Act on the Temporary Suspension of Certain Provisions of the Act on Denationalisation and of the Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions   Section 2 of the 1997 Act on the Temporary Suspension of Certain Provisions of the Act on Denationalisation and of the Act of Implementation of Penal Sanctions ( Zakon o začasnem zadržanju izvajanja nekaterih določb zakona o denacionalizaciji in zakona o izvrševanju kazenskih sankcij, Official Journal no. 49/1997) suspended, inter alia , originally until 20   December   1997 and subsequently, under new legislation, until 31   March   1998, those proceedings concerning claims for the restitution of or payment of compensation for property confiscated by virtue of criminal judgments handed down before 31 December 1958 and subsequently annulled.   4. The 1998 Act on Amendments of, and Supplements to, the Act on Implementation of Legal Sanctions   The 1998 Act on Amendments of, and Supplements to, the Act on Implementation of Legal Sanctions ( Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o izvrševanju kazenskih sankcij, Official Journal no. 10/98) made minor amendments to Section 145 of the 1978 Act. It also added new Sections 145A and 145C to the 1978 Act. As far as the criminal proceedings terminated before 31 December 1958 are concerned, Section 145A replaced Section 145, applying the provisions of the DA regarding the form and scope of restitution as well as the restrictions on restitution and the valuation of property to claims for restitution of forfeited property. Section 145C expressly removed the right to compensation for the previous owner’s inability to make use of the property during the period of forfeiture. Section 3 made the change applicable in non-contentious and contentious proceedings concerning the restitution of confiscated property when such proceedings commenced before the Act came into force, but had not become final by that time. In June 2002, further to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 15   November 2001, Section 145C was amended again so that persons entitled under Section 145A might claim compensation for being unable to use or to manage the property or for loss of earnings incurred throughout the period running from the quashing of the forfeiture of the property until the decision on its restitution becomes final.   5. The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia   The following provisions of the 1991 Constitution ( Ustava Republike Slovenije, Official Journal no. 33/91) are relevant here: Article 14 “In Slovenia everyone shall be guaranteed equal human rights and fundamental freedoms irrespective of national origin, race, sex, language, religion, political or other conviction, material standing, birth, education, social status or any other personal circumstance. All are equal before the law.” Article 15 “Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be exercised directly on the basis of the Constitution. The manner in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are exercised may be regulated by law whenever the Constitution so provides or where this is necessary due to the particular nature of an individual right or freedom. Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be restricted only by the rights of others and in such cases as are provided by this Constitution. Legal protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the right to obtain redress for the violation of such rights and freedoms, shall be guaranteed. No human right or fundamental freedom regulated by legal acts in force in Slovenia may be restricted on the ground that this Constitution does not recognise that right or freedom or recognises it to a lesser degree.”   Article 22 “Everyone shall be guaranteed equal protection of rights in any proceeding before a court and before other state authorities, local community authorities and bearers of public authority that decide on his or her rights, duties or legal interests.”   Article 23 “Everyone has the right to have any decision regarding his rights, duties and any charges brought against him made without undue delay by an independent, impartial court constituted by law. Only a judge duly appointed pursuant to rules previously established by law and by judicial regulations may judge such an individual.”   Article 26 “Everyone shall have the right to compensation for damage caused by the unlawful acts of a person or body when performing a function or engaged in an activity on behalf of a state or local authority or as a holder of public office ...”   Article 30 “Any person unjustly convicted of a criminal offence or deprived of his liberty without due cause has the right to rehabilitation and compensation, and other rights provided by law.”   Article 33 “The right to private property and inheritance shall be guaranteed.”   Article 155 “Laws and other regulations and general legal acts cannot have retroactive effect. Only a law may establish that certain of its provisions have retroactive effect, if this is required in the public interest and provided that no acquired rights are infringed thereby.”   Article 160 “The Constitutional Court shall hear:   ... constitutional appeals in which specific acts are alleged to have infringed a human right or fundamental freedom; ... Unless otherwise provided by law, the Constitutional Court shall hear a constitutional appeal only if legal remedies have been exhausted. The Constitutional Court shall decide whether a constitutional appeal is admissible for adjudication on the basis of statutory criteria and procedures.” 6. The Constitutional Court’s decisions In 1998 and 1999 several individuals challenged the 1998 Act by constitutional initiative ( ustavna pobuda ) before the Constitutional Court on the ground that its provisions were retroactive and discriminatory. On 16 July 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled (a joined decision no. U-I-60/98) that the disputed provisions of Sections 145A and 145C of the 1998 Act did not conflict with the Constitution because such interference with the constitutional rights granted in Articles 30 (right to rehabilitation and compensation in criminal proceedings) and 33 (right to own and inherit property) of the Constitution was indispensable for the protection of the rights of other claimants under the DA. Placing unjustly convicted persons on an equal footing with all other rightful claimants regarding the redress of post-war wrongs was an appropriate means through which the legislator had achieved his aim. The principle of the Welfare State empowered the legislator, with due consideration paid to the right of all citizens to social security, to have regard to the financial resources of the State and, in cases which were constitutionally admissible, also to restrict certain rights accordingly. The Constitutional Court also added that, when deciding, in November   1992 (decision no. U-I-10/92), to quash Section 92 of the DA, it had been unaware of the full extent of the property forfeited through criminal proceedings prior to 31 December 1958 and thus also of the financial obligations incumbent on the State. The Constitutional Court ruled that Section 3 of the 1998 Act was in conformity with the Constitution notwithstanding the fact that it retroactively interfered with acquired rights because the retroactive effect of the Act was justified by the public interest, and since such interference, provided it be subjected to rigorous constitutional scrutiny, was in conformity with paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court also emphasised the need, in the light of the Temporary Suspension Act and the 1998 Act, for swift completion of pending cases, all the more so as the restitution of property had twice been delayed by law and that the matter required an early solution. On 15 November 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that exclusion of claims for compensation for the inability to use or manage the property or in respect of lost profits for the period running from the quashing of the sentence of forfeiture until the decision on restitution became final was unconstitutional. In June 2002, the Parliament adopted a new wording of Section 145C. On 22 February 2001 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ initiative challenging Sections 145A and 145C of the amended 1978 Act and on 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court rejected another initiative lodged by the applicants.   7.     The Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay   The Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay (Zakon o varstvu pravice do sojenja brez nepotrebnega odlašanja , Official Journal, No. 49/2006 ) has been implemented since 1 January 2007. Under its sections   1 and 2, the right to a trial within a reasonable time is guaranteed for a party to court proceedings, a participant under the Act governing non-contentious proceedings and an injured party in criminal proceedings. Section 3 provides for two remedies to expedite pending proceedings - a supervisory appeal ( nadzorstvena pritožba ) and a motion for a deadline ( rokovni predlog ) - and, ultimately, for a claim for just satisfaction in respect of damage sustained because of the undue delay ( zahteva za pravično zadoščenje ). COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings. 2.     The applicants also complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective remedies. 3.     The applicants further complained under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention that they suffered during the proceedings. They also maintained that the illegal confiscation of their father’s property in 1950 was contrary to Article 6 § 2. Invoking Article 14 and Article 6 in substance, they further claimed that they were discriminated on political basis in the proceedings and that their right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was breached by the amendments to the 1978 Act. Finally, the applicants contended that Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 was infringed since there was no effective remedy in cases of mistrial for not holding the property for 50   years. THE LAW      The applicants’ first complaint under Article 6   §   1 of the Convention relates to the length of the proceedings, which began on 30 July 1990 and 15 January 1991 respectively and were subsequently joined. The proceedings are still pending before the Ljubljana Higher Court. They have therefore already lasted approximately seventeen years. The applicants also complained about the length of different sets of proceedings before the Constitutional Court. Article 6 reads as follows:   “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” According to the applicants, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They also stated that the courts should have appropriately instructed the applicants in the course of the proceedings. The Government reject the allegations. They argued that the applicants had not availed themselves of the effective remedies at their disposal for the purpose of expediting the judicial proceedings and/or claiming compensation, in particular after the implementation of the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay (the “2006 Act”) from 1 January 2007. In any event, the proceedings which fall into the Court’s temporal jurisdiction only after 28 June 1994 when the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia were rather complex from the factual, legal and procedural perspectives. Moreover, the applicants substantially contributed to the protracted nature of these proceedings by lodging a number of clearly unfounded legal remedies which also provoked the adjournment of hearings and not responding promptly to the courts’ requests. In the Government’s view, the applicants’ conduct represents the abuse of procedural rights. As to the proceedings started before the Constitutional Court in order to challenge the 1998 Act, the Government consider that these proceedings were not decisive for the outcome of the proceedings before the regular courts. In addition, the obligation for the Constitutional Court to hear cases within a reasonable time cannot be construed in the same way as for an ordinary court (see Tričković v. Slovenia , no.   39914/98, §   41, 12   June   2001). Finally, as far as the payment of compensation for confiscated property is concerned, the delay in the proceedings is in the applicants’ favour since they are entitled to payment of default interest. As far as the proceedings pending before the Ljubljana Higher Court are concerned, the Court observes that since 1 January 2007, when the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without undue Delay (the “2006 Act”) became operational, the applicants have been entitled to seek acceleration of the impugned proceedings pending before the domestic courts. The Court notes that in proceedings pending at first or second instance, it is open to persons such as the applicants to seek their acceleration under sections 3, 5 and 8 of the 2006 Act by means of a supervisory appeal and a motion for a deadline. The latter constitutes, in substance, an appeal against a decision on a supervisory appeal under certain conditions. Moreover, the applicants may ultimately obtain further redress through a compensatory remedy, namely by bringing a claim for just satisfaction under section 15 of the 2006 Act. The Court has already examined the aggregate of remedies provided by the 2006 Act for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It was satisfied that they were effective also in cases of excessively long proceedings pending at first and second instance, lodged before 1   January   2007, in the sense that these remedies were in principle capable of both preventing the continuation of the alleged violation of the right to a hearing without undue delay and of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Grzinčič v. Slovenia , no. 26867/02, § 98, 3 May 2007, and Korenjak v. Slovenia, (dec.) no. 463/03, § 62, 15   May   2007). The Court notes that the applicants have not availed themselves of any of the remedies provided by the 2006 Act. The applicants are required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to use the remedies available to them under the 2006 Act. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article   35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. As to the proceedings started by the applicants before the Constitutional Court on 9 July 1999, the Court notes that one part of these proceedings related to the constitutional appeal ended on 19 December 2000, which is more than six months before the applicants lodged their application with the Court. It concludes therefore that the six month time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was not respected. As to the other part of these proceedings related to the applicants’ constitutional initiative dismissed on 22 February 2001 and even assuming that their outcome was decisive for the applicants’ civil rights and obligations, the Court notes that they lasted approximately 1 year and 8 months for 1 level of jurisdiction. Even assuming also that the outcome of the second set of proceedings related to the applicants’ constitutional initiative was decisive for the applicants’ civil rights and obligations, the Court notes that it started on 25   March 2002 and ended on 10 April 2003. This set of proceedings therefore lasted 1 year and 16 days. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material submitted to it, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of two sets of proceedings before the Constitutional Court related to the applicants’ constitutional initiatives was not excessive. This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill founded under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.   2. The applicants also complained that the remedies available in Slovenia in length-of-proceedings cases were ineffective. In substance, they relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” The Government argued that the violation of Article 13 depended on the violation of some other right of the Convention. Since Article 6 was not breached, Article 13 could not have been violated. The Court has already found that the 2006 Act does afford the applicants effective remedies in respect of the complaint about the length of the proceedings pending at first and second instance (see above). That finding is also valid in the context of their complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 and   4 of the Convention.   3. The applicants complained under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention that they suffered during the proceedings. They further contended that Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 was infringed since there was no effective remedy in cases of mistrial for not holding the property for 50   years. Invoking Article 14 and Article 6 in substance, they further claimed that they were discriminated on political basis in the proceedings and that their right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was breached by the amendments to the 1978 Act. Finally, the applicants maintained that the illegal confiscation of their father’s property in 1950 was contrary to Article   6 § 2.   Article 1 provides: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.”   Article 3 reads:   “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”   Article 6 § 2 reads: “2.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”   Article 14 Article reads as follows:   “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”   In so far as relevant, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law...” Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 provides: “When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to the law or the practice of the State concerned, unless it is proved that the non ‑ disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.”   As to the complaints under Article 1, Article 6 § 1 (fairness) and Article   14 of the Convention as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 related to the denationalisaton proceedings, the Court notes that the proceedings are still pending before the Ljubljana Higher Court. It considers, therefore, that the complaints relating to those proceedings are premature, since the domestic remedies have not been exhausted as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, Sirc v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 44580/98, § 247, 22 June 2006). As to the applicants’ complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court recalls its established case-law to the effect that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc. (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, §   162). The Court considers that the facts of the case do not meet the threshold required to attract the protection of Article 3 (see, mutatis mutandis , Predojević and Others v. Slovenia (dec.), nos. 43445/98, 49740/99, 49747/99 and 54217/00, 7 June 2001, and Makuc v. Slovenia , (dec.), no.   26828/06, 31   May   2007).   This complaint is therefore manifestly ill founded in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Finally, as far as may be understood that the applicants complain about the illegal taking of their father’s property in 1951 under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the Court recalls that it has jurisdiction to examine the facts of the present case for their compatibility with the Convention only in so far as they occurred after 28   June 1994, the date of the entry into force of the Convention with regard to Slovenia (see Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia (dec.), nos.   44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, 9 October 2003). Regard being had to the fact that the events complained of occurred before that date, it follows that this complaint must be declared incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and to reject the application. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the application inadmissible.   Santiago Quesada   Corneliu Bîrsan   Registrar   President