CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 13 mai 2008

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text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }     FOURTH SECTION     CASE OF JUHNKE v. TURKEY     (Application no. 52515/99)       JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG     13 May 2008       FINAL     13/08/2008     This judgment may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Juhnke v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Nicolas Bratza, President ,   Lech Garlicki,   Rıza Türmen,   Stanislav Pavlovschi,   Ljiljana Mijović,   David Thór Björgvinsson ,   Päivi Hirvelä, judges , and Fatoş Aracı, Section Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 24   April 2008, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 52515/99) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German national, Ms Eva Tatjana Ursula Juhnke [1] (“the   applicant”), on 16   August 1999. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mrs R. Yalçındağ Baydemir, Mr   C.   Aydın and Ms E. Keskin, lawyers practising in Diyarbakır and Istanbul respectively. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court. 3.     On 5 July 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In a letter of 3 April 2007, the Court informed the parties that, in accordance with Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it would decide at the same time on both the admissibility and merits of the application. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Germany. A.     The applicant’s arrest and detention 5.     The applicant alleges that she was arrested by Turkish soldiers near Awaşin River in Northern Iraq within the context of a cross-border military operation conducted by the Turkish Army in the area on 5 or 6   October 1997. 6.     According to the seizure protocol the applicant was arrested in a cave between the Ayranlı and Meşelik regions of Şemdinli, Hakkari on 15   October 1997. The official documents in the case file also mention that she was unarmed and carried a backpack which contained a first aid kit and photos and documents relating to the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation [2] . 7.     On 24 October 1997 the applicant was handed over to gendarmes at the Hakkari Gendarmerie Command. According to the search report drafted on that day, twenty-six photographs, a notebook, some handwritten documents, a suture needle, eleven syringes and two lancets were found in her possession. 8.     On the same day the applicant was questioned by two gendarmes in the presence of an interpreter. The applicant refused to sign the document allegedly containing her statements. 9.     On the same day the applicant was examined by a doctor, Mr   A.Y., an obstetrician, who found no signs of ill-treatment on her body. This doctor also performed a gynaecological examination. The report issued by the doctor described the applicant as aggressive and presenting signs of mild depression. The report indicated whether or not the applicant was a virgin. 10.     On 26 October 1997 the applicant was examined by another doctor, Mr M.G. who found no signs of ill-treatment on her body. 11.     Afterwards the applicant was brought before a judge at the Van State Security Court, where she gave a statement with the aid of an interpreter. She refused to answer a number of questions and stated that she had been arrested twenty-two days before in Awaşin. The applicant retracted the statements she had made in custody, claiming that they were confused statements written by the gendarmes themselves. The court remanded her in custody. B.     The criminal proceedings against the applicant 12.     On 28 October 1997 the public prosecutor at the Van State Security Court filed a bill of indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). In this respect, the prosecutor stated that the applicant had been in possession of medical supplies used by members of the PKK and that in photographs found on her she was with the leader of the PKK and other terrorists. He requested that she be sentenced and convicted under Article   168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 13.     The first hearing, held before the Van State Security Court on 4   November 1997 in the applicant’s absence, was taken up with procedural matters, such as the measures to be taken to secure the presence of the accused and of a translator, Mr   E. A. 14.     In a hearing held on 4 December 1997 the applicant appeared before the court where she refused to give information about herself save for her date of birth and her mother’s name. A translator was present at the hearing. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer. She stated that she had been arrested on 6 October 1997 and not on 15 October 1997. She further submitted that she did not know where she had been caught but that it must have been somewhere called Awaşin near a river. The applicant did not respond to questions asked by the court. When asked about the documents and photographs found in her possession the applicant only answered that they were hers. The applicant also refused the court’s request for a sample of her handwriting. At the end of this hearing the court took certain procedural decisions to secure a sample of the applicant’s handwriting and to receive information about the place of the applicant’s arrest. The court also ordered a psychiatric examination. 15.     On 30 December 1997 the court noted that a lawyer who had previously examined the case file had informed them that he would not take on the case. The applicant requested the court to appoint her a lawyer. The court refused this request on the ground that this demand did not meet the conditions of Article 138 of Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) as applied to State Security Courts. Instead the applicant was given leave to appoint a lawyer and told to contact Mr O. F. at the German Embassy. During this hearing, at the applicant’s request, the indictment was translated orally to the applicant. 16.     At the next hearing, held on 5 February 1998, Attorney M. K. appeared before the Court as the applicant’s representative. Documents from various authorities were read out, including a medical report from the Van State Hospital; the applicant and her lawyer insisted that despite the recommendation in the latter report there was no need for the applicant to be subjected to a further physiological examination. The lawyer requested the court to give him more time to examine the case file and to talk to his client. 17.     In the meantime, German Interpol submitted information regarding the applicant to the Turkish authorities, particularly the fact that she was a member of an extreme left-wing organisation. 18.     On 19 March 1998 the applicant, referring to the information submitted by German Interpol, stated in Turkish that she was not a member of any organisation. The applicant stated, in German, that she had been caught near Awaşin River in Kurdistan. When the court told the applicant that no such country existed under international law, the applicant stated that there was a country called Kurdistan and that she had been caught there. The applicant’s defence submissions were read out by the translator, during which the court noted that the applicant interrupted constantly and stated that the translator was not translating her words properly. The applicant and her lawyer requested another translator and noted that there were close friends of the applicant in the room who could translate better. The applicant’s lawyer claimed that the applicant had been caught in Iraq and that therefore Turkey did not have jurisdiction to try the applicant. The court dismissed the applicant’s lawyer’s allegations, noting in particular that in any event Turkey had jurisdiction to try the applicant, in view of the offence with which she had been charged under Article 4 of the Criminal Code. 19.     In the meantime a certain Ms Hermanns’ request to visit the applicant in prison was rejected by the authorities on the ground that detainees could only be visited by family members, their legal representatives or consular agents pursuant to Article 152 of the Directive on the Execution of Punishments. 20.     At a hearing held on 30 April 1998 the applicant’s lawyer requested the court to allow the trial to be filmed. The court noted that the hearings were public and that the press were allowed to take notes. It considered however that taking photographs and filming would disrupt the conduct of the hearing. They therefore refused the applicant’s lawyer’s request. The results of the graphology tests were read out, in response to which the applicant stated, in Turkish, that most of the documents were in her writing, although she did not know the exact number. The applicant’s lawyer submitted that the applicant had been in detention more than the legal time allowed, and that she had been subjected to ill-treatment and a forced gynaecological examination in breach of her right to respect for private life. The court gave leave for the applicant’s lawyer to complain about the alleged ill-treatment. 21.     On 11 June 1998 the applicant’s lawyers stated that the applicant had been subjected to a gynaecological examination without her consent and that she had been tortured during her detention. The prosecutor noted that the applicant had been arrested during security forces operations, which had also taken place in northern Iraq, and that she had been taken for a gynaecological examination because women terrorists claimed that they were raped when they were taken into custody. The prosecutor then submitted his observations on the merits. The applicant requested time to submit her final defence submissions. 22.     On 23 July 1998 the applicant’s lawyer claimed that the applicant had been questioned contrary to Article 135 of the Criminal Code and that therefore her statements given to the police should not be admitted to the case file. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention. The lawyer also stated that the applicant wanted to make a political defence in her own language. The applicant, on the court’s inquiry, stated that she knew how to speak and read and write to a limited extent in Turkish but that she wanted to defend herself in her mother tongue. The applicant then read out her defence submissions, first in German and then in Turkish. The court noted that the applicant shouted out “ Long live the PKK, long live our party leader Abdullah Öcalan ”. 23.     At the next hearing, held on 17 September 1998, the Van State Security Court, referring to the material evidence and the applicant’s pro ‑ PKK submissions before it, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced her to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Neither the applicant nor her lawyers attended this hearing. 24.     On 6 January 1999 the applicant appealed. 25.     On 10 March 1999 the Court of Cassation held a hearing and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. This decision arrived at the registry of the Van State Security Court on 7   April 1999. C.     Investigation instigated into the applicant’s allegations of forced gynaecological examination 26.     In the meantime the applicant lodged a petition with the Hakkari public prosecutor’s office, stating that she had been subjected to a gynaecological examination without her consent. She further claimed that she had been stripped naked and sexually harassed by six or seven gendarmes present during the examination. The applicant requested the prosecution of both the gendarmes and the doctor. 27.     On 22 October 1998 the prosecutor requested the Security Directorate to establish the identity of the doctors on duty at Hakkari State Hospital on 24 October 1997, as well as of those gendarmes who had taken her for a gynaecological examination. 28.     On 30 November 1998 the prosecutor heard Mr A.Y., the doctor who had examined the applicant, who stated that the examination had been requested by the Hakkari Provincial Gendarmerie Command and that no gendarmes had been present at the medical examination. He further stated that she had not been forced to undergo a medical examination. 29.     On 8 January 1999 the prosecutor heard Mr Y.Y, one of the accused gendarmes, who denied the accusations against him. In particular, he stated that he had only been responsible for the applicant during her detention and that he had not accompanied her to the doctor. 30.     On the same day the prosecutor also heard Mr A. K., one of the accused gendarmes, who denied the accusations against him. He stated in particular that the applicant had been sent for a gynaecological examination to prevent accusations of rape. 31.     On 22 April 1999 the prosecutor heard Mr A. S., another gendarme, who stated that he had had no involvement with the applicant. 32.     On 8 June 1999 the Hakkari public prosecutor gave a decision of incompetence ratione materiae and transferred the investigation file concerning the gendarmes to the Hakkari Administrative Council. 33.     On 12 July 1999 statements from Mrs B. D., a midwife, were taken by gendarmes. Mrs B. D. stated that when the gendarmes had arrived with the applicant they had told the personnel that the applicant might try to escape or commit suicide. She noted that the applicant had refused a gynaecological examination until persuaded. The midwife maintained that the applicant had not been ill-treated or harassed by the gendarmes or the personnel and that the gendarmes had not been present during the examination. 34.     On 13 July 1999 statements from Mrs N. A., a nurse, were taken by the gendarmes. She stated that the applicant had initially resisted the medical examination but that the doctor had talked with her and persuaded her. She claimed that no gendarmes had been present in the room during the examination and that the allegations of harassment were ill-founded. 35.     On 28 July 1999 statements from Mrs S. K., a midwife, were taken by the Deputy Health Director. Mrs S. K. affirmed that the applicant had not been forced but persuaded to have a medical examination. She further maintained that no gendarmes had been in the room during her examination. 36.     On 12 August 1999 statements from Mrs F. F. C., a midwife, were taken by the Deputy Health Director. She stated that she had no information regarding the matter at issue because she had not been there on the night of the applicant’s medical examination. 37.     On 13 August 1999 statements from Mr Y. Y. and Mr A. K. were taken by gendarmes in charge of the investigation. Mr Y. Y. stated that he did not know anything about the applicant’s medical examination, since his sole responsibility had been to receive the applicant into detention after she had been medically examined. Mr A. K. affirmed that the applicant had not been forced to undergo a medical exam as alleged. 38.     On 10 September 1999 Major C. V., in his capacity as investigator ( muhakkik ), drafted a recommendation report ( fezleke ) in which he suggested that a decision of non-prosecution should be given in respect of the three gendarmes, as there was no indication that they had abused their authority. In this report it was stated that the applicant had refused to give a statement. 39.     In a letter dated 8 October 1999 then Provincial Gendarmerie Commander informed the investigator, inter alia , that the gendarmes, Mr   A.K., Mr   A.S. and Mr Y.Y., had requested the doctor to perform a gynaecological examination on the applicant without written permission from the prosecutor after she had been interrogated on the ground that she might later raise allegations of rape. 40.     On 8 October 1999 statements from Mr A. K., one of the accused gendarmes, and Mrs H. A. and Mrs B. D., nurses on duty at the hospital on the day of the events, were taken by gendarmes in charge of the investigation. 41.     Mr A.K. stated that the applicant had consented to the medical examination and that none of the gendarmes had been present in the examination room. 42.     Mrs H. A. stated that the applicant had initially resisted having a gynaecological examination but had later consented after being persuaded by the doctor. She affirmed that the gendarmes had not been in the examination room and that she had not seen anyone harassing the applicant. 43.     Mrs B. D. reiterated her earlier statements given to the gendarmes. 44.     On 13 October 1999 Major C. V. drafted another recommendation report, in which he reiterated his previous findings in identical terms, including that the applicant had refused to give a statement. He further considered that, since the Ministry of Justice’s circular requiring written permission of a judge or a public prosecutor was issued on 21   October 1998, after the alleged incident, the gendarmes could not be considered to have abused their duty by sending the applicant for a gynaecological examination without such permission. 45.     On 23 December 1999 Mr A. Y., the doctor who had examined the applicant, gave a statement to the Deputy Health Director. He maintained, in particular, that the applicant knew Turkish and was extremely aggressive. He stated that he had told her that such an examination was necessary according to the official documents (“ gelen evraklara göre ”) and, at the same time, in order to safeguard her rights. He affirmed that only he and female nurses had been present during the medical examination, and that she had been examined ten to fifteen minutes after she had been persuaded. 46.     On an unspecified date Major C. V., the investigator, submitted an additional recommendation report which was almost identical to the previous reports. Once again it noted that there was no statement from the applicant as she had refused to give one. 47.     On 18 January 2000 the Hakkari Administrative Council decided not to authorise the prosecution of the three gendarmes for lack of evidence that they had abused their authority by forcing the applicant to undergo a gynaecological examination. It noted, in particular, that the Ministry of Justice’s circular no. 27/123 concerning, inter alia , vaginal and anal examinations had been published after the alleged events. This decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer Mrs Keskin on 20 February 2000 and on Mr   Kılavuz on 3 April 2000. The applicant’s lawyers did not lodge an objection to this decision as such decisions were automatically referred by law to the Regional Administrative Court. 48.     On 18 April 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court suspended examination of the case file for five years, pursuant to Article 1 § 4 of the Conditional Release, Deferral of Procedure and Punishments Act (no.   4616). D.     Subsequent developments 49.     Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the execution of the applicant’s sentence was suspended by the Van Assize Court on 30   November 2004. 50.     On 2 December 2004 the applicant was released from prison and deported to Germany. 51.     On 29 July 2005 by an additional judgment the Van Assize Court reduced the applicant’s original sentence to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Domestic law and practice 52.     The relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following judgments: Batı and Others v. Turkey (nos.   33097/96 and 57834/00, §§   96 ‑ 100, 3 June 2004), Y.F. v. Turkey , ( no.   24209/94, §§ 23-26, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX), Özel v. Turkey (no.   42739/98, §§   20-21, 7   November 2002), and Gençel v. Turkey (no.   53431/99, §§   11   ‑ 12, 23   October 2003). 53.     Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Journal on 30   June 2004, abolished the State Security Courts. 54.     According to Article 70 of the Medical Practice Act (no.   1219) a medical intervention may only be carried out after the person concerned has given their consent. 55.     Sections 24-31 of Regulation no. 23420 on patients’ rights concerns consent to medical interventions. It stipulates, inter alia , that a medical intervention may only be carried out after the person concerned has given their consent and that the person concerned has the right to be informed of the nature and consequences of a medical intervention before giving his or her consent. B.     Relevant international material 56.     The General Rule stated in Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states as follows: “An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks. The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION 57.     The applicant, first, complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment during her detention. In this respect the applicant stated, particularly, that she had been threatened with death, kept standing for long periods of time and blindfolded. She further claimed that the area of the cell in which she had been detained was six square metres, that there was no ventilation and that the lights were on twenty-four hours a day. Secondly, the applicant claimed that the circumstances in which she had been subjected to a gynaecological examination on 24 October 1997 constituted a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In this connection the applicant claimed that the examination had been performed by a male doctor during which the gendarmes took her clothes off, made her lie down and touched every part of her body and that she had not consented to it. 58.     The applicable Articles of the Convention provide as relevant: Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 8 “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private...life... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government 59.     The Government maintained under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention that the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or, alternatively, for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they argued, firstly, that the applicant had lodged her application before exhausting the remedies provided under criminal and civil law. They further submitted that the applicant should have lodged her application within six months of the date on which the incident occurred. 60.     As regards the merits, the Government maintained that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment were baseless. They noted that the applicant’s gynaecological examination had been conducted with her consent and without the presence of the gendarmes. They stated that this examination pursued the aim of protecting the gendarmes from possible allegations of rape. The Government maintained therefore that this complaint failed to reach the threshold under Article 3 of the Convention. 61.     In addition, under Article 8, the Government repeated that the gynaecological examination of the applicant was conducted in order to avoid possible false accusations of sexual violence against the security forces and that the medical reports prepared after such examinations constituted evidence that could be used to refute defamatory allegations. The Government further noted that the CPT report prepared following its visit to Turkey in 1999 had emphasised the importance of medical examination of detainees as a safeguard against sexual violence and that the latter had urged the national authorities to take the necessary measures with a view to protecting detainees against sexual violence. They considered that the alleged interference with respect to the applicant’s private life in the instant case fell within the State’s margin of appreciation. The Government repeated that the medical examination was conducted with her consent, as attested by witnesses. 2.     The applicant 62.     The applicant disputed the Government’s arguments and reaffirmed her allegations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     Admissibility a)     Alleged forced gynaecological examination 63.     As to the Government’s objections regarding the failure to exhaust remedies under criminal law, the Court reiterates that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached shortly after the lodging of the application, but before the Court is called upon to pronounce on admissibility (see, for example, Sağat, Bayram and Berk v.   Turkey (dec.), no.   8036/02, 6 March 2007, and Yıldırım v. Turkey (dec.), no.   0074/98, 30   March 2006). The Court observes that the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations regarding her forced gynaecological examination were concluded on 18 April 2002, which is before the Court delivered its decision on admissibility. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection under this head. 64.     As regards the Government’s objections regarding the failure to exhaust remedies under civil law, the Court notes that, in the instant case, the applicant filed a petition with the Hakkari public prosecutor’s office requesting the prosecution of both the gendarmes and the doctor who had examined her. The criminal investigation brought against the gendarmes was suspended by the Supreme Administrative Court on 18 April 2002 in accordance with Article 1 of Law no. 4616. No information has been provided by the Government as to the outcome of the investigation as regards the doctor, if any. In these circumstances, the Court dismisses the Government’s argument and finds that the applicant was not required to embark on another attempt to obtain redress by bringing a civil ‑ law action (see,   for example, mutatis mutantis , Akpınar and Altun v.   Turkey , no.   56760/00, §   68, ECHR 2007 ‑ ... (extracts)). 65.     In view of the above considerations and reiterating that the six ‑ month time-limit imposed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires applicants to lodge their applications within six months of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court considers that the application lodged on 16 August 1999 was introduced in conformity with the six-month time-limit provided for in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It also rejects the Government’s objection in this connection. 66.     The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention concerning the alleged forced gynaecological examination she was subjected to on 24   October 1997 is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article   35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. b)     Alleged ill-treatment in detention and the conditions of the applicant’s detention 67.     The Court observes that, without prejudice to the applicant’s complaint above, the documentary evidence submitted by the parties does not substantiate the applicant’s allegation that she was subjected to any kind of ill-treatment with a severity above the Article   3 threshold during her detention. Nor is there any prima facie evidence to support her allegations regarding the conditions in which she had been kept while she was in detention. Therefore, this part of the complaint under Article 3 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35   §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. 2.     Merits 68.     It remains to be determined whether the applicant’s complaints concerning the gynaecological examination disclose a violation of the relevant Articles of the Convention. a)     Relevant principles 69.     As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR   2000-IV). In this connection, it reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Mouisel v. France , no.   67263/01, §   37, ECHR   2002-IX, and Gennadi Naoumenko v. Ukraine , no.   42023/98, §   108, 10   February 2004). 70.     Treatment has been held by the Court to be “inhuman” because, inter alia , it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering (see   Labita, cited above, § 120). Treatment has been considered “degrading” when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance (see Hurtado v.   Switzerland , Commission’s report of 8 July 1993, Series A no. 280, p.   14, §   67), or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience (see, for example, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (“the Greek case”), nos. 3321/67 et al. , Commission’s report of 5 November 1969, Yearbook 12, p.   186, and Keenan v. the United Kingdom , no. 27229/95, § 110, ECHR   2001-III). Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article   3, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article   3 (see Raninen v.   Finland , judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, pp. 2821-22, §   55, and Peers v. Greece , no.   28524/95, §§   68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III). In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be “inhuman” or “degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Labita , cited above, §   120). In this connection, the Court reiterates that it has found the mere fact of being taken to a hospital for a gynaecological examination does not attain the required minimum level of severity within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Devrim Turan v. Turkey , no.   879/02, §   21, 2   March 2006). 71.     With respect to medical interventions to which a detained person is subjected against his or her will, Article 3 of the Convention imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by providing them with the requisite medical assistance. The persons concerned nevertheless remain under the protection of Article 3, whose requirements permit no derogation (see   Mouisel , cited above, § 40, and Gennadi Naoumenko , cited above, §   112). A measure which is therapeutically necessary from the point of view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading (see, in particular, Herczegfalvy v.   Austria , judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 244, pp. 25-26, §   82, and Gennadi   Naoumenko , cited above, § 112).The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that a medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist and that procedural guarantees for the intervention, for example to force ‑ feed, exist and are complied with (see Nevmerzhitsky v.   Ukraine , no.   54825/00, §   94, 5   April 2005). Where a measure falls short of Article 3 treatment, it may, however, fall foul of Article 8 of the Convention, which, inter alia , provides protection of physical and moral integrity under the respect of private life head (see, for example, Wainwright v. the United Kingdom , no.   12350/04, §   43, ECHR 2006 ‑ ...). In this connection, the Court reiterates that a decision imposing a medical intervention in defiance of the subject’s will would give rise to an interference with respect for his or her private life, and in particular his or her right to physical integrity (see, mutatis mutandis , Glass v. the United Kingdom , no. 61827/00, §   70, ECHR 2004 ‑ II, Pretty v. the United Kingdom , no.   2346/02, §§   61 and 63, ECHR 2002-III, and Y.F. v. Turkey , cited above, §   33). 72.     Even where it is not motivated by reasons of medical necessity, Articles   3 and 8 of the Convention does not as such prohibit recourse to a medical procedure in defiance of the will of a suspect in order to obtain from him or her evidence of his or her involvement in the commission of a criminal offence. However, any recourse to a forcible medical intervention in order to obtain evidence of a crime must be convincingly justified on the facts of a particular case and the manner in which a person is subjected to a forcible medical procedure must not exceed the minimum level of severity prescribed by the Court’s case-law under Article 3 of the Convention (see   Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, §§   70-71, ECHR 2006 ‑ ...). 73.     Finally, it must be reiterated that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence (see, in particular, Tanrıkulu and Others   v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45907/99, 22   October 2002). To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita , cited above, §   121). b)     Application of those principles to the present case 74.     In the instant case there is no dispute that the applicant had a gynaecological examination on 24 October 1997. The parties disagree on the manner the examination was conducted and whether the applicant had consented to it. 75.     At the outset the Court finds the applicant’s allegations as regards the forced nature of the gynaecological examination unsubstantiated. The Court finds no prima facie evidence to support the applicant’s version of facts regarding the manner in which she was examined (see paragraph 57 above). Nor does the Court find, on the material before it, that in carrying out the examination the authorities overrode the decision of the applicant to refuse it. In this regard it notes that, in similar cases lodged against Turkey , where a person had refused to be examined the doctors had not in fact carried out any gynaecological examination (see, for example, Devrim Turan v. Turkey , cited above, Özalp v. Turkey (dec.), no.   74300/01, 11   October 2007, and Sız v. Turkey (dec.), no. 895/02, 26   May 2005). For that reason, the Court finds that the facts of the case do not disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 76.     On the other hand, the Court finds it established that the applicant had resisted a gynaecological examination until persuaded to agree to it. It also accepts that, in certain circumstances, a person in detention cannot be expected to continue to resist submitting to a gynaecological examination, given her vulnerability at the hands of the authorities, who exercise complete control over her throughout her detention see Y. F. v Turkey , cited above, § 34). Whether this is the case will depend on the particular facts, including the alleged victim’s personal circumstances and the context in which the examination is carried out. The Court considers that, as in the Y.F. v. Turkey case itself, this issue is more appropriately addressed in the present case under Article 8 of the Convention and in the light of the Court’s settled case-law, according to which any medical intervention against the subject’s will, or without the free, informed and express consent of the subject, constitutes an interference with his or her private life (see, for example, Glass , cited above, § 82). Such an interference will give rise to a breach of Article 8, unless it can be justified in terms of the second paragraph, namely as being “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for one or more of the legitimate aims listed therein. According to settled case-law, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Wainwright, cited above, §   43). 77.     The Court notes that in the instant case the applicant was detained incommunicado for at least nine days prior to the impugned medical intervention and that at the time of the examination, she appeared to be in a particularly vulnerable mental state (see paragraph   9). It is not suggested that there was any medical reason for such an examination or that it was carried out in response to a complaint of sexual assault lodged by the applicant. Nor is it suggested that the applicant herself requested such an examination; on the contrary, as noted above, the applicant resisted such an examination until she was persuaded by Dr A.Y. (see paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 42 and 45). It is unclear from the material before the Court whether the applicant was adequately informed of the nature and the reasons for this examination. Moreover, in light of Dr A.Y.’s reference to the necessity of the examination with respect to official documents (see paragraph 45), the Court considers that the applicant might have been misled into believing that the examination was compulsory. When account is taken of all the facts above, it cannot be concluded with certainty that any consent given by the applicant was free and informed. The Court, therefore, considers that the imposition of a gynaecological examination on the applicant, in such circumstances, gave rise to an interference with her right to respect for her private life, and in particular her right to physical integrity (see, mutatis mutandis , Glass , cited above, §   70). 78.     As regards the question whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”, the Court reiterates that this expression requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him, and be compatible with the rule of law (see, for instance, Narinen v. Finland , no. 45027/98, § 34, 1 June 2004). The latter implies that there must be a measure of protection in national law against arbitrary interferences with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 of Article   8. If a law confers a discretion on a public authority, it must indicate the scope of that discretion, although the degree of precision required will depend upon the particular subject matter (see Herczegfalvy v. Austria , cited above, §   89). 79.     The Court reiterates that in the above-mentioned Y.F. case, the Court found that the gynaecological examination of a female detainee, at the material time, was not in accordance with the law. The Court finds no particular circumstances in the instant case which would require it to depart from its findings in that case. Under Turkish law, any interference with a person’s physical integrity is prohibited except in the event of medical necessity and in circumstances defined by law. In the instant case, the Government have not presented any arguments to the effect that the interference at issue was based on and in compliance with any statutory or other legal rule. I