CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 novembre 2007

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text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sEE18EE45 { width:48.95pt; display:inline-block } .sD246B30D { width:200.98pt; display:inline-block } .sF2E32F9B { width:36.61pt; display:inline-block } .s5F32E900 { width:208.31pt; display:inline-block }     FOURTH SECTION     CASE OF DRIZA v. ALBANIA     (Application no. 33771/02)     JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG     13 November 2007       FINAL     02/06/2008       This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44   §   2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Driza v. Albania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mr   J. Casadevall, President,   Mr   G. Bonello,   Mr   K. Traja,   Mr   L. Garlicki,   Ms   L. Mijović,   Mr   J. Šikuta,   Mrs   P. Hirvelä, judges, and Mr T.L. Early , Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 16 October 2007, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 33771/02) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Mr Ramazan Driza (“the applicant”), on 4 September 2002. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mrs A. Driza-Maurer, his daughter and lawyer, who practises in Geneva. The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr S. Puto and Mrs S. Mëneri, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant complained, in particular, of a violation of the fairness aspect of Article 6 § 1 and a failure to enforce a final judgment. He also complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and, invoking Article 13, of the lack of an effective remedy for the aforementioned complaints. 4.     On 5 July 2005 the Court decided to communicate the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Tirana. 6.     The relevant domestic proceedings concern an application for the restitution of land. A.     Administrative proceedings for the restitution of land 7.     In pre-war Albania the applicant’s late father had owned a bakery in Tirana and a plot of land measuring 6,000 square metres In 1960 the Albanian authorities demolished the building and expropriated the land. 8.     On 27 September 1994 the Tirana District Court restored the applicant’s property rights over his late father’s property pursuant to the Property Restitution and Compensation Act 1993 (hereinafter, the Property Act). The decision became final and binding at the latest on 11 October 1994. 9.     As it was unable to return the original property, the Tirana City Council decided on 30   April 1996 that the applicant had a right to receive compensation in kind for the original property. It allocated him a piece of land situated two kilometres from the centre of Tirana and measuring 5,000 sq. m. The land was divided into two plots measuring, respectively, 1,650 sq. m. (hereinafter, the smaller plot) and 3,350 sq. m. (hereinafter, the larger plot). 10.     By decision no. 621 of 20 June 1996 the Tirana Commission on the Restitution of Properties and Compensation (hereinafter referred to as the “Tirana Commission”) upheld the Tirana City Council’s decision. 11.     On 15 August 1996 the applicant’s title to the land was entered in the Tirana Land Register. 12.     In 1996 and 1997 a series of possession orders concerning the two plots of land were issued by the Tirana City Council and the Tirana District Court. However, the applicant was unable to recover possession from the occupants. 13.     On 10 September 1997 he concluded a preliminary contract to sell the smaller plot. B.     Civil proceedings concerning the smaller plot 1.     Ordinary proceedings 14.     F.Z., a former member of an agricultural cooperative, had previously been granted under Law no. 7501 of 19 July 1991 the right to use the smaller of the two plots allocated to the applicant. 15.     On an unspecified date she brought a civil action in the Tirana District Court claiming full title over the smaller plot under Law no. 8053 of 21   December 1995. She also asked the District Court to set aside the Commission’s decision of 20 June 1996 in so far as it related to that plot. 16.     On 10 October 1997 the Tirana District Court set aside the Commission’s decision relating to the smaller plot on the grounds that the Commission had first to award compensation to the user and to the former owner of the land. 17.     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Tirana Court of Appeal claiming full title to the plot. He argued that, when the Commission reached its decision, the plot was State property that was available for allocation to former owners in lieu of compensation. He added that F.Z. was merely a user of the land at the time. 18.     On 2 June 1998 the Tirana Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the District Court’s decision as being defective in law and upheld the validity of the Commission’s decision concerning the applicant’s title. 19.     On 17 December 1998 the Supreme Court (Administrative Division) deciding on the merits, upheld the applicant’s rights over the smaller plot of land that had been allocated as compensation for the original property. The judgment became final and binding on an unspecified date. 2.     Supervisory review 20.     On an unspecified date, while the enforcement proceedings were in progress, F.Z. lodged an application with the Supreme Court for supervisory review ( Rekurs në interes të ligjit ) of the merits of the Supreme Court (Administrative Division’s) judgment of 17   December 1998 and of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 2   June 1998, on the grounds that they conflicted with substantive law. 21.     The application for supervisory review was examined by the Supreme Court (Joint Colleges). On 5 July 2001, approximately two and a half years after the final decision, the Supreme Court granted the application. On the same date, it quashed, by a majority, the judgments of 2 June 1998 and 17 December 1998 in favour of the applicant, and upheld the District Court’s decision of 10 October 1997 dismissing the applicant’s claims relating to the smaller plot of land. It found that the Commission’s decision had been based on a misinterpretation of the substantive law (Property Act 1993). 22.     The applicant was neither informed of the supervisory-review proceedings nor invited to attend the hearings before the Supreme Court. He was not served with the Supreme Court’s judgment within the six-month time-limit for appealing and so did not appeal against it. 23.     Of the fifteen Supreme Court judges who decided the case on 5   July 2001, three (B. C., N. SH. and M.S.) had been members of the panel which on 17 December 1998 had decided the merits of the case. A further three (Th. K., P.Z., and V.K.) had sat on the panel which on 7 December 2000 had decided the merits of the case in the proceedings concerning both plots of land (see paragraph 29 below). The first three judges were called upon to rule in the supervisory-review proceedings on their alleged misinterpretation of substantive law while the other three judges had to determine the merits of the case for the second time in the same proceedings. C.     Civil proceedings concerning the entire property (both plots of land) 24.     In 1997 the State Supreme Audit Institution ( Kontrolli i Larte i Shtetit ), acting on its own behalf and at the instance of S. SH., the user of the larger plot of land allocated to the applicant, brought an action in the Tirana District Court for an order setting aside the Commission’s decision of 20   June 1996 in its entirety, on the ground that it had exceeded its jurisdiction by allocating land to the applicant. 25.     On 22 December 1997 the Tirana District Court set aside the Commission’s decision in its entirety as being defective in law. It also held that the State had an obligation to pay the applicant compensation under the Property Act for a plot of land measuring 5,000 sq. m. 26.     On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Tirana Court of Appeal seeking the reinstatement of the Commission’s decision allocating him the land. 27.     On 9 April 1999 the Tirana Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the District Court’s decision. 28.     On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (Civil Division) arguing that the lower courts had failed to rule on the question of the users’ title to the land. 29.     On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court (Civil Division), deciding the merits of the case, upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the ground that the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding on the form of compensation the applicant should receive for the loss of his original property. It noted that pursuant to a Council of Ministers’ decision of 13   May 1996, Commissions were to be set up by the municipal councils to assess compensation for land situated in tourist areas. These Commissions had yet to be established. Lastly, the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s right under the Property Act to obtain the payment of compensation for a 5,000 sq. m. plot of land. D.     The Constitutional Court proceedings 30.     The applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court under Article 131 (f) of the Constitution, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgments of 7 December 2000 and 5 July 2001 were unconstitutional. 31.     The appeal was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 8   April 2002 pursuant to Article 31 of the Constitutional Court Act, as being “outside its jurisdiction”. E.     Recent developments 32.     The applicant says that an apartment block has now been built on the larger plot of land by third parties and the apartments sold to, and occupied by, new owners. The smaller plot is occupied by temporary structures. The applicant has not received any compensation from the authorities. II.   RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Constitution 33.     The Albanian Constitution, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: Article 41 “1. The right of private property is protected by law. 2. Property may be acquired by gift, inheritance, purchase, or any other ordinary means provided for by the Civil Code. 3.   The law may provide for expropriations or limitations in the exercise of a property right only in the public interest. 4. Expropriations or limitations of a property right that are equivalent to expropriation are permitted only if fair compensation is provided. 5.   A complaint may be filed in court to resolve disputes regarding the amount or extent of compensation due.” Article 42 § 2 “In order to protect their constitutional and legal rights, freedoms and interests, or to defend criminal charges, everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing, within a reasonable time, by an independent and impartial court established by law.” Article 142 § 3 “State bodies shall comply with judicial decisions.” Article 131 “The Constitutional Court shall decide: ... (f) final complaints by individuals alleging a violation of their constitutional rights to a fair hearing, after all legal remedies for the protection of those rights have been exhausted.”   Article 181 “1. Within two to three years from the date this Constitution enters into force, the Assembly, guided by the criteria of Article 41, shall issue laws for the just resolution of various issues relating to expropriations and confiscations that were effected before the approval of this Constitution. 2. Laws and other normative acts relating to expropriations and confiscations enacted before the entry into force of this Constitution shall continue to apply provided they are compatible with the Constitution.” B. Code of Civil Procedure 34.     Under the Code of Civil Procedure 1996, which was in force at the material time, judgments became final in the following circumstances: Article 451 “Court judgments shall become legally binding on the expiration of the time-limit for lodging an appeal if no such appeal has been lodged. If the judgment is not quashed on an appeal to a higher court, it shall become legally binding when the higher court delivers its decision...” 35.     Pursuant to the provisions in force at the material time supervisory review ( Rekurs në interes të ligjit ) was an extraordinary remedy that enabled courts to reopen proceedings after a judgment had become final. Between 1996 and its abrogation by Law no. 8812 of 17 May 2001 the supervisory-review procedure underwent several legislative changes. Section 473 – Review in the interests of the law (Law no. 8431 of 14 December 1998) “Final judgments, decisions and rulings of the colleges of the Supreme Court shall be amenable to supervisory review in the interests of the law for the reasons set forth in section 472 (a), (b) and (c) on an application lodged by the parties to the proceedings within three years from the moment the decision becomes binding. The application for supervisory review will firstly be examined by a preliminary review panel of five judges and then by the full Supreme Court (Joint Colleges). ... Judges of the Supreme Court who sat as members of the division that delivered the judgment, decision or ruling or of the preliminary review panel shall not sit on the panel that conducts the supervisory review of the final judgment...” C.     Property Restitution and Compensation Act (Law no. 7698 of 15   April 1993, as amended by Laws nos. 7736 and 7765 of 1993, 7808 and 7879 of 1994, 7916 of 1995 and 8084 of 1996, repealed by Law no. 9235 of 29 July 2004 and further amended by Laws nos.   9388 of 2005 and 9583 of 2006) 36.     The Property Restitution and Compensation Act ( Ligji për kthimin dhe kompensimin e pronës ) has undergone several amendments during the past fourteen years. The main changes to the first Property Act of 1993 came about as a result of two laws which entered into force respectively in 2004 and 2006. The original Act and these two amending Acts will hereinafter be referred to as the “Property Act 1993” the “Property Act 2004” and the “Property Act 2006” respectively. The relevant provisions of each of these laws can be summarised as follows: 1.     The Property Act 1993 37.     Under the Property Act 1993 former owners of properties expropriated by the relevant regime and the legal heirs of such owners had the right to claim ownership of the original properties. Upon ownership being determined they were entitled either to the restitution of the original immovable property or to an award of compensation either in kind (up to a maximum of 10,000 sq. m) or in value if any of the following conditions was met: the alleged property (1) was pasture, meadow, forestry land, or agricultural or non-agricultural land; (2) was not subject to Law no. 7501 of 19 July 1991; (3) was currently State-owned; or (4) had been designated as suitable for construction and was situated within the boundaries of a city. Section 16 of the Act provided for the following forms of compensation in respect of property which could not be returned: (a) State bonds, equivalent to the compensation owed, with a first option over shares in State enterprises being privatised by the Government or in other activities carried on through the granting of loans; (b) an equivalent plot of land or a building site near to an urban area, in accordance with the general urban-development regulations; and (c) an equivalent plot of land in a tourist zone, in accordance with the general urban-development regulations. The Council of Ministers had power to define detailed rules for determining how such compensation should be provided and the applicable time-limits. 38.     The 1993 Act also instituted the Commission on the Restitution of Properties and Compensation ( Komisioni i Kthimit dhe Kompensimit të Pronave ) as the competent administrative body to deal with former owners’ claims to restitution and compensation. However, it did not provide a time-limit within which a decision could be appealed against, so preventing it from even becoming binding. 2.     The Property Act 2004 39.     The Property Act 2004, which repealed the previous version, provided for two forms of restitution of immovable property, namely the return, under certain circumstances, of the original property and compensation in the event of the authorities being unable to return the original property. Restitution was not limited in size. The Act provided for five forms of compensation: (a) property of the same kind; (b) property of any other kind; (c) shares in State-owned companies; (d) the value of a State-owned property in the course of privatisation, and (e) a sum of money corresponding to the value attributed to the property at the time of the decision (section 11). The Act instituted the State Committee on Property Restitution and Compensation ( Komiteti Shteteror per Kthimin dhe Kompensimin e Pronave ), composed of five members elected by Parliament. Its role was to decide on the lawfulness of district committees’ decisions on restitution and compensation claims (sections 15 and 17). The Council of Ministers was to establish the rules and the criteria to be applied (sections 13). 40.     Section 19 provided for the enforcement of decisions awarding compensation within the first six months of each financial year. Following its entry into force, anyone entitled to claim restitution or compensation was required to lodge an application with the District Committee by 31   December 2007. The Act granted the Committee a discretion to decide which form of compensation should be granted, but applicants could express their preference in writing. An appeal lay against the District Committee’s decision to the State Committee (section 20) and to the district courts within thirty days of the date of issue of the Committee’s decision. 41.     On 28 April 2005 Parliament enacted legislation setting out the method by which immovable property would be valued for compensation purposes. Its implementation was left to the State Committee on Property Restitution and Compensation, which was to issue the site plans allowing the properties to be valued. 42.     In order to comply with the committee’s awards of pecuniary compensation, section 23 of the 2004 Act provided for the establishment of a ten-year Property Compensation Fund, whose aim was to provide financial support for such awards. The 2004 Act was examined by both the Constitutional and the Supreme Courts. On 24 March 2005 the Supreme Court (Joint Colleges) concluded that the Property Act of 2004 had no retroactive effect and that its provisions could therefore not have any impact on property rights recognised by administrative or court decisions dating from before its entry into force.   3.     The Property Act of 2006 43.     On 17 July 2006 the Property Act 2004 was amended by the Property Act 2006, which entered into force on 17 August 2006. It provided, inter alia, for the establishment of the Agency for the Restitution of Properties and Compensation, a new body competent to decide restitution and compensation claims (section 15). The new law repealed sections 11 (2), 19 and 20 of the 2004 Act which, inter alia , laid down the procedure for the enforcement of compensation awards. D. Agricultural Land Act 44.     Law no. 8053 of 21 December 1995 conferred on former members of agricultural cooperatives the right to request the title to land they were farming. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 45.     The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, arguing that the annulment of a final judgment was contrary to the principle of legal certainty, that the Supreme Court was not impartial when it decided his case and that the authorities had failed to enforce the final judgments of 17 December 1998 and 7 December 2000. In so far as relevant Article 6 § 1 reads as follows: “1.     In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...” A.     Admissibility 1.     Compliance with the six-month rule 46.     The Government contended that all the complaints under Article 6 were inadmissible as they had been lodged outside the six-month period provided for under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Owing to the discretionary character of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and since its inadmissibility decision was de plano , the final effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35 were in fact the decisions of the Supreme Court of 5 July 2001 (first set of proceedings) and 7 December 2000 (second set of proceedings), and the applicant had not introduced his application with the Court until 4 September 2002. 47.     The applicant replied, with reference to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution and the practice of the Constitutional Court, that in order to exhaust all domestic remedies, individuals had to file a complaint with the Constitutional Court if and when they alleged a breach of Article 6 of the Convention. Indeed, the applicant’s claims before the Constitutional Court, namely the impartiality of the court, the breach of the principle of legal certainty and the failure to enforce a final judgment, fell within the Constitutional Court’s competence as confirmed by its practice. Hence, the Constitutional Court had both the competence and an obligation to consider and decide the case, if necessary, by means of a judgment. Accordingly, the applicant’s claims had been lodged in time as, irrespective of the fact that it was a de plano inadmissibility decision, the Constitutional Court’s decision was dated 8 April 2002. 48.     The Court notes that the rights to fair proceedings and to have final decisions enforced, which lie at the heart of the applicant’s complaints before the Court, are constitutional rights enshrined in Articles 31 and 42 of the Constitution. 49.     It reiterates its findings in the case-law concerning Albania to the effect that the Constitutional Court can be considered an effective remedy the exhaustion of which is required by Article 35 of the Convention when Article 6 issues arise and considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, there are no reasons for it to depart from those findings (see Qufaj Co. Sh.p.k. v. Albania , no. 54268/00, § 42, 18   November 2004, and Balliu v. Albania (dec.), no. 74727/01, ECHR-2004). 50.     It follows that the relevant final decision is that of 8 April 2002. Since the applicant introduced his application on 4 September 2002, he complied with the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 35. 51.     For these reasons, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection on this point. 2.     Fairness of the proceedings: breach of the principles of legal certainty and impartiality 52.     The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 through the quashing by the Supreme Court (Joint Colleges) of the final judgment of 17 December 1998 and the Commission’s decision of 20 June 1996 by way, inter alia , of supervisory-review proceedings. He further complained of the lack of impartiality of the panels of the Supreme Court under two separate heads: three of the Supreme Court judges (TH.K., P. Z. and V. K.) had sat on the benches which had ruled against him on 5 July 2001 and on 7 December 2000; and the President of the Supreme Court had performed a dual role in the supervisory-review proceedings. 53.     The Government contested that argument. 54.     The Court considers that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 3.     Alleged failure to enforce the final judgments of 17 December 1998 and 7   December 2000 55.     The Government further maintained that, while the applicant was challenging the end result of the proceedings, he had not shown any interest in obtaining the enforcement of the judgment of 7 December 2000 as he had failed to initiate enforcement proceedings in the Tirana District Court by requesting a writ of execution and had also failed to make use of the remedies introduced by the Property Act 2004 in relation to the issue of compensation. The Government argued that this complaint should therefore be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 56.     The applicant challenged the effectiveness of the remedies relied upon by the Government. He argued that the remedy introduced by the Property Act 2004 could not provide an effective remedy within the meaning of the Convention as his property rights had been considered in the final judgments of 17 December 1998 and 7 December 2000 and an administrative body could not, therefore, re-examine the same issue. He further maintained that, had the domestic courts awarded compensation in one of the forms provided for by law, the bailiffs would not have been able to enforce the decision. It was up to the Government to adopt effective measures, either by classifying the State properties available for compensation in kind or by providing sufficient budgetary funds for pecuniary compensation, in order to make such a means of redress feasible. In conclusion, the applicant maintained that the Government had thus far failed to take effective steps to find solutions relating to the issue of compensation for former owners. 57.     The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness; it falls to the respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied (see Vernillo v. France , judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, pp. 11-12, § 27; Aksoy v. Turkey , no. 21987/93, §§   51-52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, no.   21893/93, §§ 65-67, Reports 1996-IV). 58. The Court considers that the question of the effectiveness of the remedies offered by the Property Acts is central to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It holds that both questions should be examined together on the merits. B.     Merits 1.     Fairness of the proceedings (a)     Legal certainty: Quashing of a final judgment (i) The parties’ submissions 59.     The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had breached the principle of legal certainty on two separate occasions. In the first place, by using a Brumărescu type procedure, ending with the quashing of the Supreme Court’s final judgment of 17   December 1998 that had upheld in part the validity of the Commission’s decision of 20 June 1996; and secondly, by issuing contradictory decisions in parallel proceedings in apparent ignorance of previous final findings. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s judgment of 7   December 2000 dealing with the validity of the Commission’s decision of 20 June 1996 as a whole had failed to take into account the findings in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 17   December 1998. 60.     In short, by delivering contradictory decisions in parallel sets of proceedings which entirely or partly quashed previous final adjudications, the Albanian legal system had shown deficiencies which breached the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the supervisory-review remedy had been repealed the applicant remained a victim of the alleged violations. 61.     The Government contested that argument. They maintained that during the period of June-July 1997 the domestic courts had been justified in initiating two independent sets of civil proceedings to rule on the lawfulness of the Commission’s decision of 20 June 1996 as they had been introduced by different parties and dealt with different matters. 62.     As to the supervisory-review ( Rekurs në interes të ligjit ), the Government submitted that domestic law at the time allowed a review of a decision within a period of three years of its becoming final. The procedure was aimed at redressing decisions issued in breach of domestic law during the transitional period and thus had temporary effect until 2001, when the legislation was repealed. Indeed, in the present case, in view of contradictory rulings in the two judgments in question, the review by a higher decision-making body in order to determine the matter had been necessary. This was further confirmed by the fact that the ruling of the Supreme Court in its judgment of 5 July 2001 corresponded to the findings of the judgment of 7 December 2000. (ii) The Court’s assessment 63.     The right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 §   1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which, in its relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires, among other things, that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia , no.   52854/ 99, §§   51-56, ECHR 2003-IX; and Roşca v.   Moldova , no. 6267/02, §   24, 22 March 2005). 64.     Legal certainty presupposes respect for the principle of res judicata (see Brumărescu v. Romania cited above, § 62), that is the principle of the finality of judgments. This principle insists that no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding judgment merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of the case. Higher courts’ powers of review should be exercised to correct judicial errors and miscarriages of justice, but not to carry out a fresh examination. The review should not be treated as an appeal in disguise, and the mere possibility of there being two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination. A departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character ( Roşca v. Moldova , cited above, §   25). 65.     Turning to the present case, the Court notes that on 17 December 1998 the Supreme Court (Administrative Division) upheld the applicant’s property rights over the smaller plot of land. Notwithstanding this, on 7   December 2000 the Supreme Court (Civil Division), in a parallel set of proceedings, found the recognition of title to be unlawful. In addition, on 5   July 2001, following the President of the Supreme Court’s request for leave to seek a review of the Administrative Court’s judgment of 1998 ( Rekurs në inters të ligjit ), the Supreme Court (Joint Colleges), without making any reference to its findings in the judgment of 2000, quashed the final judgment of 17 December 1998 to the detriment of the applicant. In short, after 2 years and 7 months the Supreme Court’s final judgment of 17 December 1998 was quashed twice by the Supreme Court, once by a judgment issued in parallel proceedings and once by means of a supervisory-review remedy. As a result, the applicant’s property issue is still unresolved. 66.     The Court notes that the first judgment was quashed for the first time by means of a supervisory-review procedure, which enabled the President of the Supreme Court to challenge any final decision at the request of one of the parties to the proceedings. This procedure was provided for in section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force until 17 May 2001. 67.     The Court disagrees with the Government’s argument as to the limited effect of the supervisory-review remedy. The fact that this remedy was revoked after the occurrence of the pertinent events in this case is of no relevance: there exist no domestic remedies capable of remedying the impairment of the principle of legal certainty brought about by the use of the supervisory-review procedure and its effects were never redressed in the present case (see Sardin v. Russia ( dec .), no. 69582/01, ECHR 2004-II, and Ryabykh v. Russia ( dec .), no. 52854/ 99, 21 February 2002). 68.     The same judgment was quashed a second time by a judgment delivered in a parallel set of proceedings. The Court rejects the Government’s argument that the authorities were justified in initiating two parallel sets of proceedings. It recalls that by virtue of Article 1 the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no.   30210/96, §   152, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI). 69.     In this connection, it is the State’s responsibility to organise the legal system in such a way as to identify related proceedings and where necessary to join them or prohibit the further institution of new proceedings related to the same matter, in order to circumvent reviewing final adjudications treated as an appeal in disguise, in the ambit of parallel sets of proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis , Roşca v. Moldova , cited above, §   25). 70.     In sum, the Court considers that, by granting the President of the Supreme Court’s request for leave to seek a review of a final judgment and by allowing the introduction of parallel sets of proceedings, the Supreme Court set at naught an entire judicial process which had ended in a final and enforceable judicial decision which was thus res judicata . Hence, in the light of the above circumstances, the Court does not find any reason to depart from its findings in its established case-law on the matter (see paragraphs 63-64 above). 71.     There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the quashing of the final judgment of 17   December 1998 given in the applicant’s favour. (b)     Impartiality (i) The parties’ submissions 72.     The applicant complained under this Article of a lack of impartiality on the part of the Supreme Court panels. He noted, firstly, that three of the Supreme Court judges (TH.K., P. Z. and V. K.) had sat on the panel which had ruled on his case on 5 July 2001 and had also been on the panel which had delivered the judgment of 7   December 2000. Both panels had ruled against him. Secondly, the President of the Supreme Court, who lodged the request for a supervisory-review of the judgment in his favour, had also sat as a judge on the two benches that had found against him. 73.     The Government contested that argument. They maintained that under domestic law as it stood at the material time the Supreme Court could sit as a five-judge panel (Civil/Criminal College) or a full-court panel (Joint Colleges). The latter formation was empowered to decide, inter alia , supervisory-review requests and important issues. Therefore, in the Government’s view, the functioning of the Joint Colleges would be affected if judges who had already sat on the five-judge panel were not able to sit on the Joint-Colleges bench. They referred to a judgment of the Albanian Constitutional Court dated 7 April 2000 which had held that the Supreme Court’s functioning as a full court and decision–making body was in compliance with the fair-trial requirements. Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant had failed to prove the allegations of bias on the part of the three aforementioned judges. (ii) The Court’s assessment 74.     The Court reiterates that it is of fundamental importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public (see the Padovani v. Italy judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-B, p. 20, § 27). To that end, Article 6 requires a tribunal falling within its scope to be impartial. Impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. The Court has thus distinguished between a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction or interest of a given judge in a particular case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he or she offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see Piersack v.   Belgium , judgment of 1   October 1982, Series   A no.   53, §   30, and Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no.   73797/01, §   118-119, ECHR 2005-...). 75.     In applying the subjective test the Court has consistently held that the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Hauschildt v. Denmark , judgment of 24 May 1989, Series   A no. 154, p. 21, § 47). The principle that a tribunal shall be presumed to be free of personal prejudice or partiality is long established in the case-law of the Court (see, for example, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium , judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p.   25, §   58). 76.     As to the second test, when applied to a body sitting as a bench, it means determining whether, quite apart from the personal conduct of any of the members of that body, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to its impartiality. In this respect, even appearances may be of some importance (see Castillo Algar v.   Spain , judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p.   3116, § 45, and Morel v. France , no. 34130/96, § 42, ECHR 2000-VI ). When it is being decided whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular body lacks impartiality, the standpoint of those claiming that it is not impartial is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether the fear can be held to be objectively justified (see Ferrantelli and Santangelo v.   Italy, judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports 1996-III, pp. 951-52, § 58; Wettstein v. Switzerland , no.   33958/96, § 44, CEDH 2000-XII; and Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no.   73797/01, §§   118-119, ECHR 2005). 77.     In the present case, the applicant disputed both the subjective and the objective impartiality of the three judges of the Supreme Court and the Court will examine each aspect in turn. 78.     With regard to the personal impartiality of Judges P.Z. and V.K., the Court does not find any evidence to corroborate the applicant’s allegations. As to Th. K., the President of the Supreme Court, it notes that, in accordance with Albanian law at the time, the supervisory-review proceedings were instituted at the request of the President of the Supreme Court, who had already ruled against the applicant on the same matter (in the second set of proceedings). The Supreme Court, of which the President was a member along with fourteen other judges, examined that request and decided on the merits to quash the final judgment that had been given in the applicant’s favour. The Court is of the opinion that the practice of the Albanian Supreme Court at the time was incompatible with the “subjective impartiality” of a judge hearing a particular case, since no one can be both plaintiff and judge in his own case (see Svetlana Naumenko v. Ukraine , no. 41984/98, §   97, 9   November 2004). 79.     As to objective impartiality, the concerns regarding the impartiality of the Supreme Court Joint Colleges stemmed from the fact that the bench was composed of fifteen judges including the same six judges who had previously heard the merits of the case and adopted the judgments of 17   December 1998 and 7 December 2000. 80.     The Court accepts that the situation could give rise to doubts in the applicant’s mind about the impartiality of the Supreme Court. However, it has to decide whether those doubts were objectively justified. The answer to this question depends on the circumstances of the case. 81.     In this connection, the Court observes that, pursuant to the domestic legal provisions on supervisory-review proceedings, the Supreme Court had to sit as a full court. Three judges who had already ruled on the case were among the fifteen judges called upon to decide the request for leave and subsequently, the merits of the case. They were therefore required to decide whether or not they had erred in their earlier decision. Moreover, three other judges sitting in the same full-court formation had to decide a matter on which they had already expressed their opinions. 82.     The Court therefore finds that the objective impartiality of the Supreme Court (Joint Colleges) was capable of appearing open to doubt. The applicant’s fears in this respect can thus be considered to have been objectively justified. 83. &#x