CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 janvier 2008

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s598389FF { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:18pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s491F5244 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#ff0000 } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s9F223FEE { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s434D37A9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5E503E34 { width:34.45pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s3C58F983 { width:33.77pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sC879EADF { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sD0489F03 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sD66C1369 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s9FFAAF49 { width:4.03pt; display:inline-block } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s61A5E261 { width:17pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s60723A49 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s2C695DB5 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:21.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s87F05BA2 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s82D7B801 { width:22.93pt; display:inline-block } .sF9287AF { width:174.97pt; display:inline-block } .sF2E32F9B { width:36.61pt; display:inline-block } .s5F32E900 { width:208.31pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline }     FIRST SECTION     CASE OF OSMANOĞLU v. TURKEY     (Application no. 48804/99)     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG     24 January 2008         FINAL     24/04/2008     This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article   44 §   2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Christos Rozakis, President,   Loukis Loucaides,   Riza Türmen,   Nina Vajić,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Dean Spielmann,   Sverre Erik Jebens, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2007, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 48804/99) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national of Kurdish origin, Mr   Muhyettin   Osmanoğlu (“the applicant”) on 25   September 1996. 2.     The applicant was represented before the Court by Mr Mark Muller, Mr Tim Otty, Mr Kerim   Yıldız and Ms Lucy Claridge of the Kurdish Human Rights Project in London, and by Mr Reyhan Yalçındağ, Mr   Aygül   Demirtaş and Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, lawyers practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) did not designate an agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the Convention institutions. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his son had been taken into the custody of the police and had subsequently disappeared in circumstances engaging the responsibility of the respondent State under Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 4.     The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11). 5.     By a decision of 15 June 2006, the Court declared the application admissible. 6.     The applicant and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine ). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 7.     The applicant Muhyettin Osmanoğlu was born in 1942 and lives in Diyarbakır. He is the father of Atilla Osmanoğlu, who was born in 1968. Atilla was allegedly detained by the police on 25   March 1996 and subsequently disappeared. A.     Introduction 8.     The facts of the case are disputed by the parties and will be set out separately. 9.     The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section B below. The Government's submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below. The documentary evidence submitted by the parties is summarised in Section D. B.     The applicant's submissions on the facts 10.   The applicant is a retired civil servant. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application he and his family lived in Diyarbakır, where his son Atilla ran the wholesale grocery shop owned by the applicant. Prior to living in Diyarbakır the applicant and his family had lived in the nearby town of Hazro, where he worked as a civil servant. In February 1992 the applicant and his family moved to Diyarbakır after an officer threatened his son. In 1994 the applicant was detained for 28 days and was subjected to ill-treatment during his detention. He was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. 11.     At approximately 11 a.m. on 25 March 1996 the applicant arrived at the shop and saw two men escorting Atilla out of the shop. One of the men was blonde, tall and beardless with an “American-style haircut”. The second man was thickset, of average height and with dark skin. The men were armed and carried walkie ‑ talkies. 12.     The two men told the applicant that they were police officers and that they were taking his son to police headquarters so that he could submit a bid for a contract to provide canteen services at police headquarters. The men also took with them a box of sugar and a kilo of tea. When the two men told the applicant that they would return Atilla in about half an hour and Atilla confirmed this, the applicant decided not to intervene. The applicant saw Atilla being led to a car that contained two other occupants. Neighbouring shop owners also witnessed the two men taking Atilla with them. 13.     The same two men had previously visited the shop, stating that they had come from the canteen, and had asked Atilla to go with them. When Atilla had refused to go, the two men had sat in the shop for about an hour and had made three telephone calls, which Atilla said he did not understand as the men had spoken in code. Atilla had been worried about the incident when he had related it to the applicant that evening. 14.     When Atilla did not return on the evening of 25 March 1996, the applicant thought that he had been detained in custody. The following day he applied to the governor's office and also to the chief prosecutor's office at the State Security Court. He applied again to the same prosecutor on 29   March and on 1, 9 and 19 April. On 16 May 1996 the applicant applied once again to the governor's office. 15.     The applicant received a reply to his petition of 1 April 1996 from the prosecutor at the State Security Court, who stated that his son's name did not feature in the custody records. 16.     In June 1996 the applicant was summoned before the Diyarbakır State Security Court in connection with his petitions. The statement and the complaint he made were filed under preliminary file number 1996/4041. In relation to his petition to the governor's office, the applicant was told to contact the murder desk at Diyarbakır police headquarters. The applicant applied by letter to that authority but did not receive a response other than a request to identify a number of unidentified bodies found in the area. 17.     Finally, in his observations submitted to the Court in reply to the Government's observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the applicant referred to an article published in the newspaper Özgür Gündem on 4   July 2005 giving details of a purported confession made by one Mr   Abdulkadir Aygan, allegedly a former agent of the JİTEM ( Jandarma İstihbarat Terörle Mücadele – anti-terror intelligence branch of the gendarmerie), describing the abduction and subsequent killing of his son Atilla (see paragraph 28 below). C.     The Government's submissions on the facts 18.     The Government confirmed that the applicant had lodged a complaint with the prosecutor on 1 April 1996. In that complaint the applicant alleged that his son had been taken into custody by police officers and requested information concerning his son's whereabouts. 19.     Upon receipt of the applicant's complaint, the prosecutor examined the custody records of police headquarters and concluded that Atilla   Osmanoğlu had not been taken into custody. The prosecutor did not initiate an investigation, on the grounds that there were neither custody records showing that Atilla Osmanoğlu had been detained nor any other evidence of his having been kidnapped or been the victim of an unlawful act. 20.     On 20 May 1996 a statement was taken from the applicant at the murder desk of Diyarbakır police headquarters. Following the taking of this statement, Atilla Osmanoğlu was registered as a missing person and an investigation was carried out throughout the country in order to find him. 21.     After the Court had declared the application admissible, it requested the Government to provide a copy of the full investigation file concerning Atilla Osmanoğlu's disappearance, together with information as to whether any investigation had been opened into Abdulkadir Aygan's alleged confession relating to the abduction and killing of the applicant's son. In reply, the Government informed the Court that no investigation had been initiated either into the disappearance of Atilla Osmanoğlu or into the alleged confession of Mr Aygan, as the allegations had been abstract and unsubstantiated. D.     Documentary evidence submitted by the parties 22.       The following information appears from the documents submitted by the parties. 23.     On 26 March 1996 the applicant submitted a petition to the governor's office in Diyarbakır in which he stated that his son had been taken away the previous day by two plain-clothes police officers claiming to have come from the canteen of Diyarbakır police headquarters. The applicant also stated that he had not been provided with any information about his son's whereabouts, despite the fact that he had applied to all the relevant authorities. 24.     On 1 April 1996 the applicant submitted a petition to the prosecutor at the State Security Court in Diyarbakır in which he stated that his son had been detained by members of the security forces on 25 March 1996 and that he had not heard anything from him since that date. He asked the prosecutor to inform him about his son's fate and where he was being detained. According to a hand-written note added to this petition by the prosecutor on 4   April 1996, the name of the applicant's son did not feature in the custody records. 25.     On 16 May 1996 the applicant submitted a second petition to the governor's office in Diyarbakır, reiterating the content of his previous petition of 26 March 1996. The applicant also added that his son had no connections with any illegal organisation. 26.     A statement was taken from the applicant on 20 May 1996 at the murder desk of Diyarbakır police headquarters. The applicant reiterated the content of his previous statements and gave a description of the two men who had taken his son away. He stated that he would be able to identify the two men if he saw them again. He also added that the same two men had visited his shop two days before they had taken his son, and that after leaving his shop they had gone to a neighbouring shop. The applicant pointed out that the owner of the neighbouring shop could be questioned in order to establish the identity of the police officers. 27.     The name Atilla Osmanoğlu does not feature in the custody records of Diyarbakır police headquarters which were submitted to the Court by the Government after the application was declared admissible. 28.     On 4 July 2006 the confession purportedly made by Abdulkadir   Aygan was published in the newspaper Özgür Gündem . Mr   Aygan was quoted as having stated that Attila Osmanoğlu had been kidnapped by the JİTEM and that his head had been smashed with a hammer by a certain Cindi Acet –also known as Koçero – so that it would not be possible to identify the body. The body, which had later been thrown into a disused oil tanker near the town of Silopi, had been found on 30   March 1996 and an autopsy report had been drawn up by the Silopi prosecutor. The file opened by the prosecutor had been given the preliminary investigation number 1996/313. According to the autopsy report, the body was that of a male measuring 175 centimetres, weighing 70 kilograms, approximately 25-30 years of age and with dark hair. There were a number of severe cuts to the face, and parts of the skull were broken. The body had been buried in the part of Silopi cemetery reserved for unclaimed bodies. The applicant had subsequently been shown the pictures of this body but had been unable to identify the deceased as his son. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 29.     A description of the relevant law may be found in İpek v. Turkey (no.   25760/94, §§ 92-106, ECHR 2004-II (extracts)). THE LAW I.     THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION 30.     In a letter submitted on 29 May 2007, i.e. almost one year after the application was declared admissible, the Government informed the Court that the Diyarbakır public prosecutor had rendered a decision of non ‑ prosecution on 23 June 2006 and that the applicant had not lodged a formal objection against that decision. The Government subsequently submitted to the Court a document showing that the decision in question had been communicated to the applicant on 2 October 2006. The Government invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible for the applicant's failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 31.     The applicant argued that, contrary to what was claimed by the Government, he had not been notified about the decision of non ‑ prosecution. In the applicant's opinion, even if he had objected to that decision, the outcome would have been the same as the suspect remained at large. In any event, the case had already been declared admissible and the Government had not provided any evidence to show otherwise. 32.     It must be stressed at the outset that the Government did not inform the Court about the decision of non-prosecution until 29 May 2007 despite the fact that they had the opportunity to include it in their post-admissibility additional observations which were submitted to the Court on 20 September 2006. 33.     Furthermore, the Court notes that the prosecutor's decision of 23   June 2006 was based on the statute of limitations having been reached. The offence was referred to in the decision as “restriction of personal liberty” and the statute of limitations for that offence was 10 years under the applicable domestic legislation. It was not a decision taken at the end of an investigation but was a decision merely confirming that the statute of limitations had been reached. Indeed, as acknowledged by the Government, no investigation had been initiated either into the disappearance of Atilla   Osmanoğlu or into the alleged confession of Mr   Aygan (see paragraph 21 above). 34.     In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant, who has made numerous unsuccessful applications to the domestic authorities to have an investigation instigated into the disappearance of his son, was not required to lodge an objection against the prosecutor's decision to discontinue an investigation which has, in the Government's own admission, never taken place. It therefore rejects the Government's preliminary objection.   II.     THE COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS A.     Arguments of the parties 1.       The applicant 35.     The applicant submitted that there was sufficient evidentiary basis on which to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that his son had been abducted by State agents. He had himself been an eyewitness to the abduction and had given the authorities a description of the two men involved. Furthermore, the newspaper report based on Mr Aygan's confession constituted corroborating evidence in support of his allegations concerning the involvement of the State in the disappearance of his son. The applicant conceded that the information provided by Mr Aygan amounted only to hearsay evidence; however, he invited the Court to exercise its powers under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention and Rule A1 (3) of the Annex to the Rules of Court and carry out a fact ‑ finding inquiry into the events surrounding the disappearance of his son and in particular to examine and verify the information provided by Mr Aygan, who was a former agent of the State. 36.     As the body of his son had never been positively identified, the applicant conceded that he was unable to provide concrete evidence of his son's death. However, relying on the Court's case-law concerning similar allegations (in particular, Akdeniz and Others v. Turkey , no. 23954/94, § 88, 31 May 2001), the applicant submitted that there was a reasonable presumption of death attributable to the respondent Government which arose from the following factors: (a) the length of time which had elapsed since he last saw his son in the custody of State security forces; (b) the history of harassment suffered both by his son and himself (see paragraph 10 above); (c) the lack of any documentary evidence relating to his son's detention; (d) the absence of any satisfactory and plausible explanation from, or investigation by, the State; and (e) the hearsay evidence contained in the newspaper article detailing the allegations made by Mr Aygan. 37.     The applicant also submitted that the respondent Government had failed to comply with a specific request for disclosure of information made by the Court. According to that request, made at the time the case was communicated to them, the Government had been invited to submit to the Court a copy of the entire investigation file and a copy of the custody records, but had failed to do so. The applicant invited the Court to conclude that the Government had breached their obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention to assist the Court in the establishment of the facts of the case. 38.     Finally, the applicant submitted that, given the significant potential of the missing documentation to corroborate or refute the allegations made by him, the Court was entitled to draw inferences as to the well-foundedness of the allegations. In this connection the applicant, referring to the judgments in the cases of Akkum and Others v. Turkey (no. 21894/93, §   211, ECHR 2005-II (extracts)) and Çelikbilek v. Turkey (no. 27693/95, § 70, 31   May 2005), argued that it was for the Government to explain conclusively why the documents in question could not serve to corroborate his allegations. 2.       The Government 39.     The Government argued that there was no evidence in the case file to enable the Court to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant's son had been abducted and killed by a State agent or by a person acting on behalf of the State authorities. B.     Article 38 § 1 (a) and the consequent inferences drawn by the Court 40.     Before proceeding to assess the evidence, the Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted under Article 34 of the Convention that States should furnish all necessary facilities to make possible a proper and effective examination of applications (see Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no.   23763/94, § 70, ECHR 1999-IV). It is inherent in proceedings relating to cases of this nature, where an individual applicant accuses State agents of violating his rights under the Convention, that in certain instances solely the respondent Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. A failure on a Government's part to submit such information which is in their hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well ‑ foundedness of the applicant's allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention (see Timurtaş v.   Turkey , no. 23531/94, §§ 66 and 70, ECHR 2000-VI). 41.     Furthermore, in cases where the non-disclosure by the Government of crucial documents in their exclusive possession prevents the Court from establishing the facts, it is for the Government either to argue conclusively why the documents in question cannot serve to corroborate the allegations made by the applicant, or to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred (see Akkum and Others , cited above, § 211, and Çelikbilek , cited above, § 70). 42.     Turning to the present case, the Court notes that, when it communicated the case to the Government, it requested them to provide copies of the investigation file and custody records. The Government, without submitting copies of the custody records or any documents other than a statement taken from the applicant by the police (see paragraph 26 above), stated in their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case that the relevant custody records had been examined by the prosecutor and that the prosecutor had thus been able to conclude that the applicant's son had not been detained in custody. On that basis, it had been considered unnecessary to initiate an investigation. 43.     After it had declared the application admissible, the Court again requested the Government to submit copies of the entire domestic investigation file. The Government submitted copies of what they claimed were the custody records of Diyarbakır police headquarters (see paragraph 27 above). The name of the applicant's son does not feature in the relevant parts of the custody records. 44.     The Court points out that the above ‑ mentioned obligation under Article 38 of the Convention to assist the Court in its investigation of the application is only applicable after the case has been declared admissible. Noting that the Government did submit copies of the custody records after the application had been declared admissible, the Court cannot but conclude that the Government did comply with their obligations under Article 38 §   1   (a) of the Convention. C.     The Court's assessment of the facts 45.     In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, § 161). Nevertheless, it must be stressed at the outset that this particular evidential criterion has an autonomous meaning in the Court's proceedings (see Mathew v.   the   Netherlands , no. 24919/03, § 156, ECHR 2005); it has never been the Court's purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR   2005 ‑ VII). Thus, according to the Court's established case ‑ law, in the absence of direct evidence, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (ibid. and the cases cited therein). The level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake (ibid.). 46.     Turning to the facts of the present case, the applicant submitted that his eyewitness account of the events, coupled with the allegations made by Mr Aygan (see paragraphs 17 and 28 above), provided sufficient proof in support of his allegation that his son had been abducted by agents of the respondent Contracting Party. 47.     As regards the applicant's eyewitness account of the events, the Court observes that the applicant, both when he approached the national authorities and in the proceedings before the Court in Strasbourg, has been consistent in recounting the version of the events leading up to his son being taken away from his shop. He gave descriptions of the two men (see paragraph 26 above) and informed the national authorities that the neighbouring shop owner had witnessed the two men taking his son away (see paragraph 26 above). Despite this, no investigation was conducted into his allegations by the domestic authorities other than a statement being taken from him and the custody records being checked. 48.     In this connection, the fact that the name of the applicant's son does not feature in the custody records is not, on its own, a decisive factor; the unreliability and inaccuracy of custody records for that particular part of Turkey during the relevant period have been highlighted by the Court in a number of similar cases (see, inter alia , Kurt v. Turkey , judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, § 125; Timurtaş , cited above, § 105; Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 105, ECHR 1999-IV; Çiçek v. Turkey , no. 25704/94, § 165, 27 February 2001; and Orhan v.   Turkey , no.   25656/94, §   371, 18 June 2002). 49.     In the light of the above, the Court sees no reason to doubt that the applicant's son was indeed taken away as alleged, that is, by two men who identified themselves as police officers. 50.     As regards the allegations made by Mr Aygan (see paragraphs 17 and 28 above), the Court observes that similar allegations made by Mr   Aygan concerning the killing of the applicant's husband in the case of Nesibe Haran v. Turkey were examined by the Court in the context of that case and it was concluded that no decisive importance could be attached to them “since they were untested and at the most circumstantial evidence” (see Nesibe Haran v. Turkey , no. 28299/95, § 67, 6 October 2005). 51.     In this connection and as regards the applicant's invitation to the Court to carry out a fact-finding mission with a view to verifying the accuracy of the information provided by Mr Aygan, the Court is of the view that such an investigation is a matter for the domestic authorities. Furthermore, the Court notes that, according to the information provided by the applicant, the neighbouring shop owner who was visited by the two men who took Atilla away (see paragraph 26 above) has since moved from the area and the applicant does not know his address. The applicant also informed the Court that neither he nor his lawyers had been able to locate Mr Aygan. In the circumstances of the present case the Court is not persuaded that a fact-finding inquiry in Turkey by the Court would clarify the circumstances of the case. 52.     The Court observes that the Government were specifically requested by the Court to clarify whether any investigation had been opened into the allegations made by Mr Aygan relating to the abduction and killing of the applicant's son. The Government informed the Court that no investigation had been initiated into Mr Aygan's allegations as the allegations were “abstract and unsubstantiated”. Noting that Mr Aygan named the alleged killer of the applicant's son and gave details of the alleged killing and the location where the body was buried, the Court disagrees with the Government that the allegations were vague. Nevertheless, owing to the national authorities' failure to investigate Mr Aygan's allegations, these allegations continue to remain untested and, as such, amount to no more than circumstantial evidence. The authorities' failure to investigate Mr   Aygan's allegations will be examined from the standpoint of the Government's positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation (see paragraph 91 below). 53.     In the light of the foregoing the Court considers that both before the national authorities and in the proceedings before the Court the applicant has done all that could be reasonably expected from him to support his allegations. Nevertheless, although the Court is prepared to accept that the applicant's son was taken away by two men who identified themselves as police officers, it is unable to establish, on the basis of the evidence in the file, whether or not the two men were indeed police officers. This inability follows directly from the respondent Government's failure to carry out an investigation into the applicant's allegations. The Court finds it more appropriate to deal with the consequences of this failure when examining the applicant's complaint concerning the Government's alleged failure to protect his son's right to life (see paragraphs 70-84 below). 54.     Finally, the applicant argued that the Court should reverse the burden of proof on account of the Government's failure to cooperate with the Court in the establishment of the facts and should require the Government to prove that the documents withheld by them do not corroborate his allegations (see paragraph 38 above). The Court points out that in the cases referred to by the applicant in support of this argument ( Akkum and Others and Çelikbilek – see paragraph 38 above), the Court was unable to establish the facts on account of the Government's failure to submit to it a number of crucial documents. In the present case, however, the inability to verify the accuracy of the applicant's allegations stems from the lack of a domestic investigation which, as held above, falls to be examined, in the circumstances of the present case, from the standpoint of the obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant's son. D.     Whether Atilla Osmanoğlu can be presumed dead 55.     In the above-mentioned case of Timurtaş the Court held as follows: “82.     ...Whether the failure on the part of the authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainee's fate, in the absence of a body, might ... raise issues under Article 2 of the Convention will depend on all the circumstances of the case, and in particular on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements, from which it may be concluded to the requisite standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have died in custody... 83.     In this respect the period of time which has elapsed since the person was placed in detention, although not decisive in itself, is a relevant factor to be taken into account. It must be accepted that the more time goes by without any news of the detained person, the greater the likelihood that he or she has died. The passage of time may therefore to some extent affect the weight to be attached to other elements of circumstantial evidence before it can be concluded that the person concerned is to be presumed dead. In this respect the Court considers that this situation gives rise to issues which go beyond a mere irregular detention in violation of Article 5. Such an interpretation is in keeping with the effective protection of the right to life as afforded by Article 2, which ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention...”   56.     In the instant case the Court has not found it established that the applicant's son was detained by members of the security forces, but has found that he was abducted on 25 March 1996 by two men in the circumstances alleged by the applicant. 57.     Nevertheless, the Court is of the opinion that a finding of State involvement in the disappearance of a person is not a condition sine qua non for the purposes of establishing whether that person can be presumed dead; in certain circumstances the disappearance of a person may in itself be considered as life-threatening. In this connection the Court observes that on a number of occasions it has reached the conclusion that the disappearance of a person in south-east Turkey at the relevant time could be regarded as life-threatening (for the purposes of presumption of death see, inter alia , Akdeniz v. Turkey , no. 25165/94, § 99, 31 May 2005; for the purposes of the obligation to carry out effective investigations into allegations of disappearances with a view to establishing the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and identifying those responsible see, inter alia , Toğcu v.   Turkey , no. 27601/95, § 112, 31   May 2005, and the cases cited therein). 58.     Although in many of these cases the victims' alleged PKK involvement was a factor taken into account by the Court when considering their disappearances as life-threatening in the light of the situation in south-east Turkey at the time, the lack of any suggestion that the applicant's son might have been involved in PKK-related activities does not make his disappearance any less life-threatening. To this end, the Court observes that the manner of his abduction shows many similarities with the disappearances of persons prior to their being killed in south-east Turkey at around the relevant time which have been examined by the Court (see, in particular, Avşar v. Turkey , no. 25657/94, § 283, ECHR 2001-VII (extracts); Nuray Şen v. Turkey (No. 2), no. 25354/94, 30 March 2004; and Çelikbilek , cited above). 59.     For the above reasons and taking into account the fact that no information has come to light concerning the whereabouts of Atilla   Osmanoğlu for more than 11 years ‑ a fact not disputed by the Government ‑ , the Court accepts that he must be presumed dead. 60.     The Court will now proceed to examine the applicant's complaints under the various Articles of the Convention. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 61.     Article 2 of the Convention provides: “1.     Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2.     Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a)     in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b)     in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c)     in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” A.     Alleged abduction and killing of Atilla Osmanoğlu by State agents 62.     The applicant alleged that his son had been abducted by the security forces and was now to be presumed dead, in violation of Article 2 of the Convention. 63.     The Government denied that State agents had been involved in the abduction of the applicant's son. 64.     The Court has already found that it was unable to establish who might have been responsible for the disappearance of Atilla Osmanoğlu (see paragraph 53 above). It follows, therefore, that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention on that account. B.     Alleged failure to safeguard the right to life of Atilla Osmanoğlu 1.     The applicant 65.     The applicant submitted that, in view of the grave danger to life which an enforced disappearance involved and the urgent need to locate the person, the authorities' failure to initiate a prompt and effective investigation into the disappearance of his son had directly endangered his son's life and constituted a violation of the State's positive obligation to protect life pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention. 66.     He pointed out that no action had been taken to investigate his son's whereabouts or well-being in the crucial early days following the abduction. Despite the fact that he had petitioned the governor's office on 26 March 1996, that is, the day after his son's disappearance, no response had been received from the authorities until 1 April 1996. In any event, the action taken on 1 April 1996, namely the checking of the custody records by the prosecutor (see paragraph 24 above), had been woefully inadequate and had failed to discharge the State's obligations under the Convention. 67.     Furthermore, the authorities had failed to follow up specific evidential leads provided by him, in particular the description of the two perpetrators provided in his statement to the authorities on 20 May 1996 (see paragraph 26 above). He had expressly said in that statement that he would be able to identify the two men if he saw them again. Nevertheless, the only action taken in response to the allegations he made on 20 May 1996 had been to register his son's name as a missing person, and even that had not been done until almost two months after the abduction and following at least seven petitions. 2.     The Government 68.     The Government submitted that the prosecutor had examined the custody records and concluded that Atilla Osmanoğlu had not been taken into custody by the police. The prosecutor had not initiated an investigation on the grounds that there was neither a custody record showing that the applicant's son had been detained nor any other evidence indicating that he had been kidnapped or been the victim of an unlawful act. 69.     On 20 May 1996, after a statement had been taken from the applicant at the murder desk of police headquarters, Atilla Osmanoğlu had been registered as a missing person and an investigation had been carried out throughout the country in order to find him. 3.     The Court's assessment 70.     The Court would point out at the outset that the abduction and subsequent disappearance of a person is an unlawful act under Turkish law (see İpek , cited above, § 95). Having regard to its finding above that the applicant's son was abducted as alleged by the applicant (see paragraph 49 above), it must be concluded that the applicant's son did fall victim to an unlawful act. 71.     The Court has not found it established that State agents were responsible for the disappearance of the applicant's son (see paragraph 53 above).   However, this does not necessarily exclude the responsibility of the Government under Article 2 of the Convention.   According to the established case-law of the Court, the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v.   the United Kingdom , judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-III, § 36). 72.     This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law ‑ enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman v.   the   United Kingdom , judgment of 28   October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, §   116). 73.     In this connection the Court reiterates that, in the light of the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life therefore can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising (see Akkoç v.   Turkey , nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, § 78, ECHR 2000 ‑ X). 74.     For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Osman , cited above, §   116). 75.     As to whether there was a real and immediate risk to the life of Atilla   Osmanoğlu, the Court has already established that the disappearance of a person in circumstances such as those in which the applicant's son disappeared can be regarded as life-threatening (see paragraphs 57-58 above). Furthermore, the Court has previously held that the disappearance of a person in life-threatening circumstances requires the State, pursuant to the positive obligation inherent in Article 2 of the Convention, to take operational measures to protect the right to life of the disappeared person (see Koku v. Turkey , no. 27305/95, § 132, 31 May 2005). It must also be pointed out in this connection that, both the disappeared person in the Koku case and the applicant's son in the present case had been threatened previously (see paragraph 10 above and see Koku, cited above, § 18). Furthermore, both in the Koku case and in the present case the authorities were informed of the abduction the following day. 76.     The Court finds therefore that, following his disappearance, the life of the applicant's son was at more real and immediate risk than that of other persons at that time. It follows that the action which was to be expected from the domestic authorities was not to prevent the disappearance of the applicant's son – which had already taken place – but to take preventive operational measures to protect his life, which was at risk from the criminal acts of other individuals (ibid., § 132). 77.     In this connection the Court observes that the authorities were made aware as early as 26   March 1996 of the abduction of the applicant's son (see paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, from that date, the authorities were under an obligation to take immediate steps to protect his right to life. It must be stressed at this juncture that, as is the case in respect of the obligation to carry out effective investigations when individuals are killed as a result of the use of force, the obligation to take steps to protect the right to life is not an obligation of result but of means (see, mutatis mutandis , McKerr v. the United Kingdom , no. 28883/95, § 113, ECHR 2001-III). It is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they had or ought to have had knowledge (see Osman , cited above, § 116). 78.     Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the Government, “no investigation [was] initiated into the disappearance of Atilla Osmanoğlu”. In this connection, the Court finds that the mere checking of the custody records is not on its own sufficient to protect the right to life of the applicant's son (see paragraph 19 above). As regards the Government's claim that Atilla Osmanoğlu was registered as a missing person and an investigation carried out “throughout the country in order to find him” (see paragraph 20 above), the Court observes that the Government did not provide any specifics about this purported investigation or any documents pertaining to it (see paragraphs 42-43 above). No weight can be attached, therefore, to the purported search for the applicant's son “throughout the country”. 79.     The Court is of the opinion that a number of basic steps could have been taken by the investigating authorities which would have offered a reasonable prospect of success in finding the applicant's son. To that end, the starting point for the prosecutor should have been to obtain more information from the applicant and to question the neighbouring shop owners who, the applicant claimed, had witnessed his son being taken away by the two men. 80.     In the light of the descriptions given by the applicant, the prosecutor could have made attempts to verify whether the two men who took the applicant's son away were indeed police officers. Furthermore, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that, during the relevant period, there were a large number of police and gendarmerie checkpoints on the roads in the area which could have been alerted to be on the lookout for the applicant's son in case he was transported through one of the checkpoints. 81.     In addition, the following steps, which were highlighted by the applicant in his observations and with which the Court agrees, could have been taken by the investigating authorities with a view to finding Atilla   Osmanoğlu: (a) an inspection of the relevant gendarmerie or police headquarters or any other premises to which the applicant's son might have been brought after he had been abducted; (b) the making of enquiries and the taking of statements from those in custody in the relevant gendarmerie or police headquarters at the time of the disappearance, in an attempt to establish whether or not the applicant's son had been taken into custody; (c) the making of enquiries and the taking of statements from those officers who were on duty on the relevant dates; and (d) attempts to secure potential eyewitnesses to the incident. 82.     As pointed out above, according to Turkish law it is a criminal offence to deprive an individual unlawfully of his or her liberty. Public prosecutors have a duty to investigate offences reported to them (see İpek , cited above, § 96).   Despite this, the prosecutor in the instant case remained completely and incomprehensibly inactive at a time when many people were being killed in that region of Turkey (see Koku , cited above, § 143). By failing to take any steps, neither the prosecutor, nor indeed the Turkish authorities in general, did everything within their power to protect the right to life of the applicant's son after his abduction (see, mutatis mutandis , ibid.). 83.     In the light of the foregoing the Court concludes that, although there were criminal-law provisions in place, the failure to take immediate measures undermined the effectiveness of the protection afforded by those provisions in this case and thus removed the protection which Atilla   Osmanoğlu should have received by law. 84.   &#